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Abstract 
In June 2011, PREVENT, as part of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST, was 
reformatted around the notion of ‘risk’. Despite this, there is a paucity of empirical enquiry 
which has examined the relationship between PREVENT and risk. The objective of this thesis 
is to analyse PREVENT policing, in terms of how risk is understood, as well as how PREVENT 
police operations are delivered, perceived and experienced by those tasked with counter-
terrorism. This thesis is a single-embedded case study in a geographical area defined by 
government funding structure as ‘low risk’. Through conducting qualitative interviews with 
PREVENT police officers and individuals drawn from security disciplines and interconnecting 
institutions, three key themes were identified. First, risk was understood to be interrelated with 
the concept of trust. Specifically, there was an emphasis on increasing trust with both internal 
and external partners given that PREVENT is now deployed through a multi-agency approach. 
Second, PREVENT was conceptualised as “safeguarding” rather than counter-terrorism, 
counter-radicalisation and/or de-radicalisation. Third, risk was linked to the notion of “gut 
feeling” at the referral (identification) stage of counter-radicalisation in the absence of 
radicalisation knowledge. As well as the fieldwork data which are empirically driven, a second 
objective of this thesis is to use a theoretical framework of Foucault’s concept of ‘dispositif’, 
emanating from analyses of governmentality, as well as ‘reflexive’ risk, in line with the works 
of Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens’ ‘risk society’, as measured against the interview data. 
Drawing attention to the effects of both risk positions at local level, this thesis argues that 
PREVENT policing cannot be reduced to a single factor risk perspective. Moreover, this thesis 
provides a more nuanced account of counter-terrorism through risk by illuminating the 
messiness, complexity and empirical reality of PREVENT policing on the ground.  
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1.1 Introduction  
 
Over the last decade, the organisation and principal methodologies of counter‐terrorism2 work 
have undergone significant reform. In the UK, much of this innovation has taken place under 
the auspices of the PREVENT3 programme (Innes et al., 2011: 16). Prior to the attacks on the 
London transport system in 2005, PREVENT had been the least developed of the four 
CONTEST strands4 but, for one commentator, ‘over the course of the following five years, 
PREVENT became the world’s most extensive counter-radicalisation policy’ (Burke, 2006, as 
cited in Thomas, 2012).         
 Since its inception (and in its most recent formulation), the key task of  PREVENT has 
been explicitly and specifically concerned with stopping radicalisation, discouraging people 
from becoming terrorists5 and challenging extremist ideologies which can be made to justify 
terrorism (HM Government, 2011b: 25, [Figure 6.7]). In Home Office policy, radicalisation is 
defined as the ‘processes whereby certain experiences and events in a person’s life cause them 
to become radicalised, to the extent of turning to violence to resolve perceived grievances’6 
(HM Government, 2006: 1, 9; HM Government, 2011b). Thus, the organising logic of 
PREVENT is the interconnections between ‘knowledges’ about radicalisation and the 
practice(s) of ‘preventative’ security (Heath-Kelly, 2012). Theoretically, this modelling allows 
security agents to identify where individuals exist on a progression towards radicalisation, and 
more importantly, what particular traits or characteristics are common, or even necessary, 
within these stages of advancement (Martin, 2014a: 191).7      
       PREVENT has also been the recipient of 
increasing academic attention mirroring the increased funding it has received within the 
broader milieu of the UK’s CT interventions. 8  Related to this aspect, there has been a 
burgeoning academic literature which, rooted in positivistic epistemology, has focussed on 
testing the validity of isolated variables in terms of the potential of individuals to be 
                                                          
2 CT hereafter. 
3 In academia and government policy, ‘PREVENT’ and ‘Prevent’ are used synonymously. Throughout this thesis, 
I have used ‘PREVENT’ for coherence and to clearly separate the strategy from the verb.   
4 PURSUE, PROTECT and PREPARE make up the further three pillars of CONTEST. 
5 HM Government (2009a: 56, reprinted from the National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, Cabinet 
Office, 2008b: 44); see also HM Government (2006: 1 and 2011b).  
6 Whilst the term ‘radicalisation’ has become central to CT policy-making in the UK, as Kundnani (2012) points 
out, the concept of radicalisation is by no means as solid and clear as many seem to take for granted: hence drawing 
upon the UK Home Office definition within the present study.   
7 See Sageman (2004, 2008); Wiktorowicz (2005), for important examples of such approaches. 
8 The UK security environment is also driven by the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Risk 
Register (NRR). 
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‘radicalised’ (Martin, 2014a: 191; see also King and Taylor, 2011; Horgan, 2008). Like 
radicalisation, a precise definition of PREVENT has thus far alluded the criminological gaze, 
however PREVENT has been broadly defined as ‘a multi‐disciplinary, cross departmental 
strand of the government’s CONTEST strategy intended to provide a holistic response to the 
full spectrum of terrorist risks and threats’ (Innes et al., 2011: 11). 
 
1.2 PREVENT: Reform through Risk 
 
With its aims to combat terrorism through local social programmes, the PREVENT policy9 has 
provided a new inward focus to British CT strategy (Rikabi, 2013: 25). Nevertheless, 
PREVENT has been criticised on numerous fronts since its formal introduction in 2008 leading 
to high profile reform. Notable criticism came from the Communities and Local Government 
Committee report,10 which concluded: the single focus on Muslims has been counterproductive 
to the aims of PREVENT; a required refocus of PREVENT to address a broader range of 
extremism across all communities; and suggested the need for a more comprehensive and 
effective assessment of risk (Aly et al., 2014: 369). Subsequently, in June 2011, PREVENT 
was (re)conceptualised upon the notion of ‘risk’. It is now accepted that the PREVENT strategy 
is presented as acting upon the risk of terrorism and is understood to address ‘radicalisation’ in 
the face of the ‘greatest risk to our security’ (HM Government, 2011b: 59, emphasis added). It 
is posited that the greatest risk to the UK remains al Qaeda-related 11  terrorism and the 
‘extremist ideas’ that ‘terrorist ideologies’ draw upon (HM Government, 2011b: 59, 6). 
However, in its revised version, PREVENT concentrates on all types of extremism,12 including 
right- and left-wing extremist ideologies.    The PREVENT review in 
June 2011 also significantly altered the size and approach of PREVENT. In a determined effort 
to distance prioritising PREVENT activity based on population demographics 13  (HM 
                                                          
9 Throughout the present study I use the terms PREVENT ‘policy’ and PREVENT ‘strategy’ interchangeably to 
refer to HM Government (2011b).   
10 See House of Commons (2010).   
11 AQ hereafter.  
12  Much like the concept of radicalisation, ‘extremism’ has become a nebulous term with many different 
interpretations and definitions. This has resulted in a polarised debate about what the term ‘extremism’ constitutes 
(Awan and Blakemore, 2013). In this instance, I have drawn upon the official UK government definition. 
Extremism is defined in the PREVENT strategy as, ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, 
including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and 
beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether 
in this country or overseas’ (HM Government, 2011b: 107). 
13 Pre- 2011, PREVENT ‘priority areas’ were selected according to Muslim population density (see Kundnani, 
2009).  
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Government, 2011: 11), the allocation of resources are now said to be proportionate to threat 
levels across the UK (HM Government, 2011b: 6). Consequently, PREVENT funding is 
restricted to 25 priority areas on an ‘intelligence-led basis’. Furthermore, as of 2014, 11 priority 
areas have been added, 5 of which are considered ‘supported areas’. Thus, the majority of 
PREVENT effort is now centred on risk ‘hotspots’ which are assessed against the threat of 
radicalisation and/or extremism.    In essence, through a portrayal of 
radicalisation as a linear progression of subjectivity towards violence, the concept behind 
PREVENT renders governable those considered to be ‘at risk’ (see Heath-Kelly, 2012; de 
Goede and Simon, 2013; Martin, 2014b). Emphasis is placed on the creation of successful 
identification mechanisms and it sees success in terms of their predictive power (Martin, 2014: 
191). As the PREVENT strategy outlines, PREVENT is a national strategy for countering 
terrorist ideology and religious radicalisation. It comprises interventions for ‘at risk’ 
individuals and other community-based strategies for countering extremism (HM Government, 
2011b). Thus, understanding (and indeed preventing) forms of radicalisation might be seen as 
cohesive project of risk knowledge which is deployed to render terrorism pre-emptively 
governable (Heath-Kelly, 2012: 2). 
 
1.3 Statement of the Problem: On PREVENT 
 
The existence of a risk-driven framework within UK CT most certainly should make us think 
carefully about how to frame, formulate, present and practically implement prevention policies. 
Yet, there are significant empirical and policy oversights that remain unanswered. First, 
PREVENT targets the potential future terrorist and thus the object of PREVENT’s desire is 
that which is categorically unknowable 14  (Martin, 2014b: 1-2, emphasis added). The 
importance accorded to the police’s role in this newly realised anticipatory logic is evident 
throughout CONTEST II and the revised PREVENT strategy. Although the PREVENT 
strategy makes clear, ‘[PREVENT] is not a police programme and it must not become one’ 
(HM Government, 2011b: 9), police authority members now demonstrate a high level of 
involvement in PREVENT.15 Furthermore, the establishment of an overt policing element 
designed to engage with communities and key partners to address the risks which may lead 
individuals to engage in terrorist activity remains a key pillar of PREVENT (HM Government, 
                                                          
14 A key aim of PREVENT is to reduce the potential of terrorist violence before the threat has even crystallised 
within the mind of the perpetrator (Martin, 2014a).  
15 See inter alia HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Audit Commission (2008).  
17 
 
2011b). However, despite a wealth of literature on PREVENT and the concept of radicalisation 
more generally, as Spalek (2014: 831) points out, ‘there is little substantive research about how 
individuals engaged in CT initiatives, whether police officers or other professionals, negotiate 
this challenging terrain’. This dearth has been exacerbated by the fact that numerous 
commentaries and policy‐level analyses of PREVENT have specifically focused on Islam as 
linked to the concept of ‘suspect community’. Alas, this has been at the expense of 
systematically gathering evidence about how PREVENT interventions are being delivered, 
perceived and experienced by those tasked with counter-radicalisation on the ground.16   
           Second, 
despite PREVENT being re-modelled around the concept of it risk in its reformatted version, 
qualitative (in-depth) analyses of PREVENT through a lens of risk are particularly shallow. 
Moreover, research which has examined PREVENT (and specifically the police’s role) in areas 
defined by government funding structure as ‘low risk’17 is completely absent. In a similar way 
that PREVENT (as a policy) suffered from a fallacy of centring activity on certain communities 
pre-2011 revision, empirical research has followed suit. Whilst PREVENT has been critiqued 
from numerous angles,18 most, if not all, have specifically focused on areas with a high Black 
and Minority Ethnic (BME) population density. Paradoxically, such research risks perpetuating 
exactly the sort of broad-brush ‘essentialising’ that it criticises (Thomas, 2012). The 
aforementioned theoretical lacunas are astonishing when you consider the depth and scope of 
research that has been conducted around PREVENT since its inception.   
     Such academic oversight is also mirrored in government 
policy and the legislative frameworks associated with PREVENT. For instance, a keyword 
search of the PREVENT strategy identifies 42 matches for the words 
‘priority(ies)/prioritised/prioritisation’. However, the PREVENT strategy in its revised form 
fails to provide any operational information regarding low risk, non-priority funded areas (see 
HM Government, 2011b). Whilst it is accepted that the PREVENT policy has been written 
with prioritisation in mind, this omission contradicts radicalisation as a non-exceptional 
phenomenon, of which the PREVENT strategy advocates. 
   
                                                          
16 With notable exceptions, see Innes et al. (2011) and Fussey (2013). 
17 To the best of my knowledge, there are no empirical-based studies which have provided an in-depth examination 
of PREVENT in areas outside of London, Leeds, Manchester, Birmingham and Cardiff.  
18 See, for example, Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010); Spalek and Lambert (2008); Spalek (2009a and b); 
Spalek et al. (2010); Thomas (2010, 2014).  
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1.3.1 Reading the Thesis 
         
Having briefly outlined the concept behind PREVENT and highlighted some current empirical 
and policy dearths, this is an opportune moment to provide clarity on how this thesis should 
and should not be read. The present research is a single-embedded case study which relies on 
qualitative (in-depth) semi-structured interviews with PREVENT police officers and 
individuals drawn from intelligence and security disciplines in an area defined by government 
funding structure as ‘non-priority/low risk’. The choice of case study site was driven by theory 
and policy relevance. Of note, the present research adopts an idiographic position by accepting 
that the findings are potentially unique to the case study. This is in keeping with the ontology 
and epistemology of social constructivism, which structures the critique.    
         In total 21 semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with 14 participants over the course of 14 months. The PREVENT 
team consisted of a PREVENT Lead; a PREVENT Sergeant; a PREVENT Police Officer and 
a CHANNEL Officer. However, in order to contextualise the multi-agency arrangements of 
PREVENT, further interviews were conducted with various professionals drawn from law 
enforcement, intelligence disciplines, local authorities and inter-organisational roles; some 
with extensive experience and knowledge of PREVENT. This included a PREVENT Sergeant 
from a different police force; neighbourhood police officers; a Youth Offending Team Case 
Manager; a Supported Housing Officer; a Local Housing Officer; a Community Safety Officer; 
a Community Engagement Officer; and a CHANNEL Intervention Provider. The data derived 
from the PREVENT police team serves as the main unit of analysis for the thesis, whereas the 
data afforded by participants from interrelated CT roles should be read as an embedded unit of 
analysis (Yin, 2012) within a single-embedded case study. The embedded unit of analysis is 
used to support or challenge the intensive qualitative data obtained from the PREVENT team, 
as reflected upon in the research findings.       
 As an important caveat, this thesis departs from existing analyses of risk and suspect 
communities within British CT. Rather, it follows a path similar to research by Heath-Kelly 
(2013: 3) by focusing on the ‘‘hows’ and ‘whys’ that require examination relative to the 
incorporation of risk-based models within UK CT’. Specifically, this thesis provides 
perspective on how risk is deployed and understood from the insight afforded by practitioners 
tasked with counter-radicalisation. Since the present study does not analyse PREVENT 
19 
 
policing19 from a local community perspective (ultimately, the focus is upon issues of ‘how’ 
rather than ‘whom’), many might view the axiology20 underpinning the research as somewhat 
dispassionate. However, not only have community perspectives of PREVENT been covered 
elsewhere, but removing emotion from research should not be viewed with negativity or 
distain.          
 This thesis does not reject the imposition of any a priori theoretical frameworks or 
‘theory direction’ (Grbich, 2013) at the outset, but contains several study propositions, thus 
coinciding with deductive reasoning (Yin, 2009). Yin (2009) defines study propositions as ‘the 
hypotheses that the researcher is looking to test through data collection and analysis’. The 
insight of those tasked with counter-radicalisation provides a sufficient blueprint to examine 
the theoretical propositions of dispositif risk, emanating from Foucauldian analyses of 
‘governmentality’, and reflexive risk, in line with the oeuvre of Beck and Giddens’ theory of a 
‘risk society’. Both risk positions are tested empirically at local level rather than against 
exceptional frameworks, as has thus far been the case within the context of the war on terror. 
However, these study propositions were ignored temporarily to allow the fieldwork to ‘tell its 
own story, in its own way’ (Yin, 2012: 124). Subsequently, this permitted the development of 
categories and eventually “meaning” based on the experiences and accounts of the PREVENT 
practitioners and not on preconceptions (Yin, 2014: 124). Moreover, ‘bottom-up’ reasoning (at 
the fieldwork stage) avoided prematurely closing off possible areas of enquiry (Bryman, 1988). 
The following section outlines the study propositions that structure the theoretical framework 
of the thesis.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3.2 Theory Direction 
 
In academic circles, risk has become a major topic of concern within criminology in order to  
                                                          
19 PP hereafter.  
20 ‘Axiology’ concerns the role of values and beliefs the researcher brings to research (Robson, 2002). 
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explain terrorism with ‘governmentality’ 21  and ‘risk society’ perspectives being at the 
vanguard (Mythen and Walklate, 2005: 381). With regard to the former, Foucauldian analyses 
focus on how risk management technologies manage populations through abstract factors, 
noted in an early analysis by Robert Castel in 1991 before the recent renaissance of risk in post-
structuralist studies of security (Heath-Kelly, 2012: 395). This growing critical body of 
scholarship has re-appropriated risk from Beck ‘to engage with the practices that are enacted 
in the name of managing risk and uncertainty’ (Amoore and de Goede, 2008a: 9). Scholars 
whom heed this charge argue that Beck’s narrative of risks as ideological attempts to “feign 
control” as produced by modernity do not travel well to current practices and technologies of 
risk in the current war on terror (see Aradau and van Munster, 2007).22 Rather, it is posited that 
the identification of risk is not the same as recognising the uncertainty of future events (Aradau 
et al., 2008: 150). Characteristic for most of this literature is that it constructs a concept of risk 
dispositif23  that works as a yardstick for comparing current risk practices and discourses 
(Peterson, 2012: 702). This ‘risk dispositif’ designates certain practices and discursive 
elements as fundamental to the modern understanding of risk24 (Peterson, 2012: 702) -  for 
example, calculability and present control of future uncertainties,25 thus ‘making visible’ the 
unknown ‘which would not otherwise be seen’ (Amoore and de Goede, 2008a).  
      Interestingly, in providing exegeses of Foucault’s 
original genealogy of the dispositif, scholars have described risk involving a permanent 
adjustment of traditional forms of risk management in light of the double infinity of 
catastrophic consequences and the incalculability of the risk of terrorism (Aradau and van 
Munster, 2007: 5). What is new is not so much the advent of a risk society as the emergence of 
a security politics marked by a precautionary or pre-emptive relationship to futurity that is quite 
different from templates of prevention.26 Foremost, it is argued the limit of knowledge and 
catastrophe mobilised in the precautionary dispositif introduces decisionistic politics as a form 
of governmentality of the future (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 34).    
                                                          
21 In its most simple form, ‘governmentality’ may be seen as governmental practice that provides a discursive 
field of power/knowledge through which governmental problems are articulated and techniques of governance 
are rendered “thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom (they are) practiced” 
(Burchell et al., 1991: 3). 
22 Cf., Amoore and de Goede (2005). 
23 This approach takes its starting point as the conceptualisation of risk as a dispositif i.e. a heterogeneous 
assemblage of discursive and material elements for governing social problems (Aradau and van Munster, 2008b: 
24).  
24 See, for example, Lobo-Guerrero (2008); Muller (2008); Salter (2008).  
25 See Foucault (1977, 2007). 
26 See, for example, Anderson (2010a); Aradau and van Munster (2007); Stern and Wiener (2006).  
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      As well as the exponential growth of post-
structuralist analyses of security, recent criminological work of a critical nature that has 
embraced a concern with risk more generally (as opposed to terrorism in particular), has sought 
to extract elements of Ulrich Beck’s work, rather than adhering to the risk society thesis in its 
primary form (Mythen and Walklate, 2005: 382). It is suggested Beck’s work on reflexive 
modernisation can be thought of as a ‘politics of risk’, which governs the phenomenon of social 
engagement as a form of technologies of risk management. Like Beck, Rasmussen (2001, 
2004) and Coker (2002a and b) argue how reflexivity (a concept taken from Beck) has come 
to describe the post-9/11 world; a world in which ‘there is no one to give authoritative answers’, 
and a world that ‘ceases to be modern and becomes reflexive about its own modernity’ 
(Rasmussen, 2004: 386). The analytical aim of this approach is to describe the transition from 
one form of governance27 to another in order to understand the conditions of risk management 
as opposed to (as in critical risk studies) revealing the power structures implied in the everyday 
practices of risk (Petersen, 2012: 703).        
   The parameters of both perspectives of risk have raised a number of 
points of departure regarding the formulation of a critical stance in the war on terror (Aradau 
and van Munster, 2007: 34). However, the current literature also testifies to a distinct lack of 
empirical application at local level, as opposed to more exceptional frameworks.28 As Charlotte 
Heath-Kelly (2012: 3, adapted by the present author) observes, ‘given the focus upon risk 
within the war on terror, it is surprising that the operations of PREVENT have not been 
analysed from a risk perspective’.29 The present research explores the extent to which the 
experiences and accounts of those tasked with counter-radicalisation contribute to an 
understanding of PP as measured against the aforementioned risk positions. The concern of the 
chapter now turns towards justifying the study propositions by situating the present study as an 
academic endeavour.  
                                                          
27  ‘Governance’ tends to be defined by pluralistic and decentralised decision-making structures whilst 
‘government’ is associated with the constitutional powers of a centralised sovereign state authority.  
28 For instance, the concept of dispositif has been applied to: the indefinite detention (Butler, 2006; Ericson, 2008) 
extraordinary rendition (Mutimer, 2007) and targeted killing of suspected terrorists (Kessler and Werner, 2008; 
Leander 2011); the widespread biometric monitoring of increasingly mobile populations (Amoore, 2009, 2008; 
Muller, 2010); the pre-emptive detention of refugees and asylum seekers (Isin and Rygiel, 2007; Weber, 2007); 
the pre-emptive freezing of monies and assets suspected of terrorist ties (de Goede, 2011, 2012); and the so-called 
“Bush Doctrine” of pre-emptive war (Ehrenberg et al., 2010; Stern and Wiener, 2006; Weber, 2007b). Moreover, 
the literature on dispositif precautionary risk has focused primarily on ‘high level’, executive responses, such as 
control orders/Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measure (TPIMs) (McCulloch and Pickering, 2009b; 
Zedner, 2009) as well as on crimes of association and preparatory offences (Pickering et al., 2008). 
29 Some notable exceptions have made sound theoretical contributions in this area, if not directly related to 
PREVENT. For instance, Mythen et al’s. (2009) examination of the production of British Muslims as ‘risky’ 
communities in the post-9/11 era and the social consequences of this; see also Pantazis and Pemberton (2009).  
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1.3.3 Statement of the Problem: On Risk 
 
‘[On risk] we have a range of approaches and perspectives rather than an all-embracing theory. It is 
even questionable whether such a theory would be helpful. We might be better off with a range of 
competing approaches which allow consideration of the sometimes contradictory aspects of risk 
phenomena, and support ongoing discussion. The central idea is to use a range of different approaches 
to describe, understand, or explain social phenomena. The observable similarities and differences then 
produce a “crystal” of perspectives which would lead to further insights’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2003, as 
cited in Zinn, 2008: 200). 
 
The risk positions outlined above (albeit briefly) testify to the fact that risk studies are not a 
coherent discipline, but rather a pluralistic debate on the status of the concept of risk (e.g. 
analytical or descriptive/constituting; measurable/non-measurable). Importantly, when 
discussing the ontological merit of ‘risk’, Mythen and Walklate (2005) articulate that a degree 
of theoretical camp sitting has led to something of a critical impasse on the relative merits of 
each risk position. Many Foucauldians have resolutely upheld a position as relativist as the risk 
society is realist, thus pitching up ‘either side of the river of risk’ (Mythen and Walklate, 2005: 
394). Consequently, these predefined concepts of risk become like ‘frameworks for analysis’ 
or categories that are prescriptive for any possible envisioning of politics and change. 
Subsequently, it is arguable that research has erred towards analytic under appreciation, 
particularly with regard to explaining CT through risk.    
 Through an appreciation of both theories as structurally related through the logic of 
(concepts within) their functioning, this thesis recognises the diversity in conceptual 
understandings of risk by exploring the degree to which their liaison might not simply be 
marked by immanent contradiction(s).30 However, this thesis does not claim to conveniently 
merge both risk theories as sociological bedfellows. The objective of the thesis is not one of 
trying to force these very different perspectives into a harmonious theoretical cocoon. Rather, 
the aim is to avoid privileging one discourse on risk and perhaps suggest an alternative way: to 
search for potential and possibility and to go beyond philosophical criticism by enlarging our 
horizons to the existence of different yet co-habitual concepts within risk itself. Ultimately, this 
thesis posits that instead of the binary logic of governmentality theories of risk and the risk 
society position, there is perhaps a need for a more complex understanding of the unfolding 
                                                          
30 See Aradau (2004) for a similar approach, if not directly related to PREVENT.  
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relationship between the two - this without the imperative to situate the argument within meta-
theoretical claims. 
 
1.3.4 Situating the Thesis 
 
O’Malley (2004b) argues that risk has been understood either as a unifying or uniform concept, 
or indeed, taken to imply both. Moreover, as Walklate and Mythen (2011: 102) point out, such 
presumptions deny not only the potential of differential understandings of risk, they also deny 
diverse experiences of risk. In line with both theoretical assertions, the idea to undertake a 
thesis as an epistemological approach emerging from an analysis of the risk literature was borne 
out of a review for my Master of Research (MRes) degree. The review discovered that literature 
on risk which attempted to ‘labour at the interface’ (Mythen and Walklate, 2005) was 
particularly sparse leaving risk, as a theoretical position, partially underdeveloped in social 
science(s) - this despite the huge literature on risk available across the entire spectrum of 
various disciplines.          Many 
writings on risk implicitly adopt a particular definitional view that is oblivious either to the 
philosophical debate or to other disciplinary perspectives (Althaus, 2005: 568). As one (if 
indeed obvious) example, Beck moves directly into a variety of aesthetic and affective 
representations which he contrasts to a single, rationalistic “determinate judgement” (Tulloch, 
2007: 153). In so being, there is a certain sense in the risk literature that as risk consciousness 
permeates all aspects of social existence, other rationalities and technologies of government 
have become archaic or subordinate (O’Malley, 2000: 460). Two observations should be 
immediately observed. First, it is arguable that there is a fundamental lack of attention given to 
theories which point to different discursive representations of meaning and risk amelioration 
within the deterministic rationality of risk thinking (Tulloch, 2007: 153). Second, this focus 
readily gives rise to a sense – albeit implicit – that other technologies of governance are in 
retreat before the inexorable advance of risk itself. Following guidance outlined by Jessop et 
al. (2008; see also Mythen and Walklate, 2005), this thesis can be situated as a reflexive 
investigation of the interconnections among the aforementioned dimensions of risk – that is, 
‘the mutually constitutive relations among their respective structuring principles and the 
specific practices associated with each of the latter’ (Jessop et al., 2008: 393).  
 
1.4 Research Aims 
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The objective of this research is to document how PP is understood and applied at local level 
using a critical lens of risk. It is hoped that the inclusion of the views of practitioners in this 
arena will: (1) enhance dialogue, and; (2) contribute to a more informative understanding of 
PP as linked to risk. Additionally, this thesis critically considers the implications and domain 
conjecture(s) of ‘dispositif’ risk and the notion of ‘reflexive’ risk (or reflexivity) as applied to 
PP. In doing so, further objectives of this thesis are: (1) to interpret and to use PP as a vantage 
point from which to read the way in which risk can be seen as interwoven in ways not made 
evident by current theoretical articulation; (2) to develop risk as a conceptual framework for 
CT practices by moving beyond a single theoretical position; and (3) to question whether a 
focus upon reflexive risk and dispositif risk helps to construct a more proportionate account of 
the realities of PP that better link policy and practice.   
 
1.5 Research Questions 
 
In relation to the research aims, the following research questions are analysed: 
 
1. How is risk understood by PREVENT police officers in a ‘non-priority’ 
funded/low risk area?  
 
2. How is PREVENT understood operationally by PREVENT police officers at 
local (low risk) level? 
 
In contrast to the study propositions (outlined in section 1.5.1), the research questions are 
empirically driven thus coinciding with a ‘bottom-up’ data-to-theory framework (Lander and 
Sheldrake, 2010). Justifications for adopting this approach, in contrast to, for example, template 
analysis, stem from the current state of literature on PREVENT which has so far largely evaded 
examining PREVENT from the perspective(s) of those tasked with delivering counter-
radicalisation on the ground. Summing the situation up more generally, Bigo (2000: 98) states, 
‘analyses of security ... are too inattentive to the security practices of security professionals and 
they are thus “the product of secondary rationalisations that reduce security or identity to natural 
objects”’. Further, whilst not directly applying such observations towards PREVENT, Mythen 
(2014: 179) posits, ‘we need to embrace rather than shy away from ambiguity and to observe 
rather than conceal grey areas’. In line with both observations, PP might be considered a grey 
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area given the dearth in research which has explored PREVENT through the insights of 
PREVENT practitioners. Thus, in the context of the present study, it was important to avoid 
‘ring-fencing’ participants’ views via a rigid methodological framework: hence, adopting 
empirical and largely practically driven research questions.      
 
1.5.1 Study Propositions 
 
In contrast to ‘bottom-up’ data-to-theory research questions, the present study also contains 
several study positions. However, it is important to note that the study propositions were 
ignored at the fieldwork stage to allow the data to ‘tell its own story, in its own way’ (Yin, 
2012: 124). The study propositions were then applied at the data analysis stage in order to 
develop theories and concepts appropriate to the empirical data. Subsequently, this allowed for 
comparisons between current literature and fieldwork data. The study propositions are: 
 
 To what degree does dispositif risk, in less than exceptional terms, help to 
construct a more proportionate account of PREVENT policing as a form of 
social control?  
 It is possible to integrate reflexive risk and reflexivity into explanations of 
PREVENT policing, CT practice and social control? 
 To what extent are the above risk theories interrelated within PREVENT 
policing?  
 
The inclusion of study propositions within the present study coincide with significant lacunas 
within the literature. Amoore and de Goede (2008c: 13) posit, ‘the deployment of risk in the 
war on terror invites us to think about the complex new interplays of public private, 
governmentality and sovereignty biopolitics and geographics’. In relation to this observation, 
whilst many studies have been inspired by a Foucauldian disciplinary analytical framework in 
the context of the war on terror, as McKee (2009) points out, there has been a preference to 
‘disregard the messy empirical actualities’ which results in a ‘fundamental inability to account 
for why the governance subject, constituted through discourse, fails to turn up in practice’. 
Further, in the context of PREVENT, chorusing McKee, O’Toole et al. (2015) argue, ‘many 
studies of PREVENT have focused on its discursive underpinnings through textual analysis of 
policy documents’. O’Toole et al. (2015) further add, ‘we suggest there has been a neglect 
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within the literature on PREVENT of material practices of governing’. Importantly, this 
“discursive” reading of governmentality i.e. concentrating on rationales of governing as 
manifest in key (government) documents rather than the specific and concrete ‘art of governing’ 
(Stenson, 2005: 266), contradicts Foucault’s epistemological position. Whilst Foucault’s 
writings are textually based and historical, he argues for, ‘a way that is more empirical, more 
directly related to our present situation and one that implies more relations between theory and 
practice’ (Foucault, 2003b). Likewise, Beck’s work has been generously applied in the context 
of the war on terror; however, such research similarly suffers from a paucity of empirical 
enquiry. Thus, through the inclusion of specific study propositions, this thesis enumerates the 
interplay between each risk position and their effects at local level. Ultimately, this overcomes 
the narrow focus on ‘text-as-evidence’ (McKee, 2009: 19) by illuminating the messiness and 
complexity of empirical reality - an endeavour that hinders post-structuralist analyses of 
security given an arguable disconnection from the “real”.31  
   
1.6 Thesis Organisation 
         
This thesis is organised into two parts. Part I (chapters 2-4) provides a review of the existing 
literature. Chapter 2: CONTEST, PREVENT and Domestic (UK) Counter-terrorism Policy 
provides an in-depth discussion of the PREVENT programme, CONTEST, and engages with 
a number of key moments when existing CT policy approaches were reassessed and calibrated 
post- 9/11. To begin, the chapter provides a synoptic perspective on discourses and practices 
of CT law with a particular focus upon CONTEST and CONTEST II. The chapter also provides 
perspective on PREVENT funding; the development of PP; and the downwards defluxion of 
CT responsibilities towards community level. Following this, the concern of the chapter turns 
towards exploring how ‘radicalisation’ has been made possible as a discourse - one that enables 
the performance of security around it (Heath-Kelly, 2013: 5). Moreover, the chapter highlights 
how PREVENT and CHANNEL (an extension of PREVENT) act upon futurity through, for 
example, the notion of vulnerability as linked to risk.    
 Chapter 3: Dispositif, Governmentality and Risk provides an exploration of Michel 
Foucault’s notion of the dispositif. The chapter begins by outlining Foucault’s original meaning 
of dispositif with a focus on three key interpretations of the term: dispositif as ‘apparatus’; 
dispositif power as ‘network’; and dispositif as ‘productive’. Given that concept of the 
                                                          
31 See McKee (2009) for an important analysis of such.  
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dispositif was borne through Foucault’s notion of governmentality the chapter then turns 
towards some of the central tenets of Foucault’s ‘governmentality’ theory. This includes 
governmentality read as ‘population’, ‘subjectification’, ‘circulation’, and ‘milieu’.   
 The remainder of the chapter focuses upon more contemporary research from 
International Relations, Security Studies and Critical Risk Scholarship, outlining how such 
studies attempt to provide exegeses of Foucault’s securite de dispositif through the concept of 
‘dispositif precautionary risk’. The chapter explores a growing body of work that has 
meticulously documented the discursive emergence and practical proliferation of a novel 
iteration of pre-emption that is quite different from templates of prevention in the context of 
the post-9/11 global security climate. 32  Moreover, the chapter explores narratives of 
diminishing temporal control as ‘security issues have increasingly been defined in terms of 
uncertain, potentially catastrophic threats’ (Aalberts and Werner, 2011: 2191). Lastly, the 
chapter considers the irruptive contingency of the future as techniques of imagination have 
taken on new political significance in the context of the war on terror (de Goede, 2008a: 155).
  Chapter 4: Risk Society and Reflexive Risk begins by exploring the parameters 
of Ulrich Beck’s ‘Risk (or World Risk) Society’ and the paradigm of ‘reflexivity’ because of a 
progression towards reflexive modernity. The first half of the chapter specifically focuses on 
the paradox of modernisation; Beck’s optimism about the emergence of a cosmopolitan public 
sphere through ‘sub-political’ means; and the ‘individualisation’ of risk according to Beck. The 
concern of the chapter then turns towards the work of Anthony Giddens in the context of his 
broader social theory of reflexivity. The chapter reflects upon several central tenets of Giddens’ 
work such as dis-embedding relations; the ontological (in)security of the ‘self’; and Giddens’ 
understanding of risk and trust within a postmodern world.     
       Part II of the thesis (chapters 5-7) 
provides a review of the methodological design; outlines the data analysis approach; provides 
analysis of the key themes distilled from the interview sessions; and reflects upon 
convergences, divergences and ambiguities between existing literature and research findings. 
        Chapter 5: Methodology 
describes the methodological research design and provides justifications as to why qualitative 
methods were deemed most appropriate in line with the research aims and ontological and 
epistemological position of the present study. Within this chapter, I also reflect on the 
                                                          
32 See, for example, Adey and Anderson (2012); Amoore (2007); Anderson (2010a); Aradau and van Munster 
(2007, 2011); Cooper (2006); de Goede (2008a, 2012); de Goede and Randalls (2009); Ehrenberg et al. (2010); 
Elmer and Opel (2006); Kessler and Werner (2008); Krasmann (2012); Massumi (2005a, 2007); Moreiras (2005).  
28 
 
applicability of the research findings, both epistemologically and personally, and outline the 
data analysis method and approach.       Chapter 6: Key 
Findings provides analysis of three principal themes that emerged from the fieldwork 
interviews. These are risk and trust; PREVENT as safeguarding; and risk as gut feeling. First, 
this chapter highlights a significant change in PP methodology from a ‘threat-centric’ model to 
an ‘overt’ CT capacity, of which the concept trust is considered particularly crucial. 
Furthermore, this chapter highlights certain ambiguities regarding PP as a smooth top-down 
governance structure. Second, this chapter draws attention to the fact that PP is becoming 
entirely re-conceptualised through an invocation towards “safeguarding” vulnerable 
individuals. Subsequently, risk is not so much displaced but re-oriented through terminological 
modification Accordingly, such a transformation is having a profoundly depoliticising effect 
upon the operations and objectives of PP. Lastly, the chapter highlights practitioners 
understanding(s) of acting upon “gut feeling” and “instinct” as linked to risk in the absence of 
radicalisation knowledge(s). Acting upon intuitive feeling is understood to offer various 
benefits for internal and external partners and objectives of PP more generally.  
      Chapter 7: Comparatives between Research 
Findings and Literature critically reflects upon the three key themes distilled from the 
interview sessions as measured against dispositif and reflexive risk. Within this chapter, it is 
argued both risk positions provide a sufficient theoretical framework in order to make sense of 
the fieldwork data. However, this chapter also highlights various theoretical ambiguities as 
measured against the research findings.        
    Chapter 8: Final Remarks and Directions for Future 
Research provides a summary of the preceding two chapters; reflects upon philosophy and 
pragmatics; and offers directions for future research.  
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Part I: 
Literature Review 
 
“No human action, so to speak, is inevitable”. 
- Aristotle (Rhetoric, 1357, 25-32, 
adapted from Van Eemeren and 
Houtlosser, 2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
CONTEST, PREVENT and 
Domestic (UK) Counter-Terrorism Policy 
 
2.1 Introduction 
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As Thomas (2014) observes, describing PREVENT is not straightforward as it has involved a 
number of distinct and arguably contradictory elements. This chapter engages with a number 
of key moments when existing CT approaches were reassessed and calibrated. Clearly, the 
watershed moment for UK CT came with the 2005 terrorist attacks on London, of which the 
threat of suicide attacks by British citizens was “brought home” (CONTEST, 2006: 3).  
Moreover, the defeat of the Labour party in the May 2010 elections and the formation of a 
coalition government by the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties led to a further review 
and reassessment of policies, which has subsequently initiated a new era of CT. The chapter 
specifically looks at the development of PREVENT in relation to these.   
 The first part of the chapter briefly explores the historical context of CT within the UK 
pre-PREVENT. The focus here will be on CONTEST in order to provide a synoptic perspective 
on discourses and practices of CT. It is hoped this will minimise (though far from address) 
potentially limiting historical amnesia. The final two-thirds of the chapter provide a detailed 
examination of PREVENT. Specifically, the chapter explores PREVENT funding; the 
development of PREVENT policing; the diffusion of PREVENT responsibilities towards local 
community level; and, following analysis by Heath-Kelly (2013), how ‘radicalisation’ has been 
made possible as a discourse - one that enables the performance of security around it. The 
concern here is not one of providing a detailed examination of ‘radicalisation’, but to analyse 
how the concept of radicalisation makes it possible for PREVENT and CHANNEL (an 
extension of PREVENT) to act upon futurity, as opposed to reactive CT methods.   
  Two important caveats must be acknowledged in the context of the chapter. 
First, exploring a longer time horizon of CT pre-CONTEST is not plausible for reasons of 
space. Second, this chapter omits analysing the broader contours of what constitutes 
“terrorism” for reasons twofold. First, it is for reasons of space. Over the last 15 years, there 
has been burgeoning research that has attempted to make sense of terrorism as a concept and 
as a tactic. To name but a few there is ‘new terrorism’ post-9/11, ‘lone-actor terrorism’, 
‘catastrophic terrorism’, and ‘chemical radiological nuclear terrorism’ (CRNT). Second, 
providing a finely constrained examination of terrorism as outlined in legislative policy and/or 
academia risks missing important understandings of CT at the research phase.   
          
2.2 CONTEST  
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The concepts, goals and structure of current CT policy for the UK are found in the strategy 
document CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism (Weeks, 
2013: 105; see HM Government, 2009a). First developed in 2003, CONTEST was the informal 
name given to a collection of strategies and abstract frameworks from which public safety and 
security organisations could work from to counter the threat of international terrorism within 
the UK (Weeks, 2013: 105). The introduction of CONTEST was manifested in a form of series 
of legislative norms and new institutions, such as the National Extremism Tactical Co-
ordination Unit (NETCU) in 2004,33 and the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) within 
the MI5 Security Service.34 The objective of the former was to combat “domestic terrorism” 
whilst JTAC identifies the sources of terrorism and assess the threat level.35 Post-9/11, the 
nature of the threat was originally constructed as an international one (Kuzmic, 2011: 5-6), 
although its domestic element was reflected internally before 2005 (e.g. Draft Report on Young 
Muslims and Extremism of April 2004).36      Despite the 
delay in revealing the details to the public until 2006, CONTEST was leaked to The Times in 
2004 that characterised it as “...one of the most ambitious government social engineering 
projects in recent years” (Weeks, 2013: 109). This circulating document was described as “an 
attempt to co-ordinate the pan-Governmental response to the emerging terrorist threat in the 
aftermath of the attacks on New York and Washington, DC, in September 2001” (House of 
Commons, 2009: 4). Moreover, CONTEST was simultaneously promoted as a macro socio-
political strategy aimed at winning the “hearts and minds” of the public (Bonino, 2012: 189). 
This is an important development as framings from 2001 “to win the battle of hearts and minds” 
have underscored terrorism not just as a threat to life, but also as a threat to British values 
(Fisher, 2012).37         The battle to win 
hearts and minds was also clearly interrelated with a new policy focus on the need to promote 
“community cohesion” in Britain; a significant part of the response to the civil disturbances in 
                                                          
33 In 2011, the NETCU merged with the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) and the National 
Domestic Extremism Team (NDET) to become the National Domestic Extremism Unit (NDEU).  
34  There are two further security and intelligence agencies that have roles in relation to CT; MI6 (Secret 
Intelligence Services) and GCHQ (the Government Communications Headquarters) (Choudhury, 2012: 26-27).  
35 There are currently three different threat levels in respect of the International Counter-Terrorist (ICT) threat, 
the Northern Irish Related Terrorism (NIRT) threat for Great Britain and the NIRT threat for Northern Ireland 
(both set by the Security Service). These are communicated to the public via the GOV.UK and Security Service 
websites (Home Office, 2013c: 5). More specifically, within the UK there exists a threat assessment system which 
assesses the risk from terrorist attacks according to the following five levels of threat: critical – an attack is 
expected imminently; severe – an attack is highly likely; substantial – an attack is a strong possibility; moderate 
– an attack is possible but not likely; low – an attack is unlikely.   
36 See HM Government (2004). 
37 The term “hearts and mind” originates in counter-insurgency campaigns and was based on isolating insurgents 
through winning the support and trust of the majority (English, 2009).  
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duo-cultural ex-industrial towns of Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in 2001 (see Cantle, 2001). 
Whilst social cohesion covers a range of socio-economic factors that affects groups or 
individuals defined by their social class and economic position, community cohesion is 
concerned more directly with relationships between communities defined by ethnicity or 
religion (Cantle, 2005). Key within this discursive mix was the conviction of the centripetal 
inward-looking dynamics of Muslim communities locked into a supposedly myopic 
reproduction of their “traditional” way of life38 (Afshar, 2012: 9). This mapped comfortably on 
to a dichotomy that fed both realistic and symbolic threats, coupled with a parallel trajectory 
of virulent enmities and the rhetoric of denigration (Alam and Husband, 2013).  
       Appreciating that 9/11 and the civil 
disturbances of 2001 undoubtedly served as inflection points so far as the governance of 
national security in the UK is concerned, 39  the defining moment for CT development 
domestically was the 7 July 2005 London Underground terrorist bombings (Rikabi, 2013: 25). 
Less than four months after the Prevention of Terrorism ACT 2005 (PTA) was passed, a group 
of four Islamist British citizens placed bombs on a bus and on three tube trains throughout the 
London metropolitan area committing a domestic terrorist attack. The attacks resulted in 52 
deaths and more than 770 were injured (House of Commons, 2012: 3). Authorities halted a 
copycat attempt on 21 July 2005, but the 7 July 2005 attack left substantial damage (Fisher, 
2012: 219). This domestic terrorist attack was the first such kind committed by natural-born 
citizens who had an Islamist motive. In 2006, the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair, 
described this unprecedented threat from extremism as “... the poisonous propaganda of those 
people that warps and perverts the minds of younger people” (The Guardian, 2006, as cited in 
Awan and Blakemore, 2013: 5-6).          
 Issues of cohesion and integration were further intertwined with CT narratives after the 
7/7 bombings. However, CONTEST in its original form garnered little attention until it was 
refreshed and made public in March 2009 as Prevent, Pursue, Protect, Prepare – The United 
Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, better known as CONTEST II 
(House of Commons, 2009: 9; HM Government, 2009b). 
 
2.2.1 CONTEST II  
                                                          
38 It should be noted, as Eid and Karim (2014) observe, ‘a suspicion of the “Other” and a need to control the 
definition of that “Otherness” have been integral elements of the creation and legitimation of British imperialism 
and colonialism’.  
39  Mythen and Walklate (2008) emphasise the importance of 9/11 in relation to domestic CT governance 
structures; I have adapted this to include the UK civil disturbances of 2001.  
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In March 2009, the government published a revised CT strategy written by The Office for 
Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT hereafter), known as ‘CONTEST II’ (Kundnani, 2009: 
20).40 CONTEST II set out the threat facing Britain and various priorities for dealing with it 
through to 2015, reflecting the National Security Strategy (NSS hereafter) (HM Government, 
2009a: 10-11),41 the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR hereafter) and the wider 
Coalition Programme or Government (Home Office, 2012a:  7). The updated CT strategy was 
to be “based on principles that reflect British values” (HM Government, 2009a: 10-11), “the 
evolution of the threat, both home and abroad” (House of Commons, 2009: 8), and “the greater 
resources which have been made available by the Government to address terrorism” (Innes et 
al., 2011). One factor of this “changing security situation” was, according to the then Minister 
for Security Lord West, “to raise our game, break out of specialist ‘silos’, avoid being London-
centric and ensure that lessons learned were being incorporated via a stronger central hub” 
(House of Commons, 2009: 9, see also Jackson, 2012: 77). Moreover, the NSS set out how it 
would ‘address and manage (the) diverse though interconnected set of security challenges and 
underlying drivers, both immediately and in the longer term, to safeguard the nation, it’s 
citizens, our prosperity and our way of life’ (Cabinet Office, 2008b: 3, emphasis added; see 
also House of Commons, 2009: 9).    There are two key developments which 
distinguish the “new” security problematic (CONTEST II) from its original form (CONTEST). 
First, the new strategy signalled a commitment to a much more overt campaign of countering 
terrorist violence (Kundnani, 2009). CONTEST II was to represent the government’s 
‘determination to place as much information as possible in the public domain ... (with regard 
to) security matters’ (House of Commons, 2009: 4). Importantly, CONTEST II explicitly 
included citizens as partners in this project to make Britain secure (HM Government, 2009a). 
Second, the new security strategy foregrounded the preoccupation with a ‘threat-o-genic’ 
(Massumi, 2007: 13) interconnected globe and greater emphasis on the protection of the 
‘freedoms’ of liberal-democratic life. Specifically, CONTEST II aimed to build on the existing 
(CONTEST) policy “to reduce the risk” to the UK and it its interests overseas from 
international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence (HM 
Government, 2009a: 6, emphasis added).42 Thus, as Jackson (2012: 79) observes, CONTEST 
                                                          
40 See HM Government (2009a).   
41 While the NSS identifies threats from both international and domestic sources The National Risk Assessment 
(NRA) and The National Risk Register (NRR) assess those threats that are strictly domestic (Cabinet Office, 2008a: 
5).    
42 Championing a “free society” is also retained in the Cabinet Office (2009, 2010).  
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II explicitly reflects what Bialasiewicz et al. (2007: 416) identify as the primary performative 
function of national security in the era of the war on terror: ‘to dissolve inside/outside 
spatialisations and therefore open up new spaces for the movement and entrenchment of 
neoliberal globalisation’.       To define the threat more 
specifically, CONTEST II elaborates stating that the threat to the UK (and many other 
countries) now came primarily from four sources: (1) the AQ leadership and their immediate 
associates; (2) terrorist groups affiliated to AQ; (3) ‘self-starting’ networks, or lone individuals, 
motivated by an ideology similar to that of AQ, but with no connection to that organisation; 
and (4) terrorist groups that follow a broadly similar ideology as AQ but that have their own 
identity and regional agenda (HM Government, 2009a: 11; see also HM Government, 2009b). 
Moreover, underpinning the revised strategy was the combination of four alliterative ‘work-
streams’ (or strands), known as the four P’s: 
 
- PREVENT: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism; 
- PURSUE: to stop terrorist attacks; 
- PROTECT: to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack; and  
- PREPARE: ‘mitigating the impact of attacks’ by increasing Critical National 
Infrastructure (CNI) and community resilience.43  
 
Each of these strands has a series of related objectives and supporting programmes 
reflecting the aims and principles of the UK’s strategy for countering terrorism. Through their 
interlinking, CONTEST II is intended to provide a comprehension strategy for countering-
terrorism, where “work on PURSUE and PREVENT reduces the treat from terrorism; work on 
PROTECT and PREPARE reduces the UK’s vulnerability to attack” (HM Government, 2009b: 
11). Ultimately, CONTEST II acts as a bridge between intelligence, homeland security and 
conciliatory approaches to CT (Jackson et al., 2011: 224-9).   Although 
the four strands are given a unifying coherence within the strategy (see HM Government 2009a: 
80) they are in fact incredibly diverse, deeply embedded in, but also productive of, practices, 
roles, policies, and even departments across government; from the Security Services to the 
Departments of Health, Education, and Communities and Local Government (Jackson, 2012). 
The design of the work-streams and their respective goals are further explained in CONTEST 
                                                          
43 HM Government (2011a: 10); see also HM Government (2009b: 10-15 and 51-125).  
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II as attempts to address the complexities and strategic factors that drive current extremist 
ideology (Weeks, 2013: 112-13). Moreover, CONTEST II listed four longer-term strategic 
factors:  
 
1. Unresolved regional disputes and conflicts (particularly [in] Palestine, 
Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Lebanon, Kashmir, and Iraq) and state 
fragility and failure; 
 
2. Violent extremist ideology associated with AQ, which regards most 
governments in Muslim countries as ‘un-Islamic’ or apostate; claims that 
these governments are sustained by western (sic) states who are engaged in a 
global attack on Islam; and considers violent action to be a religious duty 
incumbent upon all Muslims; 
 
3. Modern technologies, which facilitate terrorist propaganda, communications 
and terrorist operations; 
 
4. Radicalisation - the process by which people come to support violent 
extremism and, in some cases, join terrorist groups. Radicalisation has a range 
of causes (including perception of our foreign policy), varying from one 
organisation to another.44  
 
Although there is no clear dividing line, domestically the focus of PREVENT is clearly 
on radicalisation whereas the remaining three are managed mostly through international efforts 
(Weeks, 2013: 116). Since this thesis is appositely concerned with the PREVENT strand of 
CONTEST, this chapter does not provide any coverage of other three strands (PURSUE, 
PROTECT, and PREPARE). Rather, the remainder of the chapter provides an in-depth 
exploration of PREVENT. 
 
2.3 PREVENT45 and the Concept of Radicalisation 
                                                          
44 HM Government (2009b: 11; see also Weeks, 2013: 113). 
45 The Home Office now has the lead responsibility of working with communities and local authorities on 
PREVENT. In Scotland, PREVENT is delivered by the Scottish Violent Extremism Unit (SVEU); this is a joint 
initiative between the Scottish government and the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS). 
The Welsh Extremism and Counter-Terrorism Unit (WECTU) - a joint initiative between the four police forces 
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Since its inception, PREVENT has been explicitly and specifically concerned with ‘tackling 
the radicalisation of individuals’ (HM Government, 2006: 1), defined as ‘the processes 
whereby certain experiences and events in a person’s life cause them to become radicalised, to 
the extent of turning to violence to resolve perceived grievances’ (HM Government, 2006: 1, 
9). Thus, the stated goal(s) of PREVENT can be understood as ‘stopping radicalisation, 
reducing support for terrorism and discouraging people from becoming terrorists’ (HM 
Government, 2009a: 56, reprinted from the Cabinet Office, 2008b: 44). Of note, the centrality 
of the term ‘radicalisation’ can be seen in CT policy prior to the crystallisation of PREVENT 
within CONTEST II. For instance, the Home Office strategy paper Countering International 
Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy was published in 2006 as a response to the 
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC). Specifically, the ISC warned that 
‘across the whole of the CT community the development of the home-grown threat and the 
radicalism of British citizens were not fully understood or applied to strategic thinking’ (Huq, 
2010: 17).46            
 The PREVENT strategy understands that ‘ideology is a central factor in the 
radicalisation process’ (HM Government, 2011b: 40-44). Thus, a key objective of PREVENT 
is to ‘respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism’ by undertaking ‘counter-ideological 
work’ designed to ensure ‘no ungoverned spaces in which extremism is allowed to flourish’ 
(HM Government, 2011b: 9). ‘Radicalisation’ here stands as a particular model for ‘explaining’ 
the causes of terrorism, understood as a process whereby ‘extremist ideas’ are propagated and 
disseminated by key activists and thinkers who therefore ‘radicalise’ others because of their 
‘vulnerabilities’ to such a message (Coppock and McGovern, 2014: 245). Identifying the nature 
of such ‘vulnerabilities’ therefore also emerges as a crucial means of preventing 
‘radicalisation’.47 Following this, the other identified key objectives are to prevent individuals 
                                                          
in Wales - works with the Welsh Assembly to implement PREVENT in Wales. Furthermore, the Research, 
Information and Communications Unit (RICU) carry out counter-ideological or counter-narrative work 
(Choudhury, 2012: 26-27). 
46 This is unsurprising given that there is no universally accepted definition of radicalism or radicalisation in 
academia or government. For example, the Home Offices’ (2006) definition of radicalisation is different to that 
stated in CONTEST II, defined as: ‘... the process by which people come to support violent extremism and, in 
some cases, join terrorist groups’ (HM Government, 2009a: 40). Moreover, in their project to ‘reduce the risk to 
the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism’ (HM Government, 2009a, 8, 18, 54, 56), the Home 
Office and the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism theorise ‘radicalisation’ as the process whereby 
international terrorism poses a new challenge to UK security by acting through British citizens (Heath-Kelly, 
2012: 1). Additionally, over the last ten years, several other government bodies have established their own 
definitions of radicalism, which understandably has caused widespread confusion and convolution. 
47 The concept of ‘vulnerability’ is explored in further depth later in the chapter.  
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being drawn into ‘extremism’ and to diminish the ‘risks of radicalisation’ within a number of 
institutional settings (including, notably, schools, colleges and universities) (Coppock and 
McGovern, 2014: 245).        The 
portrayal of radicalisation as a linear progression can be read as interrelated with academic 
literature rooted in positivistic epistemology, which has sought to test the validity of isolated 
variables in terms of the potential of individuals to be radicalised (Martin, 2014a: 191; see also 
King and Taylor, 2011; Horgan, 2008). Recent academic literature has questioned the 
significance of a macro focus on the ‘root causes’ of radicalisation, instead focusing on ‘a 
cultural-psychological disposition’ (see Lacquer, 2000, 2004; Kundnani, 2012). The cultural-
psychological approach to radicalisation offers predicative possibilities if particular 
dispositions or patterns of behaviour can serve as a proxy ‘indicator’ of risk (Kundnani, 2012). 
In this way, a more complex account of radicalisation has been proposed in which, a 
psychological process, such as a group dynamic or struggles with identity, is seen as interacting 
with a process of acquiring an extremist theology (Kundnani, 2012: 8-9).48   
 It is within CONTEST II where the concept of identity (specifically “Britishness”, 
“integration”, and “assimilation”) can be read as a ‘risk factor’ in relation to radicalisation. A 
combination of the theological and psychological dispositions perhaps best sums up 
PREVENT(ion) within CONTEST II, since in policy terms in the UK, it is characteristic of the 
radicalisation discourse, and of the new policy regimes, that they mix a security agenda with 
an integration agenda, where security concerns and risk assessment become closely intertwined 
with questions of integration, anti-discrimination, and social cohesion (Lindekilde, 2012: 110). 
As well as this, PREVENT emphasises the individual as driven by a persuasive ideology 
(Sedgwick, 2010: 480) which becomes salient through social networks (see Sageman, 2004) 
and personal crises for the uptake of extremist ideas (Heath-Kelly, 2012: 6). Moreover, the 
prominent focus on the psychosocial well-being of individuals is clear in the 2009 CONTEST 
(II) strategy. As the strategy makes clear, ‘people are not only vulnerable to radicalisation 
because of political and economic grievances. A range of social and psychological factors are 
also important’ (HM Government, 2009a: 44). Further, it is stated that radicalisation can be 
understood, ‘not simply a result of actual or perceived grievances. It may be the result of family 
or peer pressure, the absence of positive mentors and role models, a crisis of identity, or 
                                                          
48 The importance of socio-economic factors, as well as cultural-psychological dispositions, is retained in the latest 
version of the PREVENT strategy which states, ‘individuals drawn towards right-wing terrorism are usually 
poorly educated males and often unemployed (although there are some cases of high-achieving individuals)’ (HM 
Government, 2011b: 21). 
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changing circumstances (e.g. a new environment following migration and asylum)’ (HM 
Government, 2009a: 89).  
 
2.3.1 Funding for PREVENT 
 
Interrelated with new and developing discourses on the concept of radicalisation, there has 
been considerable intellectual, political and economic investment in developing and enhancing 
PREVENT activity (Innes et al., 2011: 4). The initial pathfinder year of 2007/8 (see DCLG, 
2007a and b) made £6m available to 70 priority local authorities, specifically  those with having 
a Muslim population density of 5% or more to build on their existing work to engage with 
communities, forge partnerships with police, community and faith groups49 and work with 
mosques and education institutions (DCLG, 2007b). However, it is suggested that local 
authorities and other bodies were expected to initiate activity with little notice or negotiation 
(Thomas, 2014; see also Thomas, 2009; Husband and Alam, 2011). In the following 2008-11 
period, PREVENT was expanded to all local authorities with 2% or more of their population 
as Muslim (Thomas, 2014). Of note, funding for PREVENT was significantly expanded 
between 2008/09 and 2010/11 when £45 million was committed for the ‘Preventing Violent 
Extremism’50 (PVE hereafter) strategy through the Department of Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG hereafter) via local authorities. Moreover, in 2009/10, DCLG also 
established a £3.2 million Challenge and Innovation Fund for local authorities not receiving 
the Area Based Grant (HM Government, 2011b: 101). Furthermore, an additional £5.1 million 
- made available through the Community Leadership Fund - intended to complement work 
being taken forward by local authorities and support leadership capacity within Muslim 
communities (HM Government, 2011b: 101).  
Across all departments, including the Home Office, Foreign Office, and the Department 
for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF hereafter), this all added up to a 2008-2011 PVE 
budget of £140 million - an increase in funding by threefold since 2001, some £85 million of 
which came from the DCLG, and the security-focussed remainder from the Home Office 
(Thomas, 2010: 447-448). Moreover, as of 2014, it is suggested that PREVENT has involved 
                                                          
49 As Rikabi (2013: 26) observes, ‘local government interaction with Muslim and interfaith organisations is not 
new; the United Kingdom has established a link with Islamic charities and political groups since the 1980s’.  
50 PREVENT work has been underway since 2006 when the DCLG launched two funds under the auspices of the 
PREVENT strategy: (1) Community Leadership Fund (centred at capacity building, young people, women and 
faith leaders) and (2) Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund (funding to projects of local authorities and 
civil society) (see DCLG, 2008). Thus, whilst it is often cited that PREVENT has been part of UK CT policy since 
2007, this assertion is misinformed.   
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a spend of at least £200 million on community-based education and engagement (Thomas, 
2014). Figure 2.3 outlines funding for PREVENT from 2009-2015.  
             
Financial Year Funding Amount (£) for PREVENT 
                         2009-201051 47,080,000 
                         2010-2011 44,384,486 
                         2011-2012 35,996,000 
                         2012-2013 35,078,000 
                         2013-201452 39,000,000 
                         2014-2015 40,000,000 
Figure 2.3: PREVENT Funding 2009-2015 
 
It is important to note that the majority of PREVENT funding goes to CT policing 
(provided by the Home Office). 53  Moreover, it is argued that the policing element of 
PREVENT is more unique and distinctive than the other strands of the cross-government 
CONTEST strategy which have continued the kinds of working practices associated with 
established CT methods (see Innes et al., 2011). Further, since this thesis is appositely 
concerned with PP, the policing element of PREVENT warrants analytical depth of its own. 
 
 
 
2.3.2 PREVENT Policing54 
 
Police authority members now demonstrate a high level of involvement in PREVENT.55 This 
is unsurprising since one of the national threats to the UK that the Strategic Policing 
Requirement recognises is terrorism, of which the national security risk assessment identifies 
                                                          
51 2009-2013 statistics as cited in HM Government (2014a) 
52 2014-2015 statistics as cited in HM Government (2014b). 
53 In an accounting of programme spending in 2010, the House of Lords concluded that 70 percent of funds went 
to local police, 15 percent went to social programs, 9 percent went to partnership agencies, and a government 
campaign to denounce extremists spent 3 percent (Rikabi, 2013: 2).  
54 In the following discussion I draw generously from HM Government (2014c), given that government policy 
documents centred on PREVENT policing are significantly sparse.  
55 See HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Audit Commission (2008).  
40 
 
as a tier one risk56 (HM Government, 2014c: 37). Structurally, the police CT network in 
England and Wales consists of a London-based CT command (SO15), with four regions 
hosting a CT unit (CTU) and four hosting a CT intelligence unit (CTIU). The units are co-
ordinated nationally and managed locally by a lead force (HM Government, 2014c). Moreover, 
to support the national network, each police force in England and Wales retains Special Branch 
capability either individually or collaboratively with other forces and it deals with all national 
security issues including CT (HM Government, 2014c). Typically, these consist of a group of 
police officers and staff who work at a local level to comply with the provisions of CONTEST 
and the strategic policing requirement (HM Government, 2014c: 19). Furthermore, since 2010, 
there has also been a Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit with responsibility for enforcing 
the removal of unlawful terrorist material online (HM Government, 2014c).  
         It is suggested that PVE 
funding has led to 300 new dedicated police posts nationally, split between Regional Counter-
Terrorism Units (CTUs), Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Units (CTIUs) and ‘engagement 
posts’ where members have been engaged in the development of the national CT network since 
its inception in 2006/07. These substantial units are comprised of staff drawn from a number 
of disciplines, including highly skilled detectives, community contact teams, financial 
investigators, intelligence analysts and high-tech crime investigators (HM Government, 
2014c). The CTUs are largely self-sufficient and can effectively co-ordinate routine enquiries 
and operations without compromising the commitment of local forces to day-to-day policing 
(HM Government, 2014c: 19). The CTIUs, while still substantial, are smaller in scale than the 
CTUs and are focused upon the development of CT intelligence rather than the investigation 
of offences. Where a terrorist-related incident or intelligence is identified within a CTIU area 
the initial investigation is carried out by CTIU staff (HM Government, 2014c). Once the initial 
intelligence gathering has reached a stage where there is sufficient evidence for action (such as 
the arrest of a suspect), the investigation is then handed over to a specially trained CT 
investigator (HM Government, 2014c: 19).       
   The Home Office makes grant funding available to all forces on an 
annual basis. Allocation is based on advice from the National Counter-Terrorism Police 
Headquarters (NCTPHQ),57 and the ring-fenced money goes to Police and Crime Commissions 
                                                          
56 A tier one risk is judged to be the highest priority for UK national security over the next five years, taking into 
account both likelihood and impact (HM Government, 2014c: 37). 
57 From 1 April 2014, the headquarters’ functions of the Association of Chief Police Officers Terrorism and Allied 
Matters (ACPOTAM) have been performed by the National Counter Terrorism Police Headquarters (NCTPHQ) 
(HM Government, 2014c). 
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(PCC hereafter) specifically for CT purposes (HM Government, 2014c). There is a complex 
administrative structure in place to deliver the CT grant to different locations across forces in 
England and Wales.58 Moreover, the grant has 16 different budget lines and in 2012-2013 
figures suggest government funding for CT policing was £573 million (House of Commons, 
2014). Furthermore, in 2013/14, the total CT policing grant provided was £563m (HM 
Government, 2014c). Lastly, the security and intelligence agencies receive a budget of £2.1 
billion. In 2011-12, MI5 allocated 72% of its resources to international CT whereas MI6 and 
GCHQ allocated roughly a third each of their budgets to international CT (House of Commons, 
2014). Second in funding are local authorities and communities (provided by DCLG) and third 
are Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO hereafter) overseas operations (Kuzmic, 2011).  
 
2.3.3 PREVENT Policing: Three Phases of Development 
 
Innes et al. (2011) have broadly defined three distinct phases for the development of PP. Phase 
One entailed a traditional model of CT policing which was far more narrowly conceived and 
placed more accent upon the need for ‘covert’ activity.59 In essence, PP was predicated upon a 
clandestine threat-centric model60 (Innes et al., 2011). Phase Two involved a reconfiguration 
of assets as part of the “refresh” of approach involved in CONTEST II. Whilst PREVENT staff 
and units were altered, there was limited innovation in terms of how public‐facing services 
were delivered. In effect, there was an increase in capacity but it was still lacking defined 
PREVENT capabilities (Innes et al., 2011). Phase Three has entailed an entirely new overt 
method of doing CT policing by mixing social interaction and police work to dissuade 
suspected political extremists from participating in or supporting terrorist activities (Rikabi, 
2013: iv).          PP is now 
conceptualised as a blended methodology integrating elements of traditional CT policing with 
practices derived and distilled from and ‘Community Policing’ and ‘Neighbourhood Policing’ 
philosophies. Whilst Community Policing models are diverse, and thus not something that can 
be easily defined (Spalek, 2009: 4a), Skogan and Hartnett (1997: 5) consider Community 
Policing as comprising the following characteristics: 
 
                                                          
58 The distribution of £24 million for PP in 2010/11 is illustrated in Appendix A. Although such figures are now 
outdated, the data provides perspective on the management of CT finances.  
59 See Innes and Thiel (2008).   
60 The principle focus of a threat-centric model is on intercepting and interdicting motivating offenders in a 
comparatively low-visibility fashion (Innes et al., 2011). 
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‘Community Policing relies upon organisational decentralisation and a reorientation of patrol in order 
to facilitate two-way communication between police and the public. It assumes a commitment to 
broadly focused, problem-oriented policing and requires that police be responsive to citizens’ demands 
when they decide what local problems are and set their priorities. It also implies a commitment to 
helping neighbourhoods solve crime problems on their own, through community organisations and 
crime prevention programmes’. 
 
Moreover, Rosenbaum (1988: 334) summarises the fundamentals of Community Policing as 
‘an emphasis on improving the number and quality of police-citizen contacts, a broader 
definition of ‘legitimate’ police work, decentralisation of the police bureaucracy, and a greater 
emphasis on proactive problem-solving strategies’.      
  ‘Neighbourhood Policing’ is also being explicitly linked to CT activities. 
Neighbourhood Policing has been broadly defined as, ‘an organisational strategy that allows 
the police, its partners and the public to work closely together to solve the problems of crime 
and disorder, and to improve neighbourhood conditions and feelings of security’ (ACPO, 2006: 
10). As Innes et al. (2011) observe, this connection to Neighbourhood Policing is important 
because there is evidence that PREVENT work cannot be disconnected from more mainstream 
policing concerns. For instance, it is argued that ‘personal relationships’ will constitute the 
working capital for building trust and confidence in order to allow for community intelligence 
to be passed to the police (Spalek, 2009). Moreover, police may operationalise ‘soft power’ 
through processes of persuasion, negotiation, and agenda setting, providing a far more subtle 
mode of influence (Innes et al., 2006, as cited in Spalek, 2009a: 10). In essence, it is suggested 
PP is enhanced and may even be dependent upon the efficacy of more routine policing services 
(Innes et al., 2011). As the then director of ACPO, Sir Norman Bettison put it, “we will be 
successful in PP only when it is mainstreamed into Neighbourhood Policing” (House of 
Commons, 2012: 29; see also Bettison, 2009).    Reflecting this genealogy, 
PP is said to pivot around three main activities: (1) community engagement and community 
intelligence generation; (2) identifying and mounting disruptions against presenting risks; and 
(3) community impact management (Innes et al., 2011: 3). Moreover, Innes et al. (2011: 16) 
further break down these activities into two distinct sets of actions: (i) general community level 
interventions designed to inhibit and decay existing and potential social support for violent 
extremist ideologies. Thus, PREVENT is as much concerned with the social environment in 
which risks and threats are propagated, as with threats themselves. It seeks to address 
vulnerabilities and enhance community resilience; (ii) nested within these community level 
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interventions there is a more specific targeted focus upon preventing the radicalisation of 
individuals and small groups.     Set against this backdrop, research by 
Innes et al. (2011: 90) identified that PP now typically takes place through four principal modes 
of intervention (see Figure 2.3.1). These are: 
• Protective – where the police own the intervention in terms of defining the 
problem to be addressed and undertaking the response; 
• Mobilisation – where the community engages in self-help behaviours to deal 
with a perceived threat; 
• Type 1 Co‐production – the orthodox notion of collaborative working 
wherein the community seeks police involvement to tackle a problem; 
• Type 2 Co‐production – involves the police utilising community based 
informal social control resources to manage a problem.  
 
Figure 2.3.1: PREVENT Policing Intervention Modes61 
2.4  Counter-Radicalisation: Community Involvement  
       
It is now accepted that PREVENT objectives are sought through a variety of local community 
partnerships and across statutory bodies, as well as voluntary agencies and community groups 
‘with police forces, local authorities and their partners working closely together to oversee and 
deliver the project’ (DCLG, 2008b: 9). This is reflected in the range of government departments 
and agencies that have developed PREVENT products and activity. This has included PVE 
funding for Youth Offending Teams through the Youth Justice Board (YJB); DCSF toolkit on 
extremism (‘Learning Together to be Safe’); and Department for Business, and continuing 
Communities and Local Government (CLG) work, including the Community Leadership Fund 
                                                          
61 Innes et al. (2011: 39). 
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and the Challenge and Innovation Fund. Furthermore, the important role played by radical 
Islamist political groups in Further and Higher Education settings also led to a funding focus 
on Universities and Colleges implementing ‘Innovation and Skills’ guidance on extremism 
(DIUS, 2008). As well as this, PREVENT teams or posts have been established in almost all 
governmental departments to develop supporting intelligence, analysis and information and to 
improve strategic communications (HM Government, 2009b: 80). Moreover, as Kuzmic 
(2011) observes, further projects have included road shows targeting extremism of charismatic 
leaders to “community venues”, but also rather wider initiatives of schools’ twinning for 
sharing views on extremism. Some funding has also gone directly to mosques, such as North 
London Central Mosque, to counter the ideological legacy of imprisoned Abu Hamza 62 
(DCLG, 2007b). Other projects, such as the Conviction film about Bristol bomb plotter Isa 
Ibrahim, were funded directly by Home Office.63   The PVE agenda has also 
sought community involvement through ‘civil society’ groups. 64  This is supported by 
“National Indicator 35” which local authorities have to select as one of their “core priorities”. 
National Indicator 35 requires local authorities to have: “understanding of, and engagement 
with, Muslim communities”; “knowledge and understanding of the drivers and causes of 
violent extremism and the PREVENT objectives”; “development of a risk-based preventing 
violent extremism action plan, in support of delivery of the PREVENT objectives”; and to 
demonstrate “effective oversight, delivery and evaluation of projects and actions” (DCLG, 
2009). However, as a result of governmental pressure on local authorities under the Common 
Spending Assessment to adopt ‘National Indicator 35’ (in order to develop ‘resilience to violent 
extremism), some local authorities refused to adopt it initially, but all were required to report 
on it to Government Offices (Thomas, 2012; see also LGA, 2008b). Although many local 
authorities have remained deeply anxious about PVE (Turley, 2009), pressure from 
government saw PVE continue to grow to the point where all local authorities with significant 
Muslim communities were involved, although a number of Muslim community groups refused 
to participate (House of Commons, 2010; see also Thomas, 2010: 448).    
    The diffusion of formal responsibilities for policy 
                                                          
62 Abu Hamza is a self-style preacher and radical cleric. Originally imprisoned for 7 years in 2007, in January 
2015, Hamza was sentenced to life in prison on US terrorism conviction.  
63 Conviction is the 20-minute film which aims to dissuade young people from extremist ideology through 
negative example of Muslim convert Andrew Isa Ibrahim, who was imprisoned for planning a suicide attack in 
Bristol. Conviction is also said to allow PREVENT partners to identify and understand vulnerabilities Ibrahim 
presented as he was becoming radicalised. Of note, the movie was commissioned by the Avon and Somerset 
Police.  
64 For a breakdown of PREVENT activities, as supported by DCLG funding (2008), see Appendix B. 
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implementation and service delivery outlined above can be framed relationally in terms of 
‘harder’ and ‘softer’ strategies of CT engagement.65 Whilst the former may be understood as 
policing and community intelligence generation, the latter includes the development of 
dialogue, participation and community feedback between communities, state agencies and 
voluntary organisations in a way that serves to increase the fragile battle for “hearts and minds”. 
Consequently, there has been a consistent and conscious effort to balance the predominately 
hard powers associated with PURSUE and soft powers used in PREVENT activities. This 
effort is reflected in the statement, ‘…we have to manage the negative impact that PURSUE 
activity can have on communities and therefore our PREVENT agenda; but PURSUE 
operations are also necessary to support our PREVENT objectives ... and PREVENT 
interventions need to be considered for PURSUE type problems’ (HM Government, 2009b: 
80). The importance accorded to a balanced approach is also reiterated in the NSS, which states 
the need to ‘respond robustly whilst resisting the provocation to over-react’ (HM Government, 
2009a: 86; Cabinet Office, 2008b: 28).        
  Balancing soft power mechanics whilst simultaneously resisting the urge to 
“over-react” is undoubtedly a difficult undertaking (Weeks, 2013). At present there is no 
publically available document that measures the effectiveness of the balance of power, or 
overall effectiveness of PREVENT for that matter, within the CONTEST strategy. This is 
despite the introduction of the Public Service Agreement 26 (PSA 26) (HM Government, 
2009a: 86). PSA 26 embodies the same stated goal as CONTEST 2009, ‘...to reduce the risk to 
the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism’ (HM Government, 2009b: 158) 
and is supposed to measure progress across three outcomes: ‘…building resilience in domestic 
communities; counter-radicalisation work in key domestic sectors and services; and 
interventions in overseas priority countries’ (HM Government, 2009a: 86). However, as Weeks 
(2013: 119) points out, how assessments will occur, how frequently they will occur, or even 
what the metrics for assessment is remains, at the time of writing, unclear. Thus, inevitably, 
PREVENT has been the subject of fervent criticism both operationally and ideologically.  
 
2.5 PREVENT: A Failing Policy  
        
                                                          
65 For examples of ‘softer strategies’, as delivered by local authorities via DCLG funding (2009-2011), see 
Appendix C. 
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Although PREVENT was significantly developed from 2007-2010, it was still considered 
incomplete. Notable criticism came from the Communities and Local Government select 
committee (House of Commons, 2010), as well as from former head of the Metropolitan 
Police’s Muslim Contact Unit, Robert Lambert. A coalition in the House of Commons began 
reviewing the programme in 2010, particularly in relation to its alleged exclusive attention to 
Islamist terrorism. Far from pursuing a macro socio-political strategy aimed at winning “hearts 
and minds”, PVE’s mono-cultural focus on Muslims was said to be in stark contradiction to 
the overriding policy goal of community cohesion (Thomas, 2010). 66  Subsequently, the 
problematic design of PVE had left progress hobbled by institutional tensions at both local and 
national level (Thomas, 2010). For instance, at the level of local state, the House of Commons 
criticised the goals of PREVENT on the basis that British Muslims had been unaware of 
extremism in their communities. Moreover, it was posited that individuals could not be certain 
that information routinely gathered as part of one process would not end up being utilised for 
exactly such counter-terrorist activity (see Kundnani, 2009). At national level, it was suggested 
government relations with Muslims may have worsened; a situation exacerbated by the growth 
in state surveillance of Muslim communities and an “unhealthy conflation” of policing (House 
of Commons, 2012: 3). Regrettably, PREVENT became increasingly viewed as a political 
shibboleth (Kundnani, 2009).    The year-long Parliamentary review into the 
auspices of PREVENT also found significant gaps in the United Kingdom’s domestic terrorism 
policy. For instance, although the 2009 CONTEST strategy states that the major terrorist threats 
come primarily from four sources, it also states that the strategy contains ‘programmes’ 
relevant for tackling terrorist threats from any quarter (HM Government, 2009a: 11). However, 
the intent of this statement is somewhat contradictory given that a later statement in the same 
report states: ‘this strategy does not address the threat from domestic extremism’ (such as from 
animal rights)67 (HM Government, 2009a: 59). Moreover, whilst the focus upon far-right 
extremism has widened since the implementation of CONTEST II, it remains problematic. For 
example, there was no threat level for terrorist threats outside of those related to AQ or 
Northern Ireland, which demonstrated the minimal scope of the government’s terrorist 
prevention strategy. Furthermore, it was argued that far-right wing extremist organisations 
went unchecked because the criteria for determining terrorist organisations required them to 
                                                          
66 Introducing PVE, the government acknowledged, ‘there has always been a tiny minority who oppose tolerance 
and diversity’ (DCLG, 2007b: 2). However, the same document also stated that ‘the key measure of success will 
be demonstrable changes in attitudes among Muslims’ (DCLG, 2007b: 7; see also Thomas, 2010: 7).  
67 For a detailed analysis on animal rights and the question of terrorism, see Hadley (2009). 
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support other like-minded groups internationally (Rikabi, 2013). In response, the UK 
government stressed that only 17 people associated with far-right extremism were currently 
serving a sentence in Britain and thus, far-right extremism was considered far less serious a 
threat than that of AQ or similar Islamist terrorist groups. 68  However, the review into 
PREVENT also found that a majority (80 per cent) of respondents in the consultation believed 
that PREVENT should address the wider problems of far-right extremism (Awan and 
Blakemore, 2013; see also HM Government, 2011b). Whilst the UK government has 
recognised the threat posed by Islamist terrorist groups and as such banned certain groups 
which promote violence, critics argue similar far-right groups like the English Defence League 
(EDL) remain operational (the main difference between these groups being the ideologies and 
motives). For example, the Terrorism ACT 2000 created measures that meant certain 
international terrorist groups would not be able to operate in the UK (Home Office 2011, as 
cited in Awan and Blakemore, 2013: 11).        
      The Home Office review also argued that the 
PREVENT policy of the previous Labour Government had ‘not clearly recognised the way in 
which some terrorist ideologies draw on and make use of extremist ideas which are espoused 
and circulated by apparently non-violent organisations, very often operating within the law’ 
(HM Government, 2011b: 50). The proposal for a commitment to challenging not just “violent 
extremism” but “extremism” in general can, under The Terrorism Act 2006, be seen as a 
response to public criticism(s). For example, the criteria determining who was entitled to access 
funding was considered too loose so that groups that were “extremist”, but not engaged in 
criminal violence, could get funding (Kundnani, 2009: 20):69 
 
‘The PREVENT programme we inherited from the last Government failed to confront the extremist 
ideology at the heart of the threat we face; and in trying to reach those at risk of radicalisation, funding 
sometimes even reached the very extremist organisations that PREVENT should have been confronting’ 
(HM Government, 2011b: 1).70  
 
Moreover, much of the funded work was of little relevance to actually reducing the risk of 
extremism, since ‘PREVENT had not consistently reached the few people who are most 
                                                          
68 It could be argued this area of CT is still to be fully addressed (see Awan and Blakemore, 2013). 
69 It is argued that many projects have been manipulated by community organisations. For example, Choudhury 
talks about “PREVENT entrepreneurs” (Choudhury, 2012: 56-57; see also Kuzmic, 2011: 13).  
70 Derrida’s notion of “autoimmunity” is instructive in relation to this particular flaw in PREVENT. As Derrida 
(2003: 99-100) notes, an autoimmune crisis ‘ends up producing, reproducing, and regenerating the very thing it 
seeks to disarm’.  
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susceptible to terrorist propaganda’ (HM Government, 2011b: 7).   
 Ostensibly, there was also proposals for major renegotiation of PREVENT 
implementation and responsibilities regarding the intention to ensure the removal of 
communities’ work from the PREVENT agenda (Martin, 2014a). In the SDSR published in 
October 2010, a central concern regarding CONTEST II was the need to reform the counter-
radicalisation work stream, specifically through ‘separating it much more clearly than before 
from general communities’ policy’ (Cabinet Office, 2010: 42; see also House of Commons, 
2010). Whereas much of the original PREVENT work, including its focus on shared values 
and cohesion, had been implemented through the Home Office, it is now stated that the Home 
Office would lead on protecting those individuals most at risk from violent extremist influences 
(HM Government, 2011b). In contrast, the DCLG would be tasked with focussing solely on 
community cohesion and ethnic integration thus enabling local communities to be able to 
challenge extremists seeking to undermine ‘our way of life’ (DCLG, 2007a: 4; HM 
Government 2011b: 6).         
 Lastly, it was argued PREVENT nearly ignored any terrorist organisations that held 
their conduct on the Internet (see House of Commons, 2010; cf., HM Government, 2013b). 
Moreover, the 2007 discovery of unexploded car bombs in London and the 2007 Glasgow 
airport attack also highlighted the unreliability of CT to prevent attacks (Fisher, 2012). Given 
these criticisms, the UK government conceded that PREVENT was confused in its delivery of 
government policy to promote integration whilst simultaneously preventing terrorism. 
Subsequently, a new policy was released in 2011 allowing the coalition government the 
opportunity to initiate a new era of CT policy.    
 
2.6 PREVENT 2011: New Government, New Objectives 
      
In June 2011, a revised PREVENT strategy was released for public view having undergone a 
year-long parliamentary review.71 It is now accepted that the PREVENT strategy, as pursued 
by the DCLG (and defined by CONTEST II) is concerned with five strands (Meer, 2012: 12) 
– each conceived as prophylactic factors for people becoming or supporting terrorists or violent 
extremists. These are: 
                                                          
71 Specific aims of the review are outlined in HM Government (2011b). 
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(1) Challenging violent extremist ideology and supporting mainstream 
voices;                                                                                                                   
(2) Disrupting those who promote violent extremism and supporting the 
otherwise peaceful institutions where they are active;  
(3) Supporting individuals who are being targeted and recruited to the 
cause of violent extremism;      
(4) Increasing the resilience of communities to violent extremism;  
(5) Addressing the grievances that ideologues are exploiting.72  
 
These principles are supported by two ‘strategic enablers’: (i) developing understanding, 
analysis and information; and (ii) strategic communications (Turley, 2009: 6). In practice, 
working towards these objectives pivots around three main types of activity: 
 
• Counter-radicalisation – focuses upon inhibiting the spread and influence 
of extremist ideas both generally and in specific cases; 
 
• De-radicalisation – involves acts to reduce the influence of extremist ideas 
where they have gained traction; 
 
• Community cohesion building – is focused upon increasing the resilience 
of communities so that they are less likely to be influenced by extremist 
views.73  
 
Within this overall framework, the new PREVENT strategy is aligned around three specific 
objectives (now referred to as the three I’s: individuals, ideology, and institutions): 
 
•  Respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and aspects of extremism, 
and the threat we face from those who promote these views; 
 
• Provide practical help to prevent individuals from being drawn into 
terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support;  
                                                          
72 HM Government (2011b). 
73 Innes et al. (2011: 6). 
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• Work with a wide range of sectors/institutions (including education, 
criminal justice, faith, charities, the internet and health) where there are risks 
of radicalisation or which support counter-radicalisation work.74  
 
It is suggested that working with key sectors ensures that there is ‘an awareness and 
understanding of the risks of radicalisation and of how radicalises work and that each sector is 
capable of developing an effective response’ (HM Government, 2011b: 63, [Figure 102]). As 
the PREVENT strategy makes clear:  
 
‘Wherever possible, the partnership should comprise social services, policing, children’s services, youth 
services, UKBA, representatives from further and higher education, probation services, schools, local 
prisons, health and others as required by local need. We encourage greater levels of partnership working 
between local authorities and partners in future’ (HM Government, 2011b: 97 [Figure 11.12]).  
            
             Importantly, in its 
revised version, PREVENT challenges extremist (non-violent) ideas that are part of the terrorist 
ideology whilst remaining committed to protecting freedom of speech (HM Government, 
2011b: 6).75 However, championing British democratic values76 does not disappear. As the 
PREVENT strategy makes clear, ‘work to deal with radicalisation will depend on developing 
a sense of belonging to this country and support for our core values’ (HM Government, 2011b: 
5 [Figure 3.6]). Moreover, an emphasis on the lack of resilience in certain places and 
communities, which is said to allow the flourishing of apologists for violence, is also retained 
in the revised strategy. As the PREVENT policy outlines, ‘a stronger sense of belonging and 
citizenship makes communities more resilient to terrorist ideology and propagandists. We 
believe that PREVENT depends on integration, democratic participation and a strong interfaith 
dialogue’ (HM Government, 2011b: 28).   The concept of ‘identity’/‘values-
based tone’ (Thomas, 2012) also remains central to the reformatted PREVENT. As the strategy 
states, ‘some recent academic work suggests that radicalisation occurs as people search for 
identity, meaning and community. We note that organisations working on PREVENT have 
                                                          
74 HM Government (2011b: 7; HM Government, 2012a: 21). 
75 Protecting the right to freedom of expression is also reiterated in the Home Office report Tackling Extremism 
in the UK (HM Government, 2013b). 
76 Promoting British values is also heavily embedded within government policy discussion on education. See HM 
Government (2011b: 69 and 2012a: 21). 
51 
 
also found evidence to support the theory that identity and community are essential factors in 
radicalisation’ (HM Government, 2011b: 17). Moreover, the PREVENT strategy adds:  
 
‘Social movement and social network theory emphasise that radicalisation is a social process 
particularly prevalent in small groups. Radicalisation is about ‘who you know’. Group bonding, peer 
pressure and indoctrination are necessary to encourage the view that violence is a legitimate response 
to perceived injustice. We have also seen evidence to support this theory from classified government 
reporting’ (HM Government, 2011b: 17). 
 
Furthermore, with regard to the key drivers of radicalisation, the strategy suggests, ‘people who 
distrust Parliament, who believe that ethnic and faith cultural groups should not mix, and who 
see a conflict between being British and their own cultural identity are all likely to be more 
supportive of violent extremism’ (HM Government, 2011b: 18 [Figure 5.26]).77   
 Interestingly, promoting British values is also embedded within the definition of 
‘extremism’, defined as ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including 
democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different 
faiths and beliefs’ (HM Government, 2013b: 2). Of note, the definition of extremism has been 
expanded to include ‘calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this 
country or overseas’ (HM Government, 2013b: 2) - this most likely influenced by the murder 
of Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich, London, in 2013.  
 
2.7 PREVENT(ion) through Risk  
       
What is particularly apposite is the centrality of the word risk within the revised PREVENT 
policy. Indeed, the word ‘risk’ appears 105 times (see HM Government, 2011b). It is now 
accepted that PREVENT is presented as acting upon the risk of terrorism and is understood to 
address ‘radicalisation’ in the face of the ‘greatest risk to our security’ (HM Government, 2011: 
59). Moreover, although PREVENT is a national programme, under the revised strategy, it is 
said to be prioritised at local level according to risk assessment. As the PREVENT strategy 
states, ‘all communities are affected by the threat from terrorism but the nature and extent of 
the threat will vary across the country; local responses need to be appropriate to local 
circumstances’ (HM Government, 2012d: 5). In part, this is result of the government’s 
                                                          
77 Other key drivers include: racial or religious harassment; a negative view of policing; and perceptions of 
discrimination (HM Government, 2011b: 18, [Figure 5.26]). 
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“commitment to localism” more generally (HM Government, 2011b: 6).    The 
PREVENT review of June 2011 also significantly altered the size and approach of PREVENT 
(Thomas, 2014). Funding was restricted to 25 priority areas on an ‘intelligence-led basis’ and 
the sole, securitised control of the OSCT meant that local autonomy over PREVENT activity 
is significantly restricted (Thomas, 2014). As the PREVENT strategy makes clear, ‘funding 
will be made available by the Home Office to the 25 priority areas for project work on a grant 
basis and for activities which address specific local risks and are designed to establish specific 
PREVENT benefits’ (HM Government, 2011b: 98, 34). Moreover, the OSCT manages a 
network of up to 25 PREVENT co-ordinators within local authorities in defined priority areas. 
These people ensure smooth delivery of the policies by co-ordinating their: (1) police element; 
(2) local authorities; and (3) community partners (Kuzmic, 2011).78 In essence, PREVENT is 
now centred on ‘hotspots’ of potential radicalisation, with local co-ordinators (funded by the 
Home Office) tasked with directing local PREVENT-funded activity (Thomas, 2012).  
   An intelligence approach according to risk(s) can be read as conscious 
effort to distance PREVENT activity centred on community demographics (HM Government, 
2011: 11). For 2011/12, following an analysis of all local authority areas across the UK, the 25 
priority areas are as follows:  
 
• Barking and Dagenham • Birmingham • Blackburn with Darwen • Bradford • Brent • Camden 
• Derby • Ealing • Hackney • Hammersmith and Fulham • Haringey • Kensington and Chelsea 
• Lambeth • Leeds • Leicester • Lewisham • Luton • Manchester • Newham • Redbridge • 
Stoke-on-Trent • Tower Hamlets • Waltham Forest • Wandsworth • Westminster (HM 
Government, 2011b).79 
 
Of note, the PREVENT strategy also states, ‘we expect these areas to change over time’ (HM 
Government, 2011b: 95). As of 2013, 6 further areas have been added as ‘priority’. These are 
Cardiff; Enfield; Greenwich; High Wycombe; Islington; and Liverpool. Moreover, as of 2014, 
                                                          
78 Although the strategy was put together by OSCT, it captures the contributions of a broad range of governmental 
departments and agencies. For example, in 2011 figures show PREVENT had around 44,000 participants and 
funded 261 social integration projects (HM Government 2011b: 28, as cited Rikabi, 2013: 26). Three departments 
direct most of the policies anchored in the strategy: the Home Office, the DCLG and the FCO (HM Government 
2011b: 11). These departments provide funding and have their own offices for particular policies. The Department 
for Education (DfE) and Ministry of Justice (MoJ) also play smaller part. However, this set up has been criticised 
as departmental fragmentation supposedly leads to “competition for PREVENT pie” (Choudhury, 2012: 49).  
79 See Appendix D.  
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5 further areas have been identified as ‘supported areas’. These include Slough; Sandwell; 
Dudley; Walsall; and Kirklees.  
 There has also been a critical discursive shift towards understanding risk though 
a language of “vulnerability”, commonplace in the 2009 strategy and ubiquitous in the 2011 
revision (Martin, 2014b: 6). In the second version of CONTEST, the words ‘vulnerable’ and 
‘vulnerability’ (to describe those individuals vulnerable to ‘violent extremism’) were used no 
less than 32 times (Richards, 2012: 23). In the latest CONTEST strategy, this figure fell to 24 
but the updated PREVENT strategy used the words vulnerable, vulnerability or vulnerabilities 
in this context a total of 75 times (Richards, 2012: 23). Thus, while narratives of grievance do 
not disappear, in the revised version, there is a more explicit focus on the individual through 
the language of vulnerability. Accordingly, the subject of radicalisation becomes the individual 
who is “vulnerable to radicalisation”, “vulnerable to recruitment”, and “vulnerable to violent 
extremist messaging” (HM Government, 2011b: 83). As the PREVENT strategy outlines, ‘we 
judge that radicalisation is driven by personal vulnerabilities and specific local factors which, 
for a range of reasons, makes that ideology both attractive and compelling’ (HM Government, 
2011b: 5). The PREVENT strategy also adds, ‘we judge that communities who do not (or, 
alternatively, cannot) participate in all civic society are more likely to be vulnerable to 
radicalisation by all kinds of terrorist groups (HM Government, 2011b: 27, [Figure 6.20]). 
Moreover, psycho-cultural understandings of radicalisation are retained in the latest 
PREVENT strategy which outlines that a key driver of radicalisation is about “who you 
know”80 (Government, 2011b: 17 [Figure 5.23]).    In the revised 
policy, it is suggested vulnerability indicators not only have to be local in nature but also 
proportionate to local levels of risk. The ACPO (2008) implementation plan states: 
 
‘It is important that the local response to PREVENT is proportionate to the level of risk and vulnerability 
in the area, as determined by risk assessment ... delivery is likely to be more intense and comprehensive 
in those areas where risk and vulnerability is considered to be greatest’ (ACPO, 2008: 4, as cited in 
Innes et al., 2011:  72). 
 
The construction of judgements about relative risks and vulnerability is said to be grounded in 
the ‘richer picture’ process with such information contributing to the production of a ‘Counter‐
Terrorism Local Profile’ (CTLP hereafter) (Innes et al., 2011:  72). Developed and introduced 
                                                          
80 For a detailed analysis of psycho-cultural theories of radicalisation, see Horgan’s (2008) “bunch of guys” 
analysis. 
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in 2009, CTLPs are documents to be shared between key actors involved in delivering 
PREVENT. In brief, a CTLP is ‘a report that outlines the threat and vulnerability from 
terrorism-related activity within a specific area (e.g. police Basic Command Unit (BCU)/Local 
Policing Unit [LPU], local authority area or force)’ (HM Government, 2013: 3). Furthermore, 
the HM Government (2012b: 3) report outlines, ‘an essential part of engaging partners in 
PREVENT is making relevant information available to them to help them target activities and 
resources as effectively as possible’. Moreover, the most updated CONTEST review adds, ‘we 
continue to share with local authorities the CTLP, a summary of available information about 
terrorism and extremism in a specific area’ (HM Government, 2013: 21).81   It is 
posited that CTLPs help to achieve a ‘richer picture’ by outlining the threat, vulnerability and 
risk from extremist activity relating to terrorism within a specific area, thus providing partners 
with a practical and consistent approach to sharing CT-related information (HM Government, 
2012b). Specifically, the aims of a CTLP are to: (1) develop a joint understanding amongst 
local partners of the threats, vulnerabilities and risks relating to terrorism and non-violent 
extremism where it creates an environment conducive to terrorism; (2) provide information on 
which to base local PREVENT programmes and action plans; (3) support the mainstreaming 
of PREVENT activity into day-to-day policing, local government and partnership work; and 
(4) allow a targeted and proportionate use of shared resources (HM Government, 2012b: 7). 
Furthermore, detailed guidance about how to construct a CTLP has been issued to local forces 
and partners (Innes et al., 2011). Accordingly, local authorities and the police are responsible 
for ensuring that the local partnership action plan: (1) addresses the main objectives of the 
PREVENT strategy; (2) is jointly agreed and managed by the police, local authority and other 
partners; (3) is proportionate to the level of threat in the area; (4) reflects local needs; (5) sets 
out clear and tangible milestones in tracking progress and sets a process out for evaluation; and 
(6) is fed back into ACPO’s (TAM) Prevent Performance Framework in order to demonstrate 
progress against priority issues (HM Government, 2012b: 22). Of note, whilst CTLPs assist 
local policing bodies specifically in ‘focusing on key risk areas in relation to PREVENT (and 
other areas of CONTEST)’ (HM Government, 2012b: 13), it is suggested that a CTLP does not 
provide a complete assessment of activity in an area. Rather, Home Office policy recommends 
                                                          
81 Further decentralisation has also taken place resulting in a major change in the local CT landscape. Since 2012, 
the elected PCCs plan local PREVENT strategies while the Chief Constables remain independent. CT is thus 
becoming increasingly localised and employs more elements of “stakeholder security” (Jarvis and Lister, 2010). 
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that CTLPs are read in conjunction with other available information to produce a more 
complete overview of the risks in an area (HM Government, 2012b: 7).    
   
2.8 The CHANNEL Programme 
 
‘Risk is a theme that runs through the entire CHANNEL process: risk to the individual; risk to the 
public; and risk to statutory partners and any intervention providers’ (HM Government, 2012d). 
 
In 2007, APCO launched an extension of PREVENT known as the CHANNEL programme. 
CHANNEL is the core instrument of the second objective of PREVENT, protecting and 
supporting vulnerable individuals who are exhibiting radicalised behaviour, by working in 
partnership with communities and key partners to reduce or manage risk (HM Government, 
2011b). Funded through the OSCT,82 CHANNEL relies on co-ordinated activity at local level 
and uses existing collaborations between local authorities, the police, statutory partners 
(including the education sector, social services, children’s youth services and offender 
management services) and the local community (HM Government, 2012d: 7). Furthermore, 
official language describes CHANNEL as ‘a multi-agency programme to identify and provide 
support to people at risk of radicalisation’ (HM Government, 2011b: 55).    
 In its policy formation, CHANNEL provides a focus for public sector professionals and 
members of the community to refer individuals of concern to a multi-agency risk assessment 
and case management system bringing to bear a variety of resources and expertise to counter-
radicalisation (HM Government 2009a: 136; see also HM Government 2009b: 11-12). After 
an initial referral, risk assessments are made on each individual case and a programme of 
‘intervention’ is tailored to suit the individual’s needs (HM Government 2009a, 172–173, 150). 
Moreover, CHANNEL is modelled on other successful multi-agency risk management 
processes, such as child protection, domestic violence and the management of high risk 
offenders; it uses processes which also safeguard people at risk from crime, drugs or gangs 
(HM Government, 2011b: 57).     At the time of writing, 
CHANNEL covers 75 local authorities and 12 police forces (HM Government, 2011b: 57). 
Furthermore, as CHANNEL processes have matured, the number of CHANNEL referrals 
nationally has increased and now stands at a total figure of 3934 referrals (ACPO, 2014; see 
Figure 2.8). 
                                                          
82 The total funding for CHANNEL for the period April 2007 to March 2011 was approximately £4.7 million 
(HM Government, 2011b: 60). There is no data entry for the period 2011-2015. 
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Year CHANNEL Referrals 
2007-2008 5 
2008-2009 75 
2009-2010 179 
2010-2011 467 
2011-2012 599 
2012-2013 748 
2013-2014 1281 
2014-2015 No data 
Figure 2.8: National ACPO Statistics for CHANNEL Referrals 2006-201483 
 
Not all individuals referred will be assessed as being vulnerable to being drawn into 
violent extremism, or in need of support from CHANNEL. Out of 3934 referrals, some 777 (20 
per cent of referrals) were assessed by a multi-agency panel to be vulnerable to being attracted 
towards terrorism and will have gone on to receive support through the CHANNEL process 
(ACPO, 2014; see also HM Government, 2012d). Furthermore, whilst CHANNEL supports 
vulnerable individuals of any age, figures indicate an emphasis on supporting impressionable 
young people. For instance, between April 2007 and the end of March 2014, CHANNEL 
received 1450 referrals that were under the age of 18 at the time they were referred (ACPO, 
2014).84 However, ACPO (2014) also note that many of these individuals would not have been 
suitable for CHANNEL intervention and thus would have been sign-posted to more appropriate 
services. This observation is reiterated in the PREVENT strategy which states, ‘the referral 
process can, if poorly handled, include people who are not at risk of radicalisation’ (HM 
Government, 2011b: 56).       There is a practitioner 
responsible for co-ordinating delivery of CHANNEL in all areas. In addition, a CHANNEL 
project requires a multi-agency panel and information sharing protocols (HM Government, 
2012d: 7). Thus, some areas have a dedicated police CHANNEL co-ordinator who establishes 
and maintains a panel, which may include members of local authorities, social workers, schools 
                                                          
83 ACPO (2013b, 2014).  
84 These figures have been drawn from police forces by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) who is 
responsible for collating information on CHANNEL at national level. Recording standards have varied over time 
and across forces, so aggregated data may not be internally consistent and there is some evidence of imperfect 
data entry (ACPO, 2014).  
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and universities or people from local community85 (HM Government, 2011b: 55). In other 
areas, this role is carried out by a police officer or member of staff as part of an individual’s 
responsibilities, for example, by a PREVENT Engagement Officer (PEO) or Single Point of 
Contact (SPOC) within the police force. It is suggested PEOs and SPOCs have access to the 
support and expertise of the CHANNEL co-ordinators within their region (HM Government, 
2012d: 7). Further, the role of the multi-agency panel is to develop an appropriate support 
package to safeguard those at risk of being drawn into terrorism based on an assessment of 
their vulnerability (HM Government, 2012d). The panel is thus responsible for managing the 
safeguarding risk, which is in line with other multi-agency panels where risk is managed, such 
as Children and Adult Safeguarding panels and Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements 
(MAPPA) (HM Government, 2012d).       
   The CHANNEL process begins through a referral of the “vulnerable 
individual” made by “referral partner” (teachers, social and youth workers, etc.)86 McGready 
(2011) suggests vulnerability indicators can be broken down into ‘expressed opinions’, 
‘material indicators’, ‘behaviour and behavioural changes’, and ‘personal history’. A snapshot 
of vulnerability indictors is reproduced in Figure 2.8.1.  
                                                          
85 These are closely aligned to the PREVENT priority areas. 
86 Appendix E outlines the CHANNEL Model Scheme, as described in HM Government (2012d: 15).  
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Figure 2.8.1: Examples of Vulnerability Indicators (as cited in McGready, 2011). 
After the initial screening for appropriateness, a preliminary assessment is led by the 
CHANNEL police practitioner and will include their line manager and, if appropriate, senior 
statutory partners (such as the local authority, the police, Probation Trusts, children’s and youth 
services and the education sector). The most recent guidelines published lists 22 “vulnerability 
factors” (referred to as ERG22 or “Extreme Risk Guidance 22”), broken down into three 
dimensions, which include:  
 
• Engagement with a group, cause or ideology;  
• Intent to cause harm; and  
• Capability to cause harm (HM Government, 2012d: 11). 
 
Snapshots of the three dimensions for radicalisation are reproduced in Figure 2.8.2; Figure 
2.8.3; and Figure 2.8.4 (taken from HM Government, 2012c). 
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Figure 2.8.2: Psychological Hooks 
 
Figure 2.8.3: Intent Factors 
 
Figure 2.8.4: Capability Factors 
 
It is suggested these three dimensions also help to inform whether support is needed and what 
form support will take. It is also envisaged that through tracking these factors, the individual’s 
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progress can be charted. At this point partners should collectively assess the risk and decide 
whether the person: (1) is vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism and therefore appropriate 
for CHANNEL; (2) should be referred to a different support mechanism; or (3) should exit the 
process (see HM Government, 2012c). Moreover, in assessing risk, it is suggested that due 
consideration should be given to: (i) the risk the individual faces of being drawn into terrorism; 
and (ii) the risk the individual poses to society (HM Government, 2012c).  
 
2.9 Conclusion   
          
This chapter has outlined the origins, assumptions and content of PREVENT, as part of 
CONTEST, since its policy inception in 2006. In doing so, this chapter has detailed the key 
modifications made to PREVENT by both Labour and Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition governments. Several significant areas have been explored as linked to the operations 
of PREVENT, such as PREVENT funding structure; the diffusion of PREVENT 
responsibilities through community involvement; and the development of PREVENT policing. 
Further, whilst PREVENT remains a model from which most European governments have 
taken inspiration (Vidino and Brandon, 2012: 164), it is also important to acknowledge the 
rather clumsy and contradictory implementation of PREVENT pre-2011. Thus, this chapter 
has also engaged with several of the fervent criticisms and concerns expressed over PREVENT 
as a policy.         This chapter has also 
explored how ‘radicalisation’ has been made possible as a discourse - one that enables the 
performance of security around it (Heath-Kelly, 2013). Theoretically, this allows practitioners 
tasked with counter-radicalisation to act upon futurity through the concept of ‘vulnerability’ as 
linked to risk. Whilst the aim of this chapter has been one of making sense of this particularly 
complex policy, PREVENT (or more specifically PP) provides a blueprint to explore the 
empirical actualities of two risk positions at local level. The concern of the thesis now turns 
towards each risk position beginning with Michel Foucault’s securite de dispositif, as borne 
through the concept of ‘governmentality’.  
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
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Dispositif, Governmentality and Risk 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter engages with the turn to risk management and measurement as practices of 
governing in line with Foucauldian thought. While the univocal logic of ‘risk society’ tends to 
take a weak social constructionist approach to incalculable risk in concert with a critical 
structuralist perspective, advocates of Foucauldian approaches mostly adopt a ‘strong’ version 
of social constructionism and a post-structuralist approach to power relations (Lupton, 1999: 
84). Importantly, such analyses posit the diversity of risk practices can be understood as a 
deployment of a governmental dispositif (or securite de dispositif as it is originally referred) to 
govern social problems (Aradau and van Munster, 2007). The first part of the chapter discusses 
Foucault’s original concept of dispositif including dispositif as ‘apparatus’, dispositif power as 
a ‘network’, and dispositif as ‘productive’. As a caveat, the concept of risk is not discussed 
within this part of the chapter since Foucault did not put risk at the heart of his notion of 
dispositif. Following this, Foucault’s concept of governmentality is explored including 
governmentality read as ‘population’, ‘subjectification’, ‘circulation’, and ‘milieu’. 
           The second 
half of the chapter engages with literature that spans the pervasive idiom of exceptionalism; a 
revised calculus of risk that hyper-extends to ‘precautionary’ measures within risk rationality; 
and the subsequent modification of sovereignty.87 Specifically, the chapter explores exegeses 
of Foucault’s notion of dispositif under the logic of dispositif ‘precautionary risk’ that is 
deployed at the horizon of catastrophic future and radical uncertainty (see Aradau and van 
Munster, 2007, 2008a and b). Accordingly, this chapter draws attention to how the 
identification and management of risk is said to be a way of organising reality, taming the 
future, disciplining chance and rationalising individual conduct (Aradau and van Munster, 
2008b: 26; Hacking 1990). Moreover, the chapter highlights how pre-emptive strategies are 
said to be wedded to a creeping shift in risk assessment from retrospective estimations of harm 
to an outlook based on futurity (Mythen and Walklate, 2008: 221). This shift to a ‘state of pre-
emption’ (Ericson, 2008) ushers in a number of dilemmas around the political deployment of 
discourses of risk (Mythen and Walklate, 2008: 221). As a final caveat, whilst security studies 
have been profoundly interested in the changing practices of surveillance post-9/11 and 7/7, it 
                                                          
87 See Dean (2010) for a similar analysis of such trajectories.  
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is not surveillance per se that concern the contributions of the latter half of the chapter, but risk 
as a technology of preventative practice and pre-emptive imagining (cf., Amoore and de Goede, 
2005; Lyon, 2003).   
 
3.2 Securite de Dispositif: ‘Apparatus’ 
        
In an interview with philosopher Roger-Pol Droit in 1975, Michel Foucault outlined a key 
concept to use in order to grasp the power of play (Cote, 2007: 9).88 Here, Foucault cites an 
exceptionally detailed definition of the dispositif, one that translates as ‘apparatus’:  
 
‘What I'm trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble of 
discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, 
scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions - in short, the said as much 
as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that 
can be established between these elements. Secondly, what I am trying to identify in this apparatus is 
precisely the nature of the connection that can exist between these heterogeneous elements. Thus, a 
particular discourse can figure at one time as a programme of an institution, and at another it can 
function as a means of justifying or masking a practice which itself remains silent, or as a secondary 
reinterpretation of this practice, opening out for it a new field of rationality. In short, between these 
elements, whether discursive or non-discursive, there is a sort of interplay of shifts of positions and 
modifications of function which can also vary very widely. Thirdly, I understand by the term ‘apparatus’ 
a sort of - shall we say - formation which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of 
responding to an urgent need’ (Foucault, 1980b: 194-195; cf., Foucault, 1980a). 
 
Theorists drawing upon Foucault have used various terms to refer to the way in which 
heterogeneous elements are assembled to address an “urgent need” and invested with strategic 
purpose (Foucault 1980a: 194).89 These include apparatus, deployment, mechanism, construct, 
alignment, technology of government, regime of practices, assemblage, positivities, etc. 
However, following Agamben’s (2009) reading of dispositif, I simply wish to differentiate 
dispositif from apparatus, noting that for Foucault the latter is contained in the former. As 
Foucault notes, ‘the apparatus itself is the network that can be established between these 
elements ... By the term ‘apparatus’ I mean a kind of formation, so to speak, that at a given 
                                                          
88 As well as drawing upon the work of Foucault, I have also drawn generously from Agamben (2009), Cote 
(2007) and Deleuze (1992), given their exceptionally detailed reading(s) of Foucault’s concept of ‘dispositif’.  
89 See also Dean (1999: 21); Rose (1999: 52). 
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historical moment has as its major function the response to an urgency’ (Foucault, 1980a: 194). 
           Borrowing 
the term “positivity” from Hegel90  (which he later applies under the guise of apparatus), 
Foucault takes a position with respect to a decisive problem: the relation between individuals 
as living beings and the historical element (Agamben, 2009: 4). In this sense, the “historical 
element” constitutes the set of institutions, of processes of subjectification, and of rules in 
which power relations become concrete (Agamben, 2009). Thus, as Agamben (2009: 4) 
observes, Foucault’s ultimate aim is not the reconciliation of the two elements; it is not even to 
emphasise their conflict. For Foucault, what is at stake is rather the investigation of concrete 
modes in which the positivities (or the apparatuses) act within the relations, mechanisms, and 
“plays” of power (Agamben, 2009: 4). To put it differently, the emphasis here lies not simply 
on the collection of elements per se (the purpose) but also on the system of relations established 
between the elements (Deleuze, 1992).     The relationship between 
the elements can be conceptualised in relations of knowledge (discourse), 91  power, and 
subjectivity (Brigg, 2001: 3). However, as Deleuze (1992: 159) notes, for Foucault, 
‘knowledge, power and subjectivity are a series of variables which supplant one another’. In 
other words, Foucault assumes that ‘power produces knowledge’ and they directly imply one 
another (Foucault, 1977: 27). Thus, Foucault directs his attention to understanding how the 
exercise of control in a society and its history disguises, rarefies and wraps itself systematically 
in a language of truth, discipline, rationality and knowledge (Perezalonso, 2009). Foucault is 
interested in solving this problem: 
 
‘Relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the 
production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse. We are subjected to the production 
of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth’ (Foucault, 
1980b: 93). 
By Foucault’s own admission, understanding the precise nature of the interconnection 
between the heterogeneous elements is no easy task: ‘it is like a game, the changing of 
positions, the modifications of function, which can also vary widely’ (Foucault, 2001: 299, as 
                                                          
90 Although Foucault borrowed the term from Hegel, Hegel is indebted to the teachings of Jean Hyppolite for the 
concept of “positivities”.  
91 As Ditrych (2013: 2) observes, discourse is understood as including ‘a specific collection of statements for 
which certain conditions of existence can be defined, and a system of their formation determining what can be 
said and how and where the boundaries that delimit the marginalised and excluded lie. Discourse has ontological 
power (pouvoir d’affirmation) with respect to the domains of objects. It does not create being out of nothingness; 
but it is indispensable in endowing this being with meaning, in forming logos from chaos’ (see also Foucault, 
1981). 
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cited in Cote, 2007: 43). Moreover, this game is comprised of relations of power and 
knowledge and therein such relations are fundamental to the constitution of any dispositif 
(Cote, 2007). The dispositif is therefore ‘always inscribed in a game of power, but it is also 
always linked to one or many limits of knowledge, which emerge from but equally condition 
the dispositif’ (Foucault, 2001: 300, as cited in Cote, 2007: 42, emphasis added). In The Order 
of Discourse, for example, Foucault outlines the hypothesis that a constitution of any dispositif 
is the many limits of knowledge. Foucault notes that, ‘in every society the production of 
discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of 
procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance 
events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality’ (Foucault, 1981: 52). However, for now, 
understanding “dispositif” as borne through the notion of positivity, Agamben (2009: 6) 
advances the hypothesis that “apparatus” is an essential technical term in Foucault’s thought 
(cf., Ploger, 2008). Apparatuses are, in point of fact, what take the place of the universals (les 
universaux) in the Foucauldian strategy; not simply this or that police measure, this or that 
technology of power, and not even the generality obtained by their abstraction (Agamben, 
2009). Rather, an apparatus is ‘the network (Ie reséau) that can be established between these 
elements’ (Agamben, 2009: 7).  
 
3.2.1 Dispositif: Power as ‘Network’  
      
Power - in its complex and polyvalent myriad relations - is always both an effect and a 
constitutive element of any dispositif (Cote, 2007: 131). Power is perhaps most clearly visible 
in Foucault’s 1977-78 College de France lectures, Securite, Territoire, Population (see inter 
alia Foucault, 2007). Foucault begins by exhorting that the juridical model of sovereignty be 
abandoned; to not look at power as if it has a single centre, but at its extremities, its maternal  
means of intervention and its actual apparatuses of violence (Foucault, 2007). As Foucault 
(1980b: 102-103) notes, ‘we should direct our researches towards domination and the material 
operators of power - towards forms of subjection and the inflections and utilisations of their 
localised systems, and towards strategic apparatuses. We must eschew the model of the 
Leviathan in the study of power’. This methodological shift to more complex causal relations 
reflects Foucault’s inexorable turn to seeing power as diffused, decentralised, and arranged in 
microphysical relations (Cote, 2007).        
 In his analysis of the implementation of polyvalent disciplinary power, whether in 
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schools, in army barracks, in emerging industrial factories, or in prisons, Foucault posits that 
the dispositif stands as a rebuke of the notion that power is monolithic or as a centralised point 
(Foucault, 2003a: 266-77). Rather, Foucault envisages power as ‘relations of force that 
intersect or, on the contrary, come into conflict and strive to negate one another’ (Foucault, 
2003a: 266-7). This is why Foucault speaks ‘of a regime of multiple governmentalities’, of 
which governing is ‘much more than reigning of ruling’ (Foucault, 2007: 76-77); government 
is concerned with man’s conduct qua his relations with other man and things. Ultimately, the 
notion of dispositif makes untenable the vision of a single central luminous source, which emits 
power into a variegated spectrum (Cote, 2007). As Deleuze (1992: 73), drawing upon Foucault, 
articulates: 
 
‘These power-relations, which are simultaneously local, unstable and diffuse, do not emanate from a 
central point or unique locus of sovereignty, but at each moment move ‘from one point to another’ in a 
field of forces, marking inflections, resistances, twists and turns, when one changes direction, or retraces 
one’s steps’. 
 
This declaration of a shift flags a significant reconceptualisation of power, namely that 
power that is not a commodity possessed by individual subjects, but an expression of relations 
of power and knowledge which is both iterable and polyvalent (Cote, 2007: 22). However, as 
the term ‘resistances’ suggests, power and it’s dispositifs are always a site of contestation; the 
composition of those complex networked relations of struggle are always changing, cohering 
and diverging, depending on the particular relations of force at a given historical moment (Cote, 
2007: 131-132). In this way, the heterogeneous lines that make up a dispositif are not like the 
iron bars of a prison cell; they are more like the lines that link different nodes in a network - 
and such complex relations are always open to rearticulation, to further cohesion or divergence 
(Cote, 2007: 162). As Deleuze (1992) makes clear, one could speak of hard lines of 
sedimentation but within a dispositif, there are always lines of “breakage” and “fracture”. In 
short, dispositifs always leak; they are always in process, sometimes attaining greater cohesion, 
other times, breaking apart into new formations (Cote, 2007: 162). This is why ‘dispositifs are 
subject to changes in direction, bifurcating and forked and subject to drifting’ (Deleuze, 1992: 
189, italics in original). Thus, following their emergence, elements are always subject to 
renegotiation, displacement, or consolidation (Brigg, 2001). Moreover, untangling these lines 
within a dispositif is like drawing a map, doing cartography; this is what Foucault terms 
‘working on the ground’ (Deleuze, 1992: 159).      
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     Understanding power and networks of Power (with a 
capital P) this way, Foucault directs our gaze to the first element of the dispositif; that it is not 
a hermeneutic instrument but a heterogeneous ensemble which produces meaning and 
subjectivity through the particular composition of its elements (Cote, 2007: 9). There is not a 
single dispositif of power; it proposes neither an “organising finality” nor a “universal frame” 
nor is it merely determined by the unitary necessity of the mode of production (Cote, 2007: 9). 
Rather, a dispositif refers to a complex network of relations, to combinatory processes that 
allow us to ‘see and speak’ (Deleuze, 1992). Thus, dispositifs are neither transcendental nor 
totalising: ‘they are expressive combinatory machines which make words, things, and 
subjectivities intelligible’ (Cote, 2007: 10). Importantly, the visibility of what we can see that 
of which we speak valorised in terms of power cannot be traced back to a general source of 
light, which could be said to fall upon pre-existing objects; it is made from lines of light which 
form variable shapes inseparable from the apparatus itself (Deleuze, 1992). Thus, the discursive 
and non-discursive heterogeneous elements are not linked in any inherent or originary way, but 
are compositional in particular relations and answer to certain greater problems in a particular 
society (Peltonen, 2004: 216). Therefore, each apparatus has its own way of structuring light, 
the way in which it falls, it disperses, its blurs, disturbing the visible and the invisible, giving 
birth to objects which are dependable on it for their existence (Deleuze, 1992: 160). According 
to Deleuze (1992: 166), ‘a dispositif compromises truths of enunciation, truths of light and 
visibility, truths of power, truths of subjectivation. Truth is the actualisation of the lines which 
constitute a dispositif’.   
 
3.2.2 Dispositif as Productive 
 
The dispositif is not simply a heterogeneous ensemble of domination; Foucault is also clear 
about the productive role of the dispositif:  
 
‘The apparatus therefore has a dominant strategic function ... I said that the nature of an apparatus is 
essentially strategic, which means that we are speaking about a certain manipulation of relations of 
forces, of a rational and concrete intervention in the relation of forces, either so as to develop them in a 
particular direction, or to block them, to stabilise them, and to utilise them’ (Foucault, 1980b: 194-196). 
 
The centrality of production can be seen in some of the most detailed and meticulous passages 
in Discipline and Punish (see Foucault, 1977). For Foucault, general tactics are employed in 
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diverse institutional contexts to satisfy functional imperatives; space is organised, enclosed, 
partitioned and divided according to hierarchical rankings, such that individual activities can 
be at once supervised and optimised (Foucault, 1977: 141-149). Moreover, for Foucault, time 
is divided, regulated, programmed and coded, such that individual activities can be 
synchronised according to predetermined rhythms and incorporated into efficiently functioning 
machines (Foucault, 1977: 149-156). Spatial distributions and temporal patterns are then co-
ordinated, so that the institution in question can attain maximum efficiency with a minimum of 
interference (Foucault, 1977: 156-69). The common denominator of these heterogeneous 
tactics is their basic target - namely, ‘the ordering of human multiplicities’ (I’ordonnance des 
multiplicities humaines) (Foucault, 1977: 218) which, according to the disciplinary dispositif, 
must be rendered at once docile and useful (Brenner, 1994: 692). Moreover, whilst Foucault 
never provided a theoretical exposition of his basic categories, as Brenner (1994: 291) 
observes, his extensive use of the term “function” in Discipline and Punish suggests the 
following definition: ‘a function is any discourse, practice, or effect of the latter which 
produces a designated or latent consequence in a given social context. A dispositif emerges 
when a cluster of functions aims toward the same set of targets, such that a functional system 
is formed’.      In The History of Sexuality, Volume: 1 
(HoS hereafter), the concept of dispositif has an even more visible productive role. The basic 
thesis of HoS is the explicit inflection of examining power through a dispositif of sexuality, 
which is inscribed on the body and exercised in myriad relations. In other words, we, as 
subjects, are not “outside” dispositifs, because, as Foucault (1980b: 128) observes, ‘it is not 
possible to place one’s self outside’. Rather, for Deleuze (1992: 164), drawing upon Foucault, 
‘[w]e belong to social apparatus (read ‘dispositifs’) and act within them’. Yet, Foucault insists 
quite explicitly against Weberian theories of bureaucratisation and organisational 
rationalisation; that this dispositif is never reducible to the institutions through which it operates 
(Brenner, 1994): 
 
‘‘Discipline’ may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus (appareil); it is a type 
of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, 
levels of application, targets ... it may be taken over either by ‘specialised’ institutions ... or by 
institutions that use it as an essential instrument for a particular end ... or by pre-existing authorities that 
find in it a means of reinforcing or reorganising their internal mechanisms of power ... or by apparatuses 
(des appareils) that have made discipline their principle of internal functioning ... or finally by state 
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apparatuses (des appareils etatiques) whose major, if not exclusive, function, is to assure that discipline 
reigns over society as a whole’ (Foucault, 1977: 215-216; see also Brenner, 1994: 692).  
 
In this way, there is no a priori causality or determination - that is, there is no non-discursive 
base from which the discursive emanates, nor is there a transcendental subject which provides 
a normative matrix to co-ordinate those effects (Cote, 2007). Indeed, the utility of the dispositif 
comes to those with whom it answers a particular need (Foucault, 1980b). Typically, it involves 
identifying an “urgent need” and then delineating the various responses, specifically those that 
result in a cohesive network of relations (Foucault, 1996). As Cote (2007: 137), drawing upon 
Foucault, suggests, ‘an attempt is made to resolve it with an entire arsenal of implements and 
arms (the laws concerning the poor, the more-or-less forced isolation and, finally, 
imprisonment)’. However, this does not necessitate a strictly instrumental response, or a 
“simple” tautological affirmation: “I, reason, exercise power over you, madness”. Instead, it is 
a reflexive dynamic process, which plays out in a complex set of relations. Or, in Foucault’s 
(1996: 259) words, ‘the heterogeneity of power – how power is always born of something other 
than itself’. Unravelling the complex relations that bring about this need is one way of 
proceeding if there is neither an ordinary subject nor an unchanging, objective, transcendent 
truth (Cote, 2007: 44).      Having outlined some of 
the major tenets of Foucault’s securite de dispositif, the chapter now turns towards a focus upon 
Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’. It is recognised that the concept of the ‘dispositif’ is 
based on Foucault’s work on governmentality which has correctly been regarded as a “key 
notion” (Allen, 1991: 431) of his work. However, since the usage of the term governmentality 
can be applied as a way of refiguring the overall trajectory of Foucauldian thought, it is 
important to clarify and distinguish the concept of governmentality. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Governmentality 
 
Unlike the critical-realist scholarship on risk pioneered by Beck and Giddens, a 
governmentality approach contends that, ‘there is no such thing as risk in reality’ (Dean, 1999: 
177). Consequently, a strength of the governmentality approach is that it does not buy into the 
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ontological aspects of the things it describes (Joseph, 2012). Thus, rather than being 
preoccupied with the obsolescent ontological debate which grapples with the question ‘is risk 
really out there?’ A Foucauldian approach goes a step further in its analysis to reveal how risk 
acts as a ‘dispositif’ through which the rationality of neoliberalism shapes modern life, 
regimenting our conduct, and legitimising a wide-reaching security architecture geared to 
survey, categorise and target entire populations by governing them ‘at arm’s-length’ (Clapton, 
2011).             It is 
within the lectures of 1978 and 1979 that focus on the ‘genealogy of the modern state’92 where 
Foucault coins the concept of governmentality (Lemke, 2002). As Rose (1999: 3) observes: 
 
‘Within these lectures Foucault sketched some pathways for analysing power that were not transfixed 
by the image of the state or the constitutive oppositions of conventional political philosophy or political 
sociology. They defined their problem space in terms of government, understood, in the words of 
Foucault’s much-cited maxim, as “the conduct of conduct”’.93  
 
This maxim argues that strategies of political rule, from the earliest moments of the modern 
nation state, entailed complex and variable relations between calculations and actions of those 
seeking to exercise rule over a territory, a population, a nation and a microphysics of power 
acting at a capillary level within a multitude of practices of control that proliferate across a 
territory (Rose, 1999: 17). Importantly, Foucault links this concept to the dispositif, which 
makes possible an analysis of ‘polymorphous techniques of subjugation’ (Brenner, 1994: 685). 
Thus, fundamentally, it is a term that encompasses ‘governing the self’ to ‘governing others’ 
(Lemke, 2002: 2).          In this 
vein, Foucault endeavoured to show how the modern sovereign state and the modern 
autonomous individual co-determine each other’s emergence (Lemke, 2002: 2-3). As Deleuze 
(1986) observes, in the space left open by the disappearance of the Weberian problem of 
legitimate domination, a persistent questioning ranges the whole of Foucault’s work: how are 
we to seize these infinitesimal, diffused and heterogeneous power relations so that they do not 
always result in phenomena of domination or resistance? How can this new ontology of forces 
open up to unexpected processes of political constitution and independent processes of 
                                                          
92 For Foucault (2007: 286), a body like the state is indispensable for governmentality: ‘the state is therefore a 
schema of intelligibility for a whole set of already established institutions, a whole set of given realities’.  
93 As Lazzarato (2006: 15-16) points out, elements of “the conduct of conduct” maxim were already found in the 
Nietzschean concept of “forces” that was the precursor to Foucault’s conception of “strategic relations”. This 
modality, defined as an “action upon an action,” spreads through the will to “control the conduct of others”.  
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subjectification?94 Understood this way, the problem of security is not simply a problem of law 
or legal transgression. The problem of security is always a problem of security governance (see 
Dean, 2007).         In Foucault’s much cited 
monographs and lectures, he uses governmentality in two ways. In the first instance, his 
discussion of governmentality encompasses a historical narrative about the shifting governing 
rationalities of political modernity (Lyness, 2014: 84). As Foucault (2007: 14) makes clear:  
 
‘First, by “governmentality” I understand the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses 
and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very 
complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, 
and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument. Second, by “governmentality” I 
understand the tendency, the line of force, that for a long time, and throughout the West, has constantly 
led towards the pre-eminence over all other types of power - sovereignty, discipline, and so on - of the 
type of power that we can call “government” and which has led to the development of a series of specific 
governmental apparatuses (appareils) on the one hand, (and, on the other) to the development of a series 
of knowledges (savoirs). Finally, by “governmentality” I think we should understand the process, or 
rather, the result of the process by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the 
administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually “governmentalised”’ 
(Foucault, 2007: 144). 
 
Second, the semantic linking of governing (“gouverner”) and modes of thought 
(“mentalité”) indicates that it is not possible to study the technologies of power without an 
analysis of the political rationality underpinning them (Lemke, 2002: 2-3). When taken 
together, these complex relationships establish a framework through which political discourse 
is circumscribed and reiterated (Foucault, 2007). For example, in modernity it is argued all 
forms of government have attempted to ‘rationalise’ themselves, to account for the ‘authority 
of their authority’ (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 15). Rationalities appear therefore as 
knowledgeable discourses that represent objects of knowledge, confer identities and agencies 
upon social and political actors, and identify problems to be solved (Dean and Hindess, 1998). 
In essence, rationalities make social problems practically manageable. Accordingly, 
technologies are the means of realisation of rationalities: the social practices that are aimed at 
manipulating the social and physical world according to identifiable routines (O'Malley, 1992: 
269; see inter alia Foucault, 1988b). As such, governmental rationalities and technologies 
                                                          
94 See Lazzarato (2006).  
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affect behaviour and ‘construct’ forms of ordered agency and subjectivity for governing the 
conduct of individuals, collectivities and populations95 (Aradau, 2004: 264).  
 
3.3.1 Governmentality: Population 
 
As Foucault’s description of governmentality highlights, governmentality has “the 
population”96 as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses 
of security as its essential technical instrument (Foucault, 2007: 108, 144). Importantly, from 
a Foucauldian point, “population” does not mean people but is a statistical category, neither 
the individual as singularity, nor the people as a whole (Bigo, 2008). Population and the 
environment are perceived to be in a perpetual living interrelation of which the state must 
manage (Foucault, 1988a: 160). In Foucault (1988a: 160) words, ‘the true object of the police 
becomes ... the population’. As such, it leads again to an opposition with discipline (Foucault, 
2004: 57). Discipline classifies, and establishes a division between the capable and the 
incapable (the normal from the abnormal in Foucauldian terms) (see Foucault, 1977). In 
contrast to disciplinary normalisation, as Bigo (2008: 99), drawing upon Foucault, points out:  
 
‘Security starts from cases, from their statistical distribution, from the differential risks posed by each 
case, from the probabilities of their occurrence and it determines whether they are more or less 
dangerous, whether they have a greater or lesser chance of occurring in reality. It shows dramatically 
that in its contrary aspect insecurity, or more precisely (in)security, there is only one and the same 
process: the norm is sought from the starting point of the most pronounced curves of the statistical 
distribution of danger which are labelled as abnormal’.   
 
Moreover, in Foucault (2007: 65; 2007: 93) words, ‘[t]he operation of normalisation consists 
in establishing an interplay between these different distributions of normality and (in) acting to 
bring the most unfavourable in line with the more favourable’. The norm that Foucault speaks 
of ‘is an interplay of differential normalities. The normal comes first and the norm is deduced 
from it’ (Foucault, 2007: 65). Foucault stresses the articulation of the security-insecurity 
process grounded on the phenomenon, not attempting to hinder it, or stop it (Bigo, 2008: 100), 
but, on the contrary, ‘making other elements of reality function in relation to it, in such a way 
                                                          
95 See Dean (1999); Ewald (1991); Lupton (1998).  
96 Foucault understands population not as the entirety of all the state’s subjects, but as an entity “with its specific 
phenomena and processes” (Foucault, 2007: 66).  
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that the phenomenon is cancelled out’ (Foucault, 2007: 88).    
 Viewed through this Foucauldian lens, the dispositif of risk is instrumental in producing 
a strategic ordering of society whereby ‘risk identities’ are attributed to individuals, groups and 
‘failed’ or illiberal states necessitating targeted interventions which extend the neoliberal 
project (Clapton and Hameiri, 2011). As Bishop (2014: 232), drawing on the work of Clapton 
and Hameiri (2011), suggests:  
 
‘HIV is socially constructed as universally de-bounded ‘risk’ which merits more urgent international 
policy responses than peripheral problems such as curable disease and famine. This kind of strategic 
ordering produces risk-based hierarchies which privilege certain forms of life over others, protecting 
the core from risks accumulating in the ‘illiberal’ periphery’. 
 
This is one of the defining qualities of governmentality: a concern with the welfare of the 
population, the improvement of its condition, and the increase it its wealth, longevity, health 
and so on (Foucault, 1978 [2001]: 216-217).  
 
3.3.2 Governmentality: Subjectification 
 
Foucault uses the notion of government in a comprehensive sense geared strongly to the older 
meaning of the term and adumbrating the close link between forms of power and processes of 
subjectification (Lemke, 2001: 191). As Lemke (2002: 2; see also Foucault, 1991) observes, 
‘“government” also signified problems of self-control, guidance for the family and for children, 
management of the household, directing the soul, etc.’ Analysing this trajectory in Foucauldian 
thought, Reid (2008: 27) applies the term strategisation and questions: ‘how is it that the 
aleatory fixation of the natural body becomes the enemy against which the norm of a population 
is defined? How is it that those norms which constitute society, aided by the demographic 
sciences of population become the foundation for a security project through which the 
populations involved become mobilised?’97 Fundamentally, according to Foucault, the basis of 
threats posed by natural life are established by the biopolitical constitution of a society (Reid, 
2008).98          For 
                                                          
97 See inter alia Foucault (1991).  
98 Providing a detailed examination of biopolitics is beyond the scope of this chapter. The purpose here is less to 
track the early history of the biopolitics of security and its complex relation with the emergence and subsequent 
development of life science, however, than to establish how and why biopolitical technologies of governance 
constitute a distinctive dispositif.   
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Foucault, biopower (also understood as biological traits), like governmentality, addresses the 
population (Foucault, 2003a: 241).99 Whilst biopower is the form of power that takes the 
population as its object for the purposes of fostering life, biopolitics is a subset of governmental 
intervention, which constitutes ‘a specific area of governmental intervention’ (de Larrinaga and 
Doucet 2010a: 8; Foucault, 1980a: 136 and 2002: 246-258). Foucault (2008) thus describes a 
diagram of power, through which he illustrates how biopower has taken control of the body, 
population and life itself. For Foucault, the logic of biopower is one of production: ‘it exerts a 
positive influence on life, endeavours to administer, optimise, and multiply it’ (Foucault, 1978: 
177). Further, as Ojakangas (2005: 6) argues, in the case of biopower, ‘its task is to take charge 
of life that needs a continuous regulatory and corrective mechanism’. Foucault sums this up as 
‘the regulation of populations for society’s overall betterment’ (Foucault, 2007: 10; see also 
inter alia Foucault, 2008).  
  These calculative modes are tied explicitly to advances in rationality more generally, 
as modes of rationalising and regulating the art of governing (Foucault, 2004: 316-317; see 
also Elden, 2007: 573). It is calculation (calcul) rather than an earlier notion of ‘wisdom’ 
(sagesse) which is the model for these rationalities: ‘calculation of forces, relations, wealth, 
elements of force’ (Foucault, 2004: 315). As Foucault (1978: 137; see also Foucault, 2008) 
suggests, ‘the dispositifs of power and knowledge begin to take into account the ‘processes of 
life’ (the species, the race, and the large scale phenomena of population) and the possibility of 
controlling and modifying them’ to the point where management of species life became the 
ultimate end of government.          
 For Foucault, biopolitics - understood as specific strategies of power situated and 
exercised over the population - thus concerns the collective mass, but simultaneously 
necessitates the regulation of its depths and its details (Foucault, 2008). As Foucault (1982: 
244, as cited in Murphy, 2012: 22) makes clear, ‘the exercise of power is not a naked fact, an 
institutional right, not is it a structure which holds out or is smashed: it is elaborated, 
transformed, organised, it endows itself with processes which are more or less adjusted to the 
situation’. Further, from the perspective of governing, the content of these interests is less 
important than the mode of calculation itself: assuming that social actors undertake this form 
of calculation makes possible the manipulation and direction of their behaviour and conduct 
(Lyness, 2014: 85). As Lyness (2014: 85-86), drawing upon Foucault, makes clear:  
                                                          
99 Whilst Foucault’s concern is with biological factors, he extends this to include ‘social’ problems, what he calls 
the populations ‘public’ attributes. These include ways of doing things, forms of behaviour, customs, fears, 
prejudices, and requirements (Foucault, 2007: 75).  
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‘If rational conduct is any conduct which is sensitive to modifications in the variables of the 
environment and which responds in a non-random way, in a systematic way (to these modifications), 
then artificially modifying the environment in which homo economicus is embedded should be 
accompanied by a resulting change in behaviour. His conduct can be conducted; in short, he is in 
Foucault’s terms “eminently governable”’ (see also Foucault, 2008: 269-270).100  
 
This is a key feature of the mode of ‘government at a distance’ that Nikolas Rose (1999: 49-
50) discusses as a hallmark of governing in advanced liberal societies. Moreover, glossing 
Foucault – who says, ‘this I believe is the essential principle in the establishment of the art of 
(biopolitical) government; introduction of economy into political practice’, (Foucault, 1991: 
92) - Dillon (2008: 313) construes the ‘economic’ logic of biopolitics as a broadly transactional 
logic; the space of biopolitics as a transactional space; and the self-governing freedoms through 
which biopolitics of security are practiced as transactional freedoms - what Foucault terms 
“circulation”. 
 
3.3.3 Governmentality: Circulation 
 
In his delineation of practices of security from those of discipline, Foucault locates ‘the 
absolutely crucial notion of risk’ (Foucault, 2007: 61). Working through a painstaking 
genealogy of smallpox, Foucault identifies new ‘fields of application and techniques’ of risk 
(Amoore and de Goede, 2008c: 10). No longer did the management of disease ‘follow the 
previous practice of seeking purely and simply to nullify the disease [...]’ (Foucault, 2007: 65). 
Instead, Foucault notes ‘the emergence of a completely different problem’ (Foucault, 2007: 65; 
see also Amoore and de Goede, 2008c). Whilst discipline operates through the enclosure and 
circumscription of space, and sovereignty capitalises a territory, biopolitical apparatuses are 
concerned with ‘allowing circulations to take place, of controlling them, devising between the 
good and the bad circulation, ensuring things are always in movement’ (Foucault, 2007: 65; 
2007: 18, see Elden, 2007; Lobo-Guerrero, 2007; Amoore and de Goede, 2008a: 11). 
Moreover, in addressing and seeking to counteract the “aleatory events” that disrupt “good” 
                                                          
100 Noting that with liberalism, the individual must be ‘left alone’, Foucault wryly noted the paradox that it was 
precisely this individual - homo economicus - who was increasingly ‘manageable’ through what he called 
‘environmental’ forms of government (Braun, 2014). However, as Braun (2014: 54) points out, ‘Foucault’s 
analysis of neoliberalism still presupposed a subject who responds in terms of a particular kind of rationality - for 
instance, as a rational economic actor who accepts the ‘reality’ of the market - and it is precisely this ‘free’ exercise 
of reason in relation to this reality that renders the subject governable’. 
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circulation and make the population less productive (Foucault, 2007: 246), Foucault (2007: 17) 
specifically questions the way mechanisms of security operate in a spatial order ‘to be a perfect 
agent of circulation’. Paraphrasing Foucault (2007: 64): ‘how should things circulate or not 
circulate?’         The purpose of biopolitics 
is fundamentally the facilitation and optimisation of “circulation”. Circulation is concerned 
with flows, but flows have to be monitored and regulated” (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 
268). The question of critical governmental reason thus becomes ‘how not to govern too much’ 
(Foucault, 2008: 13, see also Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008). As Adey (2009: 12) articulates, 
‘the continual calibration of circulation is organised in order to protect that circulation from 
strangling life’. Consequently, power does not operate by probation but by the ‘delimitation of 
phenomena within accepted limits, rather than an imposition of a law that says no to them’ 
(Foucault, 2007: 66).           
  As Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero (2008: 279) observe, it is important to note that 
Foucault’s use of circulation refers to ‘circulation in the widest and most generic sense of the 
term’. Indeed, Foucault states that in his use of the concept he means circulation understood 
‘in a very broad sense of movement, exchange and contract, as a form of dispersion, and also 
as a form of distribution’ (Foucault, 2007: 64). At the same time, Foucault identifies a set of 
more technical issues regarding circulation, as the problematic of biopolitics and circulation 
includes diverse modes of circulation and not just the things that circulate (Dillon and Lobo-
Guerrero, 2009). Accordingly, circulation emerges as both the key instrument and target of 
biopolitics:101 
 
‘[...] By ‘circulation’ we should understand not only this material network that allows the circulation ... 
but also the circulation itself, that is to say, the set of regulations, constraints, and limits, or the facilities 
and encouragements that will allow the circulation of men and things’ (Foucault, 2007: 325).  
Thus, “circulation” becomes the referent object of security as security shifts from sovereign 
territoriality to life since ‘circulation concerns a world understood in terms of the biological 
structures and functions of species existence together with the relations that obtain between 
species life and all its contingent local and global correlations’ (Dillon, 2007b: 11). In further 
exegeses of Foucault’s work, Dillon102 (2007b: 12) goes on to say: 
                                                          
101 See Aradau and Blanke (2010); Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero (2008); Lobo-Guerrero (2007, 2008).  
102 Whilst Dillon questions the mechanisms and technologies that are presently deployed by those that take life as 
their referent object, he seeks to extend Foucault’s original theses to the analysis of the political rationalities and 
technologies of security, which are now common among regimes of biopower, which increasingly characterise 
the 21st century (Dillon and Lobo-Guererro, 2008: 269). 
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‘The logic of threat installed by liberal biopolitics of security is ultimately not that of an externalised 
enemy. Neither another competitive state nor an existential other form of life, the threat to life in the 
liberal struggle biopolitically to secure life becomes life itself, the very means by which lifelike 
properties circulate and propagate’.   
 
3.3.4 Governmental Milieu 
 
Subjectification alongside circulation leads to a further crucial aspect of governmentality. 
Foucault contends that the exercise of power through biopolitics and apparatuses of security 
involved planning and intervening in a “milieu” (Foucault, 2007; see also Murphy, 2012). 
Politically, Foucault explains, the milieu is also a ‘field of intervention in which ... one tries to 
affect, precisely, a population and the conjunction of a series of events produced by these 
individuals, populations, and grounds, and quasi natural events which occur around them’ 
(Foucault, 2007: 21). This, as opposed to, the ‘capitalising’ of state, territory or province as in 
sovereignty, or a space of discipline (Foucault, 2007: 20-22). It is then ‘that in which circulation 
is carried out’ and involves and relies on a mix of natural (rivers, marshes, hills) and artificial 
(an agglomeration of individuals, houses, etcetera) ‘givens’ (Foucault, 2007: 21). Importantly, 
Foucault (2007: 20) also outlines that a milieu can be understood as ‘the space in which a series 
of uncertain and temporal elements unfold’ (“l’aléatoire”),103 then as ‘both the medium of an 
action and the element in which it circulates’ (Foucault, 2007: 20). Thus, according to Foucault, 
a milieu as a space of security should instead be read as ‘a certain number of combined, overall 
effects bearing on all who live in it. It is an element in which a circular link is produced between 
effects and causes, since an effect from one point of view will be a cause from another’ 
(Foucault, 2007: 20-21).      Through his discussion of the 
milieu, one of the key dynamics in Foucault’s analysis of the relationship between security and 
circulation is that security’s object remains beyond its grasp, that the deployment of the 
technologies of security is done within a context marked by the impossibility of eliminating 
insecurity altogether (de Larrinaga and Doucet, 2008b: 524). Instead, the dispositif of security 
is presented through its relationship to the event: as the art of governing and the treatment of 
the uncertain, the aleatory (Foucault, 2007). It is a project, as Foucault notes, which demands 
                                                          
103 How to act under conditions of indeterminacy and uncertainty is not a new problem – far from it. As Foucault 
and others teach us, the problem of how to seize possession of an uncertain future has reverberated across various 
modalities of liberal government and rule (Anderson, 2010a: 780; see also Foucault, 2007, 2008; Rose, 1999).  
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that any investigation of security is oriented towards a future that is not exactly controllable, 
not precisely measured or measurable; good management therefore ‘takes into account 
precisely what might happen’ (Foucault, 2007: 20; de Larrinaga and Doucet, 2008b: 524; 
Murphy, 2012: 34). Such an orientation to the uncertain future inhibits the very idea of risk. In 
Foucault’s (2007: 19) words: 
 
‘Security will rely on a number of material givens ... it is simply a matter a maximising the positive 
elements, for which one provides the best possible circulation, and of minimising what is risky and 
inconvenient ... while knowing that they will never be completely suppressed’.  
 
Fundamentally, then, securing life is about letting ‘life live’, or, as Foucault (2007: 30) puts it, 
‘a question of constituting something like a milieu of life, existence’ (Foucault, 2007: 30). This 
produces, as Huxley writes, ‘the conditions in which (regulated) freedoms are exercised’ 
(Huxley, 2006; see also Foucault 2007: 189). Accordingly, viewing security as a dispositif of 
circulation within a life environment and not as a dispositif of disciplining bodies opens up and 
entirely different spatial configuration of security in which entirely different analytical methods 
are invariably sought (Evans, 2010: 416-417). Moreover, understanding power as 
heterogeneous, Foucault attempts to explain how notions of threat actually provide societies 
with their generative principles of formation (Evans, 2013). Thus, it is unsurprising that since 
Foucault’s death there have been several exegeses of Foucault’s work, as linked to risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Dispositif, Insurance and Risk104 
 
Acolytes of Foucault have attempted to elucidate how neo-liberal states discipline and govern  
through risk (Mythen and Walklate, 2005: 385). 105  Theorists largely heralding from the 
governmentality tradition posit risk as multiform and heterogeneous whilst its rationality and 
                                                          
104 This section borrows heavily from previous research undertaken by Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster 
(2005, 2007, 2008a, 2008c) for reasons twofold. First, Aradau and van Munster clearly articulate specific 
developments, transformations and transitions between insurance and risk. Second, their work more generally can 
be considered a catalyst for the significant growth in literature that examines ‘precautionary’ risk rationality. 
105 For an analysis of governing through autonomous subjects, see Sending and Neumann (2006).  
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logic are to be derived from an attentive analysis of configurations of practices (Aradau and 
van Munster, 2005). The combination of rationalities and technologies define risk as a ‘family 
of ways of thinking and acting, involving calculations about probable futures in the present 
followed by interventions into the present in order to control that potential future’ (Rose, 2001: 
7). Moreover, a dispositif of risk implies a specific relation to the future, a relation that requires 
the monitoring of the future, the attempt to calculate what the future can offer and the necessity 
to control and minimise its potentially harmful effects (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 9).
              Inspired by the work of 
Michel Foucault, François Ewald (1986) and Jacques Donzelot (1984) have offered a 
genealogical analysis of risk that posits insurance as a dispositif for governing the social 
(Aradau, and van Munster, 2008a: 5). The rationality of insurance is based on the principle of 
solidarity that replaces the juridical principle of responsibility as response to the 
problematisation of specific social and historical problems (Aradau and van Munster, 2007). 
Interestingly, the dispositif of risk insurance emerged where politics and economics proved 
incapable of managing social problems (Aradau and van Munster, 2007). Insurance provided 
an answer to the ‘scandal of the poor’ in the post-revolutionary French République, where 
neither political equality nor capitalism could (Donzelot, 1984, as cited in Aradau and van 
Munster, 2007: 18). Despite equality before the law and equal sovereignty, the poor had no 
property and were therefore forced to sell their labour. Yet, free access to work did not mean 
the end of indigence - the great political concern of the century (Aradau and van Munster, 
2007).  The ‘discovery’ of the work accident, for example, could have disrupting effects for 
the social fabric, with its disputable claims to responsibility and exacerbation of questions of 
exploitation (Aradau, and van Munster, 2008c:10). In this way, a rationality of risk 
reformulated accidents as something inherent to work, against which workers could however 
be protected through insurance (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 18) which reinforced the 
paradigm of risk insurance. Thus, insurance, in Donzelot’s words, could:  
 
‘Modify the relations between capital and wage-earners without distorting the historical logic on which 
they rest, ensure a better moralisation of the individual by transforming the social milieu, concretise the 
invisible bond between men of which the State is the visible expression’ (Donzelot, 1988: 399). 
        
 
In these analyses, insurance appears as a desecuritising technology rather than a means of 
governing security. This desecuritising aspect is linked with ‘social security’, a different form 
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of security – according to Ewald – that is built upon the logic of solidarity rather than danger 
or threat (Aradau and van Munster, 2008a: 6). Yet, Ewald (1986) adds another side to the 
reparation and compensation that insurance offers, namely prevention. The problem of 
compensating losses is inseparable from the problem of reducing the probability of their 
occurrence (Aradau and van Munster, 2008a). In this sense, one can argue that the neo-liberal 
modification of the paradigm of insurance and solidarity is rather a tipping of the balance in 
favour of prevention (Aradau and van Munster, 2008a).     
 It is argued the rise of neo-liberalism has spelt the end of the practice of collective risk 
management in favour of ‘prudentialism’ and prevention, in which subjects are required to 
prudently calculate, and thereby minimise, the risk that could befall them (Aradau and van 
Munster, 2007: 20; see also O’Malley, 1992). This particular subjectivity is made possible by 
discourses on, for example, terrorism and risk, and the resulting ‘at-risk’ consciousness, has 
been characterised as the ‘entrepreneurial subject’ (Rose, 1990, 1993; Petersen, 1996). This 
captures the notion that ‘life should be an enterprise of oneself’ (Petersen, 1996: 48), a personal 
project, to be continually and actively assessed, managed, worked and improved upon (see 
Rose, 1990, 1993; Lupton, 1995; Petersen, 1996, 1997). In turn, this requires the individual to 
adopt a calculative and prudent attitude with respect to risk and danger106 (Petersen, 1996: 51). 
          This does not 
however, reactivate the traditional understanding of risk, but redirects the dispositif of 
insurance towards the individual – hence the reference to the notion of “new prudentialism” 
(O’Malley, 1992: 261). Thus, insurance becomes a matter of (rediscovered) individual 
responsibility, prudential conduct and ultimately choice. Prudent individuals were said to 
negotiate the vicissitudes of fortune on their own and thus avoided becoming a burden on the 
others (Aradau and van Munster, 2007). As neo-liberalism attempts to extend the criteria of the 
market and its forms of decision-making to other areas, insurance increasingly tends to only 
insulate the ‘wise’ against contingency (Aradau and van Munster, 2008: 6). Thus, 
governmentality authors increasingly point out the divide between universal social insurance 
provided by the state and the ‘privatisation of risk management’ (Rose, 1996: 58). Alongside 
the attack from neo-liberalist accounts, it is posited insurance has undergone further 
transformations as a result of the challenge from the scientific discoveries that seemed to 
undermine the very logic of calculability and the possibility of providing calculations for the 
                                                          
106 Baker and Simon (2002) have aptly described this shift as a move from “spreading risk”, concerned with the 
socialisation of risks by spreading them out over the whole population, to “embracing risk” leading to a de-pooling 
of collective risks towards individual responsibility. 
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future that has underpinned the insurance dispositif (Aradau and van Munster, 2008b: 27; see 
also Beck, 1999c; Bigo, 2008). Accordingly, the relation to the exception is modified by the 
unknowable catastrophic event. As Aradau et al. (2008: 152) point it, ‘at the horizon of 
catastrophe, precaution, prudence or pre-mediation imbue liberal regimes with a different 
exceptionalism’. Moreover, this transition relies on what Beck would dismiss as the 
‘ideological formation of risk’, as the pretence of professionals that risks can be controlled 
against their intrinsic incalculability and unpredictability (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 17). 
           As Ewald 
has succinctly formulated in relation to this latter challenge, risk ‘tends to exceed the limits of 
the insurable in two directions: infinitely small-scale (biological, natural, or food-related risk), 
and toward the infinitely large-scale (‘major technological risks’ or technological catastrophes’ 
(Ewald, 1993: 222).107 Moreover, as Aradau and van Munster (2007: 21) articulate, the two 
‘infinities’ of risk remind us of Beck’s incalculable risks: risks created by science or civilisation 
itself. The infinity of risk is doubly manifested in their potential effects and in their ‘being’, 
posing a theoretical dilemma for the insurance dispositif (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 21). 
In so being, governmentality scholars have attempted to make sense of what happens when the 
authority of knowledge and statistical technologies are surpassed by the horizon of catastrophic 
events. It is posited, risk understood as a dispositif for governing possible future irruptions of 
social problems offers an answer to this dilemma (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 34). The 
question for governmentality theorists thus becomes one of ‘taming the limit’ of both infinities 
of risk and to mobilise discourses of vigilance, prevention and monitoring to govern 
uncertainty, or ‘govern the ungovernable’ within a dispositif of governance.108  
 
3.4.1 Dispositif Precautionary Risk        
  
Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster (2007: 90)109 have recently described ‘a society in 
which there are uncontrollable and unpredictable dangers against which insurance is 
impossible’, and whereby so-called ‘international terrorism’ becomes another example of ‘a 
risk that goes beyond rational calculation into the realm of unpredictable turbulence’. 
Foremost, it is argued that paradoxically, the recognition of incalculability and perpetual 
                                                          
107 Of course, it depends on cultural and social dispositions which risks are qualified as catastrophic (cf., Douglas 
and Wildavsky, 1982). 
108 The term “taming” is theorised in Ian Hacking’s (1990) formulation, ‘the taming of chance’ in relation to 
probabilities and statistical laws.  
109 See also Aradau and van Munster (2008); cf., Beck (1999c). 
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imminence of catastrophe110 does not lead to an abandonment of calculative techniques in 
favour of, for example, an introspective embrace of contingency through a resigned political - 
philosophical recognition of the fragility of modern life (Amoore and de Goede, 2008a: 10; see 
also de Goede and Randalls, 2009: 867; Fierke, 2007: 203). Rather, in the context of the post-
9/11 global security climate, the dominant conceptual underpinning contemporary (in)security 
governance has taken on an actively precautionary posture (Aradau and van Munster, 2007; 
Stockdale, 2014). Aradau and van Munster (2007) make this point succinctly in arguing the 
representation of the double infinity of terrorism has led to the emergence of a ‘new’ dispositif 
of risk, which they term “precautionary risk” that has been grafted upon the ‘old’ technologies 
of risk management:  
 
‘Between exceptional measures and the immediacy of action on the one hand and the ordinary 
administrative, police or insurance measures on the other, the ‘war on terror’ spans the whole space 
between the two definitions of securitisation. A genealogy of the dispositifs of risk would allow us to 
understand the challenge of the catastrophic and the ‘incalculable’ in relation to the ordinary practices 
of risk management’ (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 34).   
 
This development resonates with the international security environment, which in 
recent years has adopted many of the characteristics described by narratives of diminishing 
temporal control, as ‘security issues have increasingly been defined in terms of uncertain, 
potentially catastrophic threats’ (Aalberts and Werner, 2011: 2191). Further, it is suggested 
precautionary risk is based on four interlinked rationalities that allow for the deployment of 
specific technologies of government: zero risk, worst-case scenario, shifting the burden of 
proof and serious and irreversible damage (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 25). These 
rationalities are derived from the catastrophic and radically contingent elements of risk and 
they replace the earlier rationalities of risk insurance: risk identification, risk reduction and risk 
spreading (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 25). Any level of risk is now considered 
unacceptable; risk must be avoided at all costs (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 25).  
  Drawing upon the work of Ewald (2002), Aradau and van Munster (2007) posit 
precautionary risk tends to exceed the limits of the insurable in two directions. The first element 
of infinity that undermines a politics of insurance is the catastrophic element, the grave and 
irreversible damage that an event can cause (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 21). The second 
                                                          
110 Perpetual imminence of catastrophe is linked to the dominant rhetoric of inevitability which finds its legacy in 
prior international threat scenarios (see inter alia Coaffee, 2009).  
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element of infinity is that of uncertainty - that is, ‘to what one can apprehend without being 
able to assess’ (Ewald, 2002: 286). As Ewald (2002: 283-84) observes, ‘the precautionary 
principle does not target all risks situations but only those marked by two principle features: a 
context of scientific uncertainty on the one hand and the possibility of serious and irreversible 
damage on the other’. Furthermore, both the large and small-scale risks outlined by Ewald are 
related to scientific knowledge. The specific deployment of scientific knowledge then 
incorporates the affective domain, rendering fears and anxieties as means of anticipating the 
future (Amoore, 2009). ‘The precautionary principle’, writes Ewald (2002: 288), ‘presupposes 
a new relationship with science and with knowledge’, one which ‘invites one to anticipate what 
one does not yet know, to take into account doubtful hypotheses and simple suspicions’. Thus, 
when knowledge is unable to define the prospect of the future, to compute its own effects upon 
the future, the logic of insurance is surpassed (Ewald, 2002). This is because (traditionally) 
insurance requires the identification of risk and the statistical estimation of an event happening 
(Aradau and van Munster, 2008b: 28).   According to Aradau and van 
Munster (2007, 2008), the double infinity of risk (as Beck hypothesised) thus makes terrorism 
difficult to govern by the technologies of insurance risk.111 Yet, as Aradau and van Munster 
(2007) observe, this does not mean that these technologies dwindle out of existence or that 
governmentality is suspended. Rather, it is posited a Foucauldian approach does not portray 
risks as calculable/incalculable, but focuses on ‘how’ presumably incalculable catastrophic 
risks like terrorism are governed (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 21). 
3.4.2 Dispositif Risk: ‘At the Limit’ 
 
To understand how anticipatory action based upon risk functions, it is important to 
acknowledge the presence of the future - that is, the ontological and epistemological status of 
‘what has not and may never happen’ (Massumi, 2007). To put it differently, the proliferation 
of anticipatory action and the emphasis on an open future, are inseparable from a spatial-
temporal imaginary of life as contingency (Dillon, 2007a). Such invitations are symptomatic 
of a trend to draw upon the cultural imaginary to develop a revised calculus of risk which 
hyper-extends the anticipatory dimensions (Mythen and Walklate, 2010a: 34; see also Amoore 
and de Goede, 2008a).          In 
                                                          
111  This despite certain similarities to Beck’s uninsurable risks, of which Aradau and van Munster (2007) 
acknowledge.  
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the context of the war on terror,112 it is argued “governing”113 has involved championing an 
activist approach to security and instigating the discursive emergence and practical 
proliferation of a novel iteration of “pre-emption” (Stockdale, 2014). 114  The pre-emptive 
decision taken in the context of potentially catastrophic uncertainty is effectively severed from 
knowledge, enacting a purer decisionism reminiscent of the so-called precautionary principle 
made familiar by theories of environmental governance115 (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 
105; see also Ewald, 2002). Accordingly, a security politics marked by a precautionary 
relationship to futurity is quite different to templates of prevention. If prevention supposes a 
causal and actuarial relation to futurity, pre-emption is self-consciously speculative and entails 
an orientation to the future as “surprise” (Anderson, 2010a: 783). Put differently, pre-emption 
is less about prediction, but entails an open orientation to multiple potential futures and a 
valuation of action in the present despite incomplete knowledge or unknowable threat (de 
Goede, 2014: 49).         Although there are 
obvious convergences between the logic(s) of precaution and pre-emption, there is also an 
importance divergence. The form of action that characterises precaution is the stopping or 
halting of something before it reaches a point of irreversibility. As Massumi (2007: 14) puts it:  
 
‘Precaution is parasitic. It acts on processes that have an actual or possible existence prior to the 
intervention and does so on the basis of a determinate empirically apprehended threat. Pre-emption is 
different; it acts over threats that have not yet emerged as determinate threats, and so does not only halt 
or stop from a position outside. Its form of intervention is incitatory and it is justified on the basis of 
indeterminate potentiality’. 
 
Thus, pre-emptive acts become immersed in the conditions of emergence of a threat, ideally  
occurring before a threat has actually emerged (Anderson, 2010a: 790). What is interesting and 
disquieting is the extent to which ‘pre-crime’ measures shift risk assessment from retrospective 
                                                          
112 See, for example, Adey and Anderson (2012); Amoore and de Goede (2008a); Anderson (2010a, 2010b); 
Aradau and van Munster (2007, 2008a and b, 2011); Cooper (2006); de Goede (2012, 2008); de Goede and 
Randalls (2009); Ehrenberg et al. (2010); Massumi (2005a, 2007); Elmer and Opel (2006); Kessler and Werner 
(2008); Moreiras (2005). 
113 The primary purpose of “governing terror(ism)” is to eliminate terror through the advance of good government 
or make terror at least governable through the advance of security technologies (Dillon, 2007b: 8).  
114 It should be made clear, pre-crime and the pre-emptive logic that drives it are not synonymous with prevention. 
Pre-emption emphasises action under conditions of uncertainty about a future event, a focus on emergent threat 
in a world of interdependencies and circulations, and a generative role given to collective apprehension (Anderson, 
2010a: 790). 
115 Specifically, it is the potentially catastrophic nature of “new terrorism” which is said to have harboured pre-
emptive security logic; see Mythen and Walklate (2008: 221-223).  
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probabilistic estimations of harm to a pre-emptive approach heavily oriented and slanted 
towards dystopic future imagining116 (Mythen and Khan, 2005, emphasis added). As Aradau 
and van Munster (2007: 106) put it, ‘[w]hat counts is a coherent scenario of catastrophic risk 
and an imaginary description of the future’.117 Accordingly, the sovereign order (or security 
decision) no longer remains within the realm of empirically verifiable facticity but discernibly 
extends into the realm of the imagination (Aradau et al., 2008).    The socio-
political ramifications of this recasting of perceptions of present and future have been quite 
significant (Stockdale, 2014: 94). Firstly, the precautionary dispositif of risk reconfigures the 
debates on securitisation through the introduction of speed and urgency at the heart of 
democracies (Buzan et al., 1998) and a risk-based approach that emphasises the everyday 
practices of bureaucrats and security professionals (Bigo, 1996, as cited in Aradau and van 
Munster, 2007: 332). It is argued decisionism and speed coexist with routines and everyday 
practices of the police, the military, immigration officials and other managers of unease 
(Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 332). Moreover, the unknowability of the future thus places 
decision-makers ‘in the uncomfortable position of having to take drastic action in the face of 
an inescapably elusive, uncertain threat’ (Cooper, 2006: 119). Security is thus not only about 
the exceptional, that which threatens survival and goes beyond normal politics, but about 
everyday routines and technologies of security professionals (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 
17).         Second, a dispositif of risk is a set 
of procedures of strategic configuration different from others. The dispositif of risk emerges 
from the police state and its interventionism as a different way to manage population by 
‘laissez-faire’, related to temporality, to the institution of prevention and to the future (Bigo, 
2008: 96). Third, the security dispositif is related to limits, to standard deviation, to averages 
(Bigo, 2008: 97). In Foucault’s (2007: 8) words, security is related to ‘an order of calculation 
of probability, of statistical regularity’.   Prevention understood this way means to 
anticipate the emergence of undesirable social behaviours within a population categorised as 
‘high risk’ based on a virtuality of danger (Aradau, 2004). Thus, strategies of prevention are 
based on the assumption that if prevention is necessary, a danger exists, even if only in a virtual 
state before being actualised (Aradau, 2004: 267). Moreover, as these correlations remain 
arbitrary and can only be proven a posteriori, dangerousness becomes ‘a quality immanent to 
a subject’ (Castel, 1991: 287, italics in original). Thus, in a Castelian sense, the security 
                                                          
116 For analyses of such, see Amoore and de Goede (2008a); Anderson (2010b); de Goede (2008b); de Goede and 
Randalls (2009); McCulloch and Pickering (2009a); Moreiras (2005); Stockdale (2014); Zedner (2007, 2009). 
117 See also Aradau and van Munster (2008b: 29-30).  
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dispositif cannot be analysed as being derived from the logic of exception or an exceptional 
situation (Bigo, 2008). Rather, as Bigo (2008: 97) points out, ‘security is related to normality 
and liberty, not with war and survival, nor with coercion and surveillance. It differs from 
sovereignty and discipline as it is a cost calculation inside a series of probable event’. The 
organisation of modernity is no longer put into effect through the rationality of the diagram of 
the panopticon (Bigo, 2008). Ultimately, the audience becomes destabilised: 
 
‘The idea of the panopticon is a modern idea in one sense, but we can also say that it is completely 
archaic, since the panoptic dispositif basically involves putting someone in the centre – an eye, a gaze, 
a principle of surveillance – who will be able to make its sovereignty function over all the individuals’ 
places within this mechanics of power. To that extent we can say that the panopticon is the oldest dream 
of the oldest sovereign ... on the other hand what appeared now, is not the idea of a power which would 
take the form of an exhaustive surveillance of individuals ... but the set of dispositifs which, for the 
government and those who governed, make relevant very specific phenomena which are not exactly 
individual phenomena ... although individuals featured in them in a certain way, and there are specific 
processes of individualisation’ (Foucault, 2007: 68, 97).  
 
According to Bigo (2008: 100-101), processes of individualisation, that is to say, 
profiles drawn from statistical categories and differential risk, normalise and put under the 
“ban” certain cases rather than others, and finalise the criteria to discriminate between 
categories until each category is one unit only. However, as Bigo (2008: 101, emphasis added) 
further explains, ‘the uniqueness is not based on the person, but on the category he represents, 
and if it is not him, it may be his brother, its identity and subjectivity is not important for the 
process’. Yet, at the limit of knowledge, intelligence becomes itself insufficient (Aradau and 
van Munster, 2008b: 31). The Home Office official report on the 7/7 London bombings points 
out this dilemma: nothing marked out the four men involved in the attacks, they were all 
‘unexceptional’ (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 27; see also HM Government, 2006). As the 
underestimation of intelligence and knowledge is considered irresponsible from the viewpoint 
of precautionary risk, the scope and field of intelligence needs to be enlarged accordingly 
(Aradau and van Munster, 2008b: 31). Moreover, according to Aradau and van Munster (2007: 
32) ‘profiling everybody is regimented into technologies of vigilance and prudentialism. We 
are not only supposed to monitor our own behaviour, but detect signs of risk in the others’.
         Lastly, where hyper-
reality describes the simulation of the real, the danger with the construction of terroristic futures 
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is that they result in a condition of ‘hyper-riskality’, where creative visions of risk influence 
meanings to the extent that the probability of threat is eclipsed by (imagined) fear of harm 
(Mythen and Walklate, 2010a: 34). In a climate of ‘hyper-riskality’ it is suggested that cultural 
representations and political narratives of risk mould material decisions about crime and 
security regulation as much as firm evidence of tangible threats (Mythen and Walklate, 2010a: 
34). To this end, the ‘failure of imagination’ within US security and intelligence services 
reported by the 9/11 Commission (see United States Government, 2004) undoubtedly acted as 
a catalyst for a shifting calculus of risk in the U.S which favours early intervention to prevent 
potential harms (Mythen and Walklate, 2008). This trend is not exclusive to the United States 
but has also been a particular feature of the political landscape in the UK and the EU. Tony 
Blair’s post 7/7 assertion that “the rules of the game are changing” served as the harbinger for 
an extensive programme of domestic securitisation coupled to international military 
interventions, mobilised largely under the banner of the “war against terrorism” (Mythen et al., 
2012: 3).     By inscribing the future as that which must be 
secured above all else, this shift can be understood to have fundamentally challenged the 
cacophonous post-Cold War debates concerning appropriate spatio-material “referent objects” 
of security (Stockdale, 2011: 1). Subsequently, a number of key binaries which have 
traditionally underpinned a states’ coercive capacities have been eroded and even reversed as 
countermeasures are pursued that seek to anticipate threats before they emerge (McCulloch 
and Pickering, 2009a; see also inter alia Zedner, 2007). What these observations imply is that 
the post-crime orientation of criminal justice is increasingly overshadowed by the pre-crime 
logic of security (Zedner, 2007: 261-2) since the possibility of forestalling risks foregrounds 
what Cynthia Weber terms one’s “pre-thoughts” (Weber, 2007: 115, see also inter alia 
Stockdale, 2014). Taking the argument further, Dillon (2005a: 3 cited in Murphy, 2012: 118) 
suggests the ‘event of terror’ presents an ‘intended catastrophe’ which sees the return of 
Descartes’ ‘evil demon’, signalling the limits of calculable knowledge, wrecking ‘the best risk 
calculations’, he concludes, ‘you have to imagine the very worst’. The result is that material 
evidentiary circumscriptions of the decisional process are diminished considerably, as the 
sovereign decider is encouraged, or even compelled, ‘to take into account doubtful hypotheses 
and simple suspicions ... to take the most far-fetched forecasts seriously’, since the Cartesian 
“malicious demon” of catastrophe could emerge at any time and in any form (Ewald, 2002: 
288). As Ewald (2002: 268) envisions, we should ‘out of precaution, imagine the worst 
possible, the consequence that an infinitely deceptive malicious demon could have slipped in 
the folds of an apparently innocent enterprise’.     
87 
 
 With the sovereign decision thus contingent upon imagined scenarios rather than 
explicit knowledge, a condition emerges in which no future is considered impossible and thus, 
by default, every individual - regardless of their particular characteristics - is a potential suspect 
and is placed upon a ‘continuum of risk’ within the unlimited realm of the imaginary (Ericson, 
2008: 66; see also Ewald, 2002). Moreover, it is argued that this logic of security illustrates 
how liberal forms of rule are twisted into illiberal forms of knowledge collection, spatial 
regulation and de-subjectivation (Opitz, 2004: 94). Consequently, the dispositif of insurance 
recreates a governmental dispositif at the limit (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 31), ultimately 
tipping risk management towards a rather drastic mode of prevention.   
 
3.5 Conclusion 
                                            
This chapter has engaged with the notion of dispositif as emanating from Foucauldian analyses. 
The chapter has explored several key tenets of Foucault’s original concept of dispositif and 
attempted to provide perspective and conceptual clarity. The chapter has also drawn attention 
to several central tenets of ‘governmentality’ read as ‘population’, ‘subjectification’, 
‘circulation’, and ‘milieu’. The chapter has also engaged with an amalgamation of research that 
departs from a traditional theoretical lens emanating from International Relations - scholarship 
which argues for a different conceptualisation of risk for security studies. Exegeses of 
Foucault’s work within a post-structuralist framework posit that the introduction of a dispositif 
‘at the limit’ develops forms of accountability that take precautions against a politics of 
generalised and arbitrary decisions at the limit of knowledge as a result of a double infinity of 
risk in its catastrophic effects and the uncertainty of its occurrence (Aradau and van Munster, 
2007: 33-34). What is new is a ‘precautionary’ element grafted onto existing risk management 
structures. For such scholarship, security, then, is not a disciplinary dispositif, nor is it 
surveillance through a panopticon; it is risk management at the limit. Whilst the parameters of 
such are open to contestation, particularly in relation to governing the “ungovernable”, as this 
chapter has made clear, what it means to govern (in)security and risk understood this way raises 
a number of issues about the formulation of a critical stance in the war on terror (Aradau and 
van Munster, 2007: 34). 
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Chapter 4 
Risk Society and Reflexive Risk 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter departs from Foucauldian analyses of risk and examines the two major exponents 
of the ‘risk society’ thesis: Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens in the context of   broader social 
theory of reflexivity,118 advanced modernisation and individualisation.  Although they initially 
                                                          
118 There is nothing new about the concept of reflexivity. Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments, first 
published in 1759, was dealing with something very similar in his considerations of ethical character (Webb, 
2006: 35). Moreover, as Albert (2001: 66-67) notes ‘reflexivity’ in the sense of social awareness of risks has been 
a constant characteristic of governmental processes. Nevertheless, what has changed significantly is the 
reconfiguration of risk with the emergence of ‘reflexive modernity’. 
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developed their diagnoses of risk and late modernity largely separately of each other, the 
writings of Beck and Giddens have much in common: hence, the reason to consider them 
together.119           The first 
half of chapter explores several key parameters of the risk society thesis including Beck’s 
optimism about the emergence of a cosmopolitan public sphere through ‘sub-political’ means; 
the paradox of reflexive modernity and the ‘individualisation’ of risk. The chapter then turns 
towards explaining the paradigm of ‘reflexivity’ through the work of sociologist Anthony 
Giddens. Through Giddeon logic, the chapter explores postmodernity, which refers to the 
epistemological dissolution of modern knowledge production and the corresponding 
dissolution of identity (Hoogenboom and Ossewaarde, 2005). Specifically, the chapter 
explores the concept of dis-embedding relations; the ontological (in)security of the ‘self’; and 
the dynamics of risk and trust in postmodernity.  
 
4.2 Ulrich Beck’s ‘Risk Society’ 
 
One of the most renowned attempts to grasp recent societal transformations; why and how the 
risk society emerged and; to describe the conditions on existence within it (Danisch, 2011: 237) 
can be found in Ulrich Beck’s ubiquitously cited Risk Society.120 Beck has developed powerful 
analyses of the ways in which the rise of the risk society is transforming social reproduction, 
nature and ecology, intimate relationships, politics and democracy (Elliott, 2002: 294). 
Moreover, the ‘risk society’ has in many ways not only been posited as a visionary excursion 
into our present condition, but also a prophetic perspective on the future (Adam and van Loon, 
2000: 1). It is thus unsurprising that Beck’s highly original formulation of risk society has 
continued to challenge the social science tradition whilst stimulating an eruption of interest in 
the concept of risk itself (Mythen, 2005: 130).    The risk society 
perspective argues that the notion of risk has become a pervasive and integral aspect of the 
modern condition (Beck, 1992a). In précis, the risk society aegis recounts an epochal shift from 
industrial society to the risk society via a three-tiered historical typology through which 
transitions in the composition and cognition of risk (or hazards are they are often termed) are 
recounted (Mythen, 2007: 796): ‘pre-industrial’, ‘industrial’, and ‘risk’ societies (Beck, 1995: 
78). The latter of these, ‘risk society’, argues Beck (1996: 28, 1999: 73, italics in original), ‘is 
                                                          
119 This is not to deny major divergences within their writings.  
120 Beck has extended the ‘risk society’ aegis in Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk (1995); Democracy Without 
Enemies (1998); and World Risk Society (1999).   
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not an option which could be chosen or rejected in the course of political debate’. Instead, it is 
an inescapable structural condition of advanced industrialisation through which the automatic 
operation of autonomous modernisation processes or “hazards” of that system, in Beck’s 
words, ‘undermine and/or cancel the established safety systems of the provident states existing 
risk calculation’ (Beck, 1999: 77, italics in original).     
      As a driving force in political transformation and 
individual action, Beck (2000: 13) is adamant that it is the ‘... perception of threatening risks 
that determines thought and action’. For Beck (1992a), these risk perceptions create a 
manufactured risk. Thus, Beck (2002b: 9) believes the development of techno-scientific 
development (in line with capitalist modernisation) has served to intensify, not alleviate, risk 
production. In Beck’s (2002b: 8-9) words, ‘with the technologies of the future - genetic 
engineering, nanotechnology and robotics, we are opening a new ‘Pandora’s box’’. That is, 
risks that are both created in a literal sense through inappropriate human action upon ‘plants 
and animals i.e. the earth’ (Beck, 1992a: 13) in the first place, and secondly they are ‘... 
decisions contingent, endogenous entities which are generated by the practice of people, firms, 
state agencies and politicians’ (Beck 1992: 98).121 ‘Risks’, writes Beck (1997: 30), always 
depend on decisions - that is, they presuppose decisions. Thus, in much of Beck’s writings he 
demonstrates a realist approach to risk since risk, for him, is another word for hazard of danger 
(Lupton, 1999: 61). This realist approach however, is not consistently maintained throughout 
his work. In some parts of Beck’s writings, the social and cultural processes by which 
understandings and perceptions of risk are mediated are highlighted, and therefore he 
demonstrates a ‘weak’ version of social constructionism through an appreciation of “risk as 
knowledge” (Lupton, 1999; see Beck 1999c: 21-31, 134-35).    
     In making sense of the risk society perspective, it is 
important to clarify hazard from risk; a separation necessary by Beck’s own admission. For 
Beck, in comparison to the temporally compact hazards arising in pre-industrial cultures, the 
toxicity of contemporary security risks (hazards) are on an unprecedented scale since they 
cannot be delimited spatially, temporally, or socially (Danisch, 2011: 239). Whilst Beck 
(1992a: 21) posits that risk is a ‘... systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities 
induced and introduced by modernisation itself’, Borne (2006) usefully articulates the 
separation of risk, security and destruction, of which Beck envisages. In Borne’s (2006: 26) 
                                                          
121 Beck suggests such decision making is the responsibility of institutional elites in industry, labour, government 
and civil society – planners charged with the task of calculating and assuming responsibility for the risks that 
might befall the lives of others (Beck, 1994a).  
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words, risk (under Beckidian logic) can be read as ‘the probability of an occurrence for a given 
‘threat-hazard’, and the degree of susceptibility of the exposed to the source of that hazard – 
vulnerability’. Moreover, as Borne (2006: 26) points out, ‘combined with these two elements, 
a third can be added: the capacity of humanity to deal with these hazards’. Thus, Borne (2006: 
26) articulates, ‘risk’, as presented in the World Risk Society, can be understood as follows: 
 
Risk = Hazard (H) x Vulnerability (V)/ Capacity (C) 
 
Importantly, Beck does not wish to suggest that daily life in the risk society is 
intrinsically more hazardous than in the pre-modern world - a world characterised by famine, 
plagues and natural disasters (Elliott, 2002: 295). Rather, for Beck, no notion of risk is to be 
found in traditional culture; pre-industrial hazards or dangers, no matter how potentially 
catastrophic, were experienced as pre-given (Elliot, 2002: 295). They did not lend themselves 
to calculation in any systematic way but were instead attributed to such external factors as 
divine provenance or cosmic fate (Beck, 1994a). However, with the beginning of societal 
attempts to control, and particularly with the idea of steering towards a future of predictable 
security, the consequences of risk become a political issue (Elliott, 2002: 296). Thus, for Beck, 
the risk society emerges when: 
 
‘The dangers of industrial society begin to dominate public, political and private debates and conflicts. 
Here the institutions of industrial society become the producers and legitimators of threats they cannot 
control. What happens here is that certain features of industrial society become socially and politically 
problematic. On the one hand, society still makes decisions and takes actions according to the pattern 
of the old industrial society, but, on the other, the interest organisations, the judicial system and politics 
are clouded over by debates and conflicts that stem from the dynamism of risk society’ (Beck, 1994b: 
5, emphasis in original).  
 
In this sense, the risk society thesis documents the deleterious effects of environmental risks 
on everyday life while paradoxically championing the emancipatory capacity of risk to 
generate productive dialogue in the political sphere (Mythen and Walklate, 2008: 223). 
  As Mythen and Walklate (2005: 384) point out, ‘this ground shift is suggestive 
of a wider point about social distribution. While the logic of the class society is sectoral - some 
win and some lose - the logic of the risk society is universal: ultimately, everyone loses’. This 
is because, according to Beck (1992a: 19), ‘the problems and conflicts relating to distribution 
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in a society of scarcity overlap with the problems and conflicts that arrive from the production, 
definition and distribution of techno-scientifically produced risks’. To put it differently, the 
production of risk is subordinate to the production of wealth, to the extent that risks are taken 
to be predictable and limited but necessary side effects of technical and economic progress 
(Dean, 1999: 181). Beck (1992a: 49) concretises this historical transformation thus: 
 
‘The dream of class society is that everyone wants and ought to have a share of the pie. The utopia of 
the risk society is that everyone should be spared from poisoning ... the driving force in the class society 
can be summarised in the phrase ‘I am hungry!’ The driving force in the class society can be summarised 
in the phrase ‘I am afraid!’ The commonality of anxiety takes the place of the commonality of need’.   
 
Making something of a chronological leap, Beck goes on to discuss the cultural profile 
of risk in industrial society. In industrial society, the general public pressed political parties to 
ensure the adequate distribution of “goods” (e.g. housing, health, employment, etc.) 
Conversely, in the ‘post-needs risk society’ goods distribution is steadily augmented by public 
concern about the overproduction of ‘bads’ (Beck, 1992a: 20), as typified by the Chernobyl 
incident. In Beck’s (1996: 31) terms, ‘the injured of Chernobyl are today, years after the 
catastrophe, not even born yet’. Moreover, as Beck (2002b: 4) puts it, ‘we, with our civilising 
decisions, cause global consequences that radically contradict the institutionalised language 
and promises of authorities in catastrophic cases worldwide’. Thus, environmental pollutions, 
nanotechnology, human cloning and bioterrorism are sui generis defying temporal or 
geographical enclosure (Mythen and Walklate, 2005: 283-284).   
 
4.2.1 The Paradox of Modernisation  
        
By postulating the emergence of new forms of temporally and spatially de-bounded risks, on a 
perceptual plain, this is indicative of a movement away from differential class-consciousness 
toward a universal risk-consciousness (Mythen and Walklate, 2005: 383). As Sanjay Reddy 
(1996: 237) claims, ‘moderns had eliminated genuine indeterminacy or “uncertainty” through 
the myth of calculability’. However, by the end of the twentieth century, these foundations of 
risk logic, according to Beck, are subverted and suspended since manufactured risk shatters 
extant methods of insurance (Beck, 1994b: 2). Industrial society is shaped by hazards that are 
predictable and thus manageable through, for instance, insurance policies, welfare support 
systems and legal rules (Mythen and Walklate, 2008). By contrast, the global risk society 
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spawns conditions of extreme uncertainty whereby decision-makers are no longer able to 
guarantee predictability, security and control. ‘[T]he hidden central issue in world risk society’, 
Beck argues, ‘is how to feign control over the uncontrollable – in politics, law, science, 
technology, economy and everyday life’ (Beck, 2002a: 41). Alternatively, as Aradau and van 
Munster (2007) put it, control is ideological, doomed to fall short of the measure of reality. 
Hence, how according to Beck, the violent force of ‘worst imaginable accidents’ (WIAs) 
overpowers methods of institutional regulation (Mythen and Walklate, 2008: 228).  
        Beck posits a scenario in which 
the forces of modernisation have generated a giant Hegelian contradiction. Paradoxically, the 
more modernity produces goods, the more it produces harms of unprecedented magnitude 
(O’Malley, 2004a: 324). Thus, for Beck, ‘risks’ are “man-made hybrids” (Beck, 1999: 146) or 
“quasi-subjects”, whose acting-active quality is produced by risk societies’ institutional 
contradictions (Beck, 1999: 150). As Beck (1999c: 199) states, ‘the more modern a society 
becomes, the more unintended consequences it produces, and as these become known and 
acknowledged, they call the foundations of industrial modernisation into question’. This, Beck 
(1992a) terms, ‘the logic of the boomerang effect’ proliferates as an outcome of modernisation 
itself. 122  Consequently, risk becomes symbolic due to the prerequisite of its perpetually 
escalating character. Since risks, according to Beckidian logic, are ‘a bottomless barrel of 
demands’, this process regenerates continuously. Thus, both risk and the perception of risk 
increase because of the unintended consequences produced as modern societies seek the ‘logic 
of control’ (Beck, 1999c: 139). In Beck’s much cited terms, ‘the more we attempt to “colonize” 
the future with the aid of the category of risk, the more it slips out of our control’ (Beck, 1999c: 
139).     This damaging cyclical effect is what Beck calls ‘reflexivity’ 
(Beck, 1999: 109). Summing up the emergence of reflexivity, Beck (2000b: 81) states, ‘the 
conditio humana opens up new - with fundamentally ambivalent contingencies - complexities, 
uncertainties and risks which, conceptually and empirically, still have to be uncovered and 
understood’. This is what Beck (1992a: 56) names a ‘system-immanent normal form of the 
revolutionising of needs’. Characteristic of this process is a referential but self-sustaining 
interplay between risk and economy. In other words, fear and its satiations are merely symbolic 
and ‘independent of (their) context of satisfying human needs’ (Rigakos, 1999: 140). 
 
                                                          
122 Lupton (1999: 13) succinctly sums up this situation thus: ‘strategies which attempt to tame risk often have the 
paradoxical effect of increasing anxiety about risk through the intensity of their focus and concern’. 
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4.2.2 Reflexive Modernity According to Beck123  
       
Drawing upon the work of Beck, Elliot (2002: 297) observes, ‘the most striking limitation of 
social theories that equate modernity with industrial society lies in their lack of comprehension 
of the manner in which dangers to societal preservation and renewal infiltrate the institutions, 
organisations and subsystems of modern society itself’. In contrast to this grand consensus on 
modernisation, Beck (1992a; see also Elliott, 2002) argues that we are between industrial 
society and advanced modernity, between simple modernisation and reflexive modernisation. 
He describes the consanguinity between risk and modernisation thus:  
 
‘The concept of risk is directly bound to the concept of reflexive modernisation. Risk may be defined 
as a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernisation 
itself. Risks, as opposed to older dangers, are consequences which relate to the threatening force of 
modernisation and to its globalisation of doubt. They are politically reflexive’ (Beck, 1992a: 21, 
emphasis in original).   
 
Moreover, in later writings, Beck develops these distinctions where he states: 
 
 ‘In view of these two stages and their sequence, the concept of ‘reflexive modernisation’ may be 
introduced. This precisely does not mean reflection (as the adjective ‘reflexive’ seems to suggest), but 
above all self-confrontation. The transition from the industrial to the risk epoch of modernity occurs 
unintentionally, unseen, compulsively, in the course of a dynamic of modernisation which has made 
itself autonomous, on the pattern of latent side effects. One can almost say that the constellations of risk 
society are created because the self-evident truths of industrial society (the consensus on progress, the 
abstraction from ecological consequences and hazards) dominate the thinking and behaviour of human 
beings and institutions’ (Beck, 1996b: 28).  
 
Indeed, Beck finds an ideology of progress concealed within dominant social theories that 
equate modernisation with linear rationalisation (Elliott, 2002: 296). In Beck’s opinion, the 
                                                          
123  This chapter does not critically examine the theoretical quandaries and inner-contradictions of Beck or 
Giddens’ work. For instance, Beck’s hyperbolic style translates as a ‘hermeneutic leap’ from macro processes to 
assumed subjective experience, which is not based on empirical substantiation. Moreover, Beck’s understanding 
of the politics of community does not acknowledge either hierarchical or discursive forms of power. Thus, Beck 
homogenises the concept of reflexivity across a horizontal line of structure and agency. However, it is likely that 
the range, intensity and quality of individualisation will be mediated by embedded forms of stratification rather 
than reflexive processes as understood through nebulous structuration. Likewise, Giddens has been criticised for 
his “anything goes” outlook to social reality. Not only have such critical analyses been conducted elsewhere, but 
the limitations of both authors’ work are not a central concern of this thesis. 
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prevailing irrationality can be overcome only by way of rationality. As Beck (1997 [1993]: 
126, 1994b: 33) notes: ‘it is not an excess of rationality, but a shocking lack of rationality, the 
prevailing irrationality, that explains the ailment of industrial modernity. It can be cured, if at 
all, not by a retreat, but only by a radicalisation of rationality, which will absorb the repressed’.
           
 Overall, Beck’s theory of reflexive modernisation can be read as an attempt to 
reformulate and develop critical theory’s critique of rationality and science within a new social 
and historical context (see Beck, 1994b). Unlike critical theory however, Beck points to the 
fact that goal-rationality (instrumental reason) - because of its unpredictable and incalculable 
side effects - tends to go beyond itself and become a reflexive and ‘self-critical’ post-goal-
rationality (Post-zweckrationalita¨t): 
 
‘Risk rationality develops an existential ‘logic’ of shock, suffering and pity on a global scale in 
opposition to the ‘instrumental rationality’ which Max Weber places at the centre of his sociology and 
Horkheimer and Adorno and, most recently, also Jurgen Habermas have criticised (albeit in completely 
different ways). One could say that risk reflexivity – or, more generally, reflexive modernisation – is 
an ambivalent, realist critique of instrumentally stunted reason. Here in key domains of social 
rationalisation it can be empirically and theoretically demonstrated how the radicalisation of modernity 
leads to a self-confrontation, self-delegitimation and self-transformation of instrumental rationality’ 
(Beck, 2009a [2007]: 198-9; 1994a: 9).  
 
Accordingly, this reflexivity ushers in a new stage of modernity that brings with it a reordering 
of social institutions based around the distribution and management of risks (Beck and Willms, 
2004: 195). The question then becomes how to summarise the Beckidian concept of 
‘reflexivity’? Importantly, Lash (1994a: 200) stresses that Beck (1992a) distinguishes between 
reflexivity and the notion of reflection, where reflexivity is ‘like a reflex. It is neither 
individualistic nor conscious nor internal’. Furthermore, reflexivity involves a representative 
rather than a participatory democracy, so that there is little space for the influence of social 
movements or politicised identities on decision-making processes or forms of expertise (Lash, 
1994: 259). As Spalek (2009b: 186), drawing upon the work of Lash (1994), observes:   
 
‘Reflexivity can include reflection, where reflection might be thought of in terms of individuals, 
collective groups and/or institutions intentionally and rationally reflecting upon the part that they play 
in the perpetuation of identified social problems as well as reflecting upon ways in which they can 
intervene and act so as to minimise harms’.  
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 Beck (1999a: 109; 1994c: 175-8) however, is critical of both Giddens’ and Lash’s 
inclination to conceive of reflexive modernisation as a conscious process mediated by 
knowledge (reflection) (Rasborg, 2012: 14, italics in original). Beck does not disagree with 
Giddens and Lash - in that knowledge plays an important role in reflexive modernity. However, 
as Rasborg (2012: 14) observes, contrary to Giddens and Lash, Beck emphasises that the 
‘medium’ of reflexive modernisation (to a large extent) is unawareness, in as much as risk must 
be seen as the unintended consequences of industrial modernisation (reflexivity): 
 
‘What distinguishes my concept of reflexive modernisation from those of Giddens and Lash? To put it 
briefly and pointedly: the ‘medium’ of reflexive modernisation is not knowledge, but - more or less 
reflexive - unawareness. It is this aspect of the distribution and defence of unawareness (Nichtwissen) 
that opens the horizon of inquiry for non-linear theories (of reflexive modernisation). We live in the age 
of unintended consequences, and it is this state of affairs that must be decoded and shaped 
methodologically and theoretically, in everyday life and politically’ (Beck, 1999: 119; 2007: 224). 
 
 Beck thus makes a distinction between, on the one hand, reflexivity - understood as the 
confrontation of modernity with its own results (risk) - and on the other reflection - understood 
as a possible awareness of the ‘self- destructive potentials’ of the (world) risk society (Beck, 
1999b: 73; 1999: 109–12; 2007: 219). Whereas the first notion refers to a structural reflexivity, 
the second refers to individual (self) reflection. In relation to the former, structural reflexivity 
refers to the “self-undermining” and “self-transforming” effects of the natural logic of 
industrial development (Beck, 1994a: 174–183). The industrial dynamic quasi-autonomously 
leads to a social stage in which the guiding ideas and core institutional responses of the first 
modernity (e.g. the gender-imbalanced nuclear family, the ideal of standardised full 
employment, the abundant exploitation of nature in the name of progress) no longer appear 
self-evident or infallible (Beck, 2001: 23–24).      For Beck, 
reflexive modernity also means the self-confrontation with the effects of risk society in as far 
as the reflexive self calls itself into question. ‘Within the horizon of the opposition between old 
routine and new awareness of consequences and dangers’, writes Beck, ‘society becomes self-
critical’ (Beck, 1999c: 81). In effect, reflexivity is the turning back on oneself and a form of 
self-evaluation within the contingencies and uncertainties of risk society (Lawson, 1985, as 
cited in Webb 2006: 36). Downplaying the evident limitations of this categorisation, it is the 
autonomous, compulsive dynamic of advanced or reflexive modernisation that leads to the 
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increasing ability people have to self- confront and therefore transform, the social conditions 
in which they exist (Beck 1992: 197). Thus, self-reflexivity, or the individual reflection of these 
changing institutional conditions, involves a shift from former heteronomous or collective 
monitoring of agents to the autonomous, active, and permanent self-monitoring of individual 
life narratives (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 35; Lash, 1994b: 115–116).124   
     In this way, Beck (1999b: 73; 2007: 219) is able to point 
out that the transition from industrial society to the (world) risk society occurs in a ‘reflex-like’ 
way, rather than as a conscious and intentional process of which agents are fully aware. In other 
words, the reflexivity of the (world) risk society, in Beck’s opinion, does not necessarily imply 
an increasing reflection in the sense of an increasing awareness of risk (Rasborg, 2012: 15). 
Rather, society, as Beck (1994b: 8; 1992: 19) puts it, ‘becomes a theme and a problem for 
itself’. Thus, for Beck (1994b: 5-8), it is exactly this ‘self-confrontation’ that makes modernity 
‘reflexive’. Dean (1999: 181) usefully sums up this process thus: ‘to speak of reflexivity is not 
to say that society has become more reflective or thoughtful or necessarily better informed 
about decision-making. Rather it is to say that modernity finds itself in reflexive state of “self 
confrontation”’. Ultimately, then, Beck’s account of reflexive modernity is not (or not only) a 
realist account of the emergence of new risks; it is an assessment of the social construction of 
risk that accompanies the multiplication and dissemination of measures for the calculation and 
assessment of risks, and the consequences of such technologies and knowledge on everyday 
subjectivities (Binkley, 2009: 92).    Whilst Beck’s early elaborations of 
reflexive modernity stress that reflexive modernity is ‘reflection free’ (see Beck 1995: 176), as 
Lash (1994a: 176-7) points out, in later writings, Beck develops the distinction between 
reflexivity (self-dissolution) and reflection (knowledge): ‘(r)eflexivity of modernity can lead 
to reflection, but it need not do so’. Thus, as Beck’s work develops, the reflexive and reflective 
domains begin to converge into what Elliott (2002) terms strong and weak forms of reflexivity. 
A strong reflexive position maintains that reflexivity occurs because of institutional dynamism, 
which results from purely unintended consequences (Borne, 2010: 22). A strong reflexive 
position linked to ‘self-reflexivity’ is associated with Beck and Beck-Gernsheim’s Das ganz 
normale Chaos der Liebe and Giddens’ Modernity and Self-Identity and The Transformation 
of Intimacy. This form of reflexivity neatly fits a shift to the autonomous monitoring of life 
narratives and of love relationships (Lash, 1994b: 115-116). However, a weak form of 
                                                          
124 This should not be read as confronting a complete rupture between two historically different social forms, but 
that we increasingly come to live in a social environment that is characterised by a mixture of collective and 
reflexive features (Hustinx and Lammertyn, 2003: 171).  
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reflexivity would suggest a combination of reflex and reflection, ‘... a partial and contextual 
interaction of dissolution and reflection’ (Elliott, 2002: 302).           
    Lastly, according to Beck, unlike in the pre-industrial era where 
natural hazards are said to emit tangible effects that ‘assault the nose and eyes’ (Beck, 1992a: 
21), anthropogenic risks in the present day become more potent: the ‘social explosiveness of 
hazard’ ensures that large-scale incidents are routinely reported by the mass media (Beck, 
1999c). As a result, the damaging consequences of manufactured risks begin to dominate the 
‘public, political, and private debates’ (Beck, 1999c: 144) which subsequently arrest the public 
imagination, leading to general discontent with the operations of expert institutions (Larana, 
2001: 26, cf., Giddens, 1990). In chorus with the assessment of what Joost van Loon (1998) 
calls ‘virtual risks in an age of cybernetic reproduction’, Beck stresses ‘only by thinking of risk 
in terms of reality, or better, a becoming-real (a virtuality) can social materialisation be 
understood’ (Beck, 1999c: 136, emphasis in original). Moreover, according to Beck, a crisis 
in the legitimacy of modernisation processes themselves is exacerbated by a widespread 
reflection on the unintended consequences of this project, which includes a generalised sense 
of insecurity about personal future(s) (Binkley, 2009: 92). Consequently, for Beck, the scale 
and extent of manufactured threats force citizens to consider risk in political terms.  
 
4.2.3 Sub-Politics 
 
For Beck, the concept of reflexive modernisation signals a ground shift in cultural goals and 
political objectives where global institutions and individuals compete for political space125 - 
something Beck terms ‘sub-politics’. The ‘hidden substratum’ of modernity, Beck believes, 
will be subject to cosmopolitanism from below generated through ‘sub-political’ means (Beck 
et al., 1994: vi). Beck (1999d: 32) argues that ‘people have passed a kind of crash course in the 
contradictions of hazard administration in risk society ... They have learned more information, 
more vividly and more clearly than even the most critical critique could ever have taught them 
or demanded of them’. Society, in effect, seeks to reclaim ‘the political’ from its modernist 
relegation to the institutional sphere by locating the politics of risk at the heart of forms of 
social and cultural life (Elliot, 2002: 297).     Beck (1992a: 227) 
                                                          
125 Some critics have suggested an overemphasis on this development and thus the concept embodies nothing 
more than a “business as usual mentality”. Nonetheless, the transformation to a reflexive modernity suggests a 
society that is innately aware of the inappropriate development patterns that are based on the central tenets of 
modernity (Borne, 2006: 37, emphasis in original).  
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champions a system of differential or ‘sub-politics’ in which ‘politics becomes generalised and 
centreless’. In its purest form, ‘sub-politics means ‘direct’ politics – that is, ad hoc individual 
participation in political decisions, bypassing the institutions of representative opinion-
formation’ (Beck, 1999c: 39). Through direct actions - including protest marches, blockades, 
petitions and consumer boycotts - individual citizens are able to combine in order to contest 
both national policies and wider global issues (Mythen, 2007: 796-799). In addition, there are 
no expert solutions in risk discourses because experts can only supply factual information and 
are never able to assess which solutions are culturally acceptable (Beck, 1996a: 20). Politics, 
therefore, ‘gains priority over expert reasoning’ (Beck, 1999c: 42).    
     Ultimately, for Beck, the reinvention of politics arises 
from the flow of information generated from the agent upward by the process of reflexive 
monitoring (Dodd, 1999: 199; cf., Giddens, 1994b: 15). This, Beck argues, allows individuals 
from outside the political system to appear on the ‘stage of social design’, as do collectivities 
(Ferguson, 2003: 207). Thus, Beck’s thesis envisages the emergence of an informed and active 
citizen galvanised by risk into the practices of ‘cosmopolitan political realism’ (Mythen and 
Walklate, 2010b). In essence, the burden of risk migrates from the jurisdiction of institutions 
to the individualised sphere of personal decision-making (Mythen, 2005: 130). These 
underlying transitions in the nature and the experience of risk encourage Beck to beckon in ‘a 
new mode of societalisation, a “metamorphosis” or “categorical shift” in relation to the 
individual and society’ (Beck, 1992a: 127).   
 
4.3 Risk and Individualisation 
 
‘We are damned to choose’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 163). 
 
Whilst Beck is clearly uneasy about techno-scientific development(s), the arrival of reflexive 
modernisation is not wholly about risk; it is also about the expansion of choice (Elliott, 2002). 
For if risks are an attempt to make the incalculable calculable, then risk monitoring presupposes 
agency, choice, calculation and responsibility (Elliott, 2002: 298). Thus, Beck’s ‘risk society’ 
is not restricted to technological risks, but is also concerned with societal self-transformation 
from within by processes of individualisation 126  and institutionalised individualism 
respectively (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: xxi).      In 
                                                          
126 For Beck (1992a: 90, 127, italics in original) “individualisation” is understood as a new contradictory mode 
of societalisation.  
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permeating analogous spheres of cultural experience, the individualisation process intertwines 
with lifestyle choices, the undermining of class identities, life course/biography (de-
standardisation) and the development of diverse and reflexive life paths (Mythen, 2005: 136; 
see also Beck et al., 1994). Accordingly, the cultural ubiquity of risk on daily life feeds a 
process of individualisation through which individuals become responsibilised into a perpetual 
process of decision-making and inured to make personal risk assessments (Hudson, 2003: 44). 
Thus, for Beck (1994b: 14), individualisation means ‘the disintegration of the certainties of 
industrial society as well as the compulsion to find and invent new certainties for oneself and 
others without them’. Moreover, processes of individualisation are dependent on decision-
making as it assumes agency - the ability to shape one’s destiny through self-determination and 
identification (Lupton, 1999). As Beck (1992a: 87; see inter alia Lupton, 1999) puts it, there 
has been ‘a social surge of individualisation in which people have become compelled to make 
themselves centre of the conduct of life, taking on multiple and mutable subjectivities’. Thus, 
individualisation can be read as a social transformation that is both complex and ambiguous: 
‘seen from one angle it means freedom to choose, and from another pressure to conform to 
internalised demands, on the one hand being responsible for yourself and on the other 
dependent on conditions which elude your grasp’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995: 7).  
      For Beck, the ‘individualisation of risk’ comes 
with many of the features of reflexive modernisation as individuals are increasingly encouraged 
to adopt lower thresholds of risk tolerance, to extend their awareness of the temporality of their 
own actions into a far-reaching future and to incorporate a self-distancing regard for their own 
conduct in the face of uncertain outcomes (Binkley, 2009: 87; see Beck, 1992a, 1994; Beck 
and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995, 1996). Hence, how individualisation is fraught with risk (Beck 
and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995). According to Beck, ‘in the individualised society, the individual 
must ... learn, on pain of permanent disadvantage, to conceive of himself or herself as the centre 
of activity, as the planning office with respect to his/her own biography, abilities, orientations, 
relationships and so on’ (Beck, 1992a: 135; see also Beck-Gernsheim 1995, 1996). 
Furthermore, for Beck, individualisation is depicted as a multifaceted process, which 
underscores transformations in personal relationships, family structure, education and 
employment (Beck, 1992a: 127; 1998: 169; cf., Giddens, 1990, 1991).    
  The general thrust of the theory of individualisation is that ‘given’ forms of 
collective identity have been eroded and are being supplanted by more ‘open’ practices of 
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personal choice under heightened levels of societal reflexivity. 127  Thus, ‘do-it-yourself’ 
biographies become the prevalent form of cultural determination (Beck, 1994b: 15) via 
‘reflexivity’. Moreover, according to Beck, heightened levels of reflexivity stems from the 
dynamic interplay of a number of social changes that are increasingly characteristic of late 
modernity (Adams, 2006: 512). Paramount to the emergence of a reflexive modernity is the 
analysis of contemporary interconnectedness between reflexive globalisation and accentuating 
individualisation, to the extent where the global becomes the local and the personal becomes 
the political (Smith et al., 1997). As Beck puts it, the world risk society thus unleashes a 
‘cosmopolitan moment’ in which ‘global risks force us to confront the apparently excluded 
other, tearing down national barriers and mixing natives with foreigners’ (Beck, 2009a: 15, 
[2007]; see also Beck and Sznaider, 2006). Thus, heightened levels of reflexivity lead to a 
situation where nothing can be taken for granted as simply ‘the way things are done’ (Gergen, 
1991: 48-80). That is to say, reflexivity disassembles autopoiesis and reassembles 
communication flows into hybrid systems (Beck, 2009b: 12).    In light of 
Beck’s observations, important work on theorising human agency and reflexivity has 
followed.128 For instance, according to Ray (1999: 258), drawing on the works of Lash and 
Urry (1994) and Castells (1996):  
 
‘The same processes of modernity/globalisation create the conditions in which context can be 
reconstructed: global flows of goods, people and information present us with potential lifestyle choices; 
the critical legacy of the Enlightenment eventually led to the emergence of critiques of 
modernity/progress manifested in New Social Movements such as environmentalism and feminism’.  
 
Moreover, the new conditions for the construction of self/social identity cover ‘the recasting of 
meaning in work and leisure’, ‘the reconstitution of community and the particular’ and ‘the 
heterogenisation of complexity of space and everyday life’ (Lash and Urry, 1994: 3). This has 
led to the assertion that reflexivity increasingly constitutes self-identity in late modern societies 
(Adams, 2006: 512; see also Giddens, 1991).     
 According to Beck, it is a lack of social structures which establishes itself as the basic 
                                                          
127 This refers generally to the ability to act in the world and to critically reflect on our actions and in ways that 
may reconstitute how we act and feel and even reshape the very nature of self-identity itself (Ferguson, 2003: 
199). 
128 Cf., Bauman (1992: 134) who characterises postmodernity as the ‘age of contingency fur sich, of self-conscious 
contingency where postmodernism represents a crystallisation of and contribution towards this self-
consciousness’.  
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feature of the social structure (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 51) - resulting in a post-
traditional and individualising society (Adams, 2006: 512). In contrast to the era of ‘simple 
modernity’, for Beck, a space has opened up which provides greater autonomy for subjects to 
define their identities while interacting in new ways with ‘expert systems’ (Ferguson, 2003). 
However, Beck’s notion of individualisation is a complex phenomenon, and, as Borne (2006: 
92) points out, much of Beck’s work is easily misunderstood. Importantly, individualisation 
processes do not mean that individuals live autonomous lives free from social regulation, nor 
is this continuing enhancement of “self-reflexivity,” synonymous with a picture of fully 
autonomous “self-programmable individuals” (Castells, 2000b: 19). Beck makes clear 
individualisation does not mean ‘... atomisation, isolation, loneliness, the end of all kinds of 
society, or unconnectedness’ (Beck, 1994a: 13). Thus, individualisation does not suggest a 
separation from society, but rather a reconstitution of the fundamental tenets of the relationship 
between institutional structures and individual activity (Borne, 2006: 92). Essentially, it is less 
about subjective consciousness and identity (Beck, 1992a: 128).   To clarify this, 
Beck refers to an institutionalised individualisation, which in many ways turns the notion of 
individualisation on its head, actually referring to a collective social structure (Borne, 2006: 
92). The biographical consequences of late modernity are on the contrary, understood in terms 
of growing ambiguity and precariousness (Hustinx and Lammertyn, 2003). For Beck, increased 
individual freedom of choice intrinsically implies more uncertainty and risk and thus brings 
about ‘precarious freedoms’ in a Butlian sense (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1996, 2002, see 
inter alia Butler, 2006). Hence, the possibility of a “breakdown” of biography (Beck, 1992a: 
12; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). Thus, individuals, Beck maintains, although unable to 
escape structural forces in general, can decide on which forces to act and which to ignore 
(Skeggs, 2004: 80). This, Beck argues, does not create a ‘free’ individual; rather, it creates 
individuals who live out, biographically, the complexity and diversity of the social relations 
which surround them (Skeggs, 2004: 80). It is this ‘self’, this biographical production, that 
Beck calls ‘reflexive modernity’. 
 
4.4 Reflexive Action According to Anthony Giddens  
      
Anthony Giddens is another prominent sociologist who has based a substantial part of his 
analysis of late modernity on the notion of risk. Giddens, like Beck, emphasises that risk is a 
specifically modern phenomenon that is caused by human intervention in nature and, in a wider 
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sense, by the increasing de-traditionalisation and institutional reflexivity of late modern society 
(see Giddens, 1990, 1991). Thus, for both Beck and Giddens, we are witnessing the transition 
from modern society to late modern society based on ‘reflexivity’.    
 Whilst Beck foresees a future of uncertainty and potentially catastrophic dangers, 
Giddens tends to paint a more positive picture of the new type of society we are about to enter 
(through an emphasis on the realisation of individual identity) (Hoogenboom and Ossewaarde, 
2005: 608). Whereas Beck advocates the ‘risk society’ is shaped by a reflexive modernity 
because of the inability of bureaucracies to control the political awareness of science and 
technology, Giddens stresses the part played by individuals in this process of liberation from 
bureaucratic control (Hoogenboom and Ossewaarde, 2005: 608). Giddens (1990) likens this 
social change as expressed through a restructuring of time and space; a ‘dis-embedding’ of 
expert systems; and as a radically increased reflexivity (see Giddens, 1990). Moreover, in his 
analysis of late modernity, Giddens is focussing on the second level of transformation: the 
growing ability of individuals to rid themselves of the shackles of old ties, to master reality, 
and to a certain extent, choose their own life course(s). Thus, whilst Giddens is a scholar very 
much influenced by the thought of Beck, he advances perhaps a more optimistic reading of 
individualisation through his notion of a failure of trust within expert systems.   
        According to Giddens (1998a: 27; 
1999: 26), early modernity, which by and large was coincident with industrial society, was 
dominated by ‘external risks’, that is, risks that could somehow be perceived as independent 
of the actions of the individuals, that could fairly well be calculated, and that could therefore 
also be subjected to actuarial tables (e.g. unemployment, sickness, etc.). Further, for Giddens, 
reflexivity within ‘new’ modernity (or what is sometimes called late or postmodernity)129 is an 
advanced staged of modernity, which is distinguished from classical or industrial societies and 
from reflexive modernity. Specifically, Giddens suggests it is the proliferation of an everyday 
culture of risk which places burdensome demands upon the self, forcing individuals to 
habitually make reflexive choices (Hudson, 2003: 44) in light of new information and 
knowledge (Giddens, 1991). In this way, self-reflexivity, distinguished from structural-
reflexivity, is a state of mind in which the agent increasingly mediates and navigates through 
the institutions and values of the social world as well as a more introspective reflection on the 
self and personal identity (Green, 2009: 181; see Giddens, 1991). Thus, whilst remaining aware 
                                                          
129 As Giddens (1990: 45-46) puts it, ‘postmodernism concerns aspects of aesthetic reflection upon the nature of 
modernity ... postmodernity means that the trajectory of social development is taking us away from the institutions 
of modernity towards a new and distinct type of social order’.  
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of the obvious divergences between Beck and Giddens’ sociology of risk, the concept of 
reflexivity plays an important part in both authors’ dialogue. As Lash (1994b) observes:  
‘What indeed, it might be wondered, is ‘reflexivity’? To this question two answers must be given. First 
there is structural reflexivity in which agency, set free from the constraints of social structure’ then 
reflects on the ‘rules’ and ‘resources’ of such structure; reflects on agency’s social conditions of 
existence. Second there is self-reflexivity in which agency reflects on itself. In self-reflexivity, previous 
heteronomous monitoring of agents is displaced by self-monitoring. Beck’s Risk Society and Giddens’ 
Consequences of Modernity mainly address structural reflexivity. Beck here foregrounded reflexivity 
on the institutions of science in the framework of ecological critique, while Giddens’ focus is more 
general reflexivity regarding the rules and resources of society. (Lash, 1994b: 115-116).  
 
 
 
4.4.1 The Uncertainty of Knowledge: Ontological (In)security  
 
Although Beck has achieved fame for the concept of the risk society, insecurity is far more 
basic to Giddens’ problematique (Lash, 1994: 117, italics in original). Importantly, Giddens 
draws on ethnomethodology for his idea of hermeneutically mediated reflexivity. Giddens 
defines ontological security as an emotional phenomenon, incorporating ‘confidence that most 
human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the 
surrounding social and material environments of action’ (Giddens, 1990: 90). Giddens (1990: 
117), in effect, asks ‘how do we consciously achieve ontological security?’ According to 
Giddens, the modern world is a world where even knowledge is uncertain. At the very same 
time, that knowledge is reflected upon and thus appropriated it is likely to be revised still further 
and yet new forms of knowledge emerge (Green, 2009: 191).    
 Converging (to a degree) with Beckidian logic, according to Giddens, attempts to 
monitor targeted behaviour(s) so as to control future happenings (and increase security) 
paradoxically expose new categories of ‘risk’ which must then, in turn, be assimilated and 
harmonised within institutional frameworks (Donoghue, 2008: 347). Giddens likens this 
condition to ‘being aboard a careering juggernaut’, where social practices and institutions in 
the modern world are unstable, disembodied and unpredictable (Green, 2009). In Giddens’ 
words: 
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‘To live in the ‘world’ produced by high modernity has the feeling of riding a juggernaut. It is not just 
that more or less continuous and profound processes of change occur; rather, change does not 
consistently conform either to human expectation or to human control’ (Giddens, 1991: 28).  
 
Drawing upon the work of Giddens, Green (2009: 181) observes increased reflexivity or in 
Giddens’ terminology ‘riding the juggernaut’ goes hand in hand with increased vulnerability, 
or at the very least, an increased perception of vulnerability, which manifests itself in 
ontological insecurity and anxiety (see also Giddens, 1991). The rapid change and institutional 
reflexivity of late modernity, in other words, threatens ‘ontological security’ that, in Giddens’ 
(1991) view, is a condition for the creation of a coherent self-capable of coping with the 
complexity of late modernity. Thus, pre-modern dangers and external risks are, to a large 
degree, replaced by ‘manufactured uncertainty’ (Giddens, 1994b: 78, 152, 219; 1998b: 28; 
1999: 26-8) - that is, an existential uncertainty found in societies where traditional certainties 
are eroded as a consequence of the ‘end’ of tradition and the ‘end’ of nature (Rasborg, 2012: 
9). Hence, late modernity is an uncomfortable and insecure world, subject to both local and 
global hazards, at least partially severed from the concrete and comfortable structural 
certainties of modernity (Green, 2009: 181).       For 
Giddens, modernity then, as a reflexive social order, ‘manufactures’ its own (i.e. internally 
referential) risks and uncertainties in a different way to previous times (Webb, 2006). In a 
postmodern fashion, we are confronted with ‘high-consequence risks’ that refer to global 
threats to the environment caused by human intervention in nature (holes in the ozone layer, 
global warming, etc.,) (Giddens, 1994b: 78, 152 and 219). However, much like assertions made 
by Beck, this new structure of risk does not necessarily mean that ‘real riskiness’ altogether 
has increased in late modern society (Giddens, 1991: 114–17; 1998b: 27). On the contrary, 
increasing life expectancy indicates that a risk-reduction has occurred with regard to the basic 
life security (Nielsen, 1996: 182). Thus, overall, it seems more appropriate to say that late 
modernity is characterised by a change of the ‘risk profile’, from dangers determined by nature 
to man-made risks (Giddens, 1994b: 4; 1999: 36).     Giddeon logic also 
suggests that the welfare state as an ethos of government has been severely undermined by the 
onset of the advanced liberal politics. According to Giddens, the welfare state and its universal 
social services have gradually withered away to be replaced by much more individualistic 
rationalities of governance (Webb, 2006). Accordingly, a market rationality in all spheres of 
human action relating to individual choice, responsibility and freedom, is valorised (Webb, 
2006). Active citizenship is encouraged with individuals being increasingly held responsible 
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for managing and calculating their now risk (Webb, 2006: 338-39). However, for Giddens (and 
much like Beck), risk in a post-traditional order is about individually ‘colonising the future’ 
(Giddens, 1991); those who are unable to do so subsequently fall into the category of ‘targeted 
populations’ requiring forms of intervention and/or protection (Ferguson, 2001: 39; cf., Dean, 
1999: 167). Ultimately, if modernisation presupposes increased individualisation, then these 
individuals - less controlled by tradition and convention - will be increasingly free also to be 
in heterodox opposition to the dystopic consequences of modernisation (Lash et al., 1996: 113). 
Thus, regardless of whether they are accentuated as institutionalised behavioural expectations 
or biographical self-interpretation, as symbolic self-classification or intersubjective self-
aspiration (Ziehe, 1992: 102, as cited in Lash et al., 1996: 195), what is demanded of 
individuals in every case is cognitive, social and affective competences which, practically 
coerce them to form and expand reflexive self-relations (Lash et al., 1996: 195, emphasis 
added).  
4.4.2 Identity: The Reflective Self 
 
‘Awareness of risk seeps into the actions of almost everyone. Everyday life is experienced as situated 
calculations about the possibilities for action and as a dialectic of counter-factuals. Risk discourse tells 
them what to do and who to be. The self itself ‘becomes reflexively understood by the person in terms 
of her or his biography’ (Giddens, 1991: 11, 53, adapted by the present author).  
 
For Giddens, when trying to understand the progression towards postmodernity there is a 
second aspect of equal importance: reflexive social action is governed by the question how the 
actor is supposed to express his identity (Hoogenboom and Ossewaarde, 2005: 608). According 
to Giddens (1991), a prerequisite of late modernity is self-reflexivity: a condition whereby 
individuals perpetually consider their self-identity. Giddens (1991: 5) summarises ‘reflexivity 
of the self’ as follows:  
 
‘The reflexive project of self, which consists in the sustaining of coherent, yet continuously revised, 
biographical narratives, takes place in the context of multiple choice as filtered through abstract 
systems. In modern social life, the notion of lifestyle takes on particular significance’.  
 
Moreover, with formulaic truths and local tradition undermined as pre-given and fixed 
ontological frameworks for the construction of ‘self’ identity (and enhanced by a greater social 
mobility), responsibility is transferred to the individual (Ray, 1999 258). Hence, the reflective 
107 
 
project of the ‘self’ (Giddens, 1991, 1994). More precisely, ‘self’ identity has come to be a 
product of the interpenetration of self-development and social systems.    
 The realisation of late modern society through an optimistically configured reading of 
biographical identity construction is central to Giddens’ ‘third way’: ... state institutions must 
now develop concurrently with the idea of the ‘self-monitoring individual’ and the ‘reflexive 
agent’ (Giddens, 1991; see inter alia Giddens, 1998a, 2000). The reflexivity of modernity, 
then, is transposed from this structural level into the fabrics of personal existence, from 
institutions to the rational outlooks of a calculating individual (Binkley, 2009: 92-3). Amidst 
the rubble of radical and unsettling social upheavals we do not simply find postmodern 
dissolution, despite some commonalities with the conception of selfhood found in versions of 
that movement, but a flexible, authored self, more open, transparent and above all, reflexive 
(Adams, 2006: 512). As Giddens (1991: 14) observes:  
 
‘Each of us not only ‘has’, but lives a biography reflexively organised in terms of flows of social and 
psychological information about possible ways of life. Modernity is a post-traditional order, in which 
the question ‘How shall I live?’ has to be answered in day-to-day decisions’.   
        
Drawing upon the work of Giddens, Ray (1999: 258) outlines that self-identity works 
reflexively as individuals are able to, and indeed have to, choose, change and reflect on their 
identity/identities (although the choices are not limitless). Moreover, for Ray (1999: 258), 
individuals are ‘able to’ do so thanks to the liberating effect of ‘living in a post-traditional 
world’ in which individual choice is driven by the everyday exposure to other cultures, liberal 
ideology and marketing images. Conversely, the act of choosing also becomes imperative to 
the human condition, as a strategy to cope with the threat of existential isolation and personal 
meaningless posed by late modernity (Ray, 1999: 258). As Giddens (1991: 215) articulates:  
 
‘The narrative of self-identity has to be shaped, altered and reflexively sustained in relation to rapidly 
changing circumstances of social life, on a local and global scale. The individual must integrate 
information deriving from a diversity of mediated experiences with local involvements in such a way 
as to connect future projects with past experiences in a reasonably coherent fashion. Only if the person 
is able to develop an inner authenticity – a framework of basic trust by means of which the lifespan can 
be understood as a unity against the backdrop of the shifting social events – can this be attained. A 
reflexively ordered narrative of self-identity provides the means of giving coherence to the finite 
lifespan, given changing external circumstances’. 
 
108 
 
Giddens (1991) maps out some of these ‘dilemmas of the self’ where each person must 
navigate between the emancipatory qualities of late modernity and the fragmented, uncertain 
and potentially meaningless search for self in an increasingly unregulated world (Green, 2009: 
196). As Green (2009: 197), drawing upon the work of Giddens, states: ‘uncertainty and 
anxiety (or ontological insecurity) are only overcome by self-reflexively developing an 
authentic self-identity in which individuals strive to overcome their inner psychic blocks that 
prevent a person from ‘being true to themselves’’. Hence, the increasing prowess of ontological 
(in)security within the reflective project of self-identity. Moreover, for Giddens (1991), this 
situation is exacerbated by an uncertain and fluctuating world; riding the juggernaut of late 
modernity needs to be carefully navigated by the capacity to existentially determine a ‘true’ 
reflective self. This goes to the heart of Giddens’ project to transcend the dualisms of 
agency/structure (see Giddens, 1984). Green (2009: 197) usefully summarises this situation 
thus:      
‘The conditions of late modernity lead individuals to continuously create, recreate and reflect on their 
self-identity in a world that is itself reflexively ordered and liable to unpredictable change. The late 
modern world is therefore a world in which the ability to personally construct and maintain an identity 
is crucial to survival. Otherwise insecurity and anxiety are all that late modernity has to offer’. 
 
A need to create new communities of meaning would appear to be a key component of 
the ‘post-traditional’ human condition. Giddens likens this to an ongoing project of lifestyle 
choices. For Giddens, ‘self’-identity becomes increasingly understood in terms of personal 
biography and this - echoed by Maffesoli and his concept of ‘neotribalism’ (1996) - is fed by 
‘myriad social sources’. This is the nature of the enhanced sense of agency interrelating 
dialectically with the social/cultural. As Adams (2006: 512-513) succinctly puts it:   
‘Social theorists whose work otherwise differs in many ways converge in an emphasis upon extended 
reflexivity: ‘identity is in the process of being redefine as a pure reflexive capacity’ (Melucci, 1996: 
36); ‘(there is) an increasingly significant reflexive subjectivity’ (Lash and Urry, 1994: 3); ‘people have 
to turn to their own resources to decide what they value, to organise their priorities and to make sense 
of their lives’ (Heelas, 1996: 5); ‘the self today is for everyone a reflexive project’ (Giddens, 1992: 30).  
Thus, the reflexive self - rather than being reliant upon the self as an aesthetic project or a space 
for strategic experimentation - is a self-produced through the technique of biography and the 
ability to understand and reflect upon the risks that surround the self (Skeggs, 2004: 81). 
Moreover, Giddens sees institutional reflexivity (also referred to as ‘structural’ reflexivity) as 
109 
 
fundamental to the development of a new universal ‘life politics’ where (like Beck) individuals 
search to create a coherent biography in a fractured world (Skeggs, 2004). Skeggs (2004) 
usefully captures the reflective ‘self’ that ‘knows’ itself, of which Giddens centrally postulates:  
‘This is not a technique of the self, in which aspects previously considered to be fixed, immutable, 
beyond will or self-control are increasingly made sites of strategic decision-making – the prosthetic 
self130 – where the edict ‘I can, therefore I am’ constitutes the self rather it relies upon the old edict ‘I 
think therefore I am’. The emphasis is on the ability to ‘think’ drawing on elements of possessive 
individualism that rely upon the ability to stand outside of that which one considers to be a self and to 
separate from the body in order to have a (we can insert ‘thinking/reflecting’) proprietal relation to 
him/self as bodily property’ (Skeggs, 2004: 82). 
Importantly, according to Giddens (1990, 1991), central to an understanding of such ‘dilemmas 
of the self’ is that self-identity is bound up with trust in expert systems and ‘symbolic tokens’. 
 
4.4.3 Risk and Trust in Postmodernity  
        
Trust has been conceptualised as representing a defining feature of late modernity and the 
demarcation between what has been called ‘pre-modern’ and ‘modern’ society (Giddens 1990; 
1991; 1994a). According to Giddens (1990), trust is intrinsically linked in the modern world to 
risk. When risk and trust combine, they invariably relate inversely (Ekberg, 2007). Without 
some awareness of risk, we do not trust. Thus, in an environment of high trust, risk is low, and 
in an environment of low trust, risk is high (Ekberg, 2007: 356-357; see also Lash, 2000). Trust 
is therefore akin to faith. As Green (2009: 190; see also Giddens, 1990) observes, ‘we do not 
know that our symbolic tokens will be honoured or that are experts are competent – we simply 
must trust them. A breakdown in such trust would therefore threaten the very foundation of the 
social world we inhabit’.        Giddens 
(1990: 34) defines trust as ‘confidence in the reliability of a person or system, regarding a given 
set of outcomes or events, where that confidence expresses a faith in the probity or love of 
another, or in the correctness of abstract principles “technical knowledge”’. Moreover, whilst 
Beck (1992a; 1999c) is slightly at odds with Giddens - since he believes that the key defining 
feature of modernity is ‘risk’ - both writers stress the importance of individual and societal 
reflexivity and see this as the lens through which people both become aware of, and act upon 
                                                          
130 The ‘prosthetic self’ is a more recent version of Foucault’s ‘aesthetic self’ proposed by Lury (1998).  
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risk/trust (Ward, 2007: 122; see also Beck et al., 1994). In this way, the issue of trust/mistrust 
is not so much about the proliferation of risks, but that individuals and groups have developed 
heightened levels of reflexivity on which they can act (i.e. decide whether or not to trust a 
particular person, institution or system of knowledge) (Ward, 2007: 122).    
       Giddens asserts that trust exists in an 
environment of socially created transformative human activity. Human activity creates 
intended and unintended consequences (contingencies) and thus involves risk and danger, to 
which trust is a response mechanism (Schlichter, 2010). Importantly, for Giddens, trust is 
related to absence in time and space: the ability to have confidence even though the trusted 
person or social system is out of direct contact, which is also a fundamental precondition for 
the existence of social systems (Giddens, 1990: 33). Giddens refers to this throughout his work 
as ‘time-space distanciation’ (see Giddens, 1990; see Figure 4.3).  
 
 
Figure 4.3: ‘Time-Space Distanciation’ (as cited in Schlichter, 2010: 9) 
 
Time-space distanciation refers to a situation where action is not dependent on physical 
presence. Rather, presence and absence collapse into each other and are thus subsequently 
connected; a situation conditioned by the quality of a social system. Traditionally, societies - 
or organisations - were organised and linked through place and time (Schlichter, 2010). In order 
to interact, individuals had to be at exactly the same spot at the same time. In modernity, these 
links are untied and the social system can work independently of time and space constraints 
(Giddens, 1990); what Giddens terms the ‘emptying out’ of social relations. As Giddens (1991: 
17) makes clear, ‘the emptying out of time and space is in no sense a unilinear development, 
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but proceeds dialectically. Many forms of ‘lived time’ are possible in social settings structured 
through the separation of time and space’.      The emptying out of time 
and space is crucial for the second major influence on modernity’s dynamism: the dis-
embedding of social institutions (Giddens, 1990). The concept of dis-embedding is a process 
that leads to a situation where social relations are ‘lifted’ away from a local interaction context 
and are reconstructed across unlimited intervals of time and distance (Giddens, 1990). 
According to Giddens (1990), two types of dis-embedding mechanisms exist: the creation of 
symbolic tokens and the establishment of expert systems. For Giddens, a requisite for a dis-
embedding ‘social system’ is one or more conditions of ‘time-space distanciation’. 
Accordingly, social systems function without the necessity of direct interaction between 
experts and clients. As Giddens (1990; see also Schlichter, 2010) puts it, during the dis-
embedding process, social interactions and ‘relations would become impersonal, at a distance’ 
and ‘something’ will come between the individuals concerned. Hence, how Giddens stresses 
the separation of time from place, which leads to place becoming increasingly phantasmagoric 
(Giddens, 1990: 18-19, italics in original). Dis-embedding can therefore be understood in terms 
of technological advancements and the associated recalibration of social processes to 
accommodate changes in the ways in which we inhabit social spaces (Schlichter, 2010: 7).
         According to Giddens 
(1990), time-space distanciation is dependent on trust, and is (in itself) a result of trust. Trust 
involves the attribution of probity to a person or system to act in a reliable way in relation to 
contingent outcomes and situations with incomplete knowledge (Giddens, 1990: 6). The 
banking crisis of 2008 is an instructive example of the unfolding relationship between trust, 
time and space that Giddens centrally postulates. Trust is therefore a prerequisite for ‘dis-
embedding’. The notion of dis-embedding relations should not however, by read as separate 
from the ‘the appropriation of knowledge’ and ‘ontological insecurity’. Rather, under Giddeon 
logic, trust is a substitute for knowledge and an adaptive response to uncertain futures and 
incalculable risks. Thus, trust ‘offers security in the face of future contingencies’ (Giddens and 
Pierson, 1998: 108).     Giddens highlights one of the central 
contradictions of the risk society is the tension between trust and mistrust, or trust and 
scepticism (Ekberg, 2007: 357). Our increasing dependence on trust in expert systems as a 
strategy for managing and reducing risk has produced its opposite in anxiety and doubt 
(Ekberg, 2007: 357). Accordingly, in an era defined by ‘ontological insecurity’ (Giddens, 
1990) and ‘existential anxiety’ (Giddens, 1991), ‘stasis’ becomes the norm and individuals and 
groups constantly reflect upon their place in society and the role of traditional institutions 
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(Ward, 2007: 123). Trust is thus implicated in an individual’s ontological security - the concept 
that Giddens uses to represent an individual’s confidence in their social identity, and in their 
situation and how to proceed with it (Schlichter, 2010). Drawing upon Giddens (1990), Misztal 
(1996) summarises Giddens’ concept of trust in a world of increasingly precarious individual 
identities:  
 
 ‘Modern institutions are grounded in ‘reflexivity’ and modern individuals, without the guidance of 
traditional authority, must self-reflexively construct their identities. Consequently, the conditions of 
trust in pre-modern and modern societies are totally different, with the former based on personal trust 
secured by kinship, community, religion and tradition, and the latter resting on trust in abstract systems’ 
(Misztal, 1996: 89). 
 
  Importantly, Giddens distinguishes between trust in people and trust in abstract 
systems. Abstract systems, such as the example of legal and banking systems given previously, 
are combinations of technical means, procedures, professional expertise and other structures 
(Schlichter, 2010). Moreover, trust in abstract systems enables dynamism in modern societies 
by allowing social individuals to act with confidence in the absence of personal knowledge of, 
or contact with, the structures, people and actions embodied in the system (Schlichter, 2010: 
6). Abstract systems are thus dis-embedding mechanisms, enabling time-space distanciation 
and providing security as well as guarantees to their service users (Schlichter, 2010; Giddens 
1990). Moreover, since an abstract system is a means to stabilise relations across time and 
space - ‘something to trust in’ (Giddens, 1990) they are also central to ontological security in 
conditions of modernity (Giddens, 1990: 113). However, in the absence of trust, social actors 
are forced to take many actions to reduce risk and uncertainty, to control situations by face-to-
face interactions and confidence-building measures, and to set in place procedures and 
regulations to govern social interactions (Schlichter, 2010: 6). Furthermore, as Ekberg (2007: 
356-357) observes, this is especially pronounced ‘in an environment emptied of the security of 
traditions, one saturated with high consequence risks and where the lack of consensus among 
experts results in a more sceptical attitude towards truth claims’. This is because, according to 
Giddens (1996: 42), the image of science as omniscient and infallible has been shaken and 
accordingly, ‘science has lost a good deal of the aura of authority it once had’. Moreover, for 
Giddens, since the modern world is characterised by a continuous process of reflection upon 
new and unforeseen forms of knowledge (Giddens, 1991), trust ‘has to be continually won’ 
(Giddens, 1994a) and is therefore ‘constantly renegotiated with lay audiences’ (Giddens, 
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1990).      Giddens provides two examples of abstract systems: the 
symbolic tokens of media of exchange e.g. money (see Giddens, 1990: 22-26), and expert 
systems enabling complex systems to work e.g. transport systems (see Giddens, 1991: 27-29). 
The first type - symbolic tokens - are a media of exchange which have standard value, and thus 
are interchangeable across a plurality of contexts (Giddens, 1991: 18). With the maturation of 
modernity, groups can act on the basis of these media, in principle, without taking into 
consideration the specific characteristics of that group (Giddens, 1990). An example (in fact, 
the only example Giddens provides) - is money. The other type of abstract system is the so-
called expert system, which is a system based on, or formed from, a combination of technical 
means, procedures, professional expertise and other structures (Schlichter, 2010; Giddens, 
1990). Describing expert systems, Giddens (1990: 27) gives the following definition: ‘systems 
of technical accomplishment or professional expertise that organise large areas of the material 
and social environments in which we live today’. Thus, for Giddens, expert systems bracket 
time and space through deploying modes of technical knowledge that have validity independent 
of the practitioners and clients who use them (Giddens, 1991: 18).    Lastly, 
Giddens outlines the concept of ‘access points’ (see Figure 4.4). According to Giddens, access 
points are where people actually meet and interact with the abstract system (also called the 
‘expert system’). However, as Giddens (1990: 91) observes, the fact that access points are 
places of tension between lay scepticism and professional expertise makes them acknowledged 
sources of vulnerability for abstract systems.  
 
 
Figure 4.4: ‘Access Point’ (as cited in Schlichter, 2010) 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
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In presenting the panoramic theory of the risk society, Beck and Giddens aspire to offer an 
alternative sociological imagination for investigating the dynamics of contemporary society 
(Ekberg, 2007: 343-344). Further, in postulating the reflexive age of modernity, in Beck’s 
(1998a: 9) terms, ‘the script of modernity has to be rewritten, redefined, reinvented’. This 
chapter has introduced the twofold concept of reflexivity as the pivotal mechanism propelling 
the shift to a reinvented late modern society. The chapter has engaged with Beckidian 
etymology, which demonstrates a concern with the increasing insecurity and risk associated 
with mediating existence in contemporary society. For Beck, reflexivity plays an important 
part, of which the concern is ‘individualised’ processes. This is in contrast to Giddens (1991, 
1994a, 1994b) who prefers to speak of an ‘institutional reflexivity’ that, in a wider sense, can 
be said to be an effect of the post-traditional society; it is the dis-embedding of social actors 
and a decline in trust in expert systems which allows for an individualisation and self-reflection 
within postmodern risk society.        
 Quite clearly, there are divergences between each authors’ works however, as has been 
argued, Beckidian and Giddeon logic share mutually constitutive points of convergence among 
their respective structuring philosophical principles (see Figure 4.5). Fundamentally, both 
theorists conclude: the ethos of wealth creation that characterised industrial modernity has been 
overshadowed by an ethos of risk avoidance; class-consciousness has been displaced by a risk 
consciousness; and the increased awareness of living in an environment of risk, uncertainty 
and insecurity has become a major catalyst for social transformation (Ekberg, 2007: 344). 
 
Figure 4.5: The Parameters of the Risk Society (as cited in Ekberg, 2007: 345) 
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 This chapter has drawn attention to theoretical frameworks underpinning the contours 
of each authors’ works, of which stress that ‘high-consequence risks’ and ‘manufactured 
uncertainty’ within a ‘world risk society’ indicate the breakdown of the principle of insurance, 
in as much as it becomes difficult to identify, predict and calculate risks (Beck, 1995: 106–10). 
Hence, the risk society as characterised by a dislocation, disintegration and disorientation 
associated with the vicissitudes of detraditionalisation (Beck, 1992a; Giddens, 1994b). The 
highly developed (world) risk society, in Beck’s and Giddens’ opinion, seems to be a post-risk-
calculation-society (Beck, 1999: 183, italics in original), and thus it is a post-insurance-
society, which subsequently leads to the central paradox of postmodernity. Moreover, whilst 
the central tenets of Beck’s work are concerned with reflexivity because of the inability of 
bureaucratic control whilst Giddens stresses liberation from bureaucratic control 
(Hoogenboom and Ossewaarde, 2005), their works converge through the view that late 
modernity is the radicalisation of modernity, not its end. Ultimately, for both authors, 
individual agents are liberated from previous social structures and pressures to determine both 
action and identity. The result is a perilous condition of risky-freedoms (Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim, 1995) which, in turn, leads to the omnipresent character of the risk society: the 
collective consciousness of anxiety, insecurity, uncertainty and ambivalence (Ekberg, 2007: 
346). Thus, from both a Beckidian and Giddeon perspective, risk becomes political in 
compelling new ways. 
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Chapter 5 
Methodology 
 
5.1 Introduction 
           
The preceding chapters took as their focus the theoretical propositions of ‘dispositif risk’ and 
the ‘risk society’. This proved essential for contextualising empirical findings. This chapter 
discusses the research methodologies employed and the applicability of the data extrapolated. 
Moreover, this chapter discusses why qualitative methods were selected as the more viable 
approach for the present study, as opposed to quantitative methods. Further, this chapter moves 
on to tackle the practical concerns of data collection and analysis from a personal, ontological 
and epistemological perspective.   
 
5.2 Research Questions 
 
1. How is risk understood by PREVENT police officers in a ‘non-priority’ 
funded/low risk area?  
 
2. How is PREVENT understood operationally by PREVENT police officers at 
local (low risk) level? 
 
5.2.1 Study Propositions 
 
 To what degree does dispositif risk, in less than exceptional terms, help to 
construct a more proportionate account of PREVENT policing as a form of 
social control?  
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 It is possible to integrate reflexive risk and reflexivity into explanations of 
PREVENT policing, CT practice and social control? 
 To what extent are the above risk theories interrelated within PREVENT 
policing?    
 
5.3 Research Design 
         
Consideration was given at the outset to the suitability of various methods for conducting this 
research. Yin (2009: 10) states that ‘the first and most important condition for differentiating 
among the various research methods is to classify the type of research question being asked’.131 
Since this study is interested in exploring how PREVENT works rather than if PREVENT 
works i.e. theory building132 (see Rogers, 2000), a case study approach was most appropriate. 
Hammersley (1992: 183) defines a case study as:  
 
‘A case as such can be identified as any phenomenon located in time and space about which data are 
collected and analysed. It can comprise single individuals or a group, particular events of a situation, a 
specific organisation, social institution, neighbourhood, national society or global process. Case studies 
can address the micro situation of a single person in everyday life or the macro situation of a nation 
state in the global world. Case studies are defined by the focus of the instance of the phenomenon, not 
by the method used to study it’. 
 
The present research used a single-case design that adheres to three of Yin’s (2014) five 
rationales for a case study approach. First, the present study can be considered a critical case 
by empirically testing two risk positions at local level rather than against exceptional 
frameworks in the context of the war on terror. Second, the present study can be understood as 
a revelatory case since, to the best of my knowledge, there are currently no empirical studies 
which have examined PP (or PREVENT for that matter) in an area defined by government 
funding structure as ‘non-priority/low risk’. Third, the present study might be read as an 
unusual case given that the research departs from existing analyses of risk and suspect 
communities within British CT.         
                                                          
131 Yin (2009: 8) also identifies two further conditions: (i) the extent of control an investigator has over actual 
behavioural events; and (ii) the degree of focus on contemporary, as opposed to historical, events. 
132 Theory building has been operationally defined as ‘the process of modelling real-world phenomena’ (Torraco, 
1997: 123). 
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 Whilst a single-case design has been called into question for lacking breadth (Robson, 
2002) and its unclear comparative advantage (as opposed to randomised controlled trials for 
example), a single-case design provided a sufficient blueprint to test two risk positions against 
the empirical actualities of PP at local level. The greater level of detail that was afforded when 
examining a single-case allowed for a more comprehensive assessment of the usefulness of the 
study propositions in a different context. Furthermore, the relationship between the case study 
and theory direction is reciprocal. As Yin (2014: 37, adapted by the present author) observes, 
‘some theory development as part of the (case study) design phase is highly desired’. Moreover, 
Zinn (2008: 200) states ‘empirical data (or at least everyday knowledge) are necessary to 
develop hypotheses to integrate them into a large picture’. To put it differently, Yin (2014: 34) 
posits ‘a real-life “case” is needed to be a concrete manifestation of the abstraction’. Thus, 
whilst PREVENT embodies contemporary “real life” context, a broad exploration of 
PREVENT would err towards the research becoming too abstract and thus would not produce 
the grounds for a case study. Subsequently, defining the boundaries of the case i.e. ‘risk’, 
‘police and CT practitioners’, and ‘low risk area’, allowed for an appropriate method of 
investigation.         It is acknowledged 
that empirical data with a cross-case sample offers the potential to more fully contextualise the 
research findings as well as accentuate the implications further.133 As Silverman (2011: 156) 
observes, ‘the relative flexibility of qualitative research can improve the generalisability of our 
findings by allowing us to include new cases after initial findings are established’. When initial 
categories and themes began to emerge within the data, cross-case theme analysis was 
considered, however it was conceded that this approach was outside the limitations of the 
present study for reasons fivefold: 134  (1) concerns emerged regarding the difficulty of 
negotiating access to another PREVENT team operating in a low risk area (of which I had 
previously encountered); (2) having to correlate the same level of time building trust with the 
second case study in order to minimise inconsistencies between the data sets; (3) assume that 
all respondents in the second case study would participate in order for populations to be 
compared which were representative of each case; (4) transcribing a further data set would 
have been a hugely time consuming task that inevitably would have diverted attention away 
from data analysis within the present case (this is not to mention the time and resource 
                                                          
133 Of note, two interviews were conducted with a PREVENT Sergeant working in a different police force area. 
However, the data distilled from this participant was used to test the validity of the data derived from the key 
informants rather than adhering to a multi-embedded case study. 
134 As well as the five points outlined, statistical generalisation does not coincide with the underlining aim of the 
present research.  
120 
 
consuming nature of fieldwork more generally); (5) a single-case study allowed for a more 
comprehensive examination of two risk positions at local level.    
     
 
 
 
5.3.1 Case Definition           
 
The aforementioned traits of case study research outlined by Hammersley (1992) have been 
broken down further into distinct sub-categories. Stake (2000: 437-8, as cited in Silverman, 
2013: 139) identifies three different types of case study which include: the intrinsic case study 
where ‘the case is of interest ... in all its particularity and ordinariness’; the instrumental case 
study in which a case is examined mainly to provide insight into an issue or to revise a 
generalisation, in essence it facilitates understanding of something else, whether it be a 
theoretical debate or a social problem; and the collective case study where a number of cases 
are studied in order to investigate some general phenomenon. Yin (1994, 2009, 2014) also 
suggests that there are three different types of case study; these are exploratory, descriptive, 
and explanatory. Moreover, Hakim (1992) suggests there are descriptive, selective and 
experimental case studies. The present study cannot be categorised into a singular case study 
sub-category but coincides with the logic of three case types. First, the case study is 
instrumental to facilitate a more informed understanding of PREVENT operationally in a low 
risk local area. Second, within Yin’s categorisation, the case study is exploratory as the nature 
of risk and its relationship with PP are explored. Lastly, in line with Hakim, the case study is 
experimental, as the relationship between two risk positions is examined at local level rather 
than against exceptional frameworks in the context of the war on terror.    
         Yin (2009) states that a 
case study may be further classified in terms of the number of cases being studied and number 
of units of analysis (UoA hereafter) within the study, creating a 2x2 matrix (as shown in Figure 
5.3).  
 
 Single-Case Multiple-Cases 
Single unit of analysis Single-holistic case study Multiple-holistic case study 
121 
 
Multiple units of analysis Single-embedded case 
study 
Multiple-embedded case 
Study 
Figure 5.3: Case Study Classification Matrix (as cited in Yin, 2009). 
In the present study, a single-embedded case was investigated, defined as ‘risk as linked to the 
operations and understandings of PREVENT police officers and individuals who occupy 
interrelated CT roles in an area defined by government as ‘low risk’’. The decision about 
whether to use an embedded or holistic case study is argued to depend upon the research 
questions being posed: embedded if it involves more than one unit of analysis or holistic if it 
involves a single UoA (Yin, 2009). The present study entails three UoA: (i) risk as understood 
by PREVENT police officers; (ii) how PP is operationally understood by PREVENT police 
officers within a ‘low risk’ area; (iii) the previous two units of analysis tested against the 
accounts of practitioners from interrelated CT roles. The single-embedded case study design 
for this research is represented in Figure 5.3.1. 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3.1: Single-Embedded Case Study Design. 
 
Exploring three units of analysis finds support in Yin’s (2009: 3) assertion that ‘a case 
study is a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence’. 
Furthermore, Lofland and Lofland (1984: 11) put forward that the aim of qualitative research 
is to ‘collect the richest possible data’. In the present study, ‘rich data’ is conceptualised as the 
collection of varied information, from multiple perspectives, which is relevant to the research 
UoA –  
How do PREVENT 
police officers 
understand risk? 
UoA – 
How is PREVENT 
understood 
operationally by 
PREVENT Officers?  
UoA –  
Exploring inter-
organisational  
understandings of 
PREVENT as linked to 
risk 
CASE – How risk is understood and operationalised within a ‘low risk’ 
PREVENT area.  
CONTEXT – Risk and PREVENT policing in a ‘low risk’ area 
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question(s) posed (Lofland and Lofland, 1984; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2009). Whilst 
the appropriate ‘form’ of the case study has been established, Eisenhardt (1989, as cited in 
Borne, 2006) suggests that case study research can involve the use of qualitative and 
quantitative data separately, or a synergistic combination of both. The present research is based 
entirely on a qualitative methodological design, justifications for which are outlined in the 
following section.  
 
5.3.2 A Qualitative Approach  
      
A methodological approach is not stark choice between ‘words or numbers’ or ‘precise/ 
imprecise’ data. Nor is it to suggest that qualitative methods are ‘intrinsically superior’ or vice 
versa (Silverman, 2013). Rather, the choice of research method is dependent on the nature of 
what the research is trying to describe (Hammersley, 1992: 163). The present study is interested 
in ‘how’ questions (how an aspect of the social world is put together by its participants) rather 
than ‘how many’ questions can be put to participants, which significantly influenced the 
methodological design.         It is 
argued a qualitative research approach enables an ‘individualistic’ conventional methods 
approach to collecting data by way of direct contact with research subjects. As summarised by 
Gillham (2000: 11), one benefit of qualitative analysis is that it enables the researcher to 
‘explore complexities that are beyond the scope of more “controlled” approaches’. Such 
interaction on a personal scale provides the researcher with realistic accounts, providing rich 
data, contrasting the ‘thin abstractions of numbers’ provided by quantitative research (Robson, 
1993: 370). As Burgess (1984) observes:  
 
‘In qualitative research, the realities of everyday lives are explored as they are experienced and 
explained by the people that live them. This research yields rich and complex data, in which subjective 
experience and social action are grounded in the context of both time and place, allowing the researcher 
to get close to the data’.  
 
A qualitative approach also satisfies the ontological interest of the present study in 
providing a unique voice and ‘subjectivity’ during the collection of data. The quality of 
undeniability (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 1) is centred on the authenticity of human 
experience (Silverman, 2013: 6) since the voices of individuals tasked with CT are under-
researched and under-theorised. This notion is reinforced by Creswell (2007: 39) who states 
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that qualitative research is most appropriate when there is a need to ‘…study a group or 
population…or hear silenced voices’. Thus, in the present study, there was a lack of desire for 
such sentiment to become manifest as numbers in a quantitative study since, as Silverman 
(2013: 6) observes, utilising quantitative methods has the potential to lead to that unique voice 
becoming muted by the deadening ‘thud’ of aggregate statistics. Furthermore, given the 
research topic, which is constantly forming and evolving, it was deemed important to highlight 
individual experience(s), concepts and understandings with a heightened level of detail. 
Moreover, as Miles and Huberman (1994: 75) point out, it is argued qualitative methods 
specifically allow the researcher to describe and analyse the nuanced patterns of relationships 
that exist in these types of environments. Additionally, whereas quantitative data often 
represents macro trends, using qualitative data allows more discrete information to be 
considered (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 40). Subsequently, a qualitative approach generated 
“rich”, unique and varied data that are virtually impossible to obtain through other methods 
(Wiktorowicz, 2004: 2).        Lastly, 
qualitative methods were also deemed most appropriate through a lack of desire to make 
systematic comparisons in order to account for variance of different understandings of risk in 
other PREVENT areas. Thus, this thesis does not pretend to make generalisations. Rather, the 
aim is to contextualise and construct assessments of a single-embedded case study, of which 
participants’ experience may be more applicable to areas with shared similarities. 
Subsequently, the present study should not be seen as an attempt to make categorical truths 
about all PREVENT teams, but as an attempt to raise questions by looking at a small body of 
data in intensive detail. Accordingly, statistically representative samples were deemed 
undesirable. 
 
5.3.3 Qualitative Semi-Structured Interviews  
       
Individuals that work in a ‘low risk’ PREVENT team are significant to the key aims of this 
research in that they provide data from ‘live’ primary sources. Thus, in-depth (open-ended) 
semi-structured interviews were deemed most appropriate for the present study. Semi-
structured interviews allowed a common and an individual element, which enabled me to 
follow areas of the respondents’ interests as well as ensuring participants discussed key areas. 
Of note, whilst (open-ended) semi-structured interviews provide the core fieldwork, various 
informal discussions took place prior to the fieldwork commencing which should be read as 
complementary since this approach ultimately added depth as well as specificity to the 
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methodology. Moreover, such conversations were deemed necessary in order to become 
sensitised to the research area.         
 A qualitative interviewing approach also coincides with ontological position of the 
research which affirms that those interviewed were selected based on their respective 
understanding and experiences of PREVENT. Moreover, when attempting to reach a deeper 
understanding of an under-researched phenomenon, the importance of attaining points of views 
through conversation is stressed by various academics (see Burgess, 1982). Furthermore, 
interviews semi-structured in nature are intended to avoid the obstacles experienced by Wilson 
et al. (1982) when trying to obtain co-operation from interviewees, namely, reluctance and lack 
of co-operation (initially however, this approach far from addressed this issue!).   
        Semi-structured interviews were 
also considered most appropriate since they enable a far greater (theoretically informed) 
flexibility and adaptability that is conducive to both researcher and interviewee (Silverman, 
2013). Of note, whilst semi-structured in nature, the research questions were more in keeping 
with an interview protocol: that is, a ‘guided conversation’ with the interview protocol serving 
as a ‘conversational guide’ (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). The interview protocol contained a subset 
of topics that were considered relevant and thus were more in keeping with a mental framework 
rather than adhering to a list of questions that were verbalised to each participant. Further, 
whilst a semi-structured interview protocol ensured all interviews generated comparable data, 
departures from the guidelines were encouraged in order for participants to reflect more freely. 
Moreover, by not sticking to a formalised interview structure, the interview guide was able to 
develop as the research progressed (King, 1994: 18). Subsequently, this allowed for the 
inclusion of new topics and the removal of those that elicited vague responses. As Silverman 
observes (2013: 11), ‘you can become much more effective as a researcher if you reject 
arbitrary, self-imposed categories and instead systematically pursue knowledge about a topic 
wherever the data might take you’. Silverman’s observations neatly coincide with a quality of 
qualitative interviews since questions can be modified based on the researcher’s ‘perception of 
what seems most appropriate in the context of the conversation’ (Robson, 1993: 231), as 
opposed to, for instance, survey research.         
  Lastly, prior to and during fieldwork, numerous informal interviews and 
discussions were not recorded (most were face-to-face, whilst two were by telephone). 
Hammersley and Atkinson (2003: 139) observe that interviews in ethnographic research ‘... 
range from spontaneous, informal conversations in places that are being used for other purposes 
to formally arranged meetings in bounded settings out of earshot of other people’. When 
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discussing interviews, the present study focuses only on the ‘formal’ interview since research 
data was not obtained through ethnographic methods. This raises a number of important issues 
which require (albeit brief) discussion. First, there are numerous inherent advantages to 
ethnographic research. Herbert (2000) argues for the use of emphatic observation in order to 
tackle and disentangle the complexity that exists between process, meaning and place. 
Ethnography, according to Herbert, offers the flexibility between such macro and micro-logical 
connections whilst simultaneously proffering the ability to engage with theoretical assumptions 
and data collection. In Herbert’s (2000: 564) words, teasing out the connections between the 
micro and macro requires the ability to ‘... develop a vibrant, recursive conversation between 
theory and data’. I accept Herbert’s observations, however, using informally obtained data 
without informing participants that they are in fact participating in an interview, raises a 
number of ethical issues. Moreover, taking this approach would have entirely contradicted the 
open and honest etiquette of the research. Furthermore, these informal discussions were so 
numerous that it would have been more appropriate to categorise them as ‘participant 
observation’. Even so, one might question why the present study lacks an element of first-hand 
primary evidence in order to strengthen the credibility of the findings rather relying on second-
hand and third-hand evidence (Yin, 2012). To reiterate, informal discussions were so numerous 
that recording and transcribing each informal conversation would have been particularly 
challenging. 
 
5.3.4 Ethical Considerations and Risk Management135  
    
Originally, the idea was to provide thick descriptions of the case study including its location. 
Doing so would have supported the numerous justifications as to why research in a low risk 
area (as defined by government) is empirically warranted. Moreover, as Seale (1999: 108) 
observes, threats to transferability are dealt with most adequately if details, or “thick” 
descriptions of the “sending” context (or the “sample”), are provided’. However, for reasons 
of respecting anonymity within the present study, this is not possible. Anonymity refers to 
concealing the identity of the participants in all documents resulting from the research, 
therefore actively protecting the identity of research participants (King and Horrocks, 2010: 
117). In the context of the present study, the PREVENT team had far fewer officers in 
comparison to a PREVENT team operating in a ‘high risk’ area. Thus, had the case study 
                                                          
135 The present study also has attained ethical approval in line with the university’s code of ethics.    
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location been identified, it would have been possible to hypothesise who participated in the 
research study even if one could not directly link individuals to interview quotations. Moreover, 
even the use of pseudonyms would not suffice to protect anonymity of participants since 
pseudonyms are blind to unexpected ethical dilemmas. In this instance, it was imperative to 
avoid ‘thoughtless rule following’ (Silverman, 2013). Observations by King and Horrocks 
(2010: 110) make clear the position of the present study:  
‘The name of the participant is not the only way in which the participant can be identified. In a semi-
structured interview with a ‘key informant’ (someone who has specific information relating to the 
research), the position that the person occupies and/or other attributes and characteristics will be both 
relevant to the interview and identifiable to others’.   
 
Whilst I accept that the omission of “thick-descriptions” of the case study area could have an 
effect on the overall impact of the research, it is the responsibility of the researcher to 
comprehensively think through the impact that participation might have for people taking part 
(King and Horrocks, 2010: 210). Thus, the present study is anonymised in its entirety.  
 
5.3.5 Informed Consent 
         
Research subjects must be informed about the purpose, methods and intended possible uses of 
the research, what their participation in the research entails and what risks, if any are involved 
(Silverman, 2013: 162). This principle underpins the meaning of informed consent. 
Importantly, Silverman (2013: 162) points out, ‘consent is not simply resolved through the 
formal signing of a consent document at the start of research. Instead it is continually open to 
revision and questioning’. It was decided that conducting research into PREVENT raised a 
number of issues which extended beyond formal consent. The approach taken within the 
present study was one of avoiding a highly formal and bureaucratic way of securing consent in 
favour of fostering relationships in which ongoing ethical regard for participants is sustained 
(Silverman, 2013). The primary objective of this was to conduct ethically sound research as 
openly as possible without deception. Of note, I have maintained contact with several 
participants post-fieldwork, thus adding to the ethical nature of the research.   
  This is not to say that formal informed consent was not obtained. Prior to each 
interview, all participants were provided with an information sheet explaining the content of 
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the research, confidentiality issues, and data protection considerations. 136  This included 
informing participants of their right to refuse to participate or withdraw from the investigation 
whenever and for whatever reasons they wished. Participants were also informed that 
interviews were to be fully transcribed on my own personal computer (as opposed to a shared 
network space e.g. a university library). Moreover, participants were made aware that the 
transcribed data would be solely accessible to myself and my Director of Studies (DoS) and 
would be stored in a safe and secure place in line with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
Furthermore, participants were informed that their data would be destroyed at the end of the 
research. Lastly, participants were informed that their data would be anonymised, as would the 
identity of the case study. If participants were happy to proceed with their participation, they 
were required to sign an informed consent sheet in order to formalise their consent.  
 
5.4 Validity  
            
Validity refers the extent to which an account accurately represents the social phenomena to 
which it refers (Hammersley, 1990: 57). Howe (1988) argues that research that does not utilise 
scientific, positivist methods has been criticised for producing ambiguous and untrustworthy 
data that are not reliable or valid; what can be termed ‘issues of generalisation’. However, 
validity can be conceptualised differently depending on the epistemological position of the 
researcher. The present study does not adhere to the search for a ‘singular, objective, 
empirically valid, universal truth, existing out there in the world’ waiting to be uncovered 
through the application of ‘the scientific method’ (Taylor and Ussher, 2001: 295). This 
approach is not fitting with the research question(s). Rather, the present study adopts a position 
similar to Taylor and Ussher (2001) who, in their analytic account of S&M, outline:  
 
‘There is the rejection of the notion that complex phenomena may be explained by identifying an 
objective truth since supposed inner truth or essence reduces the opportunity for continual reflection 
and restricts the meaning of social interaction. Equally, there is a rejection of the assumption that there 
must be a unitary, fundamental and rational underlying pattern of exposition ‘ordained by nature itself’ 
(Taylor and Ussher, 2001: 295, adapted by the present author).  
 
                                                          
136 See Appendix K.  
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Similarly, the present study does not aim to have external validity in the positivist sense to the 
point where the findings generate a blanket understanding that can be applied nationally or 
even locally (Brock-Utne, 1996). In essence, there is no attempt at meta-theorising. Rather, the 
emphasis is upon the multiplicity of individual realities or epistemologies each with their own 
inherent validity (Ussher, 1999). As Mallon (2007: 98) notes, ‘while human culture and 
decisions have impacts on numerous features of the world, the impacts on humans are sui 
generis (unique)’.         
 This epistemological position is consistent with a social constructionist approach 
(Gergen, 1999). From both an epistemological and ontological perspective, emphasising that 
that there is no insistent or essential human drive or desire which pre-exists its cultural 
conscription (Foucault, 1980a) is advantageous in order to ‘contextualise’ the complex 
dynamics, interrelations and understandings of the PREVENT/risk relationship as constructed 
within a local environment. As Dickens (2004: 333) observes, ‘...the ways we understand the 
world are formed by the ways in which we interact with each other in our local cultural milieu’. 
Thus, the general aim of the present study can be read as of expanding and generalising theories 
(analytical generalisations) and not to extrapolate probabilities (statistical generalisations) 
(Yin, 2014).          Whilst the results 
are not generalisable as descriptions of what other PREVENT teams or individuals do (since 
the circumstances and mechanisms will be different for individuals in other areas/teams and 
interpreted differently), they can be considered analytically generalisable as descriptions of 
what any individual tasked with carrying out CT through PREVENT can do. Thus, whilst the 
findings are inherently subjective they are likely to have greater applicability for those 
individuals and teams in areas defined by the government as ‘low risk’.    
      It is also important to note that the data distilled 
from the interviews with the PREVENT Sergeant in a different police force shared increasing 
parallels with the insight of the PREVENT officers at the case study site. Furthermore, whilst 
consciously distancing the findings from statistical generalisation, the research findings should 
be read as exploratory rather than definitive in ways that further analytical possibilities are 
opened up. This position is in keeping with a case study approach whereby ‘the lessons learned 
could assume the form of a working hypothesis either to be applied in re-interpretating the 
results of existing studies of other concrete situations or to define new research focusing on yet 
additional concrete situations’ (Yin, 2014: 40-41).      
   Whilst the term ‘validity’ does not map well onto the qualitative 
research paradigm of the present study, nevertheless, Yin (2009) outlines four tests that are 
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commonly used to judge the quality of case study research: construct validity, internal validity, 
external validity and reliability.137 A number of steps were taken in order to increase the 
validity of the research findings. First, when assessing the quality of qualitative research, Guba 
and Lincoln (1994) replace internal validity with ‘credibility’. This refers to the extent to which 
the researcher’s interpretation is endorsed by those whom the research was conducted (King 
and Horrocks, 2010: 160). In Guba and Lincoln’s (1994) words, ‘the participants are the only 
ones who can legitimately judge the credibility of the results’. Whilst participant feedback on 
individual transcripts would have strengthened the accuracy and interpretation of the research 
data, I did not ask for participant feedback on transcripts since confidentiality requires that 
individual data are not stored against responses. Subsequently, extended analysis of the 
transcribed data that involved a level of detail beyond basic helped to promote credibility. 
Moreover, once findings were established, transcripts were subject to further detailed analysis 
to ensure that findings were true to the original data.      
  It is argued researchers using qualitative analyses need to explicitly detail the 
process via which themes are identified (Attride-Stirling, 2001). During the data analysis phase, 
I ensured that there was sufficient evidence to support the themes that had been identified from 
the transcripts. Moreover, I have documented the thematic analysis process (see Appendices 
G, H and I; and Section 5.9) in order to make explicit the decisions made in relation to data 
collection, analysis and reporting. Subsequently, this increases transparency for other 
researchers wishing to review or replicate the research. Furthermore, Section 5.9.1 provides 
examples of the coding technique used within the data analysis stage (see Appendices H, I and 
J) in order to increase the ‘trustworthiness’ of the data (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).   
          Lastly, the benefits 
of a single-embedded case study design adhered to two of Maxwell’s strategies for combating 
threats to validity. First, a single-embedded case design allowed for intensive long-term field 
involvement. This helped to produce a complete understanding of field situations and relations, 
including the opportunity to make repeated interviews (Maxwell, 2009: 244-245). Second, the 
present study used multiple sources data through conducting interviews with 14 practitioners 
from a variety of institutions in order to gain a range of perspectives, accounts and experiences 
that usefully illuminated the research question(s). Lastly, rival hypotheses (also termed 
“negative cases”) are reflected upon in chapter 6, thus increasing the internal validity of the 
data (Yin, 2003).  
                                                          
137 See Appendix F.  
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5.4.1 Reliability 
 
Reliability refers to ‘the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same 
category by different observes or by the same observer on different occasions’ (Hammersley, 
1992: 67). Thus, reliability can be read as the degree to which the findings of a study are 
independent of accidental circumstances of their production (Kirk and Miller, 1986: 20). 
Murphy et al. (1998: 70, adapted by the present author) sum this up as: 
‘(i) Qualitative researchers demonstrating that they have taken into account the inherent instability of 
the phenomenon they are studying; (ii) this entails distinguishing between instability that is integral to 
the research context itself and that which they have introduced themselves through the research 
process’.  
With reference to Murphy et al’s. (1998) former point, it is acknowledged that if the research 
was repeated at a time when the funding structure of PREVENT had significantly changed or 
altered, this potentially could have an impact upon the findings. In relation to Murphy et al’s. 
(1998) latter observation, given that interviews were conducted, it was important to satisfy the 
criterion of using ‘low-inference descriptors’ (Silverman, 2011, italics in original). Silverman 
(2011) suggests this can be achieved by: (1) tape recording all interactions; (2) carefully 
transcribing these tapes according to the needs of reliable analysis; and (3) presenting long 
extracts of data in the research report. The present research adhered to all three principles. First, 
measures were employed to ensure the accuracy of data, such as transcribing verbatim in order 
to remain faithful to context and structure of participants’ utterances. Second, after the audio 
recordings had been transcribed, transcriptions were checked for errors by re-listening to the 
audio-recordings in full alongside transcriptions. Third, the research findings contain detailed 
and descriptive data from the interview sessions in order to highlight the context of the original 
data. Of note, less descriptive data have also been included where extremely poignant to the 
case in point.  
 
5.5 Participants 
           
In total 21 interviews were conducted with 14 individuals (multiple interviews were conducted 
with the PREVENT officers in order to ‘drill-down’ on themes and concepts) over the course 
of 14 months. The intensive data for this research is derived from interviews with the 
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PREVENT officers (key informants). This includes a PREVENT Lead; a PREVENT Sergeant; 
a PREVENT police officer; and a CHANNEL Officer.138     Initially, I 
gained accessed through contacting the PREVENT team via email. Following this, several 
meetings took place between myself and the PREVENT officers at a mutual safe space in order 
to outline the nature of the research and to discuss dates and times for fieldwork to commence. 
Of note, during the fieldwork stage, a PREVENT Lead suggested various other key 
stakeholders who had extensive knowledge of PREVENT at local level. Consequently, 
interviews were conducted with a PREVENT Sergeant from a different police force; 
neighbourhood police officers; a Youth Offending Team Case Manager; a Supported Housing 
Officer; a Local Housing Officer; a Community Safety Officer; a Community Engagement 
Officer; and a CHANNEL Intervention Provider. Some of these participants were accessed on 
the basis of opportunistic and snowball sampling, whereas others were accessed theoretically 
as a result of frequently cited interrelated job roles within participants’ accounts of PREVENT 
(as discussed further in Section 5.6.1). The data gathered from these subsequent interviews is 
used to supplement the intensive qualitative data from the case study in a supportive or 
challenging fashion, as reflected in the research findings. Thus, the data derived from the 
extended sample should be read as an embedded unit of analysis within a single-embedded case 
study.           Lastly, the choice 
of interview location, time and date were dependent on participant preference and work 
schedule(s) (this is reflected upon in section 5.7.5). Of note, most interviews were conducted 
at the participants’ place of work; however, two interviews were conducted in a safe space at a 
university. 
         
5.6 Sampling Approach139  
          
Prior to the fieldwork stage, it was important to think critically about the parameters of the 
population of interest to the research. As Denzin and Lincoln (1994: 202) put it: ‘many 
qualitative researchers employ ... purposive, and not random, sampling methods. They seek out 
groups, settings and individuals where ... the processes being studied are the most likely to 
                                                          
138 During the fieldwork phase, the PREVENT team was restructured leading to some participants adopting 
various PREVENT roles within the PREVENT team.  
139 It should be noted that in case study research using the term “sampling” can be problematic. As Yin (2014: 43-
44) observes, ‘using the sample portion of the term risks misleading others into thinking that the case comes from 
some larger universe of population of like-cases, undesirably reigniting the spectre of statistical generalisation’. 
However, the term sampling has been use in this instance on the basis that there are numerous other PREVENT 
teams operating in low risk areas even if the findings are not considered statistically generalisable.  
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occur’. Burgess (1984) describes this as ‘judgement sampling’ or ‘purposive sampling’. Here, 
respondents have been selected as ‘they have particular features or characteristics which will 
enable detailed exploration and understanding of the central themes and puzzles’ (Ritchie et 
al., 2003: 78). It was identified that the most appropriate sampling approach for the present 
study was purposive sampling in order to constrain extraneous variation and sharpen external 
validity (Eisenhardt, 1989: 533).  
 
5.6.1 Extending the Sample: Embedded Unit of Analysis  
     
As emerging themes within the data became apparent, the decision was taken to negotiate 
access with other stakeholders. The aim of this was: (1) to say more about the data sample; and 
(2) to test themes against a wider data set. Alasuutari (1995: 156) describes this process through 
using the analogy of an hourglass: ‘a narrow-case analysis is broadened ... through the search 
for contrary and parallel cases, into an example of a broadened entity. Thus, the research 
process advances, in its final stages, towards a discussion of broader entities. We end up at the 
bottom of the hourglass’. Extending the data set also allowed for the examination of social 
relationships within a multi-agency CT framework. Moreover, Clive Seale (1999) suggests 
that, rather than a focus upon ‘individuals’, students should realise that all kinds of phenomena 
can be studied for research purposes. Underlining Seale’s point, Giampeitro Gobo (2007: 203-
204) states:  
 
‘The (qualitative) researcher should focus his/her investigation on interactive units (such as social 
relationships, encounters, organisations), not only because social processes are more easily detectable 
and observable, but also because these units allow more direct and deeper analysis of the characteristics 
observed’. 
 
As well as a purposive approach to sampling, the present study also used theoretical, 
opportunistic and snowball sampling methods.140 As Mason (1996: 100) puts it:  
 
                                                          
140 Having made initial contact with individuals from interrelated CT roles, there was a conscious effort to allow 
participants to respond before making further contact. This was to ensure that participants did not feel like they 
were being coerced into participating and that their consent was informed in more than bureaucratic ways (as 
consistent with the PREVENT team).  
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‘Theoretical or purposive sampling is a set of procedures where the researcher manipulates their 
analysis, theory, and sampling activities interactively during the research process, to a much greater 
extent than in statistical sampling’.  
 
Theoretical sampling was achieved by conducting further research into the local structure of 
PREVENT and subsequently identifying individuals of interest (initially, participants were 
contacted via email to outline the nature of the study). Furthermore, various participants were 
also accessed via ‘snowball’ sampling. Snowball sampling identifies cases of interest from 
people who know people who know what cases are information-rich (Creswell, 2007: 127). 
Moreover, Rubin and Rubin (2005: 65) state, ‘finding interviewees with the relevant first-hand 
experience is critical’, and further maintain that ‘enlisting individuals who are, or have been, 
directly involved is better than interviewing those who are not’. In the present study, snowball 
sampling was achieved via a PREVENT lead suggesting individuals who might be particularly 
useful for the present investigation.       During the course 
of fieldwork, I also accepted several invitations to attend presentations, talks and training days 
which helped to expose further respondents - a process described by Burgess (1984: 55) as 
‘opportunistic sampling’. Becker (1970: 35) identifies this as one of six strategies set out for 
aiding researchers to identify their sample group and ‘gather information in a more direct and 
purposive way’.  
 
5.7 Reflexivity 
 
In its broadest sense, reflexivity responds to the realisation that researchers and the methods 
they use are often entangled in the politics and practices of the social world (King and 
Horrocks, 2010). This realisation brings about the unavoidable acceptance that doing social 
research is an active and interactive process engaged in by individual subjects, with emotions 
and theoretical commitments (King and Horrocks, 2010: 126). Moreover, reflexivity enables a 
critical stance to be taken towards the impact of both the researcher and the context in which 
the research takes place (King and Horrocks, 2010: 126).  
 
5.7.1 Epistemological Reflexivity 
 
Willig (2001) identifies two kinds of reflexivity: epistemological reflexivity and personal 
reflexivity. Epistemological reflexivity advocates that the researcher reflects upon assumptions 
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about the world that have been made in the course of research (King and Horrocks, 2010). This 
includes how the research questions have been defined, interview schedules structured, and the 
method of analysis taken (Willig, 2001: 23). Various assumptions based on epistemological 
reflexivity are outlined in Section 5.7.2. Moreover, certain assumptions also coincide with the 
‘axiology’ (Robson, 2002) which underpins the present study.  
 
5.7.2 Assumptions 
 
1. That I would be successful in negotiating access to a PREVENT team (case study) in a 
‘non-priority’ (low risk) area; 
2. That every member of a PREVENT team would be willing to participate in order for 
the case study to be representative of that particular population; 
3. That participants would be interested in learning the conclusions of this study and 
benefit from the research findings; 
4. That the inclusion of the views of practitioners in this arena would enhance dialogue 
and, at the same time, provide perspective on PREVENT policing as linked to risk;  
5. That experience is ‘paramount’ to understanding risk and the operations of PREVENT 
by negating cultural and linguistic forms which structure what is considered 
‘experience’ (Silverman, 2011); 
6. That a focus upon dispositif and reflexive risk might better link PREVENT policy to 
practice; 
7. That interviewing those participants from CT roles would provide a balanced, evidence‐
led and non‐partisan assessment of PREVENT and its effects in a ‘low risk’ area. 
 
5.7.3 Personal Reflexivity  
 
Personal reflexivity in qualitative research specifically invites us to look ‘inwards’ and 
‘outwards’, exploring the intersecting relationships between existing knowledge, our 
experience, our research roles and the world around us’ (King and Horrocks, 2010: 125, 
emphasis in original). To put it differently, personal reflexivity involves considering the ways 
in which our beliefs, interests and experiences might have affected the research (Willig, 2001). 
Importantly, qualitative interviewing is itself a highly personal activity that necessitates critical 
self-reflection (King and Horrocks, 2010: 129, emphasis in original) or ‘disciplined self-
reflection’ (Wilkinson, 1988: 493). In what follows, I move beyond reporting simple ‘personal 
135 
 
thoughts’ towards providing a conceptualisation of personal experience which can be read as 
‘confessional’ (King and Horrocks, 2010).  
 
 
 
5.7.4 Identifying Methodological Dilemmas 
 
Various methodological dilemmas were identified prior to the fieldwork stage. First, Creswell 
(2007: 138-9) observes that, ‘gaining access to organisations, sites, and individuals to study 
has its own challenges. Convincing individuals to participate in the study, building up trust and 
credibility at the field site, and getting people from a site to respond are all important access 
challenges’. Figuratively speaking, the present study found itself between a rock and a hard 
place. On the one hand, the experiences and accounts of PREVENT police officers are 
significantly under-represented in both government policy and academia. On the other hand, 
one of the most challenging aspects of applying social research procedures to this study was 
gaining access to a PREVENT team operating in a low risk area.    
   Second, over the last five years, the police service has been subject to 
several significant budget cuts to both pensions and staff for the first time in their history. Thus, 
it was identified that shrinking budgets; the demands of the police service as a profession; and 
the time consuming nature of academic research, potentially made negotiating access even 
more difficult - a situation exacerbated by the fact that a ‘low risk’ case study site would have 
far fewer practitioners working within PREVENT as opposed to a ‘high risk’ area. Related to 
this aspect, it was identified that respondents might decline invitation to participate based on 
the assumption that anonymity might be harder to preserve.   Third, the basis of 
the attended problems associated with the differential exercise of power by the interactants and 
insider/outside perspectives was identified. Kvale (2006) for example, states that the interview 
is actually a hierarchical relationship with an asymmetrical power distribution between the 
interviewer and interviewee. Furthermore, Creswell (2007: 140) drawing upon the work of 
Kvale (2006), discusses the interview as ‘being “ruled” by the interviewer, enacting a one-way 
dialogue, serving the interviewer containing hidden agendas, leading to the interviewer’s 
monopoly over interpretation, enacting “counter-control” by the interviewee who does not 
answer or deflects questions, and leading to a false sense of security. Given the status of 
respondents, as well as the academic literature on police culture (see Reiner, 2010), this point 
had perhaps even more pertinence given that the methodological approach involved 
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‘interviewing up’ (Silverman, 2013). As Silverman (2013: 206) points out, as a researcher ‘you 
may find elite members unhappy about ‘opening up’ about themselves’.    
   Lastly, significant cognisance was given to the volume of negative 
political, media and academic attention PREVENT has received since its policy inception. 
Subsequently, the reverberations of participants being deceived, misrepresented and/or 
misunderstood meant that there was greater likelihood that (as a researcher) I would be viewed 
with suspicion and/or acquire biased data. For instance, Mair (1989) points out that the 
detached, depersonalised and ‘uncontaminated’ account of research that is often presented is 
arguably a very powerful and well-researched ‘illusion’. Moreover, Bourdieu (1977) 
emphasises the ability of the interviewee to temper their opinions and ideas for ‘official 
representation’ thus providing the interviewer with an official account, or an account of what 
the interviewee believes the interviewer wants to hear. Thus, the issue of what Silverman 
(2011: 369) refers to as ‘the truth status of respondents’ accounts’, and the ‘official/unofficial’ 
narrative (Bourdieu, 1977) was particularly acute to the present study. 
 
5.7.5 Resolving Methodological Dilemmas 
 
Having initially made two unsuccessful attempts at negotiating access to other research 
locations,141 several steps were taken in order to adhere to accountability and responsibility; 
what Gill (1995) terms ‘accountable reflexivity’. Ashmore (1989) states that, ‘it is the duty of 
a qualitative and quantitative researcher to apply a form of methodological reflexivity to all 
components of the research procedure’. After successfully negotiating access with the 
PREVENT team, the ‘co-construction’ of the research began months prior to the fieldwork 
stage. Due consideration was given to the validity of the data because of the fervent criticism 
of PREVENT as a policy. Specifically, the decision taken was to spend several months building 
up trust and generating a rapport with the participants142 in keeping with a case study design. 
As Yin (2014: 37) makes clear: 
 
                                                          
141 One police constabulary declined whilst the other did not respond. The identities of both police constabularies 
have been withheld in keeping with the anonymised nature of the research.   
142 It is argued the term ‘validity’ does not map well onto qualitative research paradigms. Thus, building trust with 
participants can be read as a methodological step taken to enhance the ‘trustworthiness’ of the research findings 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985).   
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‘Students think, by having selected the case study method, they can proceed quickly into their fieldwork. 
No presumption could be more misleading. Among other considerations, the relevant field contacts 
depend upon an understanding - or theory - of what is being studied’.   
 
Moreover, generating a level of trust with the PREVENT team was based on the understanding 
that ‘field relations should be treated as data’ (Silverman, 2013). As Gubrium and Holstein 
(2003b) articulate, the qualitative interview process is an ‘interactional project’ from the 
moment the research is conceived and not just at the interview stage. This is because in 
qualitative interviewing ‘we actively manage how the interaction will unfold’ since ‘we 
unavoidably co-create or co-construct the events that take place’ (King and Horrocks, 2010: 
134, italics in original). Thus, reflexivity locates researchers as involved and implicated in the 
entire process of knowledge production (Finlay and Gough, 2003: xi). Ultimately, solidifying 
trust with the research participants allowed for the following methodological advantages. First, 
trust helped to permit asking questions as the fieldwork progressed without creating too much 
suspicion. Second, due to staff reductions and budget cuts within the police force, it was 
imperative to make sure that fieldwork began around the most appropriate time for the 
participants’ schedules and not the most convenient time for myself (as a researcher). 
Respecting time restrictions and preferences helped to build healthy relationships, which 
ultimately generated “richer” data.143 Third, participants were allowed to reflect upon their 
decision to participate over a significant period of time, which helped to maintain ethical 
standards.           
 It is also important to note that several methodological steps were taken prior to 
fieldwork commencing in order to minimise the likelihood of accumulating biased or research-
lead data. During several informal discussions with participants (prior to field interviews), a 
determined effort was made to avoid directly asking participants the research questions, thus 
minimising researcher influence and affect. As Creswell (2007) observes, ‘it is important that 
disclosure is handled by the researcher by presenting general information, not specific 
information about the research study’. Rather, it was the nature of the research that was 
discussed in order to be explicit about the particular agenda(s) of the research (Gill, 1995). Of 
note, during interviews I adopted a stance of ‘talking back’ to the interviewee (Griffin, 1990). 
Thus, questions were used to promote a two-way dialogue with which helped to explore key 
themes. Whilst this approach is subject to criticism, particularly with regard to researcher 
                                                          
143 The decision to be sensitive and respectful of participants’ time constraints and preferences was also based on 
the perspective that access is a ‘process’ and not an ‘event’ (see Yin, 2012).   
138 
 
neutrality, a two-way dialogue helped to generate what Wilkerson (2007) terms “accelerated 
intimacy”.          In order to 
reduce power difference at the fieldwork stage, it was decided that the best way to achieve this 
was to be as open as possible with the participants, both morally and practically. During various 
informal discussions, participants were assured of the nature of the research, which perhaps 
resulted in interviewees reflecting more honestly and openly at the fieldwork stage. Moreover, 
during the fieldwork stage, I accepted various invitations to attend presentations delivered by 
the PREVENT team which contributed to a reduction in power imbalance by relating to 
members in the field (Perakyla, 1989: 131).    
 
5.7.6 Reflecting on Methodological Dilemmas and Resolves  
 
At the beginning of the fieldwork phase I had achieved a position of trust within the PREVENT 
team, which provided various methodological benefits. First, this helped to create a more 
comfortable interview environment, which contributed to richer contextual data through more 
open and honest answers. Second, Gray (2004: 224-5) suggests that in qualitative interviews, 
maintaining control is essential and can be achieved by ‘minimising long-winded responses 
and digressions’. He goes onto argue that the researcher should not feel concerned to interrupt 
the respondent if this enables the interview to stay focussed (Gray, 2004). Moreover, Arksey 
and Knight (1999) add ‘improvisation throughout the interview is fundamental to maintaining 
control’. In various instances within the present study, participants did digress from what was 
being discussed however, this was actively encouraged when it brought perspective to the 
research that I had not considered before. The following interview data reflects one such 
situation:144  
 
Participant: ... you know, I’m sort of going off on a tangent here ... remind me 
what the question was ... I think I’ve just lost it there ... 
Interviewer: You were discussing the links between PREVENT and local 
authorities ... 
Participant: Yeah, it is a crucial part of our work ... 
 
                                                          
144 Interview with practitioner No.03. 
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Nevertheless, since the nature of the research entailed interviewing ‘up’ (Silverman, 2013), had 
any participant spent a great deal of time on matters which were of minimal significance to the 
research, it is questionable whether I would have had the confidence to ensure the interview 
stayed on course had there been no relationship in place. Overlooking this had the potential to 
waste time, as well as neglect more pertinent topics for discussion.   
 Attaining a position of trust also raised various methodological ambiguities. Hall (2000) 
recommends researchers should aim to maintain a balanced status where they are considered 
as accepted within their sample, though at the same time not completely immersed. Similarly, 
Davis (1973: 342) writes that the researcher should aim to adopt a ‘middle ground’ position 
between what he describes as the “Martian” and the “Convert”, in order to obtain ‘a valid 
objective account of their [participants] subjective world’ (Davis: 1973: 337, emphasis in 
original). According the Davis (1973), the latter involves “going native” whilst conversely, the 
former individual prefers minimal interaction with participants. In the context of the present 
study, remaining within this ‘middle-ground’ was a difficult task that had to be carefully 
navigated throughout the research process. Thus, further caution is anticipated regarding 
notions of a strong professional empathy with the participants and a perceived lack of 
objectivity (Unler, 2012). However, a perceived lack of objectivity should be considered a 
necessary sacrifice given that the police are an increasingly difficult-to-access group.  
           Even after I 
had built trust with several key informants, the schizophrenic nature of power differentials 
came to the fore in numerous interviews. For instance, in certain interviews (as a researcher) I 
was personally afforded a position of trust within the PREVENT team, albeit hypothetically. 
The following responses display this situation:145 
  
Participant: “... Yep, I can call upon Paul Dresser, ‘cause, you’re my man; you 
know all about that, you can help this individual”.  
Participant: “I have contacts with the likes of ... OK, for instance ...  You, (name 
of contact), (name of contact) – head of security, (name of contact) on the senior 
management team ... OK, I’ve got contacts with these types of people”.  
 
                                                          
145 Interview with practitioner No.04. 
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However, in other instances with the same participant, my position had reverted to that of an 
outsider with less expertise than the interviewee:146 
  
Participant: “The problem is ... we’ve got the Police and Crime Commissioners 
and you find a lot of the surveys ... when surveys are going out asking, “What do 
you want your local police to do?” They’re not going to say terrorism because a 
lot of the time people don’t understand that, they’re not going to say burglary ... 
Any idea of what they say? ... What the top one tends to be ... or top two?”  
Researcher: “Anti-social behaviour?”  
Participant: “No. It features up there, but not in the top two …” 
Researcher: “Car crime?”  
Participant: “Illegal parking and dog shit!  Dog fouling ... that’s the top two. Are 
police officers responsible for policing dog poo all over the place? Not really, 
you know? ... I mean the council do have their own departments but that’s what 
the public want ...” 
 
Moreover, in a different interview, a participant reflected upon their experience of friction 
between the academic world and the world of policing, particularly in relation to different 
interpretations of radicalisation and how this has affected PREVENT operationally in the past. 
Whilst during the interview there seemed to be an egalitarian relationship between interviewer 
and interviewee, upon transcription of the data, power differentials became apparent. The 
following interview dialogue demonstrates how our “brought-selves” can enter the relationship 
dynamic in qualitative interviewing:147  
 
Participant: “When you’re looking at the academic side in universities when 
you’re trying to sell the agenda, and it’s about going in at the relationship level 
with those people and over time building that trust is the problem”.  
Participant: “You know, some of the universities don’t like the terminology, 
because it’s the academic world. Let’s approach it in a way that they actually like 
that terminology or want to discuss it”. 
                                                          
146 Interview with practitioner No.04. 
147 Interview with practitioner No.05. 
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Participant: “Very much from the academic side is that if we go into universities 
and use the word “radical” they will turn round and say, “There’s nothing wrong 
with being radical” … “  
     
5.7.7 Reflecting on Resolves and Findings   
 
Byrne (2004: 182) recognises that what an interview produces is a particular representation or 
account of an individual’s views or opinions. Thus, there is a lack of stability of such apparent 
‘realities’ as ‘facts’ and ‘experiences’ (Silverman, 2011). In chorus, Rapley (2004) points out: 
(i) interviews do not appear to give us direct access to the ‘facts’ or to events; and (ii) interviews 
do not tell us directly about peoples ‘experiences’ but instead offer indirect ‘representations’ 
of those experiences. Thus, cognisance should be given to the volume of criticism PREVENT 
has received since its inception from media, academic and government policy circles. 
Moreover, given the initial methodological obstacles i.e. negotiating access, it is important to 
question whether access was granted for the present case study because the PREVENT team 
were operationalising CT in a manner they were particularly pleased with and thus were willing 
to discuss this with a researcher. Accordingly, further concerns may emerge regarding 
perceived professional bias and the pursuit of vested interests on the part of the case study.
           Second, 
caution is anticipated with regard to the sample size. Although the data is a reliable set in order 
to identify data patterns, a small data sample makes ambitious conclusions challenging to 
defend. However, due to the exploratory element of the research, the aim of the present study 
was one of ‘making a lot out of a little’ (Silverman, 2013) by looking at a small body of data 
in intensive detail. In support, Rubin and Rubin (2005: 68) argue, ‘an interviewer does not need 
a large amount of respondents to increase the reliability or credibility of their findings’. 
Furthermore, the sample size also reflects the desire to gain enough data yet ensure that 
participant recruitment and data collection did not exceed the timescale and operational 
limitations of the study. Moreover, the sample size mirrors the fundamental structure of 
PREVENT in line with local funding allocations based on risk assessment. Lastly, the sample 
size is reflective of the axiology that underpins the present study. Recognising that there are 
fewer PREVENT officers operating in ‘non-priority/low risk’ areas should not mean that their 
voices remain hidden or considered inconsequential. Research which continues to focus on 
‘priority/high risk’ PREVENT areas only exacerbates the marginalisation of those working 
within PREVENT in ‘low risk’ areas from both political and academic discourse. Importantly, 
142 
 
whilst historically the police are far from a marginalised group, in the context of empirical 
research into PREVENT, the police very much embody underrepresentation.    
      Third, it is important to recognise the potential 
paradoxical effects of ‘over-rapport’. Rorty (1979) emphasised how we constitute knowledge 
through conversation and social practice. For Rorty (1979), rather than knowledge being 
conveyed in conversation, it is brought into being. This has resonance for qualitative 
interviewing as we become increasingly aware of the constructive nature of social interaction 
and the part played by active subjects in making sense of their experiences (see inter alia 
Gubrium and Holstein, 2003a and b; King and Horrocks, 2010: 17). Indeed, Shotter (1993: vi, 
emphasis in original) describes how ‘conversation is just one of our many activities in the 
world. On the contrary, we constitute both ourselves and our worlds in our conversational 
activity’. In relation to these observations, developing a rapport with participants in order to 
strengthen the integrity of the data paradoxically can compromise the validity of the data; the 
very thing I was trying to minimise.         
   Fourth, Silverman (2011, italics in original) states that interviewers are 
active subjects. Gubrium and Holstein (2004: 152) add to this argument stating, ‘while the 
respondent ... actively constructs and assembles answers, he or she does not simply “break out” 
talking. Neither elaborate narratives, nor one word replies emerge without provocation’. 
Rapley (2004: 26) takes this argument further and posits, ‘interviewing is never just ‘a 
conversation’: the interview ‘may be conversational, but you as the interviewer do have some 
level of control. You routinely decide which bit of talk to follow-up, you routinely decide when 
to open and close various topics and the interaction as a whole’. Whilst due consideration must 
be given to the open-ended nature of the interview scenario, there is also the converse argument 
that philosophically, complete researcher neutrality does not exist since inevitably the 
researcher brings a point of view to all conversations producing a negotiated text (Fontana and 
Frey, 2005, italics in original).     Fifth, my presence and 
reactions as a researcher within the initial informal meetings might have influenced 
participants’ responses at the fieldwork stage. However, throughout the fieldwork stage, I was 
extremely conscious that building trust with participants was not seen as ingratiating behaviour, 
which could ultimately reinforce participants’ opinions in a way that can become leading. 
Ultimately, however, it is only the participants who can assess the degree to which trust was 
viewed as ingratiating or leading. Conversely, had I failed to establish a rapport with any of the 
interviewees, this might have reinforced insider/outsider perspectives and/or minimised the 
‘truth status of respondents’ accounts’ (Silverman, 2011, see also King and Horrocks, 2010).
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       Consideration must also be given to the 
inconsistency in levels of trust between the PREVENT team and participants accessed through 
theoretical, opportunistic and snowball sampling. Such inconsistency has a greater chance of 
participants from the extended sample providing an “official” account rather than truthful 
account. As Wright Mills (1940: 904) succinctly puts it, ‘human actors do vocalise and impute 
motives to themselves and others, attributing this to their perceptions based on past experience’. 
Thus, it is important to recognise the heightened level of risk attached to snowball sampling 
when considering the acquisition of biased data. For instance, participants might have 
suggested individuals who held similar views, beliefs and accounts thus reaffirming their own 
views. Such caution finds support in Lyman and Scott (1970) postulation of ‘accounts’ - that 
is, a linguistic device employed whenever an action is subjected to valuative inquiry’ (Lyman 
and Scott, 1970: 112).          
    As the example in the Section 5.7.6 demonstrates, even when significant 
effort is made to minimise power imbalances within the interview environment, this does not 
mean that our “brought-selves” do not or cannot enter the interview scenario. Thus, 
consideration of the validity of this particular interview is important since, on a broader level, 
my own “brought-selves” (as an academic) is part of the group the participant referred to. 
   It is also important to be reflexive with regard to writing and 
representation at the data analysis stage as well as within pragmatic fieldwork. Two such issues 
lead to the data analysis of the present study becoming a highly personal and moral activity 
particularly with regard to representation. The first issue regards the size of the data sample. 
Working with a small data sample allowed me to obtain a significant degree of trust. However, 
this made analysing the data an even more personal task, one that came with an unforgiving 
social responsibility to tell the story of participants in the most accurate way possible. As well 
as this, as a researcher, I felt a degree of guilt having been responsive (face-to-face) to the 
participants on many occasions, to then using their working lives for the purpose of bringing 
their experiences to a wider audience.148 Consequently, at the write-up stage it was important 
to continuously reflect upon with whom I was communicating with in order for my own 
brought-selves not to take hold leading to a sense of audience pervading the writing and the 
written text (Clandinin and Connelly, 2000: 149).       
 During the write up stage it was also imperative to balance the verisimilitude 
                                                          
148 Tierney (1995) identifies four potential audiences: colleagues; those involved in interviews and observations; 
policy makers; and the general public.  
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(Richardson, 1994: 124) of academic writing – that is, a level of detail that makes the work 
come alive - whilst maintaining a style of writing that was personal, accessible and, most 
importantly, remained fully committed to telling the participants’ accounts accurately. As 
Czarnaiwaska (2004) makes clear, writing objectively, in a scientific way, has the impact of 
silencing the participants thus perpetuating the exact thing the present study aims to negate. 
Moreover, as Gilgen (2005) writes, ‘this silence is contradictory to qualitative research that 
seeks to hear all voices and perspectives’. Subsequently, there was a conscious effort not to 
overlay the voice of the participants by the authoritative voice of the researcher and a 
determined effort not to decouple the responsibility of the researcher from an interpretation of 
the data (Creswell, 2007). In essence, producing a chapter on findings and data analysis became 
a highly daunting endeavour, not least because of personal reflexivity and knowledge 
construction firmly situated within the ethical domain (Doucet and Mauthner, 2002). 
 
5.8 Data Analysis 
 
5.8.1 Transcription of Data  
         
In order to ‘log the data’ (Lofland and Lofland, 1995: 66) an audio-recorder was utilised as 
opposed to taking field notes. The strength of using audio-transcription lies in the fact that 
recorded conversations can be replayed, transcriptions can be improved, and analyses can take 
off on a different tack unlimited by the original transcript (Silverman, 2013). The tape-recorded 
conversations were studied extendedly involving close, repeated listening. This offered the 
advantage of revealing any previously missed features of the originalisation of talk (Silverman, 
2013). Moreover, analysing the transcripts in-depth helped to satisfy ‘low inference 
descriptors’ (Silverman, 2011); it is debatable whether fieldwork notes offer this advantage. 
Furthermore, it was recognised that taking field notes could have affected the natural free-
flowing element of conversation because of the difficulty of asking questions and writing 
answers simultaneously (Creswell, 2007: 134). As Pile (1990) observes, quickly inscribed 
notes may be incomplete and partial which could prove integral to the research findings. For 
example, an interview with a CHANNEL Intervention Provider exceeded three hours. Thus, 
had field notes been taken as opposed to audio-recording equipment, it is likely that a great 
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deal of this data would have been lost through the inevitably of playing “catch-up”. 149 As Pile 
(1990: 217) makes clear: 
 
‘An analysis of language can only be carried out with confidence if there is an entire record of a 
conversation. Hastily scribbled notes are not accurate enough to be used in this way. Tape-recorded 
sessions provides the only viable data for this kind of analysis’.   
      
I alone transcribed data by typing the audio recordings for reasons fourfold. First, I 
wished to become fully immersed in the data in order to gain a heightened level of familiarity, 
which might have been less possible through eliciting secretarial assistance. Second, it is 
generally accepted that doing your own transcription is the first step of data analysis since it 
allows for the initial formulation of emerging codes and themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006). As 
Atkinson and Heritage (1985) point out, the production and use of transcripts are essentially 
research activities. Third, undertaking my own transcription was in keeping with the 
interpretative element of the data analysis (see Bird, 2005) where meanings are created, rather 
than simply a mechanical one of putting spoken sounds on paper (Lapadat and Lindsay, 1999). 
Fourth, I decided that it was my responsibility alone to ensure confidentiality was adhered to 
(see Yin, 2014). Of note, to maintain the confidentiality of participants, any names including 
colleagues, locations (such as cities, towns, universities, buildings, etc.,) have been replaced in 
the transcribed data by bracketed text, e.g. ‘(name of colleague)’, ‘(name of location)’, etc. This 
also helps to preserve the anonymity of the case study location, as well as individual 
participants.         Most appropriate to the 
present study was full (verbatim) transcription. Commenting on the transcription process more 
generally, King and Horrocks (2010: 143) point out, ‘the golden rule to avoid becoming 
swamped by the transcription process is to think carefully about what needs to be transcribed, 
and at what level of detail’. Nevertheless, all interviews were transcribed verbatim to ensure a 
level of detail beyond basic. Moreover, partial transcription of the data through identifying 
common themes or main areas of interest conflicted with the research epistemology. Lastly, 
full verbatim transcription is in keeping with thematic analysis which requires a rigorous and 
thorough “orthographic” transcript – a “verbatim” account of all verbal (and sometimes 
nonverbal [e.g., coughs]) utterances (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 17).     
       All words were included in the 
                                                          
149 Prior to each interview, every participant was informed that if they did not feel comfortable with the recording 
of interviews, field notes would have been taken.  
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transcription although intonation and body language descriptions were not. The omission of 
paralinguistic aspects can lead to ‘missing content’ (Silverman, 2013) when trying to make 
sense of the transcribed data. It can also lead to a ‘shallower understanding’ of participants’ 
experience (King and Horrocks, 2010). Nevertheless, paralinguistic content was deemed not 
central to the analysis. Moreover, to minimise distorting the meaning of data, only minor 
‘tidying up’ was carried out. Whilst acknowledging that full verbatim is without grammatical 
or other tidying up, the decision was taken in order to aid comprehension. For example, on 
several occasions the word ‘us’ was used as opposed to ‘our’. It was felt that this could have 
been obscure to readers. Lastly, cursing words have been included in the transcribed data since 
such terms emphasised the nature of participants’ understandings and feelings around certain 
experiences, accounts and discussions. 
 
5.8.2 Thematic Analysis  
         
Existing literature which explores the understandings and experiences of PREVENT officers 
is particularly sparse. Thus, the present study took an exploratory approach across professionals 
since there was no desire to compare and contrast the accounts of professionals across 
disciplines. The data afforded by professionals in interrelated roles was used to supplement the 
intensive qualitative data in a complimentary or challenging fashion. Thus, the data collected 
from the interviews was amalgamated into one data set.    
 Transcription of the data sets was analysed using Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six-phase 
model of thematic analysis150 (as discussed later in the chapter). Thematic analysis seeks to 
apply meaning to data by exploring salient themes within a text at different levels (Attride-
Stirling, 2001) through ‘careful reading and re-reading of the data’ (Rice and Ezzy, 1999: 258) 
- this allows the context of the discussion to be maintained. Moreover, thematic analysis 
techniques were selected primarily because of the flexibility and variability with which they 
can be applied to provide a rich and detailed account of the data (Braun and Clark, 2006). 
 The data analysis adhered to a more detailed and nuanced account of thematic analysis 
concentrating on particular themes that were identified as “key” to participants’ accounts. 
Boyatzis (1998: 161) defines a theme as ‘a pattern in the information that at minimum describes 
and organises the possible observations and at maximum interprets aspects of the 
phenomenon’. Importantly, the “keyness” of a theme was not necessarily dependent on 
                                                          
150 For a breakdown of this process, see Appendix F.  
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quantifiable measures, but in terms of whether it captured something important in relation to 
the overall research question (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 10). As Braun and Clarke (2006) make 
clear, prevalence is an important factor to consider when coding for themes in the data, however 
they also emphasise that this is not something that is or should be quantifiable. Rather, the data 
analysis approach followed observations by Lofland et al. (2006) who emphasise the 
importance of “meaning”: what concepts participants use to understand their world and what 
meaning or significance such concepts have for them. Acknowledging that a rich overall 
description of the data would have allowed for an accurate reflection of the content of the entire 
data set, doing so would have potentially limited the depth and complexity of the key themes.
        The data analysis of the present 
study is positioned within a constructivist paradigm, which maintains that all knowledge is 
perspectival and contingent (Lyotard, 1984). Moreover, in contrast to a semantic approach - 
that is, the analyst is not looking for anything beyond what a participant has said or what has 
been written (Braun and Clarke, 2006) - thematic analysis was carried out at latent level. 
Analysis at the latent level identifies or examines the underlying ideas, assumptions, 
conceptualisations and ideologies that are theorised as shaping or informing the semantic 
content of the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 13). Furthermore, the analytical procedure was 
informed by Schutz’s (1970) social phenomenology - in particular Schutz’s second postulate - 
where a level of subjective interpretation is in line with preserving the participants’ subjective 
point of view whilst acknowledging the context within which the phenomenon was studied (see 
also Horsfall et al., 2001; Leininger 1994). This approach is in keeping with latent analysis 
since the analytical process involved interpretation: where there is an attempt to theorise the 
significance of the patterns and their broader meanings and implications (Patton, 1990). As 
Gibbs (2007: 52) points out, ‘coding should remain grounded in the data in the transcript, but 
this does not mean it simply reflects respondents’ view of things’. Participants’ accounts of 
PREVENT as a ‘network’ are instructive in this respect. Moreover, to strengthen the rigor of 
interpretation in the present study, findings are illustrated with quotations from the raw data 
where interpretation has taken place (Rice and Ezzy, 1999). This ensures that data 
interpretation remains directly linked to the words of the participants, thus strengthening the 
credibility and validity of the data (Patton, 2002).      
  Other data analysis techniques were considered but deemed inappropriate for 
the present study. In particular, Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA hereafter) 
(Smith, 1996) was considered. IPA ‘aims to explore in detail participants’ personal lived 
experience and how participants make sense of that personal experience’ (Smith, 2004: 40). 
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This type of analysis allows for in-depth analysis of individuals’ perceptions, understanding 
and accounts. Importantly, whilst IPA donates a social constructivist epistemological position, 
it is particularly well suited with a ‘bottom-up’ data-to-theory framework (Lander and 
Sheldrake, 2010). However, since the present study contains ‘theory propositions’ (Yin, 2014), 
thematic analysis was deemed most appropriate since the flexibility of thematic analysis allows 
both bottom-up data analysis and theory driven analyses (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Moreover, 
since the data sample was extended to include professionals working within various interrelated 
CT roles, IPA would not have been appropriate as a method of analysis for the present study 
given that it requires a homogenous sample (Brocki and Wearden 2009). 
 
 
5.8.3 Data Presentation 
        
There are differing levels of verbatim data that researchers can include when presenting their 
data. In the present study, a large number of direct and descriptive quotations are presented in 
order to retain the content and richness of the original data which increases the reliability of 
the data (see inter alia Silverman, 2011). Less descriptive data has also been integrated into 
the text where extremely poignant to the case in point.     
 There are different methods available to researchers for structuring their data 
presentation. In the present study, data has been separated into two chapters (chapters 6 and 7) 
in order to maintain a level of clarity for readers. Chapter 6 presents the key findings from the 
interview sessions as broken down into three overarching (or organising) themes: risk and trust; 
PREVENT as safeguarding; and risk as gut feeling. Within these organising themes, there are 
a number of sub-themes that are explored. Following this, the primary concern of chapter 7 is 
to analyse the data by making comparatives between the research findings and literature review 
(Parts I and II of the thesis). 
 
5.8.4 Data Analysis Approach 
         
The data were subjected to several levels of scrutiny following a framework described by Braun 
and Clarke (2006):151  
                                                          
151 It should be noted that data analysis occurred in a non-linear fashion rather than a smooth transition between 
each phase.  
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Phase 1: Generating initial codes 
 
Phase 2: Searching for themes 
 
Phase 3: Organising and reviewing themes  
 
Phase 1 Coding: ‘the production of initial codes from the data’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 18) 
 
Following initial immersion in the data, the thematic analysis process began by manually 
identifying codes within the data, rather than utilising specific computer software (other than 
Microsoft Word). This phase involved the production of initial codes from the data (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006), with the central idea to move from a lower level of meaning (the raw text) to a 
higher level of understanding that can inform the research question (Auerbach and Silverstein, 
2003). A code refers to ‘the most basic segment, or element, of the raw data or information that 
can be assessed in a meaningful way regarding the phenomenon’ (Boyatzis, 1998: 63). Whilst 
a code is considered as the lowest order premise found in a text (Auerbach and Silverstein, 
2003), nevertheless, the process of coding is part of analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994) since 
it entails organising research data into meaningful groups (Tuckett, 2005). The content of the 
entire data set was systemically coded, rather than coding to identify particular (and possibly 
limited) features of the data set. This approach helped to give full and equal attention to each 
data item, and identify aspects in the data items that subsequently formed the basis of repeated 
patterns (themes) across the data set (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Codes could entail single or 
stand-alone responses, however, there were no such instances given the open-ended nature of 
the interviews.       In relation to the organisation of data, a 
‘block and file’ approach to thematic analysis was considered. A benefit of a block and file 
approach is that the data remains largely intact with easy-to-access quotes (Grbich, 2013: 63). 
However, it was conceded that this approach would have created large columns of data that 
would have become unwieldy (Grbich, 2013: 63). Consequently, a combination of ‘block and 
file’ and ‘conceptual mapping’ thematic analysis was carried out. This minimised the 
disadvantage(s) of adhering to a single analytical approach i.e. simplifying and 
decontexualising the data against the generation of unwieldy data sets. Moreover, using both 
approaches allowed the data to be theoretically interpreted at an earlier stage (Braun and 
150 
 
Clarke, 2006).     Given that the organisation of data did not 
exclusively adhere to a block and file approach, data extracts were coded inclusively to 
minimise the loss of context (Bryman, 2001). Each code was linked to the text response (each 
response was labelled with a letter to identify the transcript and a number so it could be located 
within the transcript (see Appendix H). Of note, certain extracts were coded by more than one 
theme. For instance, certain themes overlapped within participants’ accounts, e.g. “buy-in” was 
coded alongside “familiarity”, “openness”, “honesty” (key theme one) and also “safeguarding” 
(key theme two). However, there was enough distinction between each theme thus avoiding 
the potential pitfall of ‘too much overlap’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006).  Moreover, when testing 
provision themes against the accounts of participants from interrelated CT roles, certain 
participants’ accounts provided an inconsistency across the data set. However, negative cases 
have also been explored, thus reducing researcher bias by challenging the robustness of the 
theme. Lastly, codes were generated using an inductive reasoning (bottom-up) approach, where 
the codes identified emerged from the data rather than a pre-existing theoretical coding frame 
(Patton, 1990) e.g. template analysis. This ensures the thematic analysis is data-driven rather 
than trying to fit participants’ views into a theoretical framework (Braun and Clarke, 2006).  
 
Phase 2 Searching for themes: ‘This phase re-focuses the analysis at the broader level of theme’ 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006: 19) 
 
After all the data had been coded and collated, codes were then sorted into potential themes. 
The name of each code was saved in a specific Microsoft Word file and a brief description was 
made in order to organise each code into theme-piles (see Appendix J). At this stage, some 
codes went on to form mains themes e.g. “trust” whilst other themes e.g. “product”, “buy-in”, 
went on to form sub-themes with an organising theme. Separating themes into ‘sub-themes’ 
and ‘main themes’ allowed for a level of structure and a hierarchy of meaning within the data 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006).  
 
Phase 3 Organising themes: This phase involves the refinement of Candidate Themes (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006) 
 
Once codes had been identified, commonalities were explored to develop organising themes. 
Organising themes arrange codes into clusters of similar issues. They bring together 
components/fragments of ideas or experiences, which are ‘often meaningless when viewed 
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alone’ (Leininger, 1985: 60). However, whilst data within themes should cohere together 
meaningfully, there should be clear and identifiable distinctions between themes (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006). Accordingly, the themes were reviewed to promote internal homogeneity 
(where data within themes cohere meaningfully) and external heterogeneity (clear distinctions 
between themes) (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Moreover, the process of organising themes was 
facilitated by two levels of reviewing. First, reviewing at the level of the coded data extracts 
was carried out by re-reading the text segments associated with each code and consideration 
was given to the strength of a coherent pattern; what Yin (2011) terms ‘reassembling the data’. 
Second, the entire data set was reviewed in order to consider the validity of individual themes 
considered against the original data set (Braun and Clarke, 2006). At this stage, each theme 
was judged against level of overlap, and in relation to the other themes. 
Chapter 6 
Key Findings 
 
6.1 Introduction and Chapter Organisation  
      
This chapter reflects on the key themes which were distilled from the interview sessions with 
PREVENT police officers and practitioners from interrelated CT roles. As a caveat, this chapter 
does not examine the two areas of risk outlined in the literature review. Drawing comparatives 
between literature review and research findings is the primary purpose of the following chapter. 
The key themes from the research data are outlined below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2    Key Theme 1: Risk and Trust;                                                               
6.2.1  “Buying-into” PREVENT through Trust                                                
6.2.2   Trusting PREVENT 
 
6.3    Key Theme 2: PREVENT as Safeguarding;                        
6.3.1  Embedding Expertise through Safeguarding                                                        
6.3.2  “Radicalisation: Another Form of Abuse”  
6.4     Key Theme 3: Risk as Gut Feeling;                                                            
6.4.1 “It might be nothing, but ...” 
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6.2 Key Theme 1: Risk and Trust 
 
Common to all participants accounts was an understanding that a key objective of PREVENT 
is to forge alignments and build relationships between security, local authorities and civil 
society. 152  This objective was accorded importance since it establishes a wide-reaching, 
‘overt’, collaborative counter-terrorism capacity;153 what is termed the ‘rich picture’ approach 
(Gregory, 2010: 94; see also Innes et al., 2011: 16). Whilst countering terrorism necessarily 
requires a degree of secrecy and some of what takes place does so out of public view, 
participants recognised that for PREVENT to be successful and durable, PREVENT cannot be 
solely the domain of the police.154 Thus, both internal and external engagement was considered 
a chief priority of PP. This is in keeping with the PREVENT strategy which states: ‘PREVENT 
must be a cross-government and cross-community programme to meet its objectives (HM 
Government, 2011b: 100); challenging ideologies is a collective responsibility (HM 
Government, 2011b: 44).        
 Adding support to research by Innes et al. (2011), participants recognised that 
engagement under the auspices of PREVENT is designed to perform two main functions. First, 
engagement work was understood to provide a communication channel in order for individuals 
and groups to convey their concerns to the police. However, participants were fervent in their 
accounts that PREVENT, through a multi-partnership approach, should not be understood as 
‘community intelligence’ generation. Rather, the message was one of promoting a “willingness 
                                                          
152 This was understood as “using an army of helpers”.  
153 Interview with practitioner No.04.  
154  A common theme distilled from the interviews was that PREVENT was understood as a “societal” 
responsibility rather than a “policing” responsibility.  
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to share concerns”.155 Thus, the emphasis was on providing partners (and civil society more 
generally) with an understanding of how to act upon risk and concern(s). Second, engagement 
was considered important in order to inform and reassure partners and communities about 
PREVENT activities, thus coinciding with the concept of reassurance policing:156 
 
“Risk assessment is something that perhaps us as police probably wouldn’t be aware 
of because it’s quite a subtle and specific area of work that they’re the experts in. 
We then rely on them to put two and two together to: a) recognise the risk of 
vulnerability to think ... what am I going to do about? Who do I contact? ... And 
that’s where I think we face a real challenge of PREVENT ... getting that message 
out there and; b) making sure it’s clearly and correctly understood”.157 
 
“For me, one of the things essential to PREVENT is it’s about trust and confidence 
– trust and confidence in the process and the people involved. PREVENT’s very 
much in that pre-crime space ... and I think that’s quite a good phrase because it’s 
very much about ... can we give people, in terms of communities, partners, and 
internally within the police, the trust and confidence to understand what we’re trying 
to do ... to work with vulnerable people, to know what to do with that information 
and to have that trust and confidence to know by giving us that information they’re 
not going to have their picture all over the front of the local newspaper - we’re not 
going to breach their confidentiality, etc.”158 
 
These two chief priorities of PREVENT coincide with ‘strategic enablers’ as outlined in 
chapter 2. The aim of the former is ‘strategic communications’, whilst the aim of the latter is 
to ‘develop understanding, analysis, and information communications’ (Turley, 2009: 6).  
  In chapter 2 it was outlined how the OSCT ensures smooth delivery of 
PREVENT by co-ordinating their police element; local authorities; and community partners. 
Moreover, the aforementioned ‘strategic enablers’ help to achieve the last strategic objective 
of PREVENT, institutions. However, a multi-partnership approach in line with the last strategic 
objective of PREVENT should not be simply assumed at local level. Since the geographical 
area was defined as ‘low risk’, it therefore had no direct funding for statutory partners on a full-
                                                          
155 Interview with practitioner(s) No.01; 02; 03; 04; 05.  
156 Several participants suggested that key to overt engagement is “myth-busting” common misconceptions about 
PREVENT. 
157 Interview with practitioner No.02.  
158 Interview with practitioner No.04.  
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time basis. This is a result of the way PREVENT is fundamentally structured at local level (see 
HM Government, 2011b). Importantly, whilst participants recognised that considerable effort 
is made to reach out and engage with both communities and institutional partners, effort does 
not automatically equate to success. Thus, both internal and external engagement had be 
“worked on” and “won”.159 Subsequently, increasing the trust and confidence of internal and 
external partners was understood to be the most important aspect of overt counter-radicalisation 
through PREVENT. 160  As one participant put it, “everything comes down to trust and 
confidence - without which PREVENT would not work”.161 Thus, in large part, the participants’ 
conceptualised risk as interrelated with the notion of trust.     
       The concept of trust was by far the most 
recurring theme in participants’ account of PREVENT operationally at local level; largely since 
it was recognised that PREVENT has moved away from a ‘threat-centric model’ to an overt 
counter-radicalisation methodology. As one participant put it, “the PREVENT team is the 
Neighbourhood Policing Team of Special Branch”.162 The overt element of PP as interrelated 
with the concept of trust is succinctly outlined in the following interview dialogue:  
 
“We always, always deliver what we say we are going to deliver, when we say we 
are going to deliver, and I think all these ... maybe small bits, that might not even be 
linked with PREVENT as such, give out trust and confidence. And I think we’ve 
established some very good relationships in key places and I’d like to think by 
working more with them, they now completely trust the way that we work because 
they’ve seen the way things are done and when we say we’ll try and get back to them 
with information by saying, “Look, we might not be able to because this could 
become quite a hot issue” ... If you are completely open and honest, and by giving 
examples of how you’ve done things in the past ... And again, word clearly gets 
around, because in the old days nobody had heard of you and now people come to 
you who you’ve never interacted with but you’d been recommended by somebody 
else, you know ... saying things like, “You should be getting these people into your 
school”. That’s always reassuring because you presume that they wouldn’t do that 
if they had had a bad experience. Trust and confidence is absolutely key and that’s 
the same for partners, agencies and community members, because occasionally you 
                                                          
159 Interview with practitioner(s) No.03; 05. 
160 This view was shared by all PREVENT police officers.  
161 Interview with practitioner No.04.   
162 Interview with practitioner No.04.   
155 
 
can go into some quite delicate situations and again ... by being open and honest it 
hopefully builds up that trust and confidence element”.163  
 
The need to build trust is recognised in the PREVENT strategy which clearly states, ‘trust in 
PREVENT must be improved’ (HM Government, 2011b: 6 [Figure 3.15]). However, in the 
battle to win “hearts and minds”, the focus of the PREVENT strategy is centred on increasing 
trust at local community level (macro level; see HM Government, 2011b). Subsequently, the 
PREVENT strategy offers little conceptual insight into issues of inter-organisational trust 
(micro level). However, central to participants’ accounts was the fact that PREVENT officers 
not only had to win “hearts and minds” of the local community, but also those of semi-public 
professionals, local authorities and internal partners. The discussion that follows provides 
perspective on the dynamics of inter‐organisational relationships within PREVENT with an 
emphasis on institutionalising logics of prevention via internal and external engagement. 
 
6.2.1 “Buying-into” PREVENT through Trust 
 
Common to all participants responses was the conceptualisation of PREVENT as a “product”, 
whereby key institutional partners e.g. the wider policing family, local authorities, semi-public 
professionals and  individuals and groups at local community level  “bought into” PREVENT 
as an agenda.164 The notion of “buy-in” which the participants referred to can be understood as 
institutionalising logics of prevention resulting in counter-radicalisation engagement via 
multi-agency partnership collaboration.165 Participants regularly referred to the engagement 
process (both externally and internally) as getting the required “buy-in”:  
 
“When we started out it was done internally. Now we need to get our messaging out 
to staff; you pick on key partners, so local authorities: fire, probation, health, higher 
education, etc. So, you sort of, target our partners. That alone is one heck of amount 
of work if you think about the amount of people involved in that, bearing in mind 
there’s no one size fits all, and that’s been a process. If you go to the Heads of your 
partners and get their buy-in it makes it much easier to roll it out further along down 
the line”.166  
                                                          
163 Interview with practitioner No.02.  
164 Interview with practitioner(s) No.01; 02; 03; 04.   
165 This is my own interpretation from the interview sessions.  
166 Interview with practitioner No.04.   
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“We are Special Branch cops but this is still very much about the pre-criminal space, 
dealing with people and issues often long before they do anything criminal. So we 
have to tread, understandably, very carefully in order to get that buy-in”.167 
 
Moreover, participants often referred to the PREVENT agenda as a “product” to be “sold” to 
key partners both internally and externally.168 The emphasis was on a sensible and efficient 
approach towards delivering PREVENT as a “product”.169 Getting the desired buy-in was a 
process that usually took place in the form of presentations and/or training specifically targeted 
towards those identified as having a key role to play in counter-radicalisation on the ground. 
Those considered key partners included the wider (internal) policing family; the education 
sector; health institutions; local charities; the housing sector; and the local community more 
generally.170 Furthermore, various participants likened internal/external engagement to a form 
of “sales pitch” where the PREVENT agenda was or was not “bought into” by partners.171 
Related to this aspect, PREVENT was understood as a product to be “sold” since engagement 
work entailed approaching organisations whom, at times, had limited understanding of 
PREVENT and/or the CONTEST strategy.172 Thus the aim of selling PREVENT through a 
“sales-pitch” approach was to make partners aware of PREVENT173 and in turn, provide a level 
of understanding with regard to how PREVENT “fits” within inter-connecting organisations 
and institutions.174      Participants also discussed 
external engagement with civil society. One specific ACPO product that was considered to be 
producing positive benefits with regard to police/community relations was ‘ACT NOW’:175  
 
“One of the teachers at (name of local college) asked if I would come along to the 
Air Cadets, so I’ve gone and given a presentation on the ACT NOWs at the Air 
Cadets. And again, word of mouth, another Air Cadets have asked up in (name of 
                                                          
167 Interview with practitioner No.02. 
168 Interview with practitioner(s) No.01; 02; 03; 04; 05. 
169 Interview with practitioner No.03.   
170 Whilst these were identified as key partners, several participants made it clear that there was no organisation, 
institution or community that the PREVENT team would not engage with either internally or externally; as one 
participant noted, “there’s nobody that we wouldn’t make the time for” (interview with practitioner No.02).   
171 Interview with practitioner(s) No.01; 03; 04. 
172 Interview with practitioner No.03.  
173 Interview with practitioner No.04. 
174 Interview with practitioner(s) No.03; 04; 05. 
175 Interview with practitioner(s) No.01; 09. 
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location) - which is what (name of colleague) looks after - so they’ve been doing 
ACT NOW to the Air Cadets up there”.176 
 
In brief, ACT NOW is an interactive CT exercise developed by the ACPO Prevent Delivery 
Unit. It provides communities with an insight into how police officers make decisions in the 
event of a terrorism incident. Moreover, ACT NOW is designed to ‘support engagement 
between people from different communities, ages, cultures and faiths and to develop open 
dialogue using facilitators in local settings’.177 It has an important role to play in supporting 
wider community engagement and helping the police, its partners and local people tackle the 
challenge from violent extremism.178 A participant discussed the interactive nature of ACT 
NOW: 
 
“ACT NOW is a table-top exercise. Its DVD-based, it gets everyone in the room 
acting as detectives and it takes you through a major incident. So, information comes 
into the incident room, and we’ve got information on a group and a load of peroxide 
has been purchased. What are you thinking? What are the information processes? 
What information would you like? And it just opens up their eyes to loopholes and 
how long things take to do and generally everybody really enjoys the product ... We 
change it a little bit at the end ‘cause they’re all thinking at that point we’ll go ... 
“Right a telephone calls come into the room, this is live time and I need answers 
now”…”179  
 
By implication, the success of ACT NOW does not necessarily materialise in the same way 
across different localities, of which some participants reflected upon when discussing ACT 
NOW in relation to local and regional difference(s).180     
  Another method of external engagement came in form of presentations 
delivered directly to civil society by PREVENT police officers in order to spread awareness of 
the PREVENT strategy following a specific incident. This can be understood as protective 
intervention whereby police own the intervention in terms of defining the problem to be 
addressed (Innes et al., 2011: 90). However, employing this approach was said to happen far 
less frequently since the decision to “push” direct engagement (protective intervention), rather 
                                                          
176 Interview with practitioner No.01.   
177 ACPO (2013a).  
178 ACPO (2013a).  
179 Interview with practitioner No.01.   
180 Interview with practitioner No.01.  
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than being “invited” by communities to engage (type 1 co-production) came with a significant 
degree of risk.181 Thus, “inviting” rather than “demanding” participation in PREVENT(ion) 
was understood to work in a circular relationship between communities and PREVENT officers 
(or those representing PREVENT). As one participant put it:  
 
“We’ve done talks directly with community groups. We’ve done talks in Mosques ... 
Not many ... (name of colleague) is doing a group ... I think it’s sort of a presentation 
tonight with (name of local charity) in (name of location). So, these things do happen. 
We don’t tend to push it as much because ... you know ... Special Branch going into 
community groups ... We tend to prefer to be invited because you can send out the 
wrong message by saying we’re coming; we want to come to you ... So, you know, 
you do get invitations but that’s more a slow burner ... I don’t think we’ve ever said, 
nor would we ever say no to anybody who declares an interest. We’ll make the time 
morning, noon, or night to speak to groups, but unless it’s something really 
important or following a particular incident like a fall-out from EDL marches, we 
don’t tend to specifically offer our services, but we are always happy to do it”.182 
 
6.2.2 Trusting PREVENT  
         
A crucial factor of whether or not internal and external partners “bought-into” the PREVENT 
strategy was understood to be based on the notion of trust. Importantly, the level of trust and 
confidence of partners was correlated with the level of “familiarity” of whoever was 
representing or spreading awareness of PREVENT,183 which in turn, increased trust within 
‘personal relations’. Moreover, levels of familiarity were considered against the longevity of 
occupying a PP position:184  
 
“I’ll speak from a (name of police constabulary) perspective. The longevity of which 
I’ve been in post, which is (number) of years, (name of colleague) has been here a 
bit longer than me, and people like the fact that it’s the same voice, it’s the same 
person, and if someone’s got a concern, once you’ve done a few case studies with 
                                                          
181 Interview with practitioner No.02. 
182 Interview with practitioner No.02.   
183 Interview with practitioner(s) No.01; 02; 03; 04.    
184 Interview with practitioner(s) No.01; 04; 05.   
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someone they know that you’re not actually there to arrest someone at six o’clock in 
the morning if there’s a concern about something”.185 
 
“(Name of colleague) has got (name of location), and he’s been on the PREVENT 
Unit ever since it started - even before it was called PREVENT. So he’s always had 
(name of location), so he’s got quite a lot of contacts in that area - like universities, 
colleges, local authorities ... So he’s able to canvas things with key institutions very 
easily”. 186 
It is interesting to note that common to the participants’ discussions was the fact that 
levels of trust were correlated not only with radicalisation knowledge(s) or expertise of the 
individual, but also with the personal demeanour of the officer and social knowledge of 
communities and institutional partners; what is termed ‘soft power’ (see Innes et al., 2007). 
Moreover, a heightened level of familiarity was said to allow PREVENT officers to canvas 
PREVENT within a multi-partnership framework more efficiently and effectively.187 This was 
understood as important since specific counter-radicalisation messages were said to often 
trickle down to Neighbourhood Policing level and be promoted on behalf of the PREVENT 
team through an internal multi-partnership methodology. Moreover, this mode of operation 
was considered crucial since it was recognised that Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPT) had 
already established relationships with the communities they serve. Thus, utilising the ‘soft-
power’ of Neighbourhood Policing Teams was understood to be a particularly effective way to 
take PREVENT forward 188  since PREVENT was conceptualised as a fine balancing act 
between effectively maintaining fragile police/community relations whilst simultaneously 
spreading counter-radicalisation messages and awareness of PREVENT:189 
 
“Nationally going out to communities has been really, really hard. And I think what 
we’ve done here is ... we’re only a team of (number) ... you’ve got to use an army of 
helpers out there. So, from a policing perspective, we’ve got our Neighbourhood 
Policing Teams and that’s how (name of police constabulary) does their policing, it 
is through their Neighbourhood Policing Teams. So for the sake of argument, if we 
want to get the message out to say ...  the Somali community, there are two 
Neighbourhood Officers based at (name of university), they’ve got a lot of contacts, 
                                                          
185 Interview with practitioner No.04.   
186 Interview with practitioner No.01.   
187 Interview with practitioner No.01. 
188 Interview with practitioner No.04. 
189 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 04; 14.   
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we use them. If we want to message out the Bangladeshi community in (name of 
location), we got to the Neighbourhood Policing Teams there”.190 
 
 “For about four and a half years now, we have had identified Single Points of 
Contact within our Neighbourhood (Policing) Teams, people such as the Community 
Cohesion Officers who we engage with, so we engage heavily with them should we 
need to put out a certain message, and we liaise with them directly, you know? The 
Neighbourhood Teams and Single Points of Contact are like another arm of 
PREVENT, because we have the knowledge of PREVENT, they have the contacts. 
And, we also engage through the IAG’s – Independent Advisory Groups, to get key 
community members involved in it. So as much as we might not necessarily be there 
day-to-day, the messaging of this is done at a precautionary level in (name of 
location) that’s the thing, so it’s proportionate to the make-up”.191   
 
“If you haven’t got the buy-in of your Neighbourhood Teams, you really are missing 
a trick. And, you know, there’s no doubt that a significant part of the security 
services’ work originates from information that comes from Neighbourhood Teams 
– that’s a fact. So, although it’s very, very rare, with the help of neighbourhood cops, 
I’m hoping there’s enough within each team now that something will get flagged up 
with enough experience compared to say, two or three years ago ... there’s enough 
visitors to the door, whether it’s an email through or a call: “have a look at 
this”…”192 
 
When discussing the importance of trust as linked to overt engagement, participants’ 
accounts also provide enlightening perspective on the “communities defeat terrorism” rhetoric 
that is ubiquitous in government policy. Whilst all participants were sanguine about the 
potential of communities defeating terrorism, such a pronouncement was understood to be 
utopian. One participant succinctly summed up the situation thus: “This idea ... this great 
joined-up working with the community isn’t there and I can’t ever see the day that that happens. 
It happens on a small-scale with certain individuals within a community”.193  Rather than 
approaching communities directly or vice versa, it was suggested community engagement 
happened far more prevalently with key trusted individuals both internally and externally and 
                                                          
190 Interview with practitioner No.04.   
191 Interview with practitioner No.05. 
192 Interview with practitioner No.02.  
193 Interview with practitioner No.02.   
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not with “communities” in the broader sense of the term.194 Utilising key trusted individuals is 
more akin to the concept of ‘strong network ties’ (Innes et al., 2011; Gravonetter, 1973, 1983) 
emanating from theories on social networking (Gravonetter, 1973, 1983). In a recent article, 
Spalek (2014: 832) terms these ties ‘connectors’ – people who are able to negotiate “sameness” 
and “difference” in order to build relationships with people so as to create environments 
conductive to implementing counter-terrorism initiatives. For Spalek (2014: 832) ‘connectors’ 
identifies social connectivity as a dimension to the role of connector. As Spalek (2014: 846) 
observes, ‘individuals are interacting with wider networks of people and organisations, 
building bridges and connections. In the context of counter-terrorism, connectors are therefore 
people who are socially networked, in that they are able to develop purposes of preventing and 
responding to terrorism’.       Whilst a direct approach at 
local community level was certainly not unheard of, it was considered rare.195 Rather, the 
emphasis was on engaging with key trusted individuals in the first instance, be that a 
professional within the health sector, the education sector or society more broadly.196 The 
following interview dialogues reflect upon such:  
 
“And you know ... a direct approach to communities like I’ve said wouldn’t be, as 
such, a last resort because sometimes you go direct to the person themselves ... but 
you have to tread very carefully and work out, why are you doing it, what are you 
hoping to gain, what are the downsides, etc. ... Because it is ... it is risky. You say 
something wrong and you know, a friend’s family might hear in the community and 
literally ...  years of hard work might be undone by you making an unnecessary or 
uncalled for or undiplomatic move. And ... you know ... literally, within certain areas, 
it’s taken months, if not years, to regain trust ... so in your communities you’ve got 
to go very carefully”.197  
 
“You do get direct contact, for instance, (name of colleague) yesterday met a 
councillor in (name of location) who is Muslim - really good guy, done a lot of work 
with him, I have an awful lot of trust in him and he understands PREVENT ...  and 
he has come forward with a number of things to discuss with regard to an individual 
                                                          
194 One participant did voice concerns regarding the problematic nature of unofficial and unelected “community 
leaders” representing community preference and concern. 
195 Interview with practitioner No.02. 
196 Interview with practitioner No.02.   
197 Interview with practitioner No.02.  
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or an incident or community tensions or whatever. And it’s about using those key 
individuals within a community”.198 
 
Moreover, common to all participants’ accounts was the fact that PREVENT relies heavily on 
key trusted individuals both internally and externally in order to push awareness of PREVENT 
(or specific counter-radicalisation messages) out to the community (type 2 co-production) 
when a direct policing approach was considered too risky (as measured against fragile 
police/community relations). The emphasis was on “spreading the word” using key trusted 
individuals as partners within communities to promote an understanding of PREVENT199 or 
canvas specific counter-radicalisation messages: 
 
“If you need to go and speak to communities, you’d usually try and identify a trusted 
person within the community, as opposed to just going into the community. Because 
you know, you’ve got to be aware of the effect on an individual in a community if 
you start ... “Oh, we’ve got an individual, we’ve got concerns about A, B, C” ... you 
know, you’ve got to understand the community the police have came in asking 
questions about, it would be suicidal ... because ... you know ... that community would 
never ... and understandably ... would never come forward. So if you’ve got a 
particular issue, you’ve got to delicately try and find somebody within the 
community”.200 
 
“It’s almost a hypercritical way that I’m looking at it. I want their help but I can’t 
go to them. And, I think what you have to do is, you have to go through your partners. 
You go through some key individuals within partnerships, we do have some key 
contacts and you try and spread the message that way because you can’t just go 
around saying, “Right PREVENT is going to do a presentation”, because people 
will become scared, they won’t get on board and you create the complete wrong 
atmosphere”.201 
 
“At the end of the day, if I want to speak to Bangladeshi community, “Who are you?” 
“Special Branch”. And you can see where that goes. But if that message is delivered 
by a local police officer, somebody they know and trust, or likewise, someone from 
                                                          
198 Interview with practitioner No.04.   
199 Interview with practitioner No.04.   
200 Interview with practitioner No.02.   
201 Interview with practitioner No.04.   
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the local health authority, or local housing group who work with vulnerable tenants, 
who understand our world, they can make that link and join up that information. 
That’s how you get through to the communities, because it’s almost too risky to go 
directly to them because you can alienate them big time, because the suspicions are 
there, we’ll see stuff in the media and it’s out of context and you’ve got to make sure 
the message is clear and accurate”.202 
 
Moreover, much like research by Innes et al. (2011: 37-38), key trusted individuals were 
considered to have a core repository of ‘soft’ skills that are needed to be able to network, co-
ordinate and mobilise interested actors in an effective manner. In this way, type 2 co-production 
and protective intervention modes proposed by Innes et al. (2011) were understood to be 
increasing interrelated when conceptualised against the notion of trust as linked to risk. 
           Whilst a 
direct approach from individual community members203 was said to happen far less frequently 
than co-production with trusted key individuals, nevertheless, the emphasis was one of being 
“familiar”, “open” and “honest”204 in order to increase the likelihood of individuals simply 
“sharing concerns”. One benefit of working within a PREVENT team with far fewer staff was 
that engagement could become “personalised”205 thus bringing a heightened level of openness 
and honesty to multi-partnership counter-radicalisation. In turn, this was said to minimise the 
potential of individuals from being deterred from sharing concerns because of a complex (and 
unfamiliar) policing environment.206 This can be seen in the following interview dialogues: 
 
“We’re trying to emphasise as well that it’s not a case that we will be arresting this 
individual that they’re asking us to consider. It is just about being honest and open, 
and that they’re not given a switchboard number, they have a personal telephone 
number into this office so they’re not going to have to explain everything over again 
and possibly lost in translation from what they’re saying to where it ends up. They 
do get the full package because we’re a small team, so we can do that with them. It 
takes time, but if you’ve had an experience in the past with the police, it can sort of, 
put you on your guard with what you might want to share”.207 
                                                          
202 Interview with practitioner No.04.   
203 This approach to counter-radicalisation coincides with type 1 co‐production – collaborative working wherein 
the community seeks police involvement to tackle a problem (Innes et al., 2011: 90). 
204 Interview with practitioner(s) No.01; 02; 03; 04; 05. 
205 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 03.  
206 Interview with practitioner No.02.  
207 Interview with practitioner No.03.   
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“Things that come in from the community, like ... I visited on a couple of occasions 
an Imam in (name of location) through my NBM208 and he knows me that well. He 
knows that if he has a problem in his Mosque, he’ll ring my direct number, so 
sometimes it doesn’t have to come in through an NBM team ... It’s getting yourself 
known and getting that confidence that they know they can ring us and I’ll ring him 
back”.209 
 
“...Going back to the safeguarding issue with getting the buy-in with people who 
work in that sphere, it’s making yourself visible. You get the trust by talking very 
openly about what you’ll do with the information that they give ... And I think that 
it’s perfectly understandable why some partner agencies might be reluctant to pick 
up the phone, you know? It’s a very confidential area to report somebody in. You 
have to have trust”. 210 
 
Whilst working in a low risk PREVENT area with fewer staff offered some operational 
benefits, participants also voiced certain disadvantages. When discussing the importance of 
trust in relation to a multi-agency partnership approach, several participants discussed the issue 
of high employee turnover within other institutions. It was suggested that high employee 
turnover within key partner institutions had the potential to detrimentally effect already formed 
relationships.211 Such relationships were said to be heavily reliant on trust and thus often take 
a significant amount of time to develop.212 Subsequently, high staff turnover within other 
institutions made it (potentially) more difficult for PREVENT, as an agenda, to remain on the 
“radar” of partner institutions since trust had to be “worked on” or “won” all over again.213 
Thus, regular engagement with key partners was accorded importance in order to maintain a 
high level of commitment to the PREVENT agenda through making new recruits within partner 
institutions aware of PREVENT.214 Moreover, regular engagement was considered important 
since a multi-partnership approach was understood to be, at times, dependent upon fragile 
                                                          
208 NBM is an acronym for Neighbourhood Beat Manager.   
209 Interview with practitioner No.01.  
210 Interview with practitioner No.02. 
211 An emphasis on the term potential is important since there was no suggestion that high employee turnover 
automatically leads to relationship breakdown with key partner institutions.  
212 Interview with practitioner No.05.   
213 Interview with practitioner(s) No.03; 05.   
214 Interview with practitioner(s) No.03; 05. 
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“goodwill”215 in an institutional environment already littered with competing demands and 
organisational objectives.216 The following interview transcripts outline this situation: 
 
“The thing about PREVENT, PREVENT is about relationships and they take time to 
build up. And for me, as much as you know, turnover of staff, you’ve got to be mindful 
with this, especially in probably in our sort of area where we have no statutory 
partners who are full-time on this because we’re not a funded area, so we’re relying 
on partners’ goodwill as well to identify somebody or a number of people to engage 
on this agenda. You’ve got to go in and really sort of ... softly softly approach, but 
once you have those initial rapports ... those partnerships ... you do tend to keep 
them on board ...  But again ...  it’s the effect of the relationships with individuals ... 
but if you change those staff it’s very difficult to try and build that up over quick 
period ... So it’s very much effective relationships (that) will maintain this agenda 
within partners and communities”.217 
 
“The initial approach is there but afterwards you keep a link because a lot of people, 
whether it be an organisation with a high turnover of staff who are coming through, 
or the recent ... sort of ... situation with a lot of cuts going through organisations, 
they’re losing a lot of staff, so they’ve got to juggle their own resources. So, you have 
to keep that engagement going. So it’s making sure people who are coming into new 
roles are aware of the strategy”.218 
 
There is one final dynamic to the research data regarding the notion of trust. PREVENT 
officers tended to equate trust with openness, honesty and familiarity which then lead to 
legitimacy and confidence in PREVENT as an agenda. However, when this provisional theme 
was tested against participants in interrelated CT roles, some participants tended to equate trust 
with being directly responsive to community concern in a disruptive fashion.219 ‘Disruption’ 
goes to the heart of the second formal aim of PREVENT to ‘disrupt and/or respond to the 
ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it’ (HM 
Government, 2011b: 7).  Public acceptance of disruption as a legitimate outcome of PREVENT 
activity was mentioned by various participants who occupied interrelated CT positions. 
                                                          
215 Interview with practitioner No.05.   
216 Interview with practitioner No.05.   
217 Interview with practitioner No.05.   
218 Interview with practitioner No.03.   
219 Interview with practitioner(s): No.07; 08; 09; 14.  
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Accordingly, disrupting the risk of radicalisation through heightened levels of resilience220 was 
seen as a central concern in order to build trust within local communities:221  
 
“There’s incidences that have been targeted against particular communities, getting 
the message out, there is a lot of that, in how serious it’s been taken and if we’ve 
managed to get anyone to go to court, etc. It’s getting those messages back out that’s 
a key element of our business”.222  
 
“The ideology of these extremist groups saps away at your communities and at your 
cohesion, so clearly there’s a community tension element to the work that we do. 
And, we will try and quickly identify that where we can; tensions what are brewing 
in the community. So that might be as simply as making sure racist graffiti is removed 
very quickly and that it is not allowed to take hold. That might mean working with 
colleges - the local college to make sure that they’re aware of the PREVENT agenda 
- so if anyone comes into the college espousing extremist views, the staff they’re 
aware and have the tools to challenge that or that they know who are the specialists 
to speak to if it’s beyond their remit to be able to that”.223 
 
For some participants from interrelated CT roles, there was an emphasis on the importance of 
community cohesion building - that is, increasing the resilience of communities so that they 
are less likely to be influenced by extremist views (Innes et al., 2011: 6) when conceptualised 
against risk and trust. This adds a further layer of complexity to how practitioners within 
PREVENT relate to and understand risk and trust within CT on the ground.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
220 For analyses of ‘resilience’ within UK CT, see Hardy (2014); Mythen and Walklate (2014).  
221 Interview with practitioner No.04.   
222 Interview with practitioner No.07. 
223 Interview with practitioner No.08.   
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6.3 Key Theme 2: PREVENT as Safeguarding 
 
The second key theme which was common to all participants’ accounts was an understanding 
of the interconnectedness of two PREVENT objectives. Key to realising the second objective 
of PREVENT, protecting (or supporting) vulnerable people (HM Government, 2011b: 55), 
was the third objective of PREVENT, institutions. Participants shared the understanding that a 
key requirement of PREVENT is to forge strategic relationships with those who have “quality 
... inter-personal relationships” within communities of concern – teachers, health workers, 
community groups, higher education staff and Neighbourhood Policing Teams, etc. Such 
relationships were understood to be important since these bodies were considered to be on the 
“frontline”.224 Various participants referred to this as utilising the “army of helpers” – without 
which, preventing extremism would be increasingly difficult to achieve at local level. 225 
Interestingly, the enlistment of expertise was being achieved through an invocation towards 
“safeguarding” vulnerable individuals.226 This situation is reflected in the following interview 
dialogues: 
 
“You’d like to think you could sit here with the millions of people who live here and 
we’re all going to be nice and friendly and that you would tell us if someone is going 
off the rails, but life isn’t like that. You’ve just got to hope that the people you’re 
engaging with to help sort of ... be part of the army out there ... and understand ... 
not just about PREVENT, but also appreciate the wider concept of safeguarding and 
making sure we are treating people and looking after those people who are most 
vulnerable”.227  
 
                                                          
224 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 04.  
225 Interview with practitioner(s) No.04; 02.  
226 Understanding PREVENT through an invocation towards “safeguarding” was shared by all participants.  
227 Interview with practitioner No.02. 
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 “For me, that’s about going to the key people, so we’ll pick on the safeguarding 
teams, the youth offending teams within local authorities who are working with 
vulnerable people. Do they understand some of the risks that are out there to young 
people? And do they feel confident in order to report that in? You’ve got to use your 
army of helpers, and that goes right up to the communities as well”.228  
 
The enlistment of key institutional partners into the governance of PREVENT was 
understood not so much a passing instrumentalisation, but more as a mode of activation and 
authorisation that works through what is called “embedding expertise” (de Goede and Simon, 
2013: 325-326). Research by de Goede and Simon (2013) suggests that embedding expertise 
positions frontline professionals as the “eyes and ears” of society in order to “spot and disrupt” 
radical and suspect behaviour – disruption being the second objective of PP (HM Government, 
2011b; see also Innes et al., 2011). Moreover, de Goede and Simon’s (2013) analysis of the 
Nuansa programme in the Netherlands reported an important transformation in the concept of 
countering radicalisation: one from an “eyes and ears” ethos to one of “hand and heart”. Much 
in the same way, participants were fervent that the process of embedding expertise should not 
be read as an “eyes and ears” tactic. Although semi-professional workers were considered to 
be on the “frontline”, the emphasis was firmly on a shift in both policy and practice from a 
perceived focus on encouraging frontline staff to “spot radicals”, to one that promotes a 
willingness to “signal or share concerns”. Furthermore, a willingness to share concerns around 
risk was understood in the spirit of “protecting vulnerable people” being drawn into terrorist 
activity through an invocation of caring for the most vulnerable individuals in the 
community.229 Moreover, an ethics of care was said to provide partners with a heightened level 
of understanding regarding radicalisation as a process and not an event. 230  Further, an 
invocation of care was understood to help partners conspicuously reflect upon the fact that, in 
contrast to PURSUE, PREVENT governs within a ‘pre-criminal’ space.231 
 
6.3.1 Embedding Expertise through Safeguarding  
      
The axis along which embedding expertise works - and in fact, the goal to which PREVENT 
and internal/external alignments are primarily geared - was understood along a language of 
                                                          
228 Interview with practitioner No.04.   
229 This understanding was shared by all participants.  
230 Interview with practitioner No.03. 
231 This point was supported by the dialogue of various semi-public professionals and local authority workers.   
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“safeguarding”. This underscores the intimate and situated nature of the interventions it seeks 
to achieve (de Goede and Simon, 2013: 328), in addition to deploying a calculus of risk. 
Moreover, an invocation of safeguarding was understood to reorient rather than displace risk. 
Whilst most participants acknowledged that the notion of risk has played a role in CT since the 
morphogenesis of PREVENT, an invocation towards safeguarding was considered beneficial 
in relation to mainstreaming PREVENT within other sectors. For example, PREVENT, 
conceptualised as safeguarding, was considered to “soften” the PREVENT strategy and thus 
partners were more likely to engage with and commit to the PREVENT agenda.232 This was 
because terms such as “Special Branch”, “terrorism” and “PREVENT” were said to “turn 
partners off” and/or muddy the link between PREVENT, risk and vulnerability:233  
 
“One thing I’ve learned … I don’t usually talk about being from SB because people 
have a preconception, and if you say to people, “Can we discuss this individual, or 
can we share some intelligence regarding the police, we’re just watching this chap?” 
... Both people are going to go ... “We’re not interested in that.” However, if I say 
to the same person, “Hi, can I share some possible safeguarding issues because 
we’ve got some real concerns about this guy?” ... they’ll go, “Yeah; what do you 
want to know?” Exactly the same thing, different language. You get the vibe”.234  
 
Thus, re-orientating language towards safeguarding was understood to help embed expertise in 
order for PREVENT to operate through a multi-partnership approach at local-level:235 
 
“I think we still absolutely use terms like radicalisation, grooming, brainwashing 
and all the terms that have been used before, but safeguarding is the term that they 
think best sums up what we do, but also its language that other partners know and 
understand and we often start talks with ...“This is about extremism and terrorism”, 
which ... ultimately it is, But to get the buy-in of all the range of frontline services 
that we give talks to, the safeguarding is the bit that people instantly think, “Argh, I 
get it”. PREVENT is such a meaningless word, in fact, most people think it’s about 
crime prevention, sort of ... the people who fit alarms and stuff ... So we’ve moved 
away from that because it’s not helpful, whereas safeguarding is a word that is used 
daily by your absolute key partners and people get that. That certainly features more 
                                                          
232 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 05. 
233 Interview with practitioner No.04.   
234 Interview with practitioner No.04.   
235 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 04.    
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in our language. So whilst we still talk about the same issues and radicalisation, it’s 
within the sphere of safeguarding”.236 
Interestingly, an invocation towards safeguarding was also seen as somewhat necessary, 
partly because of misconceptions with the word ‘PREVENT’.237 Participants acknowledged 
that the scope of PREVENT had been interoperated too broadly in the past by key partners and 
communities.238  It was suggested PREVENT had become understood by some (external) 
partners as “crime prevention” more broadly rather than counter-radicalisation. Thus, 
promoting and utilising language based around “safeguarding” was now common practice 
since safeguarding was considered to best describe PREVENT(ion) work at local level.239 
           The 
language of safeguarding was also seen to have an interrelated relationship with trust and risk 
discussed in the previous section. Much like the blurring between type 1 and type 2 co-
production outlined in the previous section, participants suggested that changing terminology 
and language associated with PREVENT objectives has allowed for “smarter ways of 
working”.240 First, understanding PREVENT as an ethics of care was seen to help govern 
externally through utilising key trusted individuals within the community:  
 
“It’s not just about getting the trust and confidence of partners; it’s also about what 
we’re doing with the communities. And when going out into the communities, some 
communities might just put the brick wall up, “We’re not interested, we know what 
you’re about” ...  and then how do you get through? You’ve got to then use, not the 
police, but use your partners in community cohesion, stuff like (name of local charity, 
01), (name of local charity, 02), who really know the community and can help sell 
the message on your behalf to say, “This is a safeguarding issue”...”241 
 
Second, contextualising the aims of PREVENT within a safeguarding sphere was understood 
to be more accepting and welcoming to key partners. 242  Third, an invocation towards 
                                                          
236 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02.   
237 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 03.   
238 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 03. 
239 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 05. 
240 Interview with practitioner No.05.   
241 Interview with practitioner No.04.   
242 Interview with practitioner No.05.   
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safeguarding was understood to help partners conspicuously recognise and assess their own 
role and responsibilities within the broader PREVENT strategy:243 
 
 “We link PREVENT to a safeguarding approach and using such language is a way 
we’ve been really successful with partners because ... I remember speaking with 
someone who is a lecturer at (name of college), we had a chat after a presentation I 
did ...  and he was really well informed on terrorist stuff and he said to me, “Look, 
we’ve all got a duty of care around safeguarding; whatever our organisation is, 
we’ve got a duty of care. But never before would I have put safeguarding and 
counter-terrorism in the same sentence”. And that’s PREVENT!”244 
 
The relationship between an invocation of care and engaging with institutional partners was 
increasingly apparent in participants’ discussions around WRAP (Workshop to Raise 
Awareness for PREVENT). In very brief terms, WRAP is an interactive and facilitated 
workshop developed by OSCT (HM Government, 2011b: 57) which invites workers from the 
education sector, health institutions, youth organisations, local authorities, community groups, 
etc., to participate in one-day training sessions. In essence, it is a programme tailored towards 
providing an understanding of how and why various partners might signal concerns around 
polarisation and radicalisation. Not only does WRAP go to the heart of the third objective of 
PREVENT, institutions, but as its name suggests, another of its aims is to bring awareness to 
key partners regarding what PREVENT does and does not entail.245 Of note, PREVENT police 
can lead WRAP training, however both internal and external partners can also deliver their own 
WRAP training within identified spaces of risk.246 Due to the low number of staff within the 
PREVENT team (compared to a priority-funded PREVENT area), local authorities had been 
encouraged to deliver WRAP themselves.247 As one participant put it:  
“It’s quite a good product, but it’s about three hours long and trying to get local 
authority to sit down for three hours when they’ve got quite a lot of things to do is 
hard. So, each authority has been given it here to try and train their own staff 
themselves, and ... we’re all trainers in WRAP, but obviously, it takes up time.  So if 
we were to do every WRAP session you’d never see us again”.248  
                                                          
243 Interview with practitioner No.05.   
244 Interview with practitioner No.04.   
245 Interview with practitioner No.06.   
246 Interview with practitioner No.07.   
247 Interview with practitioner No.01.   
248 Interview with practitioner No.01.   
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It is perhaps unsurprising then that when the data sample was extended to document the 
accounts of key individuals who occupied inter-connecting CT roles, the relevance of WRAP 
was evident in their accounts of PREVENT at local-level. WRAP was understood as a 
safeguarding tool249 with the following objectives: (1) bringing together organisations that are 
regularly and routinely in contact with potentially vulnerable individuals; 250  (2) instilling 
confidence in key partner institutions and making sure people are aware of the connections 
between vulnerability and  radicalisation;251 (3) allowing partners to understand where and how 
to pass relevant information on;252 (4) allowing partners to more conspicuously reflect upon 
their own organisational role within PREVENT;253 and (5) making sure that the concept of 
PREVENT is correctly understood.254  The following interview dialogues reflect upon the 
concept of WRAP at local level:    
 
 “WRAP training comes across as very much a safeguarding tool, and the ethos for 
me when we’re delivering the WRAP is around ... “This is your normal day job; 
you’re probably going to work with vulnerable people anyway but this is just another 
thing to be aware of”. And it is very, very hard to spot, and you might not have any 
concrete evidence that people are actively involved in extremism or terrorism but if 
you’ve got people that are arising a suspicion, pass that on ‘cause that might be part 
of the bigger jigsaw”.255 
 
“There are quite a few good clips on the WRAP with actual individuals that have 
recognised people who are potentially being radicalised and seeing what’s done 
about it. So then people can look at that and think “...Well yeah, I can now see where 
my role fits; I can see where my organisation’s role fits within PREVENT ...” And 
it’s not just about the police, it’s about taking care of our community - and that’s 
partner agencies, third sector partners/agencies and the community”.256 
 
 
                                                          
249 Interview with practitioner No.09.   
250 Interview with practitioner No.09.   
251 Interview with practitioner No.11.   
252 Interview with practitioner No.07.   
253 Interview with practitioner No.14.   
254 Interview with practitioner No.08.   
255 Interview with practitioner No.08.   
256 Interview with practitioner No.14.   
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6.3.2 “Radicalisation: Another Form of Abuse”  
      
Common to all participants’ accounts was the fact that a language of safeguarding effaces 
connotations of punitive intervention, evoking instead a questionably more palatable brand of 
normalisation. Participants suggested that depoliticising the radicalisation process has helped 
to embed the principles of PREVENT within existing processes for safeguarding vulnerable 
individuals whilst also enabling workers from key institutions to understand the parallels 
between PREVENT and existing support and intervention processes (see also HM 
Government, 2011b: 84). Much like official CHANNEL documentation which states 
‘radicalisation should be considered as another form of abuse in a similar way to exploitation, 
intimidation and coercion’ (NHS England, 2014: 3), participants drew equivalences between 
PREVENT(ion) and existent mechanisms in place to protect vulnerable people from alcohol or 
substance abuse or engaging in crime.257 Key to PP was providing partners with a layer of 
context as to why individuals may be drawn into terrorism through the notion of 
“vulnerability”. Moreover, vulnerability to radicalisation was promoted in a similar manner to 
other forms of abuse since partners could make sense of, and relate to, such terminology:258 
 
“Everyone gets the safeguarding message. And again, the other phrase I use is 
“radicalisation is another form of abuse”. So you look at the abuse that happens in 
terms of vulnerable adults, vulnerable children - the process of PREVENT is exactly 
the same. So within communities we’re asking our key partners to look out for those 
vulnerable people who might be a subject of abuse – PREVENT’s just another film 
to put into that process”.259  
 
“What we’ve always said is that it is just about safeguarding people against abuse 
in terms of childhood, things that would cause alarm bells in terms of protecting 
children, protecting vulnerable adults, domestic abuse, and just trying to see 
radicalisation through the same lens ... That it is a form of abuse, it is someone who 
might be getting groomed, getting involved in something that they wouldn’t have 
                                                          
257 This understanding was shared not only by PREVENT officers but also participants who occupied interrelated 
CT roles.  
258 Interview with practitioner No.05.  
259 Interview with practitioner No.04.  
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dreamed of doing at the beginning of the process, some of those key points that may 
have affected that change or how people might have acted to bring someone from 
their initial viewpoint to a much more extreme one”.260 
 
Furthermore, the concept of “vulnerability” through a language of risk was understood to 
depoliticise and simplify radicalisation as a concept for PREVENT officers: 
 
“When somebody’s referred in I will look at what the problem is. So, is it because 
they’re just vulnerable, or is it because they’ve said something, or done something 
overtly, or have they mentioned a group, or have they suddenly just changed 
appearance or religion? You’ve got to look at it all when it comes in but generally 
those are my questions that I go through. I have to simplify things because it can get 
very, very complicated”.261 
 
Participants also provided perspective on the most recent guidelines published by the 
Home Office (2012d) which lists 22 vulnerability factors (referred to as Extreme Risk 
Guidance 22 or ERG22), as linked to risk. Overall, participants recognised that understanding 
the risk of radicalisation as linked to vulnerability has provided useful and practical operational 
benefits, however some participants voiced certain concerns regarding the formal structure of 
ERG22. Participants emphasised the importance of treating vulnerable people on an individual 
basis rather than operationalising a blanket attribution of risk assessment.262 Moreover, since 
participants emphasised the potential and partially unknowable futures of radicalisation, 
concerns were voiced regarding the rigid, audit-like framework of ERG22:263 
 
“There’s the formal risk guidance ... the ERG22 risk guidance which is a formal 
thing ... but I guess ... I’ve never really got my head around it; a lot of is common 
sense as to what ticks the box. I think the ERG thing is a bit like ...  you know these 
questionnaires you see, “Are you an alcoholic?” And then you look down this check 
box and it gives you some crazy thing. Just ‘cause you put some ticks in some boxes, 
to me, isn’t really ... it’s a bit artificial. But I think by chatting to people sitting round 
a table, which is what we’re trying to do, get everyone’s heads together, you know 
... see if anyone has any contact with that individual, or if we need to make contact, 
                                                          
260 Interview with practitioner No.07.   
261 Interview with practitioner No.01.   
262 Interview with practitioner No.05. 
263 Interview with practitioner(s) No.01; 02; 05.   
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if its deemed necessary to do that. That’s a far better way of assessing risk rather 
than making these judgement calls by putting these ticks in boxes or putting a number 
in which ... you know ... risk will be different for you as it is for me. But based on 
somebody’s assessment or somebody’s number ... you know ... you can go in many 
different ways ... somebody could be risk assessed as high when they’re actually low 
or vice versa”.264 
 
Lastly, whilst the terms “vulnerable”, “vulnerability” and “safeguarding” were 
understood to simplify and depoliticise the concept of radicalisation to the point where key 
partners could reflect upon their own role within PREVENT strategy,265 this morphogenesis in 
PREVENT(ion) was not viewed as an entirely smooth one.266 Participants offered the view that 
the implementation towards a multi-agency partnership approach has taken time to develop,267 
particularly in relation to the NHS.268 Several respondents discussed having to change the 
“mindset” of key organisational partners in terms of positioning PREVENT as interrelated with 
their own organisational duties and institutional understandings of risk. This was not least 
because of the various rigid definitions of “vulnerability” and the required traits an individual 
must evidence in order to be considered “vulnerable”.269 For instance, participants offered the 
view that a strict definition of vulnerability had been indoctrinated into the NHS. A specific 
case that several participants reflected upon was Doctor Bill Abdullah - the man behind the 
Glasgow Airport attack.270 It was suggested that Doctor Abdullah would not have coincided 
with any of the safeguarding definitions adopted by the NHS when assessing his level of 
“vulnerability”, and yet he was radicalised to the point of committing a domestic terrorist 
attack.271 Whilst it was suggested that over time there had been an appreciation of the variations 
of the term “vulnerability”272 thus allowing for a more harmonious multi-agency approach, 
some participants voiced concerns regarding the pressure of institutions to work within their 
own organisational silos because of conflicting interpretations of risk alongside inordinate 
budget restraint:273   
 
                                                          
264 Interview with practitioner No.02.   
265 Interview with practitioner(s) No.05; 14. 
266 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 03; 04.  
267 This view was shared by all PREVENT officers.    
268 Interview with practitioner No.02.   
269 Interview with practitioner No.02.   
270 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 04.   
271 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 04.   
272 Interview with practitioner No.02.  
273 Interview with practitioner No.04.   
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“I made a note of something in a meeting and I just came across it yesterday; 
whether we should use the word vulnerable or whether we should use the word 
susceptible. The issue with vulnerability for me is ...  the definition of vulnerability 
varies. So, I’ll give you a practical example in terms of someone with mental health 
issues – health will view that person in terms of is it physical or mental vulnerability? 
My definition of vulnerability would probably not fit either of them. So, I’ll give you 
my interpretation – it would be the Glasgow doctors because Doctor Abdullah who 
was behind that one wouldn’t have fit into those two categories and yet he was 
vulnerable because he was radicalised. But he was a working class man, very 
intelligent man - I mean, he was a doctor for goodness sake! And yet, he went down 
the radicalisation process. So was he vulnerable? Answer, yes. But what do we do 
in terms of that multi-agency partnership around CHANNEL, to make sure that 
partners appreciate that? ... And that’s where I think the word susceptible is more 
appropriate. Without trying to confuse the issue, does that open things up and make 
it a bit of a more broad description? I don’t know what the answer to that is. I don’t 
know what you might do from a practical PREVENT perspective. If we were to have 
the likes of Doctor Abdullah who wouldn’t fit into the criteria in terms of 
vulnerability with health or in terms of the No Secrets document - which is what 
health work on and their own definition. What we would do with PREVENT; we 
would take ownership of that individual ...  So we have an individual, we know he’s 
vulnerable, he gets referred in through the CHANNEL process, the partners go, 
“Nah, sorry, it’s mental health, that’s got nothing to do with us”. So then it’s a case 
of - what do we do with that individual?” 274  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
274 Interview with practitioner No.04.   
177 
 
6.4 Key Theme 3: Risk as Gut Feeling 
 
The final key theme distilled from the interview sessions was an emphasis upon the notion of 
acting upon individualised instinctive feelings of risk.275 However, it is important to be clear 
on what the research data does and does not indicate on this matter. The research data does not 
suggest that the relationship between preventing radicalisation and risk should be understood 
exclusively through the notion of gut feeling. Nor does the research data indicate that referrals, 
made by a referral partner, are operationalised exclusively through social actors (be that 
internally or externally) acting upon risk as instinctive “feeling”. What the research does 
indicate is that key partners (e.g. the internal police family, teachers, social and youth workers, 
civil society, etc.,) are encouraged to act on “gut feeling” as linked to individualised risk 
“feelings” in the absence of radicalisation knowledges(s). 276  As the following dialogue 
outlines: 
 
“I think a gut feeling is something ... probably because it is so broad and everybody 
knows what you mean, because we do talk about theories of radicalisation, some of 
the concepts are difficult, you know? Getting your head around some of the concepts, 
being social isolated and all the other things ... that may be talked about but gut 
feeling is something that everybody understands instantly and it is that catch-all, you 
know ... “I’ve just got a feeling that something’s wrong” ... and it could be as simple 
as that. People feel relieved that it is a term that they can completely understand and 
I don’t have to know what Terrorism Act. S.1 Part 1 is; you know? Stuff like that. 
The gut feeling is simple language that people know ... “I’ve got a gut feeling that 
something’s not right”...”277 
 
Of note, acting upon instinct in order to reduce risk was understood to be interrelated with the 
previous two key themes. First, common to all participants’ accounts was that acting on “gut 
feeling” should be read in correlation with the trust and confidence of partners to “share 
concerns” about a “vulnerable individual”.278 As one participant put it:  
                                                          
275 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 03; 04; 14.   
276 Acting on gut feeling was encouraged when engaging with partners face-to-face and through PREVENT 
“products” such as a “Trust Your Instincts” DVD (interview with practitioner No.05).  
277 Interview with practitioner No.02. 
278 Interview with practitioner No.03. 
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“We want them to just share that concern that they have at a very early stage if 
necessary, if they have the confidence to, not necessarily come to us, but to go to a 
colleague and share that concern. That uneasiness they feel about a subject”.279  
 
Second, in a similar way to how PREVENT, understood as safeguarding, has re-oriented risk, 
acting upon instinct was understood to help simplify understandings of radicalisation by acting 
upon innate and existential feelings of risk.280 For instance, gut feeling was understood to be 
something everyone could relate to since, we all, in some way, navigate the vicissitudes of life 
through individualised existential feeling(s):281 
 
“The last person I referred in was a member of a right-wing group, who was very 
young and the information given to me was that they weren’t quite happy with the 
people they were associating with and it was just a gut feeling. They didn’t know 
anything about this right-wing organisation; it was just a gut feeling that they had 
that it was just not right. So a little bit of research from us and we thought, “Yeah, 
your gut feeling is probably right, they shouldn’t be associating with those people”. 
So that was referred into CHANNEL”.282 
 
“That’s one thing that we particularly say to people. You might see something and 
don’t understand why you’re unhappy with it, and again, it’s about that trust and 
confidence of telling the police and letting them decide whether or not it’s worthy of 
investigation. I know after the 7/7 bombings they were interviewing some of the 
people around some of the houses where the bomb factory was, or the house where 
they were making the bombs, and there was one or two people said, “I noticed the 
tree in the garden started to turn white, and I thought it was a bit strange but I didn’t 
know why”. So, to them they just had a gut feeling of, “It’s a bit weird, I don’t know 
why, but it doesn’t seem right”. For them there’s no reason to think that there’s a 
terrorist bomb factory going on and the tree’s been bleached, but they knew 
something wasn’t quite right”.283 
 
Furthermore, in a similar way to the depoliticising effect of the notion of vulnerability towards 
radicalisation knowledge(s), acting on instinct was seen to depoliticise and simplify the concept 
                                                          
279 Interview with practitioner No.03. 
280 Interview with practitioner No.02. 
281 Interview with practitioner No.02. 
282 Interview with practitioner No.14. 
283 Interview with practitioner No.14.  
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of radicalisation for partners when considering a PREVENT referral in an environment shaped 
by juxtaposed understandings of risk:  
 
“I think people have begun to accept and agree that there is slight variations 
regarding what is a vulnerable individual ... or vulnerability is inevitably going to 
be different to each individual ... the threshold at which somebody crosses that point 
of vulnerability into doing something more dangerous and potentially where they 
pick up the phone and speak to somebody it is going to be different for every 
individual. I think again, it’s a relatively new thing PREVENT and definitions evolve 
over time. And I think there might become a meeting of minds but gut feeling ... that 
is always going to be there and that covers a huge spectrum. And that gut feeling is 
used in Home Office terminology because that’s the catch-all, the levels of 
vulnerability, the levels of threat that people perceive may have different thresholds 
at which concern them, but it still has to be that gut feeling, whether it be the level 
is 9 out of 10 or 1 out of 10, it still is a gut feeling that something is not quite right”.284 
 
It was suggested that gut feeling was to be encouraged as an individual risk ‘litmus 
test’285 or “threshold”286 in the absence of radicalisation knowledge(s). Whether this was with 
reference to external partners or internal partners, the principle was understood to be the same. 
As one participant put it, “What we want them to think about is not only their experience in 
their role but also life in general, to use that as their risk test, you know? Their risk threshold 
that they feel”. 287  Whilst this may seem indicative of an “eyes and ears” approach i.e. 
community intelligence generation as linked to the disruption of radicalisation (the first 
PREVENT objective), rather, acting upon gut feeling was embedded in participants’ accounts 
of the second PREVENT objective: supporting vulnerable individuals.288  
 
6.4.1 “It might be nothing, but ...”   
      
When discussing the notion of risk as linked to gut feeling, participants regularly alluded to the 
strap-line “it might nothing, but ...”289 The phrase “it might be nothing, but ...” very much 
embodied the understandings of counter-radicalisation work much in the same way as the 
                                                          
284 Interview with practitioner No.05.  
285 Interview with practitioner No.03.   
286 Interview with practitioner(s) No.03; 05. 
287 Interview with practitioner No.03.   
288 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 03; 04; 05.    
289 Interview with practitioner(s) No.04; 01; 02; 03; 05.  
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phrase “radicalisation is another form of abuse”.290  When discussing engagement with both 
internal and external partners, participants reiterated the importance of implanting the phrase 
“it might be nothing, but ...” into the mindset of key institutional partners. Contextualising to 
key partners what is meant by the term “it might be nothing, but ...” whilst simultaneously 
building the trust and confidence of partners to act upon a feeling of uneasiness was seen to be 
a key undertaking for PP:291  
 
“So it’s very useful both for us, but especially for reporting agencies and we often 
end our talks with “it may be noting, but ...” which you have seen on some of the 
talks we do. And there’s still a huge number of calls that come in ... sort of almost 
apologetically ... “I don’t want to trouble you, but ...” But it is that gut feeling, you 
know ... something isn’t quite right ... so it is very useful”.292  
 
“It’s not a motto for PREVENT, it’s something I’ve come up with, OK? I pinched it 
from the MET because that was part of an advertising campaign they used before 
the Olympics with regard to getting people to be eyes and ears basically, and that’s 
not really the PREVENT agenda but, you know ... suspicious packages, people acting 
strange, all this stuff, you know ... don’t be afraid to report it to the conventional 
hotline etc., etc. But for me, and everything you do has to be focused around trust 
and confidence, so we go back to the doctors and we’ve given them the phrase. If 
they can leave the presentation with “I’m sure it’s nothing, but ...” in the back of 
their mind, that hopefully gives them the trust and confidence in terms of what we’re 
trying to do with PREVENT. And no matter how little, no information is insignificant 
because we say a lot of the time, it’s the smallest bit which can complete the picture, 
and you think, “Actually, that makes sense - now we can go to the where we need to 
with this information regarding this person”. So ... it’s pretty much a local thing, 
there’s nothing like it nationally. I think it would be great if it was adopted 
nationally”.293 
 
Moreover, it was suggested the phrase allowed partners to more contextualise PREVENT 
within a ‘pre-criminal’ space thus separating the operations of PREVENT from PURSUE.294 
It was suggested that “it might be nothing, but ...” as linked to “gut feeling” allowed partners 
                                                          
290 Interview with practitioner No.04.   
291 Interview with practitioner No.02.  
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293 Interview with practitioner No.04.  
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to situate PREVENT at the “bottom-end” of a security sphere rather than conceptualising the 
objectives of PREVENT against high-level security threats:295   
 
“Key is getting that report in and a much lower level, the bottom stage, the what ifs, 
the gut feeling, that if someone is fairly far on we would have already had that report, 
and then it wouldn’t necessarily be PREVENT because they might be well into the 
criminal sphere. But it’s just giving people the trust and confidence at the bottom 
end to report it in”.296  
 
 “Partners phone in and we have a catchphrase that we’ve got “I’m sure it’s nothing, 
but...” And they’re phoning up using that phrase because they understand the 
concept of PREVENT -  they have a concern about a vulnerable individual and 
they’re not quite sure what to do with it”.297  
 
However, as can be seen in the above dialogue acting on gut feeling through the motto, “it 
might be nothing, but ...” should not be read in isolation from trust but is increasingly dependent 
on trust in order for the referral process to commence through a willingness of partners and 
communities to simply share concerns. 298  The emphasis was on sharing “a feeling of 
uneasiness” at an early stage - be that with the police or a work colleague299 - if institutional 
partners (and individuals with the local community) had the trust and confidence to do so. The 
following interview except outlines the interrelatedness of trust and instinctive feelings of risk:  
 
“We’re not saying it is definitely going to be terrorism or extremism, it might be 
drugs for instance, but if you have, for whatever reason, that feeling inside that 
suggests “I don’t know what it is but there’s just something not quite right with this 
person” ... that you have the confidence to contact your local police, somebody at 
work through your local partners or the PREVENT team”.300  
 
It was also suggested “it might be nothing, but ...” was helping to unite Neighbourhood 
Policing Teams and Special Branch in a more harmonious and co-productive relationship301 - 
                                                          
295 Interview with practitioner No.05.   
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297 Interview with practitioner No.04.   
298 An emphasis on gut feeling as linked to both trust and risk was common to all PREVENT police officers and 
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299 Interview with practitioner No.03. 
300 Interview with practitioner No.05.   
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a CT methodology largely unheard of in the not so distant past. Several participants suggested 
the phrase, “it might be nothing, but ...” was, in a metaphorical sense, “opening doors”, with 
Neighbourhood Policing Teams more likely to engage with the PREVENT team through an 
appreciation and understanding of the phrase “it might be nothing, but ...”302 Moreover, the 
internal policing family were actively encouraged to act around the notion of gut feeling in the 
absence of radicalisation knowledge(s): 
 
“Police officers act an awful lot on instinct, hunches, experience, and you know, we 
actively encourage them to act as such around PREVENT. Because there is no 
definitive rule book that says ... when you become radicalised this is what you’re 
going to do, this is how you’re going to behave, this is what you’re going to say, this 
is the sort of materials you’re going to have in your house. That isn’t there - it could 
literally be anything. So yeah, it’s a massive thing - hunches, instinct, experience”.303   
 
Furthermore, acting on gut feeling was understood to be helping Special Branch policing shake 
its reputation as a “secret squirrel”304  and operate in a much more overt fashion. As one 
participant put it:  
 
“The world of PREVENT is very much the overt face of Special Branch. Special 
Branch has always been associated with the secret service, a secret squirrel. What 
we’ve done with PREVENT is open up doors, so in the office you now get cops 
phoning up saying, “Can I run this past you?” When I joined you wouldn’t have 
looked at someone in Special Branch never mind picked up the phone to ask them a 
question”.305      
 
Acting upon instinct was also entwined with the operations of PREVENT in various other 
ways. First, acting on instinct was accorded importance within risk management protocols post-
referral. Various participants suggested that instinctive feeling should work alongside 
standardised risk assessment models, for example ERG22, in a complementary fashion.306 One 
participant summed up this situation thus: 
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304 Interview with practitioner(s) No.04; 05.  
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“I think you’ve got to have something that’s standardised, so we all stick to sort of 
... the same guidance ... but for me the ERG22 is useful if you do have someone within 
CHANNEL, that you can continually monitor them against it, and whether they are 
increasing in threat or whether it is lowering. So again, its national, I think you’ve 
still got to go with your gut instinct and your personal engagement with an 
individual”.307  
 
Second, acting upon instinct was deemed important because of time itself.308 Since deliberation 
takes time, the quicker the decision the lesser the risk and vice versa. Communities and partners 
were encouraged to “share a concern” at an early stage if they had a gut feeling in the absence 
of radicalisation knowledge(s). The emphasis was on promoting a willingness to share 
concern(s), thus allowing the police to “make the call”309  through risk management post-
referral; this as opposed to individuals trying to assess the situation and/or work their way 
through it conspicuously,310 since by that time the progression towards radicalisation and/or 
extremism might have gone “too far down the road”.311 As one participant put it:  
 
“Don’t try and work out whether that individual is going to go on to become a 
terrorist because there’s so much else before that. We’re hoping that we’ve caught 
it at an early stage, if it is, but don’t try and come up with the solution or the answer 
- let other people consider it”.312 
 
Lastly, a willingness to share concern was also being encouraged at the earliest stage possible313 
since participants equated deliberation with the breakdown of previous missed opportunities.314 
By promoting the phrase “it might be nothing, but ...” the preference was firmly on dealing 
with an abundance of referrals rather than missing a potentially crucial opportunity to intervene 
and offer support to a radicalised (or potentially radicalised) individual.315  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
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This chapter has provided a conceptual analysis of three key themes that emerged from the 
interview data: risk and trust; PREVENT as “safeguarding”; and risk as gut feeling. 
Participants’ accounts of PREVENT demonstrate a significant change in CT methodology 
from a threat-centric model to an ‘overt’ CT capacity. Importantly, participants offered the 
view that new open ways of working cannot be divorced from the notion(s) of trust/confidence 
if PREVENT is to be successful in gaining a ‘rich picture’ of radicalisation risk at local level. 
Thus, this chapter has provided perspective on what was considered to be operationally 
beneficial (and vice versa) with regard to inter-organisational partnerships, something the 
PREVENT strategy gives surprisingly sparse attention to (see HM Government, 2011b). 
         Whilst local authorities 
and semi-public professionals were considered a crucial component of counter-radicalisation 
on the ground - as connoted by the phrase “utilising an army of helpers” - the findings highlight 
certain ambiguities regarding the operationalisation of PREVENT as a smooth top-down 
governance structure. Whilst a multi-partnership approach towards counter-radicalisation was 
considered imperative, the findings indicate that in a geographical area with no direct funding 
for statutory partners, multi-partnerships at local level should not be simply assumed. Hence, 
how PREVENT was “sold” as a “product” to targeted key partners.    
        The chapter has also provided 
perspective on the “communities defeat terrorism” rhetoric that has become ubiquitous in 
government policy. Whilst direct engagement with communities was one method 
operationalised at local level, practitioners accounts are indicative of engaging far more 
prevalently with key trusted individuals in order to cascade awareness of PREVENT and/or 
specific counter-radicalisation messages. This is because direct engagement was understood to 
carry a degree of risk when conceptualised against fragile police/community relations.  
        The chapter has also highlighted 
how PREVENT has become entirely re-conceptualised through changes in terminology and 
language. In order to achieve the second and third objective of PREVENT, PP has been 
reconfigured through an invocation towards “safeguarding” vulnerable individuals: hence, how 
radicalisation was understood as “another form of abuse”. Ultimately, an ethos of safeguarding 
was understood to have a profoundly depoliticising effect upon the operations of PREVENT 
which offered significant advantages, particularly regarding how key partners conspicuously 
assessed their own role within the PREVENT strategy.   
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Finally, participants’ accounts highlight the importance of acting upon “gut feeling” 
and “instinct” as linked to risk in the absence of radicalisation knowledges(s). The phrase “it 
might be nothing, but ...” was understood to proffer practical advantages, specifically the 
development of internal and external multi-partnerships. Moreover, acting on intuitive feeling 
was interrelated with the concept of “trust”, “supporting vulnerable individuals” and a 
“willingness to share concerns”. Lastly, the objective of promoting the strap-line “it may be 
nothing, but ...” was to implant the phrase into the individual and organisational mindset of key 
institutional partners in the hope of contextualising the PREVENT strategy as governing within 
a ‘pre-criminal’ space.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
Comparatives between Research Findings and Literature 
 
7.1 Introduction and Chapter Organisation  
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The primary purpose of this chapter is to analyse the key findings of the research outlined in 
the preceding chapter. Critically, the research findings are considered, measured and contrasted 
against dispositif and reflexive risk, as explored in chapters 3 and 4. Comparatives between 
research findings and current literature will then be drawn upon in order to crystallise 
conclusions and thoughts for future research in the final chapter. As a caveat, there is no 
conclusion provided within this chapter since the final chapter shapes the research findings into 
a final thoughts paradigm. An outline for this chapter is produced below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.2 Key Theme 1: Risk and Trust 
 
7.2.1 Reading overt PREVENT Policing through the Risk Society  
    
The research findings make clear that the political power of PP is not immediately structured 
in terms of the hegemonic role of the state. PP is dependent upon a complex set of relations 
between state and non-state authorities, upon infrastructural powers, and upon the activities of 
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7.2.2 Trusting PREVENT 
7.2.3 Troubling Giddens 
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7.3.3    PREVENT(ion) through Language  
7.3.4    PREVENT(ion) through Safeguarding: Political Rationality 
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authorities who do not form part of the formal or informal state apparatus (Rose, 1999: 15). 
Such bodies and practices frequently reside outside, or parallel to, state institutions and thus 
their sum total amounts to a ‘new regime of governing’, where ‘traditional’ government 
structures have become sub-ordinate (Swyngedouw et al., 2002: 556). Thus, PREVENT tasked 
as “joint responsibility” marks a departure from traditional forms of government. Government 
is associated with notions of centralised, sovereign state authority, possessing constitutional 
powers (those institutions and agents charged with governing); ‘governance’ tends to be 
associated with more informal, decentralised and pluralistic decision-making structures (the 
modes and manner of governing); and governing to the act of governing itself (Griffin, 2012: 
210). Accordingly, multi-agency PREVENT(ion) can be understood through the ‘multi-
lateralisation’ of auspices and providers that constitute the modern security assemblage, thus 
eschewing the traditional one-dimensional security dichotomy (Dupont, 2004).   
           In light of 
the above observations, PP might be thought of as “a product” of the late modern condition 
itself, in line with ‘reflexivity’ explored in chapter 4. There it was argued that the political 
landscape of a reflexive modernity extends from, and disrupts, traditional political structures 
(Borne, 2006). Importantly, an overt PP architecture might be seen as indicative of a general 
shift towards system-induced reflexivity (Giddens) as well as individualised reflexivity (Beck). 
Thus, the relationship between PP and reflexive modernity addresses two levels of sub-politics: 
hence examining Beck and Giddens’ work synonymously in the following discussion. As 
Borne (2010: 71-72) notes (on sub-politics), ‘within reflexive modernity the first is the level 
which represents an opening up of governance processes through partnership working.316 The 
second level of sub-politics operates at the individual level in the form of participants of the 
scheme’.      Although Beck constructs a developmental 
model of modern societies in which tensions of classical modernity pave the way for reflexive 
modernity, reflexivity is as much a part of reflexive social systems (or reflexive culture) as it is 
of individual cognition (Webb, 2006: 35; see inter alia Giddens, 1991). As Giddens (1991: 20) 
articulates, institutional reflexivity is ‘the regularised use of knowledge about circumstances of 
social life as a constitutive element in its organisation of transformation’. In this regard, 
institutional reflexivity is linked to re-evaluation: a social ‘activity’ is reconsidered and refined 
in perpetuum via the use of information relating to that activity (Giddens, 1994b: 86). To put 
it differently, reflexivity is ‘the circularity of social knowledge’, and within this paradigm exist 
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reflex(ive) responses by individuals and by institutions (Ferguson, 1997: 225). The re-
evaluative element of PP can be seen throughout the previous chapter, for instance, PREVENT 
understood as “safeguarding”.       
 Second, a reflexive system (or institutional reflexivity), generates an output as a 
function of an input. The establishment of reflexive systems in late modernity is best considered 
as an acculturation process that requires a new discipline among the carrying subjects (Webb, 
2006: 35). This critical perspective can be summarised in a twofold question: what is the impact 
of a security device on the relationship between the users and their activity, and between the 
users and the institution? (Lianos, 2003: 420). Much like Rasmussen’s (2001: 298) 
observations on NATO, the research findings suggest PP defines itself by the constructive 
character by which it has set a new security agenda through an overt multi-partnership (CT) 
approach. For example, whilst it was recognised that means testing the success of PP is an 
increasingly difficult task (largely as result of PREVENT governing within a ‘pre-criminal’ 
space), it was suggested the success of PP might be gauged by the amount and standard of 
partner referrals:317 
 
“Here we’ve doubled our referrals from 2012/2013. And success is a really hard 
thing to measure, you know? I might sit here and think we’ve been really successful, 
but what evidence have I got of that? It’s a hard one to measure what you’ve 
prevented ... and one of the ways I think you can do that is by looking at the referrals 
that are coming in from partners”. 318 
 
Third, an important part of reflexivity is the self-awareness brought about by reflection 
on one’s ability to construct one’s own terms of existence (Rasmussen, 2001), or as Beck puts 
it, ‘the radicalisation of modernity leads to a self-confrontation, self-delegitimation and self-
transformation of instrumental rationality’ (Beck, 2009a, [2007]: 198-199). In this way, 
reflexivity is not only relevant for a number of new security issues, reflexivity has the potential 
to transform the security agenda (Rasmussen, 2004: 394) because of risk’s ‘origin in decision-
making’ (Beck, 1999c: 50) in the context of a certain political project.319 This redefinition is a 
self-conscious break with the past and forms the basis for the construction of a new praxeology 
of security. To put it differently, ‘methods’ of government transform with the times; what Beck 
(1994b: 35) terms the ‘politics of politics’. Importantly, Beck (1994b: 34-36) distinguishes 
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319 This is what Beck (1992a: 46) terms ‘symbolic politics’.  
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between ‘rule-directed politics’ and ‘rule-altering politics’, of which PP through a multi-agency 
framework exemplifies the latter. This is a type of politics one might refer to as constructivist 
as it seeks to redirect policy by changing the entire conception of the environment of action 
(Rasmussen, 2001: 299). Indeed, one of Beck’s central ideas is that constructivism is not only 
a philosophy of science but also a characteristic of our times. PP can be seen as being in a time 
of re-construction since the organisation of PP is actively reconstructing the terms of its own 
existence through overt CT engagement. A participant alluded to the (re)constructive character 
of PP when discussing external CT engagement:  
 
“So, the guy stood at the front said, “Right, this is your slot - what would you like to 
say now?” And my opening gambit was, “I work in PREVENT - has anyone heard 
of PREVENT?” At which point all heads nodded ... And I had a bit of a hallelujah 
moment there because as a key partner, they had their training, they recognised, 
remembered and understood and that was fantastic”.320    
    
However, since multi-agency partnerships had to be “worked on” or “won” (in large part 
dependent upon trust), the participants’ accounts suggest PP might be read as “under 
construction” rather than construction as “complete”.321  
Fourth, PP invites a discourse of reflexivity through individuals taking up certain 
socially acceptable positions and behaviours and rejecting those categorised as dangerous or 
deviant (Hacking, 1990). In this sense, reflexivity is developed into a communicative 
competence through confronting risk as a matter of personal responsibility and institutional 
responsibility (Webb, 2006: 35):  
‘I think there was a lot of society that never recognised the fact that they had key 
role to play in PREVENT and preventing radicalisation. A lot of people looked at 
PREVENT and thought, “that’s the police, MI5, their job - what on earth do I have 
to do with that?” After the training they can see what their role is; they can see why 
they should become involved’.322 
 
“We had a referral from a psychiatrist who was dealing with a patient, went to see 
his line manager, his line manager had been on a WRAP course, understood it all, 
got on the phone and said, “Can we have a discussion?” That for me was a major 
                                                          
320 Interview with practitioner No.04. 
321 By Giddens’ own admission, he uses the term ‘structural reflexivity’ rather than ‘reflexive modernisation’ 
since, for him, the latter connotes completed structuration.  
322 Interview with practitioner No.14. 
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step forward with health because when you think of patient/doctor confidentiality ... 
But that person was thinking outside the box ‘cause he immediately identified that 
he potentially posed a real risk and needed help”.323  
 
In this sense, PP is indicative of Beck’s cultural relativist approach. As Beck notes, risks ‘are 
now no longer thought of as arbitrators but as protagonists in the confrontation, which is 
enacted in terms of projections (Beck, 1995: 92, emphasis added). However, contextualising 
partners’ roles within PREVENT, at both individual and institutional level (through WRAP for 
instance), also coincides with a softening of Beck’s writings in which he seeks to integrate 
cultural relativism and natural-scientific objectivism; what Beck calls ‘a sociological 
perspective’ (Beck, 1995: 76). As Beck points out, certain risks come to the centre stage since 
they are: 
 
‘Symbolically mediated. Symbols that touch a cultural nerve and cause alarm, shattering and making 
comprehensible the unreality and hyper-reality of hazards in everyday life, gain a key significance in 
the abstractness, imperceptibility and impalpability of the process of devastation kept alive by the 
advanced industrial hazards’ (Beck, 1995: 47).  
 
Fifth, recall how overt CT engagement was accorded importance in order to “inform and 
reassure communities about PREVENT activities”.324 One way of getting partners “on-board” 
was through de-mystifying common (mis)conceptions about PREVENT via reassurance 
policing.325 This is being achieved through open methods of working which informs both 
internal and external partners what PREVENT is, and it importantly, what it is not:  
“PREVENT really has two principle sides to its work - one is the frontline liaison 
training workshops with frontline staff informing what PREVENT is and just as 
importantly what it isn’t”.326   
 
Moreover, the reassurance element of PP is embedded within the PREVENT strategy which 
states, ‘PREVENT enables government to effectively communicate its policies in areas of 
controversy’ (HM Government, 2011b: 47). The PREVENT strategy further adds, ‘in 
addressing ideological issues, we also need to be very clear about our purpose and method’ 
                                                          
323 Interview with practitioner No.04. 
324 Interview with practitioner No.02. 
325 Interview with practitioner(s) No.04; 06; 09. 
326 Interview with practitioner No.02. 
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(HM Government, 2011b: 51 [Figure 8.53]). Reassuring communities (more broadly) and 
institutional partners through de-mystifying the objectives of PP was a key part of participants’ 
accounts: 
 
“It’s about recognising with communities and bringing them together … trying to 
de-mystify the PREVENT extremism agenda to them to make sure some of those 
concerns that are put across nationally, such as PREVENT as a spying tool or 
getting communities to inform on themselves ... Work was done in the borough to try 
and assuage some of those fears”.327 
 
Furthermore, participants’ accounts of ACT NOW also evidence the de-mystifying function of 
PP. A participant reflected upon such: “[On ACT NOW] it starts a debate, and you’ll always 
get different answers but it’s trying to explain why things have happened in the past and how 
we’ve developed over time”.328 The de-mystifying qualities embedded within ACT NOW are 
also outlined within official ACPO documents, which state: ‘by engaging local communities 
in the debate about extremism, ACT NOW helps to dispel myths in a policing of extremism 
context. It puts under the spotlight the procedures and thought processes that the police go 
through to arrive at vital decisions’.329 Furthermore, participants suggested that certain myths 
about PP operations have taken a significant amount of time to break down,330 partly as a result 
of the toxic legacy left by the PREVENT agenda in its original form: 
 
“It’s a question of education and explaining what PREVENT is; what we seek to 
achieve by having PREVENT. It did get a bad press when it first launched because 
it was seen, in fact, it was directed towards the Muslim community. And it’s taken 
an awfully long time to try and break down some of those barriers and explain it’s 
not about just radicalisation in those communities, it’s not about just terrorists 
within those communities - it’s about radicalisation and terrorism across the 
board”.331  
 
In order to make sense of the reassuring and de-mystifying function(s) of PP through a 
lens of reflexivity, it is necessary to move away from ‘natural-scientific objectivism’ about 
                                                          
327 Interview with practitioner No.09. 
328 Interview with practitioner No.01. 
329 ACPO (2013b). 
330 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 04; 07; 14. 
331 Interview with practitioner No.07.  
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hazards (Beck’s term for the realist approach) and towards a Beckidian ‘weak’ version of social 
constructivism. In ‘risk society’, Beck notes that there is a difference between ‘a risk itself’ and 
‘public perception of it’, commenting further that, ‘it is not clear whether it is the risks that 
have intensified, or our view of them’ (Beck, 1992a: 55, emphasis in original). Risks are ‘risks 
in knowledge’ and therefore perceptions of risk and risks themselves ‘are not different things, 
but one and the same’ (Beck, 1992a: 55). However, as Lupton (1999: 60) observes, in a later 
article, Beck similarly argues that risks are ‘social constructs which are strategically defined, 
covered up or dramatised in the public sphere with the help of scientific material supplied for 
the purpose’ (see Beck, 1996a: 4). De-mystifying common frames of misconception about 
PREVENT in the public sphere would adhere to Beck’s weak version of social constructivism 
rather than his realist approach to risk in its primary form.     PP is 
indicative of the heuristic value of Beck’s concept of self-conscious constructivism in other 
ways. On the one hand, attempts to increase the legitimacy of both PREVENT officers and the 
PREVENT strategy through reassurance policing embodies the paradoxical effect of 
modernisation which Beck alludes to. Paradoxically, attempts to monitor targeted behaviour(s) 
so as to control future happenings (and increase security) subsequently expose new categories 
of ‘risk’ because of political decisions. Beck (1992a: 80) terms this ‘the political side effects 
of civilianisation’s side effects which threaten the continued existence of the democratic 
political system’. In more simple terms, Beck (1999c: 141) refers to this as the ‘pre-emptive 
risk trap’. According to Beck (1992a: 80), pre-empting risks paradoxically creates risks which 
must then be assimilated and harmonised within institutional frameworks since the system is 
caught in the unpleasant dilemma of either failing in the face of systematically produced 
hazards or suspending fundamental democratic principles through repressive ‘buttresses’. 
Institutional systems, Beck (1992b: 137) notes, ‘continually produce frictions, disharmonies 
and contradictions within and among individual biographies’. Whilst Beck applies his 
argument at the level of policy decision-making (rather than at individual level),332 it is possible 
to apply his argument within other domains. It would seem utilising ‘connectors’ (Spalek, 
2014) in order to promote awareness of PREVENT and/or suppress local level risk on the 
police’s behalf can be read as PP finding itself in the ‘pre-emptive trap’ (Rasmussen, 2006) - 
that is, managing future risks whilst navigating the many unintended consequences of that 
action.333      Whilst the pragmatics of a key trusted 
                                                          
332 As Beck (1999c: 141) states, ‘policy-makers become paralysed because every action holds a new risk’.  
333 This condition also has connotations of ‘being aboard a careering juggernaut’ (see Giddens, 1990).   
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individual or a ‘connector’ can, to a degree, be plausibly explained though Beck’s notion of 
the ‘pre-emptive risk trap’, Beckidian logic also has its limitations when measured against this 
finding. Specifically, Beck’s affirmative inclination to attribute political reflexivity as rooted 
in henneneutical voluntarism is problematic. As Mythen (2004) observes, Beck’s concept of 
‘individualisation’ through cosmopolitan political realism homogenises both the public’s 
abilities to negotiate risk information and subsequent environmental behaviour, thus reducing 
all changes in lifestyle as evidencing reflexivity. However, PP delivered through key trusted 
individuals should not be read as an inevitable inclination to engagement or a complete 
transformation of socio-political structures. Rather, the role played by key trusted individuals 
draws attention to how people respond variably to information received. Accordingly, 
individualisation bleeds into multi-source biographies rather than positing overt engagement as 
totalising human experience, which is blanketed by overarching ‘reflexivity’.  
     Recall from the previous chapter that the PREVENT 
agenda is understood by practitioners as a “product”. What this suggests is that the PREVENT 
strategy is understood as having an evaluative element to it. Importantly, as Webb (2006: 36) 
observes, ‘whilst reflexivity conjures up an image of an incessant contest with self and others 
in the risk society there is far more to the concept. The reflexive process is inter-subjectivity in 
the sense that individuals monitor their own and others’ behaviour, not as isolated acts but as 
instances of shared understanding of how to make sense of a complex life’. This evaluative 
process, what Elliot (1996) terms ‘reflexive scanning’, can be seen in the participants’ 
discussions, for example, “bringing awareness around PREVENT”,334 and “trying to explain 
how you see it fitting within their roles”335. At a phenomenological level, such consciousness 
contributes to the emergence of a particular form of subjectivity - that is, a particular way of 
thinking about, relating to and situating the self in terms of the broader social and political 
context within which the self is embedded (Robertson, 2001: 230). As Webb (2006: 36, 
emphasis added) notes, reflexivity is the ability of the individuals of a social system ‘to reflect 
on and importantly, evaluate both their conception of the system and their role in it and to 
choose activities according to their reflexive evaluation’. In this respect, individuals reflexively 
make, or as the case might be, do not make themselves the subjects of social processes that are 
regulating social control (Ferguson, 1997). This is because the ‘reflexive individual’ in late 
modern society is interested in knowledge(s) and thus people always feel compelled to know, 
                                                          
334 Interview with practitioner No.03. 
335 Interview with practitioner(s) No.03; 14. 
194 
 
with reference to some description of risk, what they are doing and why they are doing it 
(Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 98). As Ferguson (1997: 229) puts it: 
 
‘A by-product of pervasive and diffuse contemporary media discourses, the ‘reflexive individual’ is 
interested in and simultaneously concerned about how they (as individuals) are governed, and the 
structures that are in place to control them’.   
 
Moreover, reflexivity suggests that their (social actors) monitoring is not just a passive check 
but is strategic, allowing them to order the rules of interaction and challenge them in doing so 
(Webb, 2006: 36). Since the “buy-in” of partners had to be “worked on” or “won”, challenge 
was an accepted element of an overt (multi-partnership) PP approach:336  
 
“There was a person in the audience who was a professional, (who) had a 
professional background and had gone on to become a councillor, who was 
challenging PREVENT. By the end of the session I was invited to lunch to discuss 
PREVENT further with him and by the end of that he was on board ... He could see 
where we are trying to go with it”.337  
 
Hence, while it is the institutional processes themselves that are governing the management of 
‘risk’, individuals as ‘service users’ are reflexively engaged in a proxy evaluation of those 
services (see Lash and Urry, 1994: 4). That is, ‘in a socially reflexive era, expertise does not 
remain the sole province of the expert’ (Ferguson, 1997: 229). This is because individuals are 
(more) knowledgeable about social/policy processes and interventions and they have become 
increasingly critical and reflexive with reference to them (Lash and Urry, 1994: 4). In this 
context, the rules of social interaction are not fixed at all and social actors do not have to take 
them for granted; the rules do not provide the conditions for interaction but are themselves 
subject of debate (Hoogenboom and Ossewaarde, 2005: 614). That is to say, reflexive actors 
do not have to take their condition for granted (as a fate), but seek to shape their own condition. 
They actively engage with diverse sources of incoming information flows, which are an 
inevitable part of survival in a social environment where no role, task or function – indeed no 
identity (in a Giddeon sense), is fixed (Hoogenboom and Ossewaarde, 2005: 614, adapted by 
the present author). As a participant noted:  
                                                          
336 Interview with practitioner No.03. 
337 Interview with practitioner No.03. 
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“I was asked to speak to 30 doctors a few weeks back in (name of location), and it 
was at (name of location) and I should have thought, (name of location), 30 doctors, 
that doesn’t sound quite right, because when I got there ... there was 290. It was 
every GP in (name of location). So, I thought – “Fantastic! - Here’s an opportunity”. 
So, I got asked a question from a doctor who said, “We have patients who don’t 
necessarily want their information shared with the police - you’re saying around 
PREVENT that we should trust you - with all due respect, why should I trust 
you?”…”338 
 
Having to secure the “buy-in” of partners fits with reflexivity as characterised by a loss 
of control (Beck, 1999c: 139). Ends are no longer believed to be controlled by the means 
allocated to achieve them. Moreover, because of this lack of control of outcomes, taking a 
decision becomes a risk in itself. ‘Risks’ writes Beck (1997: 30), ‘always depend on decisions 
– that is, they presuppose decisions.’339 In the risk society since nobody craves ownerships of 
bads, the logic is no longer based on possession, but avoidance (Mythen and Walklate, 2005). 
Moreover, it becomes a risk because it is based on a scenario for the future and it is risky 
because any reflective decision is in fact a choice between risks rather than a choice between a 
safe and unsafe policy (Rasmussen, 2001: 294). According to Beck, this in fact makes you 
reflect on everything you are doing to others as if it was something you were doing to yourself. 
As the interview excerpt outlined previously indicates, the individual was consciously 
reflecting upon the decision to engage based on the aetiology of risk; this most likely influenced 
by the No Secrets340 document which governs the NHS. Thus, it is possible to draw upon 
Beck’s notion of ‘individualisation of risk’ where he states: ‘we are concerned with 
individualised institutional situations, whose connections and fractures (neglected at the level 
of system) continually produce frictions, disharmonies and contradictions within and among 
individual biographies’ (Beck, 1992a: 137). Furthermore, from a Beckidian position, this 
aetiology of risk is recognised at policy level. The PREVENT strategy states:   
‘In common with other sectors, uptake of PREVENT in the health sector has not always been consistent. This has 
been partly due to the unfamiliarity of the subject matter and partly because early training was not always 
                                                          
338 Interview with practitioner No.04. 
339 Here, Giddeon logic is also instructive; as Giddens (1990: 90) observes many people ‘bargain with modernity 
in terms of the trust they vest in symbolic tokens and expert systems. The nature of the bargain is governed by 
specific admixtures of deference and scepticism, comfort and fear’.  
340 See HM Government (2000). 
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appropriate. ACPO’s internal 2010 review of PREVENT policing has also identified issues regarding information 
sharing in the health sector’ (HM Government, 2011b: 85, [Figure 10. 144]).  
 
The PREVENT strategy further comments, ‘the Department of Health will need to ensure that 
the crucial relationship of trust and confidence between patient and clinician is balanced with 
the clinician’s professional duty of care and their responsibility to protect wider public safety’ 
(HM Government, 2011b: 85, [Figure 10.145]). This goes to the heart of Adam Smith’s original 
concept of reflexivity that ‘we must imagine ourselves not the actors but the spectators of our 
own character and conduct and consider how these would affect us when viewed from this 
station’ (Smith, 1974: 190, as cited in Webb, 2006: 35).     
 Fundamentally, in order to understand PP through overt methods of prevention, 
reflexive monitoring of risk is intrinsic to both personal (Beck) and institutionalised (Giddens) 
risk processes (Webb, 2006: 34). Moreover, it is also important take into account the 
‘sociological perspective’ (Beck, 1995) developed in Beck’s later writings, as well as a natural-
scientific objectivist disposition and cultural relativist disposition, both of which are more 
prominently (though not exclusively), associated with Beck than Giddens.  
 
7.2.2 Trusting PREVENT 
          
In chapter 4 it was outlined how, for Giddens, the concept of risk is inseparable from trust. 
Thus, whilst the following discussion is centred on the notion of trust, this should not be read 
as a departure from the overall theme of risk. Rather, participants’ accounts of trust coincide 
with Giddens’ definition of reflexivity as ‘the constant appropriation of new knowledge as the 
basis for social organisation and self-identity’ (Giddens, 1990). In short, reflexivity is described 
as ‘a process of continuous monitoring and surveillance, and of making adjustments as new 
information and revised knowledge become available’ (Ekberg, 2007: 354).  
          Drawing upon the 
work of Giddens (1990), Ekberg (2007) maintains it is not the emergence of trust that 
differentiates reflexive modernity from pre-modernity and primary modernity, but the 
emergence of new definitions and expressions of trust. Moreover, recall that in chapter 4 it was 
outlined how, for Giddens (1990), trust is operationalised at two levels: inter-personal trust and 
system-based trust (Giddens also refers to this as trust in ‘abstract-systems’). The research 
findings suggest that both internal and external partners are more likely to “buy-into” the 
PREVENT strategy based on trust developed at interpersonal level rather than abstract-systems 
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level (the PREVENT agenda). Thus, Giddens’ The Consequences of Modernity is particularly 
apposite to the following discussion.341    Giddens (1990, 1991) is careful to 
remind us that trust is also central to the radical transformation of intimate inter-personal and 
intra-familial relations occurring within reflexive modernity. Liberated from the oppressive 
bonds of patriarchal traditions, reflexive individuals form relationships based on mutual, 
reciprocal and active trust (Ekberg, 2007: 257) and thus, according to Giddens (1990, 1991), 
we still have bonds of intimacy that remain at the local level. In particular, friendships and 
sexual partners remain physically proximate even in reflexive modernity characterised by dis-
embedding processes (Giddens, 1991). As Green (2009: 192) observes: 
 
‘The basis of intimacy, or personal trust, in the modern world is mutual openness and self-disclosure. 
Intimate relationships are therefore formed through a process of self-enquiry or self-reflection that is 
then shared with another. This is part of the search for self-identity which is bound up with the process 
of self-reflection in the late modern world. The character of intimacy is therefore transformed as a 
consequence of a dis-embedded and increasingly global society that is nevertheless still routinely 
traversed on a day-to-day basis in physical localities’.  
 
In a Giddeon sense, the participants’ discussions around the concept of trust, as linked to a 
multi-partnership (CT) approach through trusted key individuals, suggest that PP might be read 
through the concept of “kinship connections” (Giddens, 1990). As Giddens (1990: 101) points 
out, ‘kinship connections are very much the bonds which can be relied upon in the structuring 
or actions in fields of time-space’. For Giddens (1990: 101), in pre-modernity kinship provides 
a nexus of reliable social connections that in principle, and very commonly in practice, form 
an organising medium of trust relations. This is true on the level of both fairly impersonal and 
more personal connections (Giddens, 1990: 101). Troubling Giddens somewhat since he states 
that kinship relations are no longer the carriers of intensively organised social ties across time-
space (Giddens, 1990: 108, emphasis added), utilising key trusted individuals or ‘connectors’ 
might be understood through the concept of kinship connections based on a “pure 
relationship”.342 A pure relationship is a more equal, open and democratic relationship that is 
                                                          
341 The strength of Giddens conceptualisation of ‘trust’, as measured against the research findings, lies in the fact 
that he rejects the Luhmanian view that trust must be seen as separate from confidence (see Giddens, 1990: 29-
33). In the same way that participants understood trust as synonymous with confidence, Giddens homogenises 
both concepts by postulating that trust is the link between faith and confidence which distinguishes it from “weak 
inductive knowledge” (Giddens, 1990: 33).  
342 Utilising key trusted individuals in the fight against extremism and/or radicalisation coincides with two of 
Giddens’ typologies of trust and personal relations: ‘kinship relations’, and ‘personal relations’, rather than 
adhering to Giddens’ third typology: ‘sexual intimacy’, in conditions of modernity.  
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actively sustained rather than passively accepted and a flexible relationship that retains a 
permanent option of reversal (Ekberg, 2007: 357). In Giddens’ (1991: 6) words: 
 
‘A pure relationship is one in which external criteria have become dissolved: the relationship exists 
solely for whatever rewards that relationship as such can deliver. In the context of the pure relationship, 
trust can be mobilised only be a process of mutual disclosure. Trust, in other words, can by definition 
no longer be anchored in criteria outside of the relationship itself – such as criteria of kinship, social 
duty or traditional obligation. Like self-identity, with which it is closely intertwined, the pure 
relationship has to be reflexively controlled over the long term, against the backdrop of external 
transitions and transformations’.  
 
Importantly, Giddens stresses the part of ‘personal relations’ within pure-relationships. 
Discussing the concept of “friend” as today’s substitute for “honourable companion”, Giddens 
suggests that whilst social connections can involve emotional intimacy this is not a prerequisite 
of maintaining personal trust in conditions of modernity (Giddens, 1990: 119, emphasis added). 
For Giddens, it is institutionalised personal ties and informal or informalised codes of sincerity 
and honour, which provide frameworks of trust (Giddens, 1990: 119, emphasis added). A 
participant summed up the police/partner relationship thus: “You have to be seen as a friend ... 
but a friend that you’re going to need almost never”.343 Moreover, recall that for the PREVENT 
officers, a key component of PP was demonstrating to partners and communities that “you’re 
as good as your word”344 by operating in an “open”, “honest” and egalitarian manner, thus 
coinciding with a ‘soft’-policing approach: 
 
“An awful lot of people who don’t trust PREVENT, who think the police spy on them, 
who think as a soon as they give us information their name will be all over the 
newspapers and then the person will be arrested. That’s not what PREVENT’s about 
... It’s how you promote that”. 345 
 
“Do we understand the concerns of things from their side, and not be dealing with 
it in a completely police-y-type manner. I think it’s fair to say a lot of groups that 
we’ve been to have been ... not shocked, but I’d like to think pleasantly surprised that 
it’s not this over-bearing, you know ... people still hear Special Branch and go, “Oh, 
                                                          
343 Interview with practitioner No.02. 
344 Interview with practitioner No.04. 
345 Interview with practitioner No.04. 
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I thought he’d be in uniform”. So you know ... even that is a bit of a shock for 
them”.346  
 
Furthermore, the importance accorded to ‘soft policing’ within PREVENT has connotations 
with Giddens’ “focused interaction” (Giddens, 1990: 82). As Giddens (1990: 85) points out, 
‘facework’ commitments tend to be heavily dependent upon what might be called the 
demeanour of system representatives or operators. Accordingly, recall that participants 
highlighted the importance of operating in an “open” and “honest” manner, particularly if the 
issue became “too hot”.347 Such a situation is reflected in Goffman’s front and backstage 
performances, of which Giddens’ work around trust is heavily influenced. As Giddens (1990: 
86, emphasis in original) notes, ‘the clear distinction between front- and backstage reinforces 
demeanour as a means of reducing the impact of imperfect skills and human fallibility’.  
  Adding support to the argument that PP operates through ‘kinship connections’ 
which are built on “pure-relationships”, the participants’ accounts of the fragility of 
police/community relations based on trust are informative. Giddens (1990: 101) points out that 
kinship connections ‘are often the site of conflict or tension’, whilst a pure relationship is 
‘continued only in so far as it is thought by both parties to deliver enough satisfaction for each 
individual to stay within it’ (Giddens, 1992: 58). This is because, according to Giddens, pure 
relationships exemplify autonomy and flexibility yet at the same time exemplify a loss of 
loyalty, stability, solidarity, security and commitment (Ekberg, 2007: 356-357). A participant 
reflected upon the fragility of community trust when external engagement was used to push 
relevant awareness of PREVENT out to a Kurdish community: 
 
“So we did all this when I first started, the first time it came round, and (name of 
location) came back to me and said, “We can’t really do that anymore because we’ve 
got a lack of trust and confidence in that community now due to an incident in the 
community prior to me getting here; somebody’s told them something in confidence 
and it’s went through the wrong protocol and some people ended up getting arrested 
basically, and that community won’t forget that incident unfortunately in (name of 
location)”. Whereas in a different place ... in (name of location) they were, like ... 
“Yeah. We’ll do it”. So we’ve had to ... over time ... try to do it differently in (name 
of location), because people don’t tend to forget”.348  
                                                          
346 Interview with practitioner No.02. 
347 Interview with practitioner No.02. 
348 Interview with practitioner No.01. 
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Moreover, recall that PP utilises key trusted individuals when protective intervention (police 
defined) is considered too risky. As one participant noted: “You can go the direct route, but it 
can also be a risky one because you can equally do something in a Mosque and people might 
go “we’re not happy with that”, and that can backfire and further alienate people”.349 Thus, 
the research findings neatly fit with the different attitudes towards risk in a reflexive modernity 
- a different ontology and aetiology of risk and a heightened sensitivity to the social and 
political consequences of a risk event (Ekberg, 2007: 347). Further, the fragility of 
police/community relations suggests that trust in people or abstract systems can never be 
absolute or constant over time, but must be reconfirmed periodically (see inter alia Schlichter, 
2010). Losing the trust of the Kurdish community (as just one example) embodies reflexivity 
in so far as reflexivity can be seen as the conscious self-consideration of one’s contemporary 
life in terms of a tension between other-informed and self-informed sources of determination 
(Heelas, 1996: 4); what Giddens terms ‘dilemmas of the self’ (see Giddens, 1990, 1991). The 
concept of ‘dilemmas of the self’ is also wrapped up in Giddens’ notion of ‘chronic reflection’ 
- that is, constant reflective evaluation of the situation as a result of anxiety, trust and doubt 
(Giddens, 1990; see Figure 7.2). For Giddens (1990), commitments to practices are constantly 
adjusted based on knowledge rather than tradition. Moreover, according to Giddens (1990), 
modern human beings are affected heavily by chronic reflection and this has consequences for 
their identity.  
 
Figure 7.2: ‘Chronic Reflection’ (as cited in Schlichter, 2010: 12). 
 
                                                          
349 Interview with practitioner No.04. 
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To support the argument that multi-agency partnerships within PP are (to a degree) 
formed and maintained as ‘pure relationships’, various participants suggested that key to 
engagement is “time” itself. Participants voiced concerns regarding the potential of high staff 
turnover to detrimentally affect multi-agency partnerships since trust takes time to cement. 
Hence, how participants suggested that trust had to be continually sustained or “won” through 
“openness” and “honesty” rather than being passively accepted. Moreover, recall that for 
Giddens (1994a), in the modern-world, networks must be worked at, earned, or ‘have to be 
continually to be won’. This is because integrity cannot be taken for granted on the basis of a 
person’s incumbency of a particular social position (Giddens, 1994a: 197). Giddens sums the 
concept of ‘active trust’ thus: 
 
‘Trust on a personal level becomes a project to be “worked at” by the parties involved, and demands 
the opening out of the individual to the other. Where it cannot be controlled by fixed normative codes, 
trust has to be won, and the means of doing this is demonstrable warmth and openness’ (Giddens, 1990: 
121, italics in original). 
 
In this sense, trust is based on a highly reflexive relationship since it presupposes ‘facework 
commitment’ that has to be ‘actively negotiated’ (Giddens, 1991) and ‘renegotiated with lay 
audiences’ (Giddens, 1990). Giddens (1990) terms this ‘voluntary commitment’. In a similar 
way, the participants suggested that developing and then maintaining the trust of partners was 
crucial if PP was to be successful and durable in an institutional environment shaped by 
competing priorities and organisational objectives.350 Again, Giddens’ work is informative 
where he states: ‘even in the domains of expert systems active trust becomes more dominant 
partly because of the divisions within, and contestations of, expertise’; what Giddens terms 
‘institutional opening out’ (Giddens, 1994a: 187). However, Giddens goes further and suggests 
risk is contained within a relationship of deep trust between individuals and collective 
institutions (Giddens, 1990). This is because, as Giddens observes, the issue of trust/mistrust 
is not so much about the proliferation of risks, but that individuals and groups have developed 
heightened levels of reflexivity on which they can act i.e. decide whether or not to trust a person 
or institution (Ward, 2007: 122). High employee turnover within partner institutions was seen 
as a potential barrier to achieving what Giddens (1991; see also Green, 2009) terms ‘emotional 
                                                          
350 This finding has parallels with the social contract theory of John Locke. Locke argues that the need and desire 
for political institutions arises because socially connected persons with multiple and sometimes conflicting 
institutional commitments recognise that their relationships are liable to conflict and inequalities of power that 
can lead to mistrust, violence, exploitation, and domination (Young, 2006: 105). 
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intimacy, openness and sincerity’ which provides both internal and external forms of 
‘authenticity’. Importantly, for Giddens (1991: 197), ‘the authentic person is one who knows 
himself/herself and is able to reveal that knowledge to the other’. Thus, interpersonal trust plays 
a particularly important role within PP since ‘revealing that knowledge to the other’ might be 
read in a similar way to “a willingness to share concerns”.  The notion of trust also has 
significant implications for governing at a distance. Whilst participants suggested PP largely 
relies on key trusted individuals, the research findings also indicate that various other partners 
and individuals are involved in PREVENT, even if, in a Giddeon sense, the relationship is less 
intimate. Importantly, when discussing trustworthiness in postmodernity, Giddens (1990: 85) 
suggests ‘many encounters with representatives of abstract systems are periodic and transitory’. 
Such situations were reflected on numerous occasions in participants’ accounts. As one 
participated noted, “we also engage through the IAG’s – Independent Advisory Groups to get 
key community members involved in it, as much as we might not necessarily be there day-to-
day”.351 Thus, PP also has connotations with Giddens’ notion of ‘time-space distanciation’ (see 
Figure 7.3).    The research findings suggest that through the concept of trust, PP 
attempts to dis-embed the PREVENT strategy352 within key institutions both internally and 
externally in order to govern at a distance (Rose, 1999). The following interview dialogue 
instructively describes the dis-embedding and re-embedding nature of PP: 
 
“We do a lot of stuff internally with police, principally Neighbourhood Teams 
because you assume that they have the neighbourhood contacts ... they have ... they 
are likely to know the communities. We do a little bit of stuff with 24/7 police officers 
but they tend to deal with the job in and out, but less likely, certainly not impossible, 
that they’ll see and assess something on a one-off. So, we do a lot of training with 
them. We try and do it at least once a year ... We’ll do stuff specifically with the PVP 
Unit - Protecting Vulnerable People Unit - which is a form of MAPPA. Quite clearly, 
there is a huge crossover there, you know? PREVENT will form a very small part of 
that, which is far more domestic abuse, child abuse, but nevertheless there is a 
crossover”.353  
 
                                                          
351 Interview with practitioner No.06. 
352 See Figure 7.3. 
353 Interview with practitioner No.02. 
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Figure 7.3: ‘Dis- and Re-embedding’ (as cited in Schlichter, 2010: 10). 
 
In Giddens’ terms, dis-embedding supports the establishment of procedures with less personal 
contact. However, for Giddens (1990; see inter alia Schlichter, 2010), dis-embedding is 
dependent upon trust - those involved must believe that the social relationship will endure at a 
later time. Maintaining the trust of partners through ‘re-embedding’ trust was reflected in 
numerous participants’ accounts: 
 
“We make it clear that if we go down to a school, we’re not going to go, “Right, 
thanks for the information, see you later”. The school, the hospital, whatever it is 
will be a key part of that programme. We tell people quite openly that we’re not 
going to go in and then go behind the school’s back saying, “Guess what?” They 
aren’t going to be side-lined and the police then scurry off to dark places with that 
information never to be seen again. We never do that”.354 
 
To understand PP as an upholding of social relations over time and space constraints, 
Giddens’ caretaker/infant couplet based on D. W. Winnicott’s ‘potential space’ is 
informative.355 For Giddens (1991: 38), an awareness of the separate identity of the parenting 
figure originates in the emotional acceptance of absence: the ‘faith’ that the caretaker will 
return, even though he or she is no longer in the presence of the infant. This creates ‘potential 
space’ that can lead to ‘ontological anxiety’. However, such ontological anxiety can be 
                                                          
354 Interview with practitioner No.02. 
355 Demonstration of this continual renewal of the “contract” which individuals undertake with one another is also 
the exact point of Harold Garfinkel’s “experiments with trust” (see Giddens, 1990: 98).  
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overcome by the discipline of routine which helps to constitute a ‘formed framework’ for 
existence by cultivating a sense of ‘being’, and its separation from ‘non-being’, which is 
elemental to ontological security (Giddens, 1991: 39). However, as the participants suggested, 
high employee turnover potentially made governing at a distance (through Giddens’ concept 
of ‘dis-embedding’) challenging since the introduction of new staff within partner institutions 
required PREVENT to be ‘re-embedded’, usually through ensuring that new recruits were 
aware of the PREVENT strategy. Subsequently, it was suggested that trust (at times) had to be 
“won” all over again.356 Thus, it would seem high employee turnover is opposed to emotional 
inoculation against existential anxieties since trust, by its very nature, entails a commitment to 
‘leap into the unknown’, a hostage of fortune which implies a preparedness to embrace novel 
experiences (Giddens, 1991: 41). Nevertheless, the data suggests that the axial position 
occupied by ‘expert’ systems in a reflexive sense is supplanted allowing PP to re-contextualise 
the experiences of individuals, groups and institutions – in that ‘the everyday experience of 
citizens is dis-embedded ... before being re-embedded within the lived relations that re-
introduce a degree of local definition’ (Scourfield and Welsh, 2003: 404). Subsequently, overt 
CT engagement is developed and evolved through de facto categories of ‘risk’ created by 
‘expert’ systems i.e. PREVENT, and correspondingly, PP operationalised through a multi-
agency framework might be thought of as advanced via reflexivity.   
 
 
 
7.2.3 Troubling Giddens  
 
Giddens (1990) highlights that inter-personal trust and systems-based trust is interrelated. 
Giddens calls the meeting points of the two levels of trust ‘access points’, of which trust in 
abstract systems is highly dependent on the individual’s experience(s) at access points 
(Schlichter, 2010). By means of access points, a person can meet the system in two ways (thus 
distinguishing between two forms of trust): trust in persons or facework commitment (inter-
personal trust, ‘front-stage’) and trust in systems or faceless commitment (systems-based trust, 
‘back stage’) (Giddens, 1990: 88). WRAP is an indicative example of Giddens’ access point(s) 
since it provides the link between ‘personal’ and ‘systems’ trust (Giddens, 1990). However, for 
Giddens, when reflexive individuals invest their trust in abstract systems, they trust the 
                                                          
356 Interview with practitioner No.03. 
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credentials and legitimacy conferred through professional codes of practice, qualifications, 
accreditation, licensing, performance and reputation (Giddens, 1990: 87). In Giddens’ words, 
‘the real repository of trust is in the abstract system, rather than the individuals who in specific 
contexts “represent” it’ (Giddens, 1990: 85). Thus, for Giddens (1990: 85), access points 
merely carry a reminder that ‘it is flesh-and-blood people (who are potentially fallible) who are 
its operators’. Giddens is essentially exposing a difference between ‘expertise’ (the system of 
knowledge) and the ‘expert’ (representative), and locating trust as being a factor between the 
two (Ward, 2007: 125).        To a degree, the 
research findings support Giddens’ assertions on trust within postmodernity. Several 
participants talked openly about the myth-busting aspect of PP, as linked to the past 
mismanagement of PREVENT, which had resulted in a degree of mistrust towards the 
PREVENT agenda. However, the research findings also trouble Giddeon logic, particularly 
trust conceptualised in a one-dimensional manner as Giddens suggests. Although not using 
such terminology, participants made clear the interrelated nature of inter-personal trust and 
trust at ‘abstract’-system level:357 
 
“I remember we had a case in (name of university), where the response from the 
Dean of the School was, to quote him, “Yeah, the PREVENT team did exactly what 
they said they would do”. That then promotes a whole host of trust and confidence, 
you know? We’re not bullshitting you here. We are here for all the right reasons. We 
want to work with you and you need to trust us - this is how we do our business. But 
that takes time to get that trust and confidence. And again, going back to the other 
communities - how the hell do we try and spread that message? Because all it takes 
is one bad example of the police in the media and all of a sudden it’s, “Yeah, the 
police, you can’t trust them” ... you know Plebgate and all that stuff. That does so 
much damage to the overall trust and confidence in the police. It happened in 
London, it had nothing to do with me but we all get labelled with that, “It’s all the 
police, they’re all the same”. So one instance like that can do an awful lot of harm 
when trying to build trust and confidence in a very specific area of work like what 
we cover”.358  
 
Thus, when making sense of CT engagement through a lens of reflexivity, local level trust 
cannot be conceptualised in a one-dimensional manner. PP is located within a complex array 
                                                          
357 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 04; 05. 
358 Interview with practitioner No.04. 
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of dynamic issues that influence not only trust, but also knowledge formation. Moreover, and 
similarly to observations made by Borne (2006: 99) on the CRISP359 project, de-mystifying 
common misconceptions about PREVENT suggests the discursive representations of 
PREVENT cannot be considered in autonomy, but must be sensitive to the underlying social 
and political processes that exist, including virtual risk. Risk based on virtuality is more 
Beckidian than Giddeon and coincides with the cultural relativist approach to risk. For Beck 
(2000: 13), risks are ‘a type of virtual reality or real virtuality’. Beck is aware that his concept 
of ‘[World] Risk Society’ is also a ‘science, media and information society’ (Beck, 1992a: 46), 
and ‘... the political site of world risk society is not the street but the television’ (Beck, 1999c: 
44). For the reflexive agenda, this is established through the relationship between aesthetic and 
cognitive reflexivity (Borne, 2010: 82). Beck exemplifies this by maintaining that ‘... the 
images in the news of skeletal trees, or of dying seals have opened people’s eyes’ (Beck, 1999c: 
71). For Beck, this opening of people’s eyes is evidence of a reflexive modernity.   
         Castells’ (1996, 2000a) 
analysis of risk presents a theoretical overlap with Beck with respect to the creation of 
knowledge and the circulation of information in a globalised world (Borne, 2010). Importantly, 
a common term for both commentators is the notion of ‘real virtuality’ (Borne, 2010: 83). 
Castells (2000a: 318) tells us that real virtuality is a ‘... system in which reality itself is fully 
immersed in a virtual image setting in the world of make believe, in which symbols are not just 
metaphors, but comprise of actual experience’. In a similar vein, as Borne (2006: 99) observes, 
Beck concurs with Van Loon (2000) who describes a ‘cybernetic reproduction’ of risk, arguing 
that risk cannot be understood outside of its representative form. According to Beck, risks (in 
the present day) become more potent as a direct result of “virtuality”. Thus, the scale and extent 
of manufactured threats force citizens to consider risk in political terms. Such discussions move 
to the heart of what constitutes risk and should be understood in light of the epistemological 
debate that exists between realists and constructivists (Borne, 2006: 99). Considering these 
dynamics, as well as Giddeon logic in relation to trust and risk, fundamentally influences the 
extent that PP is capable of being fully understood through the concept of reflexive modernity.  
                     
 
                                                          
359 The Carbon Reduction Innovation Support Pilot (CRISP) in Plymouth, UK, represents collaboration between 
governmental and non-governmental actors to produce sustainable lifestyles and contribute towards sustainable 
development more generally (Borne, 2006: 100).  
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7.3 Key Theme 2: PREVENT as Safeguarding 
 
7.3.1 Embedding Expertise: Assemblage over Network 
      
In the preceding section, it was argued PP might be understood as governing at a distance 
(Rose, 1999) through methods of embedding expertise. For example, the concept of WRAP 
evidences the panoply of agents and agencies which are brought together in order to reduce the 
risk of radicalisation at local level. This is much in keeping with the notion of governmentality, 
of which risk can be read as ‘governed via a heterogeneous network of interactive actors, 
institutions, knowledge(s) and practices’ (Lupton, 1999: 87). Moreover, recall the utility of a 
dispositif outlined in chapter 3 as ‘coming to those with whom it answers a particular need (or 
“urgent need” as Foucault referred to it). Identifying this urgent need then delineates various 
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responses, specifically those that result in a cohesive body of relations: an attempt is made to 
resolve it with an entire arsenal of implements and arms (Foucault, 1996). This heterogeneity 
of “arms” (mechanisms, institutions) is what Foucault terms a dispositif.   
        One might posit that PP - as 
operationalised within a ‘hyper-complex’ security environment - coincides with the concept of 
dispositif. However, it is my opinion that comparatives can only be made by moving away 
from readings of Foucault’s dispositif which have been depicted as reductionist - seeing it as 
an attempt to define a functionalist concept as ‘the basic unit’ (Brenner, 1994: 687) - and 
towards the view that a dispositif should be read as generative (see Huxley, 2006). The 
reductionist reading of dispositif as a prosaic device or as utilities ‘to produce something – a 
machinic contraption’ (Foucault, 2003a: 10) becomes problematic when measured against the 
participants’ account of PREVENT. Rather, the participants’ accounts of embedding expertise 
through PP are more in keeping with the Deleuzian reading of dispositif as ‘assemblage’.  
       As a caveat, the term ‘assemblage’ did not 
feature in any of the participants’ responses or accounts. Rather, most participants tended to 
refer to the wider body of social actors responsibilised through a multi-partnership CT approach 
as a ‘network’:360  
 
“It’s about trying to identify groups out there who would benefit from some 
awareness of the PREVENT strategy and hopefully make the engagements with them 
and long term it’s to set up the liaison and the networks really”.361 
 
“It’s crucial, the partnership, and certainly where you can now see where ... you can 
see the impact of budget cuts ... massively have hit local authority and again, you 
know, you’re looking to establish the workings and network that you can call upon 
quite quickly if there is a concern there and be able to be very active, very 
quickly”.362 
 
The notion of network coincides with the literature on ‘dispositif as ‘apparatus’: a complex and 
combinatory ‘network’363 of relations that allow us to “see and speak” (Deleuze, 1992). Indeed, 
                                                          
360 Interview with practitioner(s) No.01; 03; 02; 05; 06. 
361 Interview with practitioner No.05. 
362 Interview with practitioner No.03. 
363 Rabinow and Rose (2003: 10) argue that Foucault himself said that ‘the defining aspect of apparatus was their 
grouping of heterogeneous elements into a common network (réseau)’.  
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one might be tempted to depict the invocation of the teacher, social worker, healthcare 
professional etc., which distributes and enmeshes responsibility for preventing radicalisation 
through society as connoting a ‘network’. However, understanding PP through the concept of 
assemblage is based on an interpretative approach to thematic analysis and is justified in the 
following ways. First, it is important to understand the context in which the term network was 
used. Participants’ accounts of PREVENT are indicative of PREVENT officers forming part 
of an assemblage, not bodies that sit over and apart from assemblage. Their manoeuvres and 
negotiations are entangled in a wider governance structure and it is through such relationships 
that the constraints and impositions of the ‘centre’ are revealed (Allen, 2011). In this way, 
“embedding” expertise does not sit well with readings of dispositif as apparatus or network as 
discussed in chapter 3, even if the term ‘assemblage’ was not directly used. Rather, embedding 
expertise shares increasing parallels to forging alignments within literature on assemblages that 
is ‘the will to govern as a point of convergence and fracture’ (Li, 2007: 268).   
        Second, following the work of 
McFarlane (2009: 2) on “translocal” assemblages, the key partners which the participants 
described as making up the multi-partnership “network” had far more historical depth than the 
notion of “node” or “point” suggests – as connoted by network e.g. the health sector; the 
education sector, the fire service, the probation service, etc. Thus, it is difficult to understand 
the last strategic objective of PREVENT (i.e. institutions) as simply a spatial category, output, 
or resultant formation. Rather, it was found that not only does PP signify doing and 
performance but at different moments in times, these relations within and between sites in the 
assemblage are vulnerable to collapse, or to re-assembling in different forms (McFarlane, 2009: 
6-7). The re-assembling of different forms can be seen within participants’ accounts of 
(mis)trust. Moreover, as the research findings indicate, there is an emphasis placed on fragility 
and provisionality, fissures and fractures that accompany processes of gathering and dispersing 
(McFarlane and Anderson, 2011: 124-125). Therefore, PP through a multi-agency approach 
should not be read as an assemblage whereby anything goes, but is vulnerable to fracture and 
dispersion: 
 
“We also go into the voluntary sector, community youth groups, youth offending 
teams (YOTS), UKBA ... a lot of housing groups, particularly a lot of housing where 
they’re supported by (name of local housing group), which is a housing group which 
looks after people with mental issues. And it tends to be these groups; they ask us to 
come along as a one-off, but some others are almost embedded ... For example, now 
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at (name of university) we are officially part of the Social Work course. We were 
hoping to get in with Nursing, but that hasn’t quite worked out ... And teacher 
training ... but, you know, as time goes on it’s expanding and expanding. But training 
still remains a significant part of our job, either as one-off training, or with police, 
or regular officers”.364  
 
“I’ve had a couple of schools that looked like they were interested and then the Head 
Teacher has said, “I’m really sorry, I’ve got targets that I have to hit - I don’t want 
you to come in and give your training”...” 365 
 
In more simple terms, participants emphasised the “hard work” required to draw complex 
“social and material formations” that consist of “heterogeneous elements” together ... and 
sustain these connections in the face of increasing tension” (Li, 2007: 264). As Ong and Collier 
(2005) suggest, assemblages are never ‘reducible to a single logic’, and they do not ‘always 
involve new forms, but forms that are shifting, in formation, or at stake’. Chorusing this 
viewpoint, Tsing (2005) states, ‘every situation brings with it its own different set of 
connections that are unpredictable in both their constitution as well as their outcome’. 
  Lastly, a conceptual lens of assemblage combines a focus on the (discursive) 
‘problematisation’366 of radicalisation as a security matter with analysis of the ways in which 
the problem is rendered technical, how alliances are forged in its name, and how it acts in local 
settings (see Li, 2007: 265). This is important when providing perspective on language and 
terminology associated with counter-radicalisation on the ground. Thus, as Ploger (2008: 54) 
observes, ‘if one wants to emphasise Foucault’s work on the relations between elements, a 
translation of dispositif as “assemblage” (Deleuze’s ‘agencement’) could be seen as 
relevant’.367                   
 In a similar way to assertions made by de Goede and Simon (2013) on the Nuansa 
                                                          
364 Interview with practitioner No.02. 
365 Interview with practitioner No.01. 
366 In the 1980s, Foucault frequently used the expression “problematisation” apparently referring to the political 
relevance of a dispositif: “it is true that my attitude isn’t a result of the form of critique that claims to be a 
methodical examination in order to reject all possible solutions except for the one valid one. It is more on the 
order of ‘problematisation’ - which is to say, the development of a domain of acts, practices, and thoughts that 
seem to me to pose problems for politics” (Foucault, 1984b:  384). 
367 This does not mean that I am entirely abandoning Foucault’s notion of dispositif as ‘apparatus/network’. As 
Legg (2011) articulates, the interconnections between apparatus and assemblage can be productively thought of 
as a dialectic. Thus, according to Legg (2011: 129-130), ‘what we are left with between the two author’s 
discussions is an acknowledgement that apparatuses are etymologically and genealogically indissociable from 
assemblages. Since both emerge as part and one of each other, they are almost comically assemblage-like’.  
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training programme, 368  PP acts as complex assemblage that does not definitively and 
coherently act but is rather a ‘generative flux of forces and relations that work to produce 
particular realities’ (Law, 2004: 7). Thus, PP can be seen as a ‘broad descriptor of different 
historical relations coming together, as an ethos oriented to the ‘instability’ of interactions, and 
the potential for novelty and spatiotemporal difference, and as a concept for thinking the 
relations between stability and transformation in the production of the social’ (Anderson et al., 
2012: 171-172, italics in original). Importantly, in discussing the internal dynamism of 
assemblages, Deleuze directs our attention to how, as he puts it, ‘all the elements of a non-
homogenous set converge, making them function together’ (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977: 39). 
The emphasis is squarely the bringing together of the heterogeneous entities into some form of 
temporary relation (or set of relations) without presupposing that these relations necessarily 
constitute on organism (Anderson et al., 2012: 177). An assemblage is therefore both the 
provisional holding together of a group of entities across differences and a continuous process 
of movement and transformation as relations and terms change (Anderson et al., 2012: 177). 
The term provisional is crucial since the line of fracture between PREVENT police and key 
partners - the line drawn by the will to govern supplemented by the capacity to coerce - 
threatens the assemblage. Remarkably, the same line enables diverse authorities to forge 
workable (though fragile) alignments among themselves (Li, 2007: 269). Understanding risk 
through the concept of “vulnerability” is indicative in this respect. As one participant noted 
when discussing more routine police work: 
“If you have someone brought into custody under the Mental Health Act and we 
would say, “Look, this individual has real problems, they need some help”. And then 
they get assessed by a psychiatrist who might say, “Nah, they’re alright”. But that’s 
not possible because we know of that person’s vulnerabilities”.369 
 
Embedding expertise within PP can also be understood through two further lines of 
thought. First, Giddens’ (1990) theory of modernity suggests that the esoteric aspects of 
expertise in modern systems have little or nothing to do with the ineffability of pre-modern 
                                                          
368  Nuansa is a knowledge-gathering group for frontline professionals involved in CoPPRa and RecoRa 
programmes in the Netherlands (see de Goede and Simon, 2013). In relation to the CoPPRa and RecoRa 
programmes, de Goede and Simon (2013: 317) outline, ‘CoPPRa is an EU-funded Belgian initiative that seeks to 
bridge Community Policing and counter-radicalisation through the development of training materials for frontline 
police to spot signs of radicalisation’. RecoRa on the other hand, was ‘an EU-funded programme that brought 
together counter-radicalisation practitioners from the UK, the Netherlands and Germany to workshop best 
practices with frontline professionals’ (de Goede and Simon, 2013: 317).  
369 Interview with practitioner No.04. 
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expertise. Instead, key to modern abstract systems is the dependence on a combination of 
training and specialisation. The knowledge incorporated in modern forms of expertise is, in 
principle, available to everyone, have they the available resources, energy and time acquire it 
(Giddens, 1991). Thus, abstract systems are opaque to the majority. Their opaque quality – the 
underlying element in the extension of trust in the context of dis-embedding mechanisms – 
comes from the very specialisation that abstract systems demand and foster (Giddens, 1992: 
30). As Giddens (1990: 145) points out, ‘technical knowledge, in one shape or another, is re-
appropriated by lay persons and routinely applied in the course of their day-to-day activities’. 
Moreover, the interaction between expertise and re-appropriation is strongly influenced by 
‘access points’ (Giddens, 1990). WRAP is an indicative example of such since, through a 
mixture of risk and opportunity, the high-consequence risk of terrorism permeates the core of 
day-to-day activities within partner institutions.       
  Second, embedding expertise might be read in a similar way to observations 
made by Aradau and van Munster who describe how the anticipatory governance of terrorism 
has manifested as a dispositif of risk that ‘activates all the technologies imaginable in the face 
of uncertainty’ (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 105). Importantly, such observations are 
indebted to Foucault’s notion of governmentality and the ‘retreat of state’. As Lemke (2002: 
11), drawing upon the work of Foucault, observes:  
 
‘What we observe today is a displacement from formal to informal techniques of government and the 
appearance of new actors on the scene of government, that indicate fundamental transformations in 
statehood and a new relation between state and civil society actors. These effects entail not just the 
simple reproduction of existing social asymmetries or their ideological obfuscation, but encompass the 
displacement of forms of practices that were formerly defined in terms of nation state to the 
development of forms of sub-politics, “beneath” politics in its traditional meaning’.  
  
Whilst both avenues of thought shed light on the semantics of flexibility and the 
introduction of new structures of production within a neo-liberal governmentality (Lemke, 
2002), there is also a further dynamic to PP. PP requires a disaggregated framework in which 
subsidiary authorities possess a significant degree of autonomy in terms of practically pursuing 
the overall goal of pre-empting radicalisation and/or extremism. In a similar way to the 
objectives of the Nuansa programme, partners and communities ‘autonomatised’ by PP are 
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simultaneously ‘responsibilised’370 (Li, 2007: 269) since internal and external partners (as well 
as society at macro level) are recruited into the assemblage and authorised to act in its name 
(see de Goede and Simon, 2013). This adds a coercive element to governmental strategies that 
operate, as far as possible, through rather than against the desires and interests of their target 
population (Dean, 1999: 209). This, then, is not entirely governmentality as outlined in chapter 
3. The notion of a highly centralised governmental apparatus where power is practiced as an 
antithesis of freedom and agency (see inter alia McKee, 2009; Stockdale, 2014) does not 
provide an adequately nuanced account of the empirical actualities of PP at local level. Rather, 
embedding expertise within PP might be more plausibly understood through Judith Butler’s 
(2006) reading of governmentality - that is, ‘sovereignty within the midst of governmentality’.  
 
7.3.2 PREVENT and the Petty Sovereign  
 
Butler follows Foucault by arguing that the proliferation of governmentality is most visibly 
illustrated in the current moment by the ongoing “disarticulation” of the state ‘into a set of 
administrative and bureaucratic powers’ (Butler, 2006: 55). This phenomenon is particularly 
characterised by the downloading of what she terms “prerogative power” to unelected agents 
of the state - a managerialisation of governance in which appointed “officials with no clear 
claim to legitimate authority” are endowed with what amounts to sovereign power within a 
particular context (Butler, 2006: 54-56). In a similar way to Butler’s observations on 
‘decisioners’ within American national security, PP governs through risk by evoking 
institutions and individuals as partners - they are essentially powerless (not controlling the 
inaugurating forms of power that they deploy) - while wielding the power to render unilateral 
decisions. This is sovereign power performing itself through governmentality by ‘ruling’ 
through the application of rules (Butler, 2004: 56–65), partly embodying the power of the state 
in everyday engagements (Huysmans, 2011) in which new (relatively) hidden or obscure 
powers are invented and acted upon (McRobbie, 2006).      
 The various actors that are tasked with CT through PREVENT are diffusely constituted 
by the interaction within an assemblage of multiple-existences of power, each exercising its 
own varied degree of agency vis-à-vis the ultimately sovereign centre (Rose and Miller, 1992; 
Stockdale, 2014). For instance, key trusted individuals considered partners emerge as the power 
                                                          
370 The responsibilisation of citizens as an adaptive strategy within crime control is far from a new development 
(see inter alia Garland, 1996), nor is it a novel observation in relation to the ‘risk society’.  
214 
 
of the ‘official’- a figure that is ‘deployed by tactics of power (s/he) does not control’ but who 
is also able to exercise decisional power in a way that ‘reanimate(s) a sovereignty that the 
governmentalised constellation of power appeared to have foreclosed’ (Butler, 2006: 65). 
Butler has labelled these figures “petty sovereigns”.371     Butler 
applies her analysis to figures such as border guards, airport security officials, customs agents, 
intelligence officers, and military field commanders. However, it is important to recognise that 
the petty sovereign figure can refer to any agent endowed with such capacities within the 
broader governmental assemblage, given that Butler leaves open the possibility of an otherwise 
(Butler, 2006: 56, 65, emphasis added). In the context of the present study, this ‘otherwise’ 
might be understood as any social actor ‘delegated with the prerogative power to render 
unilateral decisions in a particular context’ (Butler, 2006: 56). Or, to put it differently, any 
“manager of unease” that is responsibilised to help prevent or reduce the risk of radicalisation 
e.g. a health worker, an education worker, a community leader, a charity worker, etc. This is 
because, as de Goede (2008b: 176) points out, the governing effects of petty sovereigns ‘do not 
just target precisely circumscribed risk groups, but affect society at large, through assumptions 
and definitions of ‘normal’ behaviour’. The following dialogue(s) illustrates the downloading 
of prerogative power within PP: 
“We also train people, for instance, people within (the) fire (service), to give them 
an input on PREVENT, and they will then go and cascade that message on, so that 
isn’t us sort of face-to-face with them, it’s their own staff”.372 
 
“Going back a few years, there was 5 white kids in a school in (name of location) 
who came out with some quite radical right-wing views. (Name of colleague) 
arranged for a local Imam he knows to go along, talk to them in a classroom for a 
couple of hours. Not only did that guy change the perception of those five kids - 
basically their view of the world was that all Muslims are terrorists - but following 
that chat, they then spread that message amongst the wider school. That to me is 
success”.373 
 
                                                          
371  Butler applies the concept of the “petty sovereign” at the exceptional level within her discussion of 
Guantanamo Bay. In the present study, Butler’s figure of the petty sovereign is applied at local level since the 
delegation of PP power to key partners means that such individuals are not true sovereigns - they are constituted 
within the constraints of governmentality - and yet they act.  
372 Interview with practitioner No.06. 
373 Interview with practitioner No.04. 
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Utilising Butler’s figure of the petty sovereign in order to explain PP as co-production 
highlights the productive tension between the ‘structure’ of PREVENT as a pre-emptive 
dispositif of risk outlined in chapter 3 and the autonomous ‘agency’ of these seeking to render 
it actionable that is key to governance of PP within a ‘pre-criminal’ space. Moreover, Butler’s 
figure of the petty sovereign is also illustrative of agency/structure dichotomy central the 
concept of reflexivity. As Mythen and Walklate (2010b: 55) observe, one of the key shortfalls 
of risk theorising has been its inability to articulate a meaningful relationship between structure 
and agency. For instance, Beck (1992a: 191) notes, as a consequence of reflexive 
modernisation, political decision-making processes, no matter on what level they occur, can no 
longer be understood as the enforcement or implementation of a single model determined in 
advance, but is rather a process of collective action. This implies that the official decision-
making authority of political institutions is necessarily decentralised (Beck, 1992a: 191). 
However, both Beck and Giddens have equally fallen into the trap of conflating agency either 
with responsibility (prudentialism), affect (neurosis), or political confrontation 
(cosmopolitanism) (Mythen and Walklate, 2010b). This paradox is defined by Archer (2007: 
41) as one in which there is a ‘failure to transcend the dualisms of subject/object, 
structure/agency and thus to recognise each as constitutive of the other’.   
  Whilst all structural properties found in any society are continuously activity 
dependent, nevertheless, it is possible to separate structure and agency through analytical 
dualism, and to examine their interplay in order to account for the structuring and restructuring 
of the social order (Archer, 2012). Fundamentally, this is important for two reasons. First, 
structure and agency are different kinds of emergent entities, although space precludes entering 
the debate about emergence here. This is shown by the differences in their properties and 
powers, despite the fact that they are crucial for one another’s formation, continuation, and 
development (Archer, 2012: 51). Bhaksar (1989: 76) puts it succinctly: ‘People and society ... 
do not constitute two moments of the same process. Rather they refer to radically different 
things’. Thus, structure and agency operate diachronically over different tracts of time because: 
(i) structure necessarily predates the action(s) that transform it; and (ii) structural elaboration 
necessarily postdates those actions (Archer, 2010).     Drawing 
upon the work of Butler, Stockdale (2014: 108-109; see also Butler, 2006: 62) suggests petty 
sovereigns are constrained within an overarching discursive/governmental structure since ‘they 
do not fully control the aims that animate from their action and yet equally retain a significant 
degree of agency since the general idea of pre-emption can only be translated into a functional 
security rationality by delegating prerogative powers to various agents tasked with making it 
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so’. The participants’ accounts within the present study might be read in a similar way. As one 
participant put it, “it’s about the Housing Manager or any local authority worker working 
alongside the local cop”.374 However, Stockdale (2014) further comments there is an additional 
dimension to the connection between Butler’s paradigm of political power and the praxis of 
the agency-structure relationship that obtains under pre-emptive security governance. For 
Butler, petty sovereigns are far from coincidental since they often serve as figures through 
which pre-emptive security rationalities are practically operationalised (Stockdale, 20014; see 
also Butler, 2006). In other words, it is those figures which Butler sees as embodying 
sovereignty within governmentality that are often on the frontline implementing pre-emptive 
security logic (Stockdale, 2014). In a similar way, since the PREVENT team had fewer officers 
than that of a ‘priority/high risk’ area, gaining the trust, confidence and support of frontline 
institutions’375 was considered a chief priority of PP. One such method was through training 
workshops with partner institutions considered to operate on the frontline:376 
“Quite clearly it is highly unlikely that one of us in the team is someone that sees 
something.377 It’s way more likely that someone working as a frontline staff - be it 
any institution - is going to see something”.378  
Furthermore, the downwards defluxion of prerogative power to unelected frontline agents can 
also been seen within the PREVENT strategy which states: ‘departments and statutory partners 
have undertaken activity to raise awareness and help frontline staff to identify signs of 
vulnerability’ (HM Government, 2011b: 57, [Figure 9.12], emphasis added).   
  Taken at face value the ‘petty sovereign’ figure might imply that the managers 
of risk could reign at free will, as Butler (2006: 96) puts it, ‘governmentality produces lawless 
sovereignty’, one with ‘no end in sight’. However, as Huber and Scheytt (2013: 8) point out, it 
would be an oversimplification to argue that risk management is a dispositif that could be used 
as a totalitarian instrument of power by organisational or political elites in a completely 
undistorted manner and of their own will. Recall that the latter half of the original definition of 
the dispositif is that of ‘a formation ... the nature of an apparatus is essentially strategic, which 
means that we are speaking about a certain manipulation of relations of forces ...’ (Foucault, 
1977, as cited in Agamben, 2009: 2). Although power here is not understood as a position by 
                                                          
374 Interview with practitioner No.04. 
375 Interview with practitioner No.02. 
376 Interview with practitioner No.04. 
377 This can also be understood through Giddeon logic, since, for Giddens, ‘the prime condition of requirements 
for trust is not lack of power but lack of full information’ (Giddens, 1990: 33).  
378 Interview with practitioner No.02. 
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an individual à la Max Weber, it serves a strategic purpose, but not by a single actor ruling at 
will (Huber and Scheytt, 2013: 8). Rather, relevant partners and individuals “responsibilised” 
through a dispositif of risk might be read in a similar way to observations made by Young 
(2006) on social connectivity and responsibilisation.    For Young (2006), 
a social connection model of responsibility comprises responsibility as an interpretation of 
obligations of justice arising from structural social processes, which can only be discharged 
through collective action. Moving away from the paradigmatic of the ‘liability model’ - that is 
to be responsible is to be guilty or at fault for having caused a harm and without valid excuses 
- Young (2006: 119) interprets responsibility ‘by virtue of social roles or positions, as when 
we say that a teacher has specific responsibilities, or when we appeal to our responsibilities as 
citizens’. In this meaning, finding an agent responsible does not imply finding the agent at fault 
or liable for a past wrong, but rather refers to agents ‘carrying out activities in a morally 
appropriate way and aiming for certain outcomes’ (Young, 2006: 119). In the context of the 
present study, as various participants suggested, post-PREVENT training partners “could see 
their role and responsibility within PREVENT”.379 Reading PP through the concept of “petty-
sovereign”, as well as in line with Young’s (2006) responsibility model, perhaps provides a 
partial response to Amoore and de Goede’s question: ‘how is responsibility to be reintroduced 
to the decision, such that it confronts the political difficulties of indecision?’ (Amoore and de 
Goede, 2008c: 182). In essence, PP might be read as a politics of ethics with its focus on 
individual and institutional responsibility to act on principles of conduct and by connecting 
subjective decisions to the reproduction of sovereign decisions with gravitational power 
(Huysmans, 2011).  
 
7.3.3 PREVENT(ion) through Language 
 
As can be seen in the previous chapter, terminology and language associated with the 
operations of PP play an important role in achieving both the second objective of PREVENT 
(i.e. protecting vulnerable people), as well as a multi-institutional CT approach (the third 
objective of PREVENT). The research findings indicate that preventing radicalisation and/or 
extremism is realised discursively through language and terminology, which ultimately fuses 
exceptionality to normality regarding who may be vulnerable to radicalisation. Importantly, it 
is not that language determines outcomes, but inter-subjective understandings formed through 
                                                          
379 Interview with practitioner(s) No.06; 14. 
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discursive practice delimit spaces for agency, and thus have a causal effect on what outcomes 
are possible (Fisher, 2012). Two key phrases that are helping to mainstream PREVENT in 
various key sectors are “vulnerability” and “safeguarding”.      
  Li’s (2007) concept of ‘problematisation’ is particularly instructive when 
analysing how the heterogeneous parts of a dispositif are assembled and orders hold together 
and endure both across differences and through differences (Anderson et al., 2012: 177). For 
Li (2007), ‘problematising’ is an important element in the assemblage, and analysis of ‘how 
problems come to be defined ... in relation to particular schemes of thought, diagnosis of 
deficiency and promises of improvement’ remains important, alongside questions of how 
knowledge is rendered technical and depoliticised; how alliances are forged, and how failures 
and contradictions are reincorporated into the assemblage (de Goede and Simon, 2013: 319). 
Participants’ accounts suggest that the ‘problematisation’ of radicalisation has been made 
possible through notions of radicalisation as a process and not as an event, as linked to 
terminological modification.         
 The importance of language does not escape Deleuze in his rendering of dispositif as 
assemblage. Deleuze connects the concept of dispositif to that of power in Foucault’s writing, 
where relations of power ‘constitute an act upon an act’. For Deleuze (1988), a dispositif is a 
discursive or non-discursive force that disperses in space through discourses (speaking, words). 
Moreover, according to Deleuze, one of the main points is that ideologies and subjectification 
‘always assume an organisation or “system” within which they operate’ (Deleuze, 1988: 29). 
What Deleuze is hinting at is the centrality of language and expression to any dispositif. As 
Deleuze (1992: 9) notes, ‘a dispositif comprises of truths of enunciation; truth is the 
actualisation of the lines which constitute a dispositif’. This assertion finds support in work by 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987, [2004]: 407) who term assemblage a “constellation” which can be 
divided on two axes. It is the second of these axes that is of concern to the current discussion: 
“enunciation” (Deleuze and Guattari (1987, [2004]: 81). Enunciation refers to a collection of 
languages, words and meanings; a provisional unity is produced through the ‘co-functioning’ 
of words (Deleuze and Parnet, 2006: 52, emphasis added).380                        
       Although I have drawn upon Deleuzian 
etymology above, this does not mean that Foucauldian logic disappears out of view; far from 
it. As the previous chapter demonstrates, PP is transforming from a punitive-based model to a 
                                                          
380 The curve of enunciation which conditions the dispositif (Deleuze, 1992) might be read in a similar way to 
changes in terminology within PREVENT(ion) governance.  
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more normalised invocation of care - the phrase “radicalisation as another form of abuse” 
clearly evidences this morphogenesis. Further, PP understood as “safeguarding” transforms the 
distinction between normality and exception and thus modifies our understanding of the 
relationship between politics, risk and preventing radicalisation in ways similar to observations 
made by Aradau et al. (2008: 152), who state:  
 
‘The architecture of the normal takes shape through heterogeneous and mundane actuarial practices, 
through the arbitrary declarations of risky-ness and bureaucratic reallocation of power. The 
imperceptible and unknowable captured by technologies of risk are re-inscribed upon concrete 
everydayness, thereby colonising normality. Rather than the limit of normality, risk infuses 
exceptionalism381 within the governmentality of everydayness’.  
 
Such assertions go to the heart of what is considered Foucault’s greatest intellectual 
accomplishment: to investigate the microphysics of power by diffusing the macro-perspective 
of the state and centring on the power-holders through the notion of dispositif.   
  Foucault’s microphysical layer of the dispositif is an important departure point to make 
sense of participants’ understandings of radicalisation “as another form of abuse”. Foucault’s 
conceptualisation of power-knowledge as a microphysical layer of interconnected disciplinary 
dispositifs is employed in his account of the emergence of ‘normalising’ practices. However, 
drawing upon the work of Georges Canguilhem, Foucault extends the concept of the ‘norm’ in 
new directions. For Foucault, the norm draws its meaning from what is outside itself that does 
not conform to what it requires; it evaluates this outside negatively, but is also dependent on it 
(Ennis, 2008: 257). Foucault supports this observation in his discussion of the carceral system 
within Discipline and Punishment (see Foucault, 1977). For Foucault, the dispositif of the 
prison is positioned at the centre of the disciplinary continuum of different types of carceral 
institutions (Ennis, 2008: 257). Importantly however, as Ennis (2008: 234) observes:  
 
‘Normalising processes are not, as is often assumed, the product of the functioning of disciplinary 
dispositifs in general. Foucault argues that the fact that these processes spread across society was due 
to the influence which the carceral system exercised over other institutions involved in the supervision, 
correction and improvement of individuals who fell outside the normal range of various behaviours’.  
 
                                                          
381 For a detailed analysis of exceptionalism in the context of the war of terror, see Neal (2006).  
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In this development, behaviour is placed on a “grid of normality” which ultimately links 
categories (or “institutions”) that had previously been separate; this without suggesting that the 
resultant formation is top-down mechanisms of power (see Foucault, 1991). Rather, separate 
institutions ‘shape behaviour in congruence with particular sets of norms and with a certain 
goal’ (Dean, 1999: 15, emphasis added). Subsequently, as Foucault (1975: 304) observes, 
behaviour is either normalised or pathologised by teachers, doctors and social workers who 
emerge as the new “judges of normality”. Participants’ accounts of PP suggest embedding 
expertise through the notion of “radicalisation as another form of abuse” might be read in a 
similar way.382         PP 
conceptualised as “safeguarding” also coincides with the logic of dispositif precautionary risk, 
which emphasises the central importance of mundane, everyday life to practices of anticipatory 
security (Amoore and de Goede, 2008a). As Louise Amoore (2009: 55-56) has put it, data-led 
security practices ‘concerned with anticipating an uncertain future’ - that she calls algorithmic 
war - ‘(re-inscribe) the imaginative geography of the deviant, atypical, abnormal “other” inside 
the spaces of everyday life’. The latter point is particularly crucial since the knowledge 
practices that cast radicalisation as a social process or continuum suggest the possibility of 
early identification and intervention in the life-worlds of potential future radicals (de Goede 
and Simon, 2013). Importantly, this literature is influenced by Foucault’s concept of the norm 
even if it has been extended and applied in new directions.  Ultimately, whilst Foucault’s aim 
was to “cut off the king’s head” in political analysis, counter-radicalisation as linked to an 
invocation towards “safeguarding” is helping PP to govern as a ‘headless body as if it indeed 
has a head’ (Dean, 1994: 156).383 This is a crucial element of counter-radicalisation through 
PP since, the notion of dispositif is ‘far from being a single system of management with a 
common rationality, it consists of knowledges, practices, and institutions that have no more 
unity and no more necessity beyond the simple fact of being stitched together’ (Braun, 2014; 
see also Deleuze, 1988). As Deleuze (1992: 163, 160) notes, ‘a dispositif is composed of lines, 
each having a different nature. And the lines in the apparatus do not outline or surround systems 
which are each homogenous in their own right, object, subject, language and so on’.  
      In light of these observations, many might posit 
that this, then, is not the risk society explored by Beck: an account of risk almost wholly 
                                                          
382 Ericson and Haggerty’s Policing the Risk Society (1997) is also instructive here. Specifically, Ericson and 
Haggerty posit policing as “risk communication” and the police as “knowledge workers” (Ericson and Haggerty, 
1997: 3, 19); see also Rose (1998).  
383 This is without going as far to suggest that various institutions automatically follow the dictates of a central 
authority.  
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preoccupied with cataloguing the growth of man-made dangers. However, this does not mean 
reflexivity is entirely fallible in making sense of PP understood as “safeguarding”. An 
invocation towards safeguarding is indicative of PP as a reflexive organisation. For instance, 
Jessop (2003) suggests that there are several conditions for effective reflexive self-
organisation. These are:  
 
‘(a) Simplifying models and practices, which reduce the complexity of the world but are still congruent 
with real world processes and relevant to actors’ objectives; (b) developing the capacity for dynamic, 
interactive social learning among autonomous but interdependent agencies about causal processes and 
forms of interdependence, attributions of responsibility and capacity for actions, and possibilities of co-
ordination in a complex, turbulent environment; (c) building methods for co-ordinating actions across 
social forces with different identities, interests, and meaning systems, over different spatio-temporal 
horizons, and over different domains of action; and (d) establishing a common world view for individual 
action to stabilise key players’ orientations, expectations, and rules of conduct’ (Jessop, 2003: 147). 
 
PP understood as safeguarding adheres to all four conditions. Moreover, Hoogenboom and 
Ossewaarde (2005) suggest that the implications of shifting from rational to reflexive ethics 
leaves reflexive organisations with the aim of uniting members through a collective 
understanding of the situation their organisation is in the contest of extreme uncertainty. One 
participant succinctly summed up this situation of uncertainty: “Whatever our organisation is 
we’ve got a duty of care. But never before would I have put safeguarding and counter-terrorism 
in the same sentence. And that’s PREVENT!”384 This is because reflexive organisations are 
confronted with a divergence and conflict of ethical perceptions of its members (Hoogenboom 
and Ossewaarde, 2005). Indeed, as Beck notes, the ‘latent unintended consequence’ of risk 
society does not mean no knowledge at all but one knowledge whose claims are controversial 
(Beck, 1999c: 120, emphasis in original). Furthermore, for Beck, the latent unintended 
consequences thus denote a conflict of different expert knowledge leading to a battle-ground 
of pluralistic rationality claims (Beck, 1999c: 120, italics in original). The participants’ 
discussions around juxtaposed definitions of “vulnerability” are indicative of the dogmatism 
Beck refers to. Moreover, for reflexive organisations, the measure of integration is the ability 
of their members to shape the future for themselves (Hoogenboom and Ossewaarde, 2005: 
617). Changes in terminology and language as connoted by “vulnerability”, “risk” and 
“safeguarding” should not be viewed as separate from this observation.    
                                                          
384 Interview with practitioner No.04. 
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     Lastly, reflexive organisations are not just socially 
designed, they transform into such through social necessity. Moreover, for Hoogenboom and 
Ossewaarde (2005: 617), what separates bureaucracies from reflexive organisations is that 
reflexive organisations are ‘forced to communicate openly’. The overt nature of PP can be seen 
throughout participants’ accounts in the preceding chapter. Thus, viewing PREVENT as a 
reflective authority perhaps goes someway in addressing observations made by Aradau and 
van Munster (2007: 12) who state, ‘it is not clear how a theory of risk based on an evolutionary 
understanding of modernity can explicate the risk technologies deployed in the war on terror’. 
Furthermore, reflexive decision-making, in this case an invocation towards an ethics of care, 
might also be read as putting the limited use of intelligence that job segmentation generates to 
the fore, because in a late modern society, structured by latent rather than manifest 
consequences, intelligence, in particular social intelligence, must be maximised (Hoogenboom 
and Ossewaarde, 2005: 617). A multi-agency approach to counter-radicalisation is considered 
imperative since, as English (2009: 131) observes, ‘intelligence is the most vital element in 
successful counter-terrorism’. In this way, PP contextualised as “safeguarding” can also be 
understood within the conceptual matrix of political analysis. 
 
 
7.3.4 PREVENT(ion) through Safeguarding: Political Rationality 
 
In chapter 3, it was argued the heterogeneous elements that make up a dispositif could be 
understood more systematically as techniques, technologies and rationalities for the 
government of society. Moreover, it was suggested that the semantic linking of governing and 
modes of thought indicate that it is not possible to study technologies of power without an 
analysis of the political rationality underpinning them (Lemke, 2002: 2-3). Indeed, the concept 
of governmentality defines a discursive field in which the telos of action is ‘rationalised’ 
following a specific form of reasoning (Hindess 1996: 106). PP contextualised as 
“safeguarding” might thus be conceptualised as what Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, following 
Foucault, term a “political rationality”385 (Rose and Miller 1992; see also Aradau and van 
Munster 2007: 97; Stockdale, 2014: 100). A political rationality “problematises” a certain 
                                                          
385 As Lemke (2002: 2-3) observes, it is within the lectures of 1978 and 1979 and a focus on the “genealogy of 
the modern state” that Foucault outlined the importance of political rationalities. For Foucault, the semantic 
linking of governing (“gouverner”) and modes of thought (“mentalité”) indicates that it is not possible to study 
the technologies of power without an analysis of the political rationality underpinning them.   
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aspect of the social world, and offers a framework through which “programmes of government” 
can be developed in response to the identified problem(s) (Stockdale, 2014: 181-2, 100). 
Moreover, PREVENT(ion), as linked to an invocation of care, might be seen as an attempt of 
‘rationalisation’, and an account for the ‘authority of authority’. As Rose (1990: 10) observes, 
‘contemporary government ... operates through the delicate and minute infiltration of the 
ambitions of regulation into the very interior of our existence and experience as subjects’. 
Rationalities appear therefore as knowledgeable discourses that represent objects of 
knowledge, confer identities and agencies upon social and political actors, and identify 
problems to be solved (Dean and Hindess, 1998).     The 
research findings embody the literature on political rationality in various ways. First, as Rose 
and Miller (1992: 178) posit, ‘political discourse is a domain for the formulation and 
justiﬁcation of idealised schemata for representing reality, analysing it and rectifying it’. In 
chorus, Stockdale (2014: 8) articulates: 
 
 ‘Political rationalities are explicitly premised upon an underlying normative claim regarding the 
particular realm of human affairs with which they are concerned, as they both affirm that this area 
requires governmental action, and offer a normative-conceptual framework that guides political action 
in a certain context by both articulating the sort(s) of problem(s) to be addressed, and providing a 
programme for action through which political power can be mobilised toward these ends’. 
Coinciding with this logic, recall form the previous chapter that “safeguarding” was understood 
to be “more welcoming to partners”,386 “people seem to “get it” more”,387 and “it’s the only 
way we can afford to do it”.388         
 Second, because political rationalities imply such a practical dimension whose 
actualisation will be subject to the inexorable vagaries of social context, political rationalities 
‘do not have the systematic and closed character of disciplined bodies of theoretical discourse’ 
(Stockdale, 2014: 178). Thus, it is possible to discern regularities that are termed political 
rationalities (Rose and Miller, 1992: 276) as those that refer to a ‘discursive field within which 
the exercise of power is conceptualised’, which combines ‘justifications for particular ways of 
exercising power by diverse authorities’ with ‘notions of the appropriate forms, objects, and 
limits of politics, and conceptions of the proper distribution of such tasks’ (Rose and Miller, 
1992: 175; Stockdale, 2014: 100). In the context of the present study, participants suggested 
                                                          
386 Interview with practitioner No.05. 
387 Interview with practitioner No.02. 
388 Interview with practitioner No.04. 
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that in the past, the phrase PREVENT had problematically become associated with situational 
crime prevention more generally.389  
Third, because they are concerned both with framing a social problem as in need of 
rectification and providing a governmental framework through which it can be addressed, 
‘political rationalities have a characteristically moral form’ that ‘consider(s) the ideals or 
principles to which government should be directed’ (Stockdale, 2014: 178-9, 100-101, 
emphasis added). As the participants made clear: “We’ve moved away from the word 
PREVENT as it was unhelpful, whereas safeguarding is a term used by our partners daily”.390 
Here, the interview discussions embody Foucault’s later analysis of thinking as a situated 
practice of critical reflection that establishes a certain critical distance from existing forms of 
acting and understanding and works to remediate and recombine these forms (Collier, 2009: 
80). As Collier (2009) observes, Foucault’s 1978-79 governmentality lectures place new 
emphasis on thinking as an active response to situated problems and as a key driver in shaping 
new topologies of power. Moreover, such occurrences are situated amid upheaval, in sites of 
problematisation in which existing forms have lost their coherence and their purchase in 
addressing present problems, and in which new forms of understanding and acting have to be 
invented (Foucault, 2009: 95).391 However, it would also seem PP coincides with a re-reading 
of Foucault’s account of neoliberalism itself. Examining ‘advanced liberal government’ (rather 
than a generalised concern with neoliberal governmentality), Rose et al. (2006: 84) emphasise 
how projects of political rationalisation ‘are constantly undergoing modification in the face of 
some newly identified problem or solution’. Concurring with Rose et al. (2006), Collier (2009: 
99-100) argues that neoliberalism is not a form of knowledge-power or a kind of 
governmentality that establishes the ‘conditions of possibility’ for thinking and acting in a 
certain way. For Collier (2009), it is not a diagram of power or a congeries of technical 
elements. Instead, as Collier (2009: 100) writes, ‘it is a form of thinking, a kind of reflection 
that aims to critique and remediate existing mentalités and practices of government that have 
become uncertain or problematic’.       
 Fourth, political rationalities have what one might term an ‘epistemological’ character. 
That is to say, they are articulated in relation to some conception of the nature of the objects 
governed - society, the nation, the population, the economy (Rose and Miller, 1992). In 
                                                          
389 Interview with practitioner(s) No.02; 03. 
390 Interview with practitioner No.02. 
391 Interestingly, an emphasis on ‘thinking’ and ‘inventing new forms’ is also indicative of Beckidian societal self-
critique.  
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particular, they embody some account of the persons over whom government is to be exercised. 
As Rose and Miller (1992: 276, italics in original) point out, ‘these can be speciﬁed as members 
of a ﬂock to be led, legal subjects with rights, children to be educated, a resource to be exploited, 
elements of a population to be managed’. The epistemological character of PP is evident within 
the interview discussions around PREVENT contextualised as safeguarding which effaces 
connotations of punitive intervention, evoking instead a questionably more palatable brand of 
normalisation through appropriate “advice”, “guidance” and “support” offered to individuals 
vulnerable to extremist trajectories.   Lastly, political rationalities are 
articulated in a distinctive idiom. The language that constitutes political discourse is more than 
rhetoric. It should be seen, rather, as rendering reality thinkable in such a way that it is amenable 
to political deliberations (Rose and Miller, 2008). Applying such observations to the present 
study, operationally (and rhetorically) the term “vulnerability” was considered the subject of 
debate not least because of juxtaposed institutional definitions and interpretations of the 
concept itself. However, as some participants suggested, over time terms such as 
“safeguarding” and “vulnerability”, as linked to the operations and objectives of PP, are 
becoming politically legitimate among authorities alike. This is because political rationalities 
are morally coloured, grounded upon knowledge, and made thinkable through language (Rose 
and Miller, 1992, emphasis added).  
 
 
 
7.4 Key Theme 3: Risk as Gut Feeling 
 
As the previous chapter makes clear, (external and internal) partners, as well as the local 
community more generally, are encouraged to act upon risk using the experiential system 
(intuitive, automatic, natural, narrative) rather than the rational system (analytical, 
deliberative). In so being, PP coincides with the literature on pre-emption outlined in chapter 
3 since the primary basis of the security decision based upon instinctive risk shifts risk from 
the realm of empirically verifiable facticity to the realm of the imagination (Stockdale, 2011). 
As Melinda Cooper (2006: 120) concisely explains, the core premise of the logic of pre-
emption ‘exhorts us to respond to what we suspect without being able to discern; to prepare for 
the emergent long before we can predict how and when it will be actualised; to counter the 
unknowable before it is even realised’. Moreover, acting upon risk in a compressed time space 
and devoid of democratic deliberation (Stockdale, 2014) is being primarily encouraged based 
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on “gut feelings” (Elmer and Opel, 2008: 14; see also de Goede, 2012). As Elmer and Opel 
(2008: 14) emphasise, “gut instinct” emerges as the primary basis for decision/action ‘in the 
absence of either time to contemplate decisions or adequate intelligence and research on which 
decisions are based’. The absence of time and intelligence can be seen in the participants’ 
discussions regarding the relationship between partner referrals and acting upon risk as 
instinctive feeling(s):  
 
“Tell us what you’ve got when you’ve got that gut feeling, that hunch rather than 
when you’re sure something’s wrong because by then it might have gone too far 
down the road”.392  
 
“We don’t want them to then sit there and try to assess it and work their way through 
it”.393      
 
Participants emphasised the importance of not deliberating whether to act upon risk 
through an emphasis on “sharing concerns” at the earliest possible stage. Thus, the research 
findings coincide with precautionary dispositif of risk outlined in chapter 3, which reconfigures 
the debates between securitisation as the introduction of speed and urgency at the heart of 
democracies (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 332). However, before proceeding further it is 
important to be clear on what is being argued. Democratic deliberation quite clearly plays an 
important role within PP operations. If deliberation played no such role, PP would be reduced 
to merely an exercise of violence. The concept of democratic deliberation featured in many of 
the participants’ accounts of risk management as linked to ‘gut feeling’ post-referral: “let us 
make that call”;394 “don’t try and come up with the solution or the answer, let other people 
consider it”;395 “the second side of things is dealing with the individual referrals of people of 
concern. Trying to assess what level of risk they actually do pose”.396 This said, an “elixir of 
speed” (Falk, 2010: 255) is being encouraged over democratically oriented deliberation at the 
referral stage (i.e. identification) since, as one participant noted, “I think that’s where the 
breakdown in previous missed opportunities has been”.397 In this way, the importance of acting 
on “gut feeling” most clearly illustrates how a pre-emptive politics relies on the play of ‘affect’ 
                                                          
392 Interview with practitioner No.14. 
393 Interview with practitioner No.03. 
394 Interview with practitioner No.14. 
395 Interview with practitioner No.05. 
396 Interview with practitioner No.02. 
397 Interview with practitioner No.03. 
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(Massumi, 2007), as it illuminates the decisional logic through which such a politics of risk is 
operationalised. In other words, affective resonances are not merely crucial to making the 
future actionable in the present – they also provide the underlying informational basis in the 
context of a pre-emptive rationality since, in Ewaldian terms, precaution “invites one to 
anticipate what one does not know yet” (Ewald, 2002: 288). As one participant stated: “Don’t 
try and work out whether that individual is then going to go on to become a terrorist because 
there’s so much else before that”.398  
          
7.4.1 PREVENT as Pre-emption and the Play of Affect  
    
Theorising ‘affect’ as the pre-individual capacity to affect and to be affected, Brian Massumi 
emphasises the role played by autonomic bodily responses, which have been defined as in-
excess of conscious states of perception and therefore point to a ‘visceral perception’ preceding 
perception (Massumi, 2002: 25). For Massumi, the turn to affect is about opening the human 
body to its indeterminacy (Clough et al., 2007). It is therefore necessary for Massumi to define 
affect in terms of its autonomy from conscious perception and language, as well as emotion 
(Clough et al., 2007). Massumi (2002: 25; see also Clough et al., 2007: 66) proposes that if 
conscious perception is to be understood as the narration of affect - as it is in the case of emotion 
- there is, nonetheless, always “a never-to-be-conscious autonomic remainder”, “a virtual 
remainder”, or an excess that pertains to the virtuality of affect itself. Massumi’s concept of 
the “affective fact” usefully captures this idea. For Massumi, the affective fact refers to a 
circumstance in which an ‘affective mechanism ... exhibit(s) the certainty to which empirical 
facts aspire’- that is, an empirically ungroundable set of premises to which the powerful 
resonance of affective responses grants the semblance of veracity (Massumi, 2005a: 7; 2010: 
55; Stockdale, 2014: 143). The idea of affective fact can thus refer to precisely the sort of 
imagined potentialities upon which anticipatory action is premised, since the latter cannot be 
grounded in empirical data - as they exist only in the ultimately unknowable future - and yet 
are endowed with an adequate degree of veracity to serve as the basis for concrete interventions 
in the present (Massumi, 2010: 68; Stockdale, 2014: 143-144).     
         The notion of affect 
understood as a pre-emptive politics of risk usefully sheds light on the research findings around 
individualised intuitive risk feelings. Firstly, Zajonc (1980) proposers those affective reactions 
                                                          
398 Interview with practitioner No.03. 
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to stimuli are often the very first reactions, occurring automatically and subsequently guiding 
information processing and judgement. Under this logic, affective reactions may serve as 
orienting mechanisms, helping us navigate quickly and efficiently through a complex, 
uncertain, and dangerous world (Slovic et al., 2004). Recall that acting upon gut feeling was 
accorded importance since it was “simple language”399 that partners “understood instantly”400 
and could “immediately relate to”.401     Secondly, affect means the 
specific quality of “goodness” or “badness”: (1) experienced as a feeling state; and (2) 
demarcating a positive or negative quality of a stimulus (Slovic et al., 2004: 312). Thus, affect 
shifts its mode of intervention from corrective perturbation responding to chaotic stirrings to 
alarm in response to the uncertainty of threat (Massumi, 2005b). Damasio (1994; see also 
Slovic, 2004: 314) for example, argues that when a negative somatic marker is linked to an 
image of a future outcome, it sounds an ‘alarm’. The participants’ accounts of risk as linked to 
a feeling of uneasiness suggest that, in the context of PP, dispositif precautionary risk has 
moulded itself to threat.    Outlining the concept of ‘threat’, Massumi 
(2005a) observes, ‘threat’ does not belong to linear time, but ‘belongs to the non-linear circuit 
of the always have been ... a threat that does not materialise is not false. It has the affective 
reality of a past future, truly felt’ (Massumi, 2005a: 3). Thus, as Massumi (2005b: 35, emphasis 
added) puts it, ‘a threat is unknowable. If it were known in its specifics, it wouldn’t be a threat. 
A threat is only a threat if it retains indeterminacy. If it has a form, it is not a substantial form, 
but a time form: a futurity. The threat as such is nothing yet - just a looming’. Accordingly, for 
Massumi (2005b), the event remains virtual - future-past - but is real and present in its effects. 
The present reality of its effects means that threats are responded to pragmatically all the while 
remaining virtual (Massumi, 2005a: 8). Thus, threat is a futurity with a virtual power to affect 
the present quasicausally. Moreover, as Massumi (2005b: 35) observes, ‘when a governmental 
mechanism makes threat its business, it is taking this virtuality as its object and adopting 
quasicausality as its mode of operation. That quasicausal operation goes by the name of 
security’.402           
 Risk conceptualised as ‘virtuality’ coincides with the notion risk outlined by Beck. 
‘Risk’, writes Beck, ‘reverses the relationship of past, present and future’.403 Thus, risk is the 
                                                          
399 Interview with practitioner No.05. 
400 Interview with practitioner No.03. 
401 Interview with practitioner No.02. 
402  The virtuality of risk is mentioned in PREVENT strategy but only with reference to the technological 
interpretation of ‘virtual’, rather than virtuality as futurity (see HM Government, 2011b: 44).  
403 Similarly, Giddens (1991: 111) makes this point in his discussion of risk as the ‘colonisation of the future’.  
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consequence of an action, which has yet to materialise. In attempting to avoid risk, one is thus 
defining present problems by their perceived future consequences (Rasmussen, 2001: 239). In 
Beck’s (1999c: 52) words, ‘future events that have not yet occurred become the object of 
current action’. At present, there is no effect, only the scenario of what may happen. Scenarios 
make risks, in Beck’s phrase, a ‘real virtuality’ (Beck, 1999c: 136). Accordingly, the very 
causality of political discourse is thus circumvented. It is not present actions that are to produce 
future results, but perceived future results that produce present actions (Rasmussen, 2001: 239). 
          Acting on gut 
feeling - as read through Massumi’s concept of affect - also coincides with the logic of 
dispositif precautionary risk since there is a paradoxical reciprocity between threat understood 
as a quasicause (see Massumi, 2005b). Importantly, radical uncertainty about both the precise 
nature of the threat and the moment at which it is likely to emerge does not serve as an 
impediment to anticipatory action (Stockdale, 2014). Rather, it instead provides the very reason 
for it, since the radical uncertainty of the present as well as the potential imminence of future 
catastrophe suggests that, ‘(w)ithout some form of action, a threshold will be crossed and a 
disastrous future will come about’ (Anderson, 2010a: 780). Or, in Massumi’s (2007: 8) words, 
‘the threat is known to have the ontological status of indeterminate potentiality’. Moreover, as 
Stockdale (2014) articulates, ‘the indeterminacy of potentiality demands that anticipatory 
adopts a lower threshold of certainty with respect to the nature and imminence of the threat’. 
In the context of the present study, acting upon risk as linked to individualised risk threshold(s) 
was a recurring theme in the participants’ discussions:  
“The threshold at which somebody crosses that point of vulnerability into doing 
something more dangerous and potentially where they pick up the phone and speak 
to somebody it is going to be different for every individual”.404 
 
“The levels of threat that people perceive may have different thresholds at which 
concern them, but it still has to be that gut feeling - whether it be the level is 9 out of 
10 or 1 out of 10 -  it still is a gut feeling that something is not quite right”.405  
 
“We want them to think about, not only their experience in their role, but also life in 
general, to use that as their risk test, their risk threshold that they feel”.406 
                                                          
404 Interview with practitioner No.03. 
405 Interview with practitioner No.05. 
406 Interview with practitioner No.03. 
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Accordingly, PP encourages active citizenship through individuals managing and calculating 
their now risk (see Beck 1999). Such a perspective coincides with Beck’s (and to a degree 
Giddens’) assertions on the ‘individualisation’ of risk outlined in chapter 4. In Beck’s (1994a: 
vii) words, ‘the notion of ‘risk’ is central to modern culture today precisely because so much 
of our thinking has to be of ‘as-if’ kind. We regularly construct potential futures, knowing that 
such construction may in fact prevent them coming about’. Or, to put it differently, ‘modernity 
institutionalises the principle of radical doubt and insists that all knowledge(s) takes the form 
of hypotheses: claims which may very well be true but which are always open to revision and 
may have at some point to be abandoned’ (Giddens, 1991: 1). As the participants suggested: 
“We’re not saying it is definitely going to be terrorism or extremism”;407 “If it’s nothing, as is 
often the case, it can be written off in a matter of hours, after you’ve done the checks”.408 
Giddens (1991: 29) sums this situation up thus:  
 
‘The popularity of futurology in the system of high modernity is not an eccentric preoccupation. It 
signals a recognition that the consideration of counterfactual possibilities is intrinsic to reflexivity in 
the context of risk assessment and evaluation’.   
Furthermore, Beck posits that there has been the transformation of personal time 
consciousness, and the adoption of a uniquely reflexive future orientation embedded in the 
practice of self-government (Binkley, 2009). According to Beck, individuals are increasingly 
encouraged to act upon thresholds of risk tolerance, to extend their awareness of the temporality 
of their own actions into a far-reaching future and to incorporate a self-distancing regard for 
their own conduct in the face of uncertain outcomes (Binkley, 2009: 87).409 With the cultural 
ubiquity of risk in everyday life, for Beck, individuals are responsibilised into a perpetual 
process of decision-making and inured to making personal risk assessments (Hudson, 2003: 
44). As Beck (1994b: 8) puts it, individuals are now expected to master these ‘risky 
opportunities’, without being able to make the necessary decisions on a well-founded and 
responsible basis, that is to say, considering the possible consequences. Importantly, Beck 
(1994c: viii) suggests that ‘we differ among ourselves in our various diagnoses of what these 
political ramifications might be’. Thus, rather than the Kantian or Cartesian subject of simple 
modernity, as Lash (2002: ix), drawing upon the work of Beck, observes:  
                                                          
407 Interview with practitioner No.03. 
408 Interview with practitioner No.02. 
409 See Beck (1992a, 1994, 1994b); Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (1995, 1996, 2002). 
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‘Reflexes are indeterminate. They are immediate. They do not in any sense subsume. Reflexes cope 
with a world of speed and quick decision-making. What Beck often omits to say is that the individual 
must choose fast, must – as in reflex – make quick decisions. The non-linear individual may wish to be 
reflective but neither has the time or space to reflect in an atmosphere of risk in which knowledge and 
life changes are precarious’.  
  
The research findings also trouble the concept of risk as conceptualised within 
modernist understandings that use risk and uncertainty interchangeably and thus consider each 
as separate epistemic conditions. Rather, acting on gut feeling coincides with a pre-emptive 
logic of security through a transformation of the logic of risk itself. As Aradau et al. (2008) 
make clear, risk understood as a dispositif (due to the double infinity of risk) tries to discipline 
uncertainty by bringing uncertainty under control, making it orderly and docile. The idea of 
risk thus renders the inherent contingency of the future both “knowable and actionable” by 
“making the unpredictable predictable” (Aradau et al., 2008: 150). Or, in Ewaldian terms, to 
calculate risk is ‘to master time, to discipline the future’ (Ewald, 1991: 207).  
           Such 
findings also support Stockdale’s (2014) excellent recent critique of Philip Fisher’s typology 
of temporal spaces. In his 2002 book The Vehement Passions, Fisher offers an account of the 
way “the passions” - meaning the affective resonances that colour and characterise the human 
experience - are crucial to mediating our understanding of, and relation to, temporality in 
general and the future in particular410 (Fisher 2002: 78). Importantly, Fisher makes a clear 
distinction between what he terms the “imminent future” and the “abstract future”, and their 
respective relationships to the present (Fisher, 2002: 79; Stockdale, 2014: 128). Fisher 
describes the abstract future as temporally distant (far removed from our existence in the 
present) that we cannot possess any coherent knowledge or understanding of what the future 
holds (Fisher, 2002: 79). This is because the epistemic fuzziness of the temporal distance means 
that ‘we cannot think of ourselves as acting reasonably about it’; and as such, no impetus to act 
is generated regarding its potentialities (Fisher, 2002: 80; Stockdale, 2014: 128). By contrast, 
Fisher contends that the imminent future’s temporal proximity (about-to-be-realised moment) 
grants it an adequate degree of intelligibility which thus activates the sorts of affective 
resonances that generate the impetus for action in the present (Fisher, 2002: 80-81; Stockdale, 
                                                          
410 In more simple terms, Fisher (2002) posits that the operation of passions is deemed a necessary condition for 
action in the present.  
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2014: 129). In summarising Fisher’s future concepts, Stockdale (2014: 129; see also Fisher, 
2002: 76) outlines that, for Fisher, the immediately imminent future is the only temporal space 
from which potential events can generate the degree affective resonance required to trigger 
some sort of action (a decision to act).        
                                                      As Stockdale (2014: 130-131) instructively 
articulates, ‘Fisher’s affectively mediated account of our relation to the future provides a 
psycho-philosophical grounding which travels well to the conventional articulation of pre-
emption in the context of exceptional (inter)national security concerns that are located in the 
Fisherian imminent future’. Moreover, Stockdale (2014) usefully draws attention to the death 
of Jean Charles de Menezes which is instructive in this respect since, as Stockdale (2014) 
suggests, it is plausible that the officers’ decision to “shoot to kill” was based on the “feeling” 
that an attack was imminent; this most likely attributable to the previous 7/7 atrocities. 
However, the experiential contents of risk as ‘gut feeling’ i.e. pragmatic speculations which 
actively populate the sensations of the present, inhabits the Fisherian abstract future since PP 
confronts radical uncertainty that is confined to speculative imaginings of radicalisation and/or 
extremism which may or may not actualise. However, under this logic, Fisher’s framework 
suggests that this would not generate the sort of affective response that would precipitate action. 
Yet, following Stockdale (2014), it is precisely this type of ostensibly in-actionable potentiality 
that the logic of PP takes as one such basis for action since PREVENT encourages the intrusion 
of distant events into everyday consciousness (Giddens, 1991: 27).     
   As Stockdale (2014) astutely observes, understood this way, pre-
emption radically alters the distinction between the abstract and the imminent future to the 
point where they “collapse”. In Stockdale (2014: 132, italics in original) words, passions can 
be activated with respect to ‘potentialities, irrespective of their temporal proximity in the lived 
present’. Thus, by encouraging partners and individuals to act on risk as gut feeling, PP 
operates in a rather Machiavellian manner. As the famous Machiavellian passage reads:  
 
‘It is necessary not only to pay attention to immediate crises, but to foresee those that will come and to 
make every effort to prevent them. For if you see them coming well in advance, then you can easily 
take the appropriate action to remedy them, but if you wait until they are right on top of you, then the 
prescription will take long to take effect, because the disease is far too advanced’ (Machiavelli, 1531 
[reprinted 2010]). 
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Understanding PP in this way thus adds an additional layer of support to the broader claim that 
PP functions as a political rationality since PREVENT changes the spatiotemporal conceptions 
of the future with regard to the unfolding relationship of prevention as pre-emption. Prevention 
requires certainty to legitimate action, however under pre-emptive logic, uncertainty acts as a 
catalyst for anticipatory action in the present. Whilst the two adopt different methodologies to 
capture and act on future space-times, PREVENT(ion) within the Fisherian abstract future 
(through individualised gut feeling[s]) has not been reinvented, but rather refigured towards 
risk as pre-emption.  
 
7.4.2 PREVENT: Risk as Politics 
  
PP understood through Massumi’s notion of “affect” provides enlightening perspective on the 
identification of risk at the referral stage. However, and to reiterate, it would be incorrect to 
suggest that no deliberation of risk(s) takes place post-referral; the participants’ accounts of 
ERG22 are indicative of democratic deliberation, which to a degree, guides decisions based on 
risk. Moreover, a second side of PP, or what the participants considered “the follow on” from 
gut feeling, was that of dealing with individual referrals.411 Thus, it is implausible to suggest 
that risk management within PP is entirely operationalised on the basis of pure speculation of 
what an unknowable future might hold (Hacking, 1990) i.e. a gut feeling. Rather, the 
participants’ accounts of PP post-referral suggest that the praxis of risk in a preventative 
governance framework requires the ongoing accumulation of what O’Malley (2004b) terms 
“risk knowledge”, which refers to any information deemed to be relevant or necessary for the 
creation of an informed picture of the future412 (O’Malley, 2005: 51; see also Ericson and 
Haggerty, 1997). Thus, PP might be understood as characterised by ‘the dance of affect and 
reason’ (Finucane et al., 2003).        
 Slovic et al. (2004) posit that risk in the modern world is confronted and dealt with in 
three fundamental ways:  
 
‘Risk as feelings refers to our fast, instinctive, and intuitive reactions to danger. Risk as analysis brings 
logic, reason, and scientific deliberation to bear on hazard management. When the first of these two 
                                                          
411 Interview with practitioner No.02. 
412 Hence, how according to Rose (1998: 185), the claims experts/professionals become, in certain fundamental 
senses, knowledge workers, engaged in the accumulation, calibration, classification and interpretation and 
communication of information relevant to judgements about risk.  
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orders of fact overlap in their pretension to certainty, this in effect produces a third reality - risk as 
politics’ (Slovic, 2004: 311, emphasis added).  
 
However, as Massumi (2005a) observes, as well as overlapping with the traditional family of 
facts, affective facts overlap with command by logic by homology with it. Moreover, according 
to Slovic et al. (2004) the central political significance of affect rests on these overlaps because 
they enable a slippage between the orders they bring in contact. As Slovic et al. (2004: 316, 
emphasis added) put it, ‘while we may be able to “do the right thing” without analysis, it is 
unlikely that we can employ analytical thinking rationally without guidance from affect 
somewhere along the line and vice versa’. In this way, the experiential mode of thinking and 
analytical mode of thinking are continually active, interacting in what has been characterised 
as “the dance of affect and reason” (Finucane et al., 2003).      The 
notion of “the dance of affect and reason” is instructive in explaining risk management within 
PP post-referral: 
  
“If it’s been a flippant remark, it’s been something whereby I think they’ve been a 
little bit naive, the discussion will go round the table whether ... do we approach 
them and let them know that we know about it? If it’s a child, do we get their parents 
in and have a word with them? ‘Cause a lot of stuff these days is like social media, 
things put on Facebook and like, for instance, Anders Breivik put himself in full 
uniform with a gun ... some kids have got, like, Swastikas in the background ... not 
really knowing what it is but they’re referred into us, and have they got extreme right 
wing views? We don’t know sometimes”.413 
 
Moreover, the aim of “judgement” within “the dance of affect and reason” is to develop a better 
understanding of a future threat precisely at the edge of calculable knowledge in order to render 
it actionable. As Briggs (2005: 57, as cited in Murphy, 2012: 119) contends, whilst these threats 
may be beyond measures, ‘information is a means to an end - better and more confident 
judgement’. Thus, in opposition to the claim by Beck who presents risk society as ‘riddled with 
risks of which we can have neither knowledge nor measure’ (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 
93), the post-referral operations of PP might be thought of as characterised by what Aradau 
and van Munster (2007: 93) call “the quest for knowledge” in the form of risk management 
around prevention. To put it differently, in a Derridian sense, ‘the decision, if there is to be one, 
                                                          
413 Interview with practitioner No.01. 
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must advance towards a future which is not known, which cannot be anticipated. In these terms, 
a decision that is anticipatory is not a decision at all, but merely the application of a body of 
knowledge’ (Derrida, 1994: 37; see also Derrida, 1992).    Most 
directly relevant to the current focus on decision-making under risk, and also consistent with 
the positive view of emotions as affect, Slovic et al. (2004) have proposed an “affect heuristic” 
that highlights the importance of affect for risk perceptions and risk-related behaviour (see 
Slovic et al., 2004). For Slovic et al (2004: 314), the feelings that become salient in a judgement 
or decision-making process depend on characteristics of the individual and the task as well as 
the interaction between them. Moreover, it is argued individuals differ in the way they react 
affectively, and in their tendency to rely upon experiential thinking (Peters and Slovic, 2000). 
As Slovic et al. (2014: 314) posit:  
 
‘Tasks differ regarding the evaluability (relative affective salience) of information. These differences 
result in the affective qualities of a stimulus image being “mapped” or interpreted in diverse ways. The 
salient qualities of real or imagined stimuli then evoke images (perceptual and symbolic interpretations) 
that may be made up of both affective and instrumental dimensions. The mapping of affective 
information determines the contribution stimulus images make to an individual’s “affect pool.” All of 
the images in people’s minds are tagged or marked to varying degrees with affect. The affect pool 
contains all the positive and negative markers associated (consciously or unconsciously) with the 
images. People consult or “sense” the affect pool in the process of making judgements’.  
 The participants’ discussions around “dealing with referrals” might be read in a similar 
way. For instance, the standardized risk framework of ERG22 coincides with a “quest for 
knowledge” (Aradau and van Munster, 2007: 91), or, as Ben Anderson puts it, “anticipatory 
epistemic objects” - the knowledge strategies through which ‘future possibilities and 
potentialities are disclosed, objectified, communicated and rendered mobile’ in the face of 
unpredictable futures (Anderson, 2007: 158; see also Lakoff, 2008). In one sense, the 
application of a precautionary logic is invoked through the mapping of radicalisation as a linear, 
teleological process as linked to ERG22. Moreover, the concept behind ERG22 transforms 
radicalisation risk into a carefully crafted artefact, one linked to notions of normalisation. Thus, 
ERG22 dissolves the notion of a subject or a concrete individual, and puts in its place a 
combinatory of risk factors in a Castelian sense: 
 
‘To intervene no longer means, or at least to begin with, taking one’s target a given individual in order 
to correct, punish or care for him ... There is, in fact, no longer a relation of immediacy with a subject 
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because there is no longer a subject. What the new preventative policies primarily address is no longer 
individuals but factors, statistical correlations of heterogeneous elements. They deconstruct the concrete 
subject of intervention, and reconstruct a combination of factors liable to produce risk. Their primary 
aim is not to confront a concrete dangerous situation, but to anticipate all the possible forms of irruption 
of danger’ (Castel, 1991: 288, emphasis in original).  
 
In the context of the present study, PP understood entirely through the concept of 
ERG22 adheres to what the governmentality literature has called ‘clinical’ risk. Clinical risk 
works by locating probabilistic indicators of future conditions (O'Malley, 2004b: 22; see also 
Aradau and van Munster, 2009). Furthermore, under this rationality, risks are to be detected in 
ordinary situations, inscribed in everyday behaviours (Aradau and van Munster, 2009: 7). 
Accordingly, as Castel (1991: 283, italics in original) suggests, ‘there can only ever be 
imputations of dangerousness, postulating the hypothesis of a more or less probable 
relationship between certain present symptoms and a certain act to come. In this way, risks 
‘dwell “in” the subject even though it has often not yet manifested itself in any act’ (Castel, 
1991: 283). In relation to risk management through ERG22, the language of (susceptibility to) 
persuasion, disadvantage and vulnerability creates a “vulnerable” (potential) suspect separate 
from radicalised recruiters.         
 Importantly, the research findings do not fully coincide with Castel, or the logic of 
clinical risk since participants emphasised radicalisation as a “fluctuating and unpredictable” 
process (Vermeulen and Bovenkerk, 2012: 19). Thus, the notion of “affect heuristic” is 
instructive since it sheds light on the participants’ accounts of the role played by gut feeling 
alongside risk knowledge management. In contrast to Castel who states, ‘the essential 
component of intervention no longer takes the form of direct face-to-face relationship between 
the carer and the cared, the helper and the helped, the professional and the client’ (Castel, 1991: 
281), participants emphasised the importance of individual engagement, experience, common 
sense and gut feeling post-referral.414 This, then, does not fully coincide with observations 
made by Castel or dispositif at the limit. Rather, PP might be read as case-management within 
the oeuvre of governmentality.        
 Under a case-management approach, individuals are deemed threatening or disruptive 
in some way to the social order. Risk calculation in this type involves the qualitative assessment 
of risk for individuals or groups who are deemed to be ‘at risk’ (Dean, 1997: 17). However, in 
contrast to clinical risk rationalities, a case-management approach uses more individualistic 
                                                          
414 Interview with practitioner No.05. 
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sources of data derived from interaction with and observation of specific clients (Lupton, 
1999). Once risk is assessed, techniques for managing it on the part of the relevant experts are 
brought into play (Dean, 1997: 217-18; Lupton, 1999). Risks are thus created, circulated, 
proliferated and capitalised upon in a whole variety of burgeoning ways and identified by a 
whole host of new actors who enter the scene. Interestingly, Foucault (2007: 68) questions: ‘Is 
security a different ‘dispositif’ based on risk and profiling of population, based on monitoring 
the future and the potential actualisation of the present? Have we escaped from the territory 
with the population as statistical category and not as people?’ Whilst there was to be no reply, 
in the context of present study, it would seem the combination of ERG22 alongside risk 
management as individual engagement, common sense and gut feeling has connotations with 
Foucault’s original reading of dispositif, as well as dispositif conceptualised as statistical 
categorisation at the limit.  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 8 
Final Remarks and Directions for Future Research 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The axiology underpinning this thesis might be interpreted by some readers as dispassionate. 
This thesis has not sought to provide a review of PREVENT in relation to the concept of suspect 
communities and/or BME demographics. Whilst such analyses have certainly contributed to a 
greater understanding of PREVENT, 415  such tracks have become significantly worn and 
subsequently research into PREVENT has become repetitive and fatigued. Rather, this thesis 
has explored PP as linked to the concept of risk, both of which play a crucial role in preventing 
                                                          
415 See, for example, Spalek and Lambert (2008); Spalek (2009a and b); Thomas (2012).  
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radicalisation at local level, yet are significantly under-researched and under-theorised.  
        By pursuing a somewhat 
experimental pathway, the objectives of this thesis can be read as triadic. First, this thesis 
contributes to a rather underwhelming knowledge of PP. Second, this thesis has examined two 
risk positions at local level rather than against exceptional or discursive frameworks, as has 
been the case in the context of the war on terror. Third, this thesis has drawn attention to the 
complicity and structurally related functioning of concepts within dispositif risk and reflexive 
risk as measured against the empirical reality of PP on the ground. However, I acknowledge 
the idiographic nature of the research and thus consciously distance the findings from statistical 
generalisation. Moreover, there is no desire to situate the findings within grandiose theoretical 
claims by proposing this thesis conveniently merges two very different risk positions as 
harmonious sociological bedfellows. In essence, there is no attempt to meta-theorise. Rather, 
this thesis has followed a sketch outlined by Tulloch (2007) who observes, ‘different parts of 
different traditions can be used together in future risk research, provided that two conditions 
are met: first, that the critiques of the risk society tradition and parts of the governmentality 
tradition for “meta-theory” are met via detailed local empirical research; second, that the theory 
of knowledge representation and the power of the researcher-as-writer becomes part of the risk 
analysis as a norm of research practice’ (Tulloch, 2007: 166, emphasis in original).  
 
8.2 On Pragmatics and Philosophy 
  
This thesis has drawn attention to the significance of trust within PP. Figure 3.15 of the 
PREVENT strategy clearly states, ‘trust in PREVENT must be improved’ (HM Government, 
2011b: 6). However, in the battle to win “hearts and minds”, the focus of the PREVENT 
strategy is centred on increasing trust at local community level (macro level). Subsequently, 
there is a virtual absence of space devoted to the issue of inter-organisational trust (micro level; 
see HM Government, 2011b). This thesis has provided perspective on this oversight by 
situating the findings within Giddeon logic, specifically, The Consequences of Modernity. The 
findings indicate that PP heavily relies on the development of positive interpersonal “pure” 
relationships that might be thought of as “kinship connections” before trust and confidence are 
formed at abstract-systems level (the PREVENT agenda itself). Moreover, it would seem 
personal relations are significantly influenced by the personal demeanour of PP officers: hence, 
the emphasis on ‘soft power’ - that is, openness, honesty and familiarity. Importantly, once 
“active trust” was established, key partners were more likely “buy-into” PREVENT and “sell” 
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PREVENT as an agenda to other key stakeholders, institutions and individuals at local level. 
          The thesis has also 
drawn attention to how PP upholds social relations over time and space constraints. PP attempts 
to dis-embed (and re-embed when and where necessary) the PREVENT agenda within key 
partner institutions. However, certain relationships within a multi-partnership framework were 
considered periodic and transitory and thus, ontological anxiety was overcome by the 
emotional acceptance of absence. In so being, it would seem PP is functionally alien to methods 
of working which ignore the intricate nature of trust at both individual and abstract level, thus 
troubling Giddeon logic which conceptualises trust in a one-dimensional manner. Crucially, 
what both levels of trust require is a reciprocal relationship that takes a considerable amount of 
time to cement. At present, research that examines inter-organisational partnerships within 
PREVENT, particularly in relation to the notion of trust, is significantly lacking. This thesis 
strongly advocates the need for further research into this oversight.    
       Figure 11.18 of the PREVENT strategy 
states, ‘policing has played a galvanising role in developing local PREVENT partnerships and 
bringing together a wide range of other organisations to support the strategy’ (HM 
Government, 2011b: 99; see also HM Government, 2013b: 4). Related to this statement, this 
thesis has drawn attention to how PP eschews the traditional one-dimensional security 
dichotomy and thus addresses two levels of sub-politics: governance processes through 
partnership working (systems induced reflexivity) and at individual level in the form of 
participants of the scheme (individual reflexivity).416 Moreover, whilst PP might be thought as 
‘rule-altering politics’ (Beck, 1994b: 34-36) as a result of the ‘multi-lateralisation’ of auspices 
and providers that constitute this new security assemblage, as has been argued, it is important 
to avoid blanketing Beck’s realist approach in its primary form and remain aware of Beckidian 
etymology which includes a cultural relativist approach, natural-scientific objectivism, 
constructivism, and a sociological perspective (Beck, 1995: 76).     
     
  Whilst this thesis does not challenge the sanguinity of the aforementioned PREVENT 
statement (i.e. HM Government 2011b [Figure 11.18]), it does highlight some ambiguities 
regarding the operationalisation of PREVENT as a smooth top-down governance structure. 
Many might posit the hyper-complex security environment that PP operates in as embodying 
                                                          
416 For a similar analysis of sub-politics and governance (though not applied towards CT), see Borne (2010: 71-
72).   
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post-structuralist readings of Foucault’s concept of governmentality. However, this thesis has 
argued that a highly centralised governmental apparatus where power is practiced as an 
antithesis of freedom and agency does not provide an adequately nuanced account of the 
empirical realities of PP in a low risk area. Rather, PP operates diffusely within an assemblage 
of multiple-existences of power, each exercising its own varied degree of agency vis-à-vis the 
ultimately sovereign centre (Rose and Miller, 1992, 2008; Stockdale, 2014).   
 Subsequently, this thesis highlights the potential of the generative reading of dispositif 
as “assemblage” to offer an alternative account to that of “network”, the pre-dominant and 
often de facto concept used in discussion of governance reform (McFarlane, 2009). The 
potential of assemblage as a theoretical tool lies in is very manipulability: in its widest sense it 
can be used as a broad descriptor of disparate actors coming together; as a way of thinking 
about phenomena as productivist or practice-based; and as an ethos that tends to the social in-
formation, and as a means of problematising origins, agency, politics and ethics (Anderson and 
McFarlane, 2011: 126). However, as Amoore and de Goede (2008b) point out, this does not 
mean that such technologies exist as all-encompassing and all-seeing mechanisms by the state. 
On the contrary, rather than viewing power as omnipresent and totalising, this thesis has argued 
that the PP might be considered what William Connolly (2005: 144) describes as a ‘complex 
assemblage’ fashioned by ‘resonances’ between multiple sites of authorisation (Amoore and 
de Goede, 2008b).         Inevitably, such 
complexity brings with it sites of resistance, dogmatism and mutation. Thus, the empirical 
actualities of PP coincide with a more ‘critical realist’ reading of governmentality, as opposed 
to post-structuralist discursive accounts of identity. For example, this thesis has drawn attention 
to some potential barriers to achieving the second and third objectives of PREVENT, such as 
high employee turnover within key partner institutions, competing organisational objectives 
and juxtaposed organisational interpretations and definitions of “risk” and “vulnerability”. 
Thus, rather than being passively accepted, a multi-partnership approach had to be “worked 
on” and “won”. Interestingly, securing the “buy-in” of both internal and external partners is, in 
one way, achieved through terminological modification that embeds alignments of expertise 
along an axis of “safeguarding”. Moreover, contextualising the radicalised (or potentially 
radicalised) “vulnerable” subject in need of “protection” was understood to be pragmatically 
necessary since, rhetorically, the lines between PREVENT and PURSUE were understood to 
have become increasingly blurred in the past; a point reiterated in the PREVENT strategy (see 
HM Government, 2011b, [Figure 6.40]).       
  Even given the positive benefits produced by re-orientating risk towards an 
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invocation of safeguarding, it is problematic to assume coherent joined-up methods of 
PREVENT(ion) where funding restriction means it is not compulsory to govern in such a way. 
This situation is potentially exacerbated in a world of ‘lightly-engaged strangers’ (Young, 
1999) and the burgeoning body of official security actors that is the hallmark of social and 
political relations. In the context of the present study, whilst in theory PREVENT is recognised 
as a multi-agency approach - that is, ‘the coming together of various agencies to address a 
problem’ (Crawford, 1998: 119) - the research findings err towards PP as ‘inter-agency’ 
involving ‘some degree of fusion and melding of relations between agencies’ (Crawford,1998: 
119). Interestingly, Mythen and Walklate (2005: 15) point out the danger of governmentality 
is that ‘individuals are portrayed as insentient “docile bodies” observing and obeying 
disciplinary discourses’. In chorus, Lupton (1999: 102) states, ‘governmentality can be 
criticised for devoting too much attention to ... discourses and strategies and not enough to how 
people actually respond to them as part of their everyday lives’. In the context of PP, the 
research findings support both assertions.        
  The PREVENT strategy states, ‘one of the effects of PREVENT to date has 
been the improvement in understanding and co-operation between police and communities in 
this country on a range of issues, including security’ (HM Government, 2011: 10). At a policy 
level, this thesis highlights a fundamental divide between the assumption made in 
governmental rhetoric which champions “communities defeat terrorism” and the realistic 
uptake at the case study site. Whilst participants recognised that, to a degree, individuals and 
groups within the local community generate intelligence, the “communities defeat terrorism” 
rhetoric was considered utopian. Rather, PP operates far more prevalently in a co-productive 
manner with key trusted individuals or ‘connectors’ (Spalek, 2014), more akin to the concept 
of ‘strong network ties’ emanating from theories on social networking (see Gravonetter, 1973, 
1983). Thus, rather than PP adhering to governmentality in its primary form, this thesis has 
engaged with Butler’s conceptualisation of sovereignty in the midst governmentality (Butler, 
2006).            The 
research findings suggest it is those figures Butler terms ‘petty sovereigns’ who are considered 
frontline workers in the fight against extremism rather than “communities” in the broader sense 
of the term. Moreover, it was also found that this method of working was far from coincidental 
but pragmatically necessary given that PP operates within a ‘pre-emptive risk trap’ (Beck, 
1999c: 141) as a result of what Beck terms ‘the political side effects of civilianisation’s side 
effects which threaten the continued existence of the democratic political system’ (Beck, 
1992a: 80). Thus, Butler’s figure of the petty sovereign deserves cognisance when analysing 
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pre-emptive governance within PP as it implies an answer to the agency-structure dichotomy. 
The delegation of PP power to key partners means that such individuals are not true sovereigns 
- they are constituted within the constraints of governmentality - and yet there is space for 
practical agency within which they act.     It has also been argued that 
the figure of the petty sovereign does not mean there are significant ramifications for 
‘capricious proceduralism outside the law’ (Butler, 2006: 92) as Butler suggests. Rather, this 
thesis has argued PP might be understood as a dispositif that serves a strategic purpose, not by 
a single actor ruling at will, but in line with Young’s (2006: 123) responsibilisation model 
which suggests that ‘responsibility derived from social connection is ultimately political 
responsibility’. As Young (2006: 123) clarifies, ‘most fundamentally, what I mean by “politics” 
here is public communicative engagement with others for the sake of organising our 
relationships and co-ordinating our actions’. Accordingly, PP attempts to turn the democratic 
public and political community upside down forming associations and experimenting with new 
kinds of political participation as a political rationality. Thus, the concept of risk cannot be 
reduced to a mere description of a certain empirical political reality (Peterson, 2012: 696). Nor 
can political rationalities be divorced from ‘risk’-oriented thinking. Rather, risk must be 
understood as a medium for defining the possibility of politics since political risk is contingent 
on political action. Thus, PP becomes a politics of risk. Subsequently, it would be fruitful for 
future research to examine PREVENT from a vantage point of political theory and political 
science, as well as sociology and criminology.        
  Understanding PP through notion of sovereignty in the midst of 
governmentality also raises further questions regarding “the decision” of risk that ushers in the 
political. Whilst a detailed discussion of securitisation theory is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, an important point warrants discussion. It becomes arguable that both Schmitt and 
securitisation theory which preclude giving sufficient recognition to the possibility of multiple 
and dispersed decisions and ultimately the possibility of locating either sovereignty or “the 
political” in any unambiguous and decidable way is problematic (cf., Schmitt, 1985). 
Conversely, this thesis adds support to Doty’s (2007: 130) argument for ‘the possibility of 
securitisation practices originating from social actors who are not necessarily strategically 
positioned politically or institutionally’. As Doty’s (2007: 130) conceptual reading of border 
vigilantes suggests, arguably, just the reverse may be the case: “the decision” “we,” “the 
people,” “the nation,” “the society,” is in fact a plurality of decisions made from diverse locales 
including “from below”. Similarly, PP understood as “societal responsibility” exposes a hole 
at the heart of a definitive locus of sovereignty; everyone is potentially the “police” - faceless 
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creators and up-holders of the social order if they so desire (cf., Doty, 2007: 133; 2009).   
    This thesis has also argued the importance of the notion of affect 
to PP. To understand how PP governs in the present to avoid potential harm in the future, this 
thesis has drawn attention to risk as individualised gut feeling(s) to the point where, following 
Stockdale (2014), the abstract and immediate future - in a Fisherian sense - collapse. Thus, 
while the idea of pre-emption is perhaps most often associated with discourses of security 
exemplified through exceptional and discursive frameworks, this thesis has highlighted the 
central importance of daily, mundane and everyday life to practices of anticipatory security 
which requires fastidious attention at its own level. Subsequently, this thesis has perhaps 
responded to observations made by criminologist Richard Ericson that the logic of pre-emption 
can be seen to permeate all aspects of the exercise of power in the current moment and not just 
exceptional practices and discourses (Ericson, 2008: 58). PP is conceived in terms of 
“safeguarding” the future of “vulnerable” individuals from what may or may not come to pass 
by undertaking precautionary measures in the present that are conceived in relation to an 
imagined future since PREVENT governs within a pre-criminal space. Thus, from a 
Foucauldian (and Nietzschean) standpoint, PP can be seen to operate ‘against time, and thus 
on time, in favour of a (hoped for) time to come’ (Deleuze, 1992). 
 
8.3 On Risk 
 
This thesis has aimed to complement critiques of PREVENT by introducing a critical risk 
perspective which, as Heath-Kelly (2012: 3) points out, ‘is much more frequently applied to 
the war on terror technologies of biometrics and data mining of financial transactions, 
exceptional CT measures, or the re-evaluation of security practice around risk’. However, to 
be clear, the theoretical subtleties and nuances of governmentality and risk-society theories 
(and the wider integrities and social utility of these theories) have not been the only focus of 
this thesis. The objective has not been to reify either Foucault’s or Beck’s work or exegeses of 
said authors. As Mythen and Walklate (2005: 380) point out, ‘given the sprawling corpus 
available, coverage of both perspectives is necessarily incomplete’. Like all theories, they 
simply provide the theoretical lens through which PP has been systematically analysed. Nor 
has the object of the task been one of solely exploring PP. Rather, this thesis has drawn attention 
to the fact that PP cannot be reduced to a single risk perspective. Whilst it is acknowledged that 
different types of risk have their distinctive rationality and set of technologies, i.e. each of the 
disciplines is underscored by particular methods for acquiring and applying knowledge to 
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uncertainty shaped by risk, in instances they are functionally complementary.  
         As Anderson (2007: 158) 
observes, O’Malley has previously made a similar argument drawing on the example of the 
promissory logic of contract law where he cautions against any one-dimensional understanding 
of anticipatory practices by arguing that uncertainty itself has long been a distinctive modality 
of governance based on both (see O’Malley, 2000: 461). In the context of PP, to understand 
the ways in which the concept of risk has been interpreted, made calculable, displaced, 
supplemented and substituted, what is necessary is to consider a genealogical analysis of 
different paradigms of risk and their lines of descent (Aradau and van Munster, 2008c: 9). It is 
arguable that research has erred towards a unilinear theory of the war on terror through using 
a single measuring rod for comparing and contrasting CT modalities. However, as this thesis 
argues, it is problematic to reduce PP to a singular discursive terrain of risk described and thus, 
a more critical approach is required. A first step would be to take the dialectical relationship of 
risk as interwoven within PREVENT(ion) more seriously.      
      It is not that alternative means of theorising 
terrorism prevention should be downplayed; it is acknowledged that dichotomised rationales 
exist. Nevertheless, the aim has been to highlight in an intellectually engaging manner the 
relevance of concepts within ‘risk’ as measured against the empirical reality of PP at local 
level. Moreover, the ways in which the relation between subjectivity and risk interact within 
an inter-disciplinary framework might themselves be an object of study for future research. 
Further, in similar manner to observations by Neal (2006) on the politics of exception, it would 
be instructive for security studies and risk studies to engage with discourse, where discourse is 
taken in the broadest possible sense: as a co-habitual relation between, objects, subject 
positions, concepts and strategies (Neal, 2006: 43; Foucault, 2002). Interestingly, it is within 
The Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault, 2002) where Foucault outlines such guidance. 
Drawing upon the work of Foucault, Neal (2006: 182) outlines, ‘looking into the various 
discourses on madness, Foucault realises these are not all talking about the same thing. In legal 
parlance, in religious settings, in medical diagnoses, and in daily experience, quite different 
notions of madness are apparent; so much so as to undermine the idea that the statements are 
united by a common object’ (Foucault, 2002: 35-36; see also Neal, 2006: 182). Similarly, the 
theoretical departure point for this thesis has been that different notions of risk may be activated 
within PREVENT by many different actors at particular times for diverse purposes, in the same 
manner that Foucault suggests with the advancement of archaeological analysis (see inter alia 
Foucault, 2002).          
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  This thesis has also taken great inspiration from an example outlined by Mythen 
and Walklate (2005), ‘to raise problematic theoretical questions, lay bare contradictions in 
policy and flag up residual ambiguities that require further investigation’. Thus, following 
Mythen and Walklate (2005), the spirit of the thesis has been of one of adventure, rather than 
empirical precision. Moreover, underlying this exploratory method is a belief that 
criminological theory should enable us to offer up accounts of cause and effect by appreciating 
the positive facets of more than an exclusive risk paradigm, together with a ‘willingness to 
labour at the interface’ (Mythen and Walklate, 2005: 394). Furthermore, by situating the ambit 
of the criminological imagination at the forefront the present study, this thesis has followed the 
advice of Jock Young (2003) and endeavoured to continue the Mannheimian tradition of 
exploring ‘dangerous thoughts’ - of thinking through and behind the contemporary 
criminological scene towards a fuller understanding of the concepts it has come to adopt 
(Mythen and Walklate, 2005: 395). Interestingly, Young (2003) advised for the need to 
reconnect criminology to sociology. Should this thesis be read as an attempt of such?  In certain 
ways, perhaps.           
 Criminology, particularly with reference to “war on terror”, has stubbornly grappled 
with the dichotomous question: ‘risk society’ or ‘governmentality’? The epistemological 
underpinnings of this thesis refute the option of choice. Rather, as Jessop et al. (2008: 393) 
suggest, it is important that research enables movement towards multi-dimensional and 
polymorphous accounts based on: (a) the elaboration of sufficiently rich concepts for each of 
the dimensions of said relations; and (b) their deployment in a manner that permits researchers 
to explore more precisely their differential weighting and articulation in a given context. 
Moreover, as Jessop et al., (2008: 393) observe, ‘failure to pursue this strategy can lead to two 
distinct but symmetrical types of quasi-reduction to one-dimensional analyses. Both types 
occur when the conceptual and theoretical framework for exploring one aspect of a complex 
phenomenon has greater precision, depth, and breadth than the frameworks developed for other 
aspects’.        To conclude, whilst this 
thesis has drawn attention to how different risk positions provide a mutually integrative 
storyline of PP at local level, it would be interesting to see how many domains such a vantage 
point could be applied. Through taking a rather unusual exploration, it is hoped we can progress 
our understanding of risk by adopting an ameliorative approach that embraces the perspectives 
and collective wisdom of risk positions despite immanent contradictions that seem apparent at 
face value. Looking at the way in which two risk positions define and treat risk, this thesis has 
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evidenced points of ambiguity that might act as catalyst for future scholars to explore the 
possibilities of an “otherwise” (Doty, 2007); a key trajectory of critical scholarship.  
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Appendix A 
 
National PREVENT Policing Funding Distribution 2010-2011:417 
 
                                                          
417 HM Government (2011b: 101).  
283 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
Local Authority Delivered (PREVENT) Activity in 2008:418 
 
                                                          
418 HM Government (2011b: 28) 
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Appendix C 
Local Authority Projects via DCLG Funding 2009-2011:419  
                                                          
419 HM Government (2011b: 29) 
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Appendix D 
PREVENT Priority Areas as of 2013: 
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Key: 
A: Leeds; B: Bradford; C: Blackburn; D: Manchester; E: Liverpool; F: Stoke; G: Derby; H: 
Leicester; I: Birmingham; J: Cardiff; K: Luton; L: Brent; Camden; Ealing; Enfield; 
Greenwich; Hackney; Hammersmith and Fulham; Haringey; High Wycombe; Islington; 
Kensington and Chelsea; Lambeth; Lewisham; Newham; Redbridge; Tower Hamlets; 
Waltham Forest; Wandsworth; and Westminster; M: Barking and Dagenham.  
 
 
 
Appendix E 
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CHANNEL Model Scheme:420  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
420 HM Government (2012d: 15) 
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Appendix F 
Case Study Tactics for Four Design Tests (adapted from Yin, 2003: 34):421 
Tests Case study tactic Phase of research in which 
tactic occurs 
 
 
Construct validity 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal Validity 
 
 
 
 
External Validity 
 
 
 
Reliability 
  Use of multiple sources of  
evidence 
   Establish chain of evidence 
   Have key informants review 
draft case study report 
 
  Do pattern-matching 
  Do explanation building 
  Address rival explanations 
  Use logic models 
 
 Use theory in single-case 
studies 
 Use replication logic in 
multiple-case studies 
 
 Use case study protocol                  
 Develop case study database 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
               
 
                
 
                                  
            Research design 
   
                       
                   
            Data collection 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
421 Text in italics indicate which design tests were adhered to within the present study.  
 Data analysis 
Data collection 
 
Composition 
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Appendix G 
Braun and Clarke’s Six Phases of Thematic Analysis (taken from Braun and Clarke, 2006):  
 
Phase Description of the process 
1. Familiarising yourself with your data: Transcribing data (if necessary), reading and re-reading 
the data, noting down initial ideas. 
2. Generating initial codes: Coding interesting features of the data in a systematic 
fashion across the entire data set, collating data relevant 
to each code. 
3. Searching for themes: Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all data 
relevant to each potential theme. 
4. Reviewing themes: Checking in the themes work in relation to the coded 
extracts (Level 1) and the entire data set (Level 2), 
generating a thematic ‘map’ of the analysis. 
5. Defining and naming themes: Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each theme, 
and the overall story the analysis tells; generating clear 
definitions and names for each theme. 
6. Producing the report: The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of vivid, 
compelling extract examples, final analysis of selected 
extracts, relating back of the analysis to the research 
question and literature, producing a scholarly report of 
the analysis. 
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Appendix H 
Examples of Coding Technique:422  
 
Overt ‘soft-power’ policing (interactions)   
Multi-partnership through         PREVENT as a product        Overt ‘soft-power’ policing 
safeguarding (strategies/tactics)                                                                  (interactions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 Engagement dependent on trust (conditions)   
Potential barrier to engagement (conditions) 
Maintaining overt engagement (strategies/tactics)  Potential barrier to engagement (conditions) 
         
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
422 The right-hand margin highlights the descriptive codes used; text attached to arrows indicates the progression 
towards phase two coding; and linguistic connectors i.e. examples given in the participants’ accounts, have been 
highlighted with a dashed line in the right-hand margin.  
‘Going back to the safeguarding issue with getting the buy-in with people who work 
in that sphere, it’s making yourself visible; you get the trust by talking very openly 
about what you’ll do with the information that they give ... And I think that it’s 
perfectly understandable why some partner agencies might be reluctant to pick up 
the phone, you know? It’s a very confidential area to report somebody in. You have 
to have trust’.  
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
‘Safeguard’/‘Buy-in’ 
‘Visibility’ 
‘Openness,’ 
‘Reluctance’ 
‘Confidentiality’ 
‘Trust’ 
 (strategies/tactics)
‘The initial approach is there but afterwards you keep a link because a lot of 
people, whether it be an organisation with a high turnover of staff who are 
coming through, or the recent ... sort of ... situation with a lot of cuts going 
through organisations, they’re losing a lot of staff, so they’ve got to juggle 
their own resources. So you’ve got to keep that  
engagement going. So it’s making sure people who are coming into new roles 
are aware of the strategy’. 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
 
 ‘Maintain links’ 
‘Staff-turnover’ 
‘Job cuts’ 
‘Losing staff’ 
‘Finance’  
‘Maintain links’  
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Potential barrier to engagement                                     Re-establishing overt engagement 
(strategies/tactics)          
PREVENT as a product (strategies/tactics)        Terminology still used (strategies/tactics)   
                  Partners as Frontline          Increased partner understanding (interactions) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Terminology ceased   Increased partner understanding                           Terminology increased   
     Decreased partner understanding  
     (Interactions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(conditions) 
‘I think we still absolutely use terms like radicalisation, grooming, 
brainwashing and all the terms that have been used before, but safeguarding 
is the term that they think best sums up what we do, but also its language that 
other partners know and understand and we often start talks with ... “This is 
about extremism, and terrorism”, which ... ultimately it is. But to get the buy-
in of all the range of frontline services that we give talks to, the safeguarding 
is the bit that people instantly think, “Argh, I get it.” PREVENT is such a 
meaningless word, in fact most people think it’s about crime prevention, sort 
of ... the people who fit alarms and stuff ... So we’ve moved away from that 
because it’s not helpful, whereas safeguarding is a word that is used daily by 
your absolute key partners and people get that. That certainly features more 
in our language. So whilst we still talk about the same issues and 
radicalisation, it’s within the sphere of safeguarding’. 
 
2 
3 
4
5 
6 
 
7
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
 ‘Terminology’ 
‘Safeguarding’ 
‘Language’ 
 
‘Buy-in’  
  ‘Frontline’  
‘Linguistic Connector’ 
‘Language’ 
 
   ‘Safeguarding’ 
    
‘Language’ 
‘Safeguarding’ 
(strategies/tactics)          (strategies/tactics)    (strategies/tactics) 
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Situating PREVENT                     Engagement linked to gut feeling (strategies/tactics)                   
within ‘pre’-criminal space          
(conditions)    PREVENT as a product   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Confidence to pre-empt                Pre-emption  
 
PREVENT as societal responsibility    
 
 
 
 
 
‘Gut feeling is sort of, a strap-line that we use with all our sort of engagement, 
whether we’re using the trust your instincts DVD or whether we’re using the 
strap-line from the MET, it’s just about saying to people, right then, we’re talking 
about terrorism or extremism here, things that they might sort of see as a very 
high level, it’s a case of saying alright then, you might come into contact with 
somebody, they might live next door, you know ... Somebody who you might see 
changes, or something’s not quite right, we’re not saying it is definitely going to 
be terrorism or extremism, it might be drugs for instance, but if you have, for 
whatever reason, that feeling inside that suggests I don’t know what it is but 
there’s just something not quite right with this person, that you have the 
confidence to contact your local police, somebody at work through your local 
partners, or the PREVENT team. And it is just about reacting to that gut feeling. 
It might not be something as evident as you know? Chemical bottles in a 
neighbours back garden but there’s just something, you know? You might see the 
changes much like us, you know? Its communities that will defeat terrorism not 
just us, you’re the ones who will see the changes and differences in your 
communities’.  
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
 ‘Gut feeling’ 
‘Instinct’ 
 ‘Strap-line’ 
 
 ‘High-level threat’ 
 
‘Linguistic Connector’ 
 
‘Feeling’ 
 
‘Confidence’ 
‘Gut feeling’ 
‘Linguistic Connector’ 
‘Social responsibility’ 
‘Community cohesion’ 
 
(strategies/tactics)    (conditions) 
   (strategies/tactics) 
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Appendix I 
Examples of Block and File Phase One and Phase Two Coding: 
 
Original Field notes Initial Code (One) Organising Code (Two) 
PREVENT is about 
relationships and they take time 
to build up. And for me, as 
much as you know, turnover of 
staff, you’ve got to be mindful 
with this, especially in probably 
in our sort of area where we 
have no statutory partners who 
are full time on this because 
we’re not a funded area, so 
we’re relying on partners 
goodwill. 
 
 
 
 
 
High staff turnover 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Potential barrier to overt 
inter-organisational 
counter-radicalisation 
 
There’s so much pressure for 
people to perform in individual 
silos and it does worry me; 
... situation with a lot of cuts 
going through organisations, 
they’re losing a lot of staff, so 
they’ve got to juggle their own 
resources. So you’ve got to 
keep that engagement going. So 
it’s making sure people who are 
coming into new roles are 
aware of the strategy; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Differing organisational 
objectives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Potential barrier to overt 
inter-organisational 
counter-radicalisation 
 
He was new to that division and 
didn’t know what had gone on.  
So again it depends on how 
long you’ve been there; if 
people have moved on they can 
 
 
 
 
Lack of familiarity and 
experience 
 
 
 
 
Example(s) of Phase One and Phase Two Coding 
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try and do stuff that could just 
absolutely destroy some stuff at 
times; 
I’m seen as a bit of an outsider, 
from the accent alone. 
 Decreased levels of trust 
and confidence from 
partners and communities 
 
 
People like the fact that it’s the 
same voice, it’s the same 
person; 
With the longevity of being in 
post, we’ve been able to show 
... look you’ve shown an 
interest four years ago. 
 
 
 
 
Heightened levels of 
familiarity 
 
 
 
 
 
Increased level of trust and 
confidence from key 
partners and communities 
 
If you are completely open and 
honest, and by giving examples 
of how you’ve done things in 
the past ... And again, word 
clearly gets around; 
By being open and honest it 
hopefully builds up that trust 
and confidence element; 
It is just about being honest and 
open, and that they’re not given 
a switchboard number, they 
have a personal telephone 
number into this office;  
It is very much about being 
open and transparent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Openness and honesty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increased level of trust and 
confidence of key partners 
and communities  
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Appendix J 
Examples of Block and File Thematic Analysis with Explanation of Codes: 
Name of data-driven code PREVENT Policing reliant on Trust  
 
Explanation of code 
Trust and confidence as an important 
component of multi-agency partnership 
approach to counter-radicalisation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Interview details  
per quote restricted) 
Trying to get people on board ... explaining how 
we deal with referrals, and, you know, trying to 
gain that trust and confidence and support of 
frontline institutions; 
Without that trust and confidence, people just 
aren’t going to pick up the phone or pop in to see 
you; 
You’d usually try and identify a trusted person 
within the community; 
One of the things essential to PREVENT is it’s 
about trust and confidence – trust and confidence 
in the process and the people involved; 
It’s very much about, can we give people, in 
terms of communities, partners, and internally 
within the police, the trust and confidence to 
understand what we’re trying to do – to work 
with vulnerable people; 
We do get things coming in from the community, 
but it’s a case of spreading the word using your 
key trusted individuals as partners within the 
communities themselves to promote that 
understanding. 
 
Name of data-driven code Safeguarding through Language 
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Explanation of code 
Changes in terminology and language  as a 
crucial component of external and internal 
engagement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Interview details 
per quote restricted) 
It’s getting that terminology right that has proved 
over the years doing this role, that people fully 
understand safeguarding and if you contextualise 
safeguarding to them, people seem to get 
PREVENT more; 
You’ve got to look at the terminology that people 
understand, bring it down to terrorism and the act 
is the final thing, but let’s take it back to the 
beginning as it were, and let’s see why that 
person has been vulnerable to being drawn into 
that arena; 
What terminology do you want? Because if you 
do have somebody from their own organisation 
there they do sort of get it; 
Safeguarding is the term that they think best sums 
up what we do, but also its language that other 
partners know and understand; 
I think the word safeguarding seems to soften the 
strategy, the agenda. I think where a lot of 
misconception with it has been because police 
have been pushing the agenda, it must be a 
criminal act ... Whereas when you talk about 
safeguarding, it’s reminding people that this is 
pre-criminal space and it seems to be more 
accepting. So changing terminology and the best 
terminology to use seems to be more welcoming 
with a lot of organisations out there, so I think 
that has helped massively; 
You know, some of the universities don’t like 
the terminology because it’s the academic 
world. Let’s approach it in a way that they 
actually like that terminology or want to discuss 
it. So we might not just go in and mention 
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terrorism, extremism or PREVENT; we would 
always make reference to those but then we 
would discuss it in a safeguarding format that 
they get; 
 Most people see PREVENT in terms of 
safeguarding now, particularly when you have 
bodies like NHS on board ... it helps soften that 
message, and you know ... that’s the way it 
needs to be. 
 
Name of data-driven code PREVENT as Assemblage 
 
Explanation of code 
Multi-partnership approach evidencing 
points of fracture and dispersion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Interview details 
per quote restricted) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now, at (name of university) we are officially 
part of the Social Work course. We were hoping 
to get in with Nursing, but that hasn’t quite 
worked out ... teacher training ... but you know, 
as time goes on it’s expanding and expanding, 
but training still remains a significant part of our 
job, either as one-off training, or with police, or 
regular officers; 
We’ll deal with NHS to some degree, although 
they tend to do a lot of their own training. But 
we’ll deal with some staff, adult safeguarding, 
child safeguarding ... a lot of stuff with schools, 
colleges and universities. And again ... schools 
we identified as a key area, one area where it’s an 
absolute nightmare to get into and its very much 
based on an individual school’s buy-in, ‘cause 
either the Head Teacher “gets it” ... or because 
something has happened at a particular school 
and they think ... “Argh right” ... But that is a real 
problem; 
Everybody’s complaint within PREVENT is that 
schools ... not necessarily because they’re against 
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(Interview details 
per quote restricted) 
 
PREVENT, but because they just don’t have the 
time in the timetable ... and it’s sort of mentioned 
in the Extremism Task Force but it doesn’t really 
say a great deal that we already didn’t know; 
Very much from the academic side is that if we 
do into universities and use the word “radical” 
they will turn round and say, “there’s nothing 
wrong with being radical”; 
So we have an individual, we know he’s 
vulnerable, he gets referred in through the 
CHANNEL process, the partners go: “nah, sorry, 
it’s mental health, that’s got nothing to do with us”. 
So then it’s a case of - what do we do with that 
individual? 
We go into the voluntary sector, Community 
Youth Groups, Youth Offending Teams, UKBA ... 
a lot of housing groups, particularly a lot of 
housing where they’re supported by (name of local 
housing group), which is a housing group which 
looks after people with mental issues. And it tends 
to be these groups, they ask us to come along as a 
one-off, but some others are almost embedded; 
Still there are those who simply will not accept 
what PREVENT’s about and that’s still the 
ongoing challenge. And unfortunately, it takes the 
likes of a Woolwich to underline that, and God 
forbid that something else happens that then makes 
people realise, “Right, we have to take this 
seriously”, and then doctors say, you know, 
“Right, we’re willing to share this information 
because we can’t do this on our own”. Yes, 
patient/doctor confidentiality is very important but 
ultimately we need to support that individual and I 
think there are cases where it’s been shown not to 
be the case; 
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We’re struggling a little bit in getting into the 
schools because the schools are dictated by the 
curriculum and they don’t have to take you on 
board. 
 
 
Name of data-driven code Buying into PREVENT 
 
Explanation of code 
Multi-partnership approach understood 
through “buy-in” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Interview details 
per quote restricted) 
 
So we have to tread, understandably, very 
carefully in order to get that buy-in; 
You’ve got to understand that your 
communities are actually a bit more to do with 
things like housing, health; these are the things 
that actually concern people far more, and if 
you jump over to these onto other subjects ... 
You have to try and first get that buy-in. If you 
haven’t got the buy-in of your neighbourhood 
teams, you really are missing a trick; 
If you want to get people to buy into what you 
do, it’s quite useful to make them aware that 
you are looking at every form of extremism 
including the people who are making your lives 
increasingly griefy;  
We’ve got buy-in from the senior management 
teams from that department ‘cause we have 
different directives within force, but within the 
force area to ... you know ... engage with the 
police with regard to CONTEST, and 
specifically PREVENT, you go through a gold, 
silver, bronze CONTEST structure; 
... we often start talks with ... “This is about 
extremism and terrorism”, which ... ultimately 
it is. But to get the buy-in of all the range of 
frontline services that we give talks to, the 
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safeguarding is the bit that people instantly 
think, “Argh, I get it”; 
If you go to the Heads of your partners and get 
their buy-in it makes it much easier to roll it out 
further along down the line; 
...Going back to the safeguarding issue with 
getting the buy-in with people who work in that 
sphere. 
 
Name of data-driven code PREVENT as a Product 
 
Explanation of code 
PREVENT officers’ understanding  of 
PREVENT as a product in relation to multi-
agency engagement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Interview details 
per quote restricted) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We all deal with it differently on how we try to 
promote ourselves and get ourselves out into 
them areas. So I came upon with a little bit of 
an email of products we did, like, table topping 
exercises with children and courses like the 
‘ACT NOW’ we do. We go and give a 
presentation or a DVD on conviction ... there’s 
loads of ACPO products we can use ... some we 
don’t use because we don’t think that they work 
very well. 
So one went in to MAPPA who were told of 
some violent things which were going on in the 
house and how they were dealing with it. They 
got invited on to the MAPPA panel, referred by 
the Head Teacher so ... the first time they seen 
me was turning up trying to sell them this 
product, and then they suddenly seen me sat at 
a MAPPA panel;  
There’s generally new ACPO products that are 
coming out and you’ll get emails from them 
saying; there’ll be an event on a certain day, and 
it’s attending to get trained up in something; 
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(Interview details 
per quote restricted) 
 
It gets rolled-out differently up and down the 
county ... so we’ll get given a product and it’s 
however best we think it’ll work here to 
promote it; 
If we’ve got a new ACPO product come out 
that’s worked in one area but not in another ... 
so like ... for us here, we seem to do brilliantly 
with the ACT NOW product in universities and 
colleges; 
 You’ve got to literally go out and do a bit of a 
... I suppose you can class it as a bit of a sales 
pitch – you’re trying to sell this product to them 
and trying to explain how you see it fitting 
within their roles; 
I’ve got a team of (number) doing PREVENT 
so you go to the local police, and it’s almost a 
sales pitch to say, we have this product to bring 
awareness to you around PREVENT; 
You’ll be aware that ACPO have a number of 
sort of ... national products that can be used 
across health, colleges, universities etc., usually 
in DVD format, whether that be .... to me that 
product does need some sort of context putting 
to it, whether us going in or whether you train 
a partner up to show that there are national 
products, but they are not a one size fits all 
which we have found within our area so a 
couple of instances, we have made local 
products;  
So again, we appreciate with having only 
(number) in the team we are not going to hit 
everyone, so we’ve got to work that little bit 
smarter, so one thing we’re literally in the 
process of rolling-out is that product; 
You have to be sensible and efficient with how 
we go out and deliver this product now; 
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We do free training, “If you want training here 
are some of our products”.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix K 
Fieldwork Participant Consent Form: 
 
Information Sheet for Consent Form 423 
I am PhD student in the school of Social Sciences at MMU.  I am conducting research as part of 
my PhD thesis and I would greatly appreciate your participation in this project.   
Please read this read this information sheet carefully before you consider consenting to take part 
in this research.   
Title of Research Project       The evolving meaning of prevent policing, 
community engagement and social control in the 
context of a progression towards both ‘reflexive 
modernisation’ and ‘dispositif’ precautionary 
risk’ 
Name of Researcher Paul Dresser 
 
Researcher’s Contact Details Email: 11066778@stu.mmu.ac.uk 
Email: paul.dresser@northumbria.ac.uk 
Mobile Number: 07912680933 
 
                                                          
423 The title of the thesis was subsequently shortened; hence the different title on the Consent Form.   
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Name of Supervisor Dr Kathryn Chadwick 
Dr Robert Grimm 
Dr Peter Joyce 
 
Supervisor’s Contact Details Dr Kathryn Chadwick: 
K.Chadwick@mmu.ac.uk 
 
Aims of this research  To consider critically the implications of Beck’s 
‘risk society’ and Foucault’s ‘governmentality’ 
thesis to our understanding of the revised 
prevent policy, community engagement and 
Prevent Policing practice with a specific focus 
upon ‘risk’. It is hoped the data from this 
research will establish a wider-ranging agenda 
for criminological thought as a result of a fuller 
embrace of interdisciplinary risk theories. 
  
Why do you want me as a participant? I wish to interview Prevent police officers/staff 
to explore their views on community 
engagement, Prevent and associated policing 
practice both pre-and post- policy revision 
(2011). 
What will this involve? It is proposed interviews are to last between 60-
120 minutes and each interviewee to be 
interviewed a minimum of three times.  
How will my data be recorded? Dictaphone 
Will this be confidential? Yes, only pseudonyms will be used.  Your data 
will be stored on a secure part of my computer.  
Your data will not be stored on common areas 
of networks or on desktops of shared computers. 
Your data will only be accessed by me and my 
supervisor and the second marker(s). Your data 
will be destroyed at the end of my 
dissertation/thesis work. 
What If I Change My Mind? If at any point during the interview or afterwards 
you may withdraw your consent from the 
research.  This means I will not use your data 
and will destroy any data collected related to 
you. 
Can I Read Your Results? Yes 
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PhD THESIS PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
T 
      Title of Project: ‘The evolving meaning of prevent policing, community 
engagement and social control in the context of a progression towards both 
‘reflexive modernisation’ and ‘dispositif’ precautionary risk’. 
 
Name of researcher: PAUL DRESSER 
 
Name of supervisor:  Dr. KATHRYN CHADWICK 
 
Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information 
sheet dated………. for the above study.  I have had the 
opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and 
have had these answered satisfactorily.  I acknowledge the 
risks associated with the study and they have been 
explained to me. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I 
am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason, 
without my medical care or legal rights being affected. 
 
3. I agree to take part in the study. 
 
 
_____________________  ____________        ____________________ 
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Name of participant  Date   Signature 
 
 
_______________________ ____________         ____________________ 
Name of person                Date   Signature 
taking consent 
